Like his mammoth Spanish Civil War, and History of Cuba, Hugh Thomas’ history of the Atlantic slave trade (not of slavery as such) leaves nothing out – it is a forest of details and historical anecdotes, which often makes it difficult to read and risks losing the reader’s interest at times. It is a narrative history, with little room for moral indignation and a strong emphasis on facts over analysis. The voice of the slaves themselves is, as he notes, missing.
It starts off by noting that the Renaissance revival of Antiquity led to a resurgence of slavery in Europe (where it had been prohibited before hand for several centuries), especially after the 15C ‘discovery’ of the Americas by Portugal and Spain, initially – this resort to antiquity was highly convenient, as was the judgement that it was better to be enslaved by Christians than to be under godless rulers in Africa. These countries began to explore the interior of Africa and buying slaves for use as labour in their new colonies – partly because the local indigenous Indians were regarded as unfit for hard labour and because the Church thought them viable candidates for conversion to Christianity (and therefore ineligible for slavery).
As Thomas notes, the Protestant countries were to take the Atlantic slave trade to a new level in the coming century. The coming to the throne of the Stuarts in England in 1660 marked a turning point. There then began the business of seeking slaves out in West Africa and taking them to the colonies – the start of the vast horror of the Middle Crossing. The English set up Royal companies, such as the Royal African Company [RAC, 1672] which floated for more investors – it had a charter of ‘a thousand years’, and was one of the largest early joint stock companies. By the 1730s England had exceeded Portugal as the largest exporter of slaves to the Americas (most to the Caribbean, about 25% to the American colonies), with Liverpool emerging as the key port in England for the trade (specialising in trade direct to Spanish empire colonies).
It was a triangular trade – ships picked up slaves in W Africa in return for manufactured goods (e.g. woollen cloth) and then took them to Americas, then came back with tropical goods to sell (which slaves would have harvested in turn). The ships' crews themselves were also treated atrociously and the death rate was up to 20% for them (against 12% for slaves, who were on board for much less time). By end of 18C, 80,000 slaves were going from Africa across the Atlantic annually – most were, it is noted, from captures in wars but not all; some also had to be sold for debt, or for breaking laws, and others were kidnapped (sometimes by local groups to sell on). The book asks whether the ‘wars’ were fomented by the Europeans to keep the trade going – definitely the trade encouraged wars in the region, as did the sale of western arms to local leaders. Though it was a hazardous business, with loss of ships common, slave trading was very profitable – mostly these profits were made by independent traders, while the national privileged companies often made less, owing to the high overheads of their officials at home and in Africa. Main profits were made by ‘interlopers’, who would sell slaves in Caribbean or the Americas for twice the cost paid on the Congo coast. As a result of African traders realising this, profits fell over 18C as the prices got closer on either side of the Atlantic, so the margin went down for the trade, and especially the national companies. Thomas notes that the decline of profitability in late 18C was a factor in the abolitionist movement after the 1780s peak of the ‘African meteor’, if not the deciding one.
The Abolitionist Section is the most interesting of all. In Europe, the movement was driven by French Enlightenment thought in the 18C and the English tradition of free speech/liberty, Thomas says. The English loss of the American colonies, industrialisation and the San Tome scandal (when 133 slaves were thrown alive overboard from a ship, whose owners then claimed insurance for their 'losses') increased anti-slavery feeling in England after 1783, led by the Quakers and Friends Societies (though the Quakers had previously been investors in the RAC and other such companies, it is worth recalling). This led to the creation of a parliamentary committee and a national movement to end the slave trade, which was symbolised by a Wedgwood designed figure of a black man on bended knee. The movement became led by William Wilberforce, a young MP and friend of PM William Pitt, who was also opposed, and a ‘leader in evangelical thought’. It was based on ‘moral conviction’ for the author but the movement also made economic arguments, e.g. it would save lives of seamen, encourage markets for raw materials needed by industry, new opportunities for our goods, etc. The arguments against abolition were mainly economic but also, strikingly, that working people in England, such as child chimney sweeps, were also working in atrocious conditions, so why not ban that as well (as they later would). After many attempts, usually blocked by the Lords, Willberforce’s Bill was passed in May 1807 making the slave trade illegal in the Empire – it did not abolish slavery per se, which continued to flourish in the Empire and beyond, but trading slaves was abolished.
The trade continued to be widespread in the African continent and was routinely practised by other states. There then followed a campaign by England, as the world’s leading naval power, to prevent slave trading by other countries, using the West Africa Squadron, which was principally aimed at Spain and Portugal, who eventually abolished the trade in the 1830s, though it persisted in their colonies. Palmerston used gunboat diplomacy to enforce the abolition and was accused of hypocrisy by other powers (especially given his explicit racialist views of other peoples), and using the campaign to extend British power at sea. Eventually, Brazil banished slavery in 1851 and, finally, Cuba in 1867, though it continued until 1870.
In the Epilogue, Thomas reiterates that the Atlantic slave trade, 1440-1870 was ‘a disgraceful business’ but says it would have been impossible without the direct cooperation of the local rulers in West Africa (mainly that region). Most slaves were ‘procured as a result of Africans selling their neighbours’ – he even notes that the conduct of Europeans was indefensible but that of the Africans ‘was even more reprehensible’ in ‘bartering each other’ (though he notes that there was no sense of ‘Africa’ at that point in history). These seems an over-generous view of the conduct of Western states, who had a variety of other trading options and were supposedly ‘Christian’ countries. Thomas also notes that all the great enterprises of the first 400 years of colonisation of the Americas were based on slave labour – sugar, tobacco, cotton, silver, gold, rice, which seems to make clear the economic imperative of the practice, which resulted in great wealth for some. He does mainly attribute the abolition of the slave trade down to England’s ‘moral crusade’, though the fact that reparations were still being paid to former slave traders up until 2015 (two centuries later!) does beg the question of how much of a moral question it was in reality. This book provides a good overview of the basic facts of the Atlantic trade (too many facts, in fact), but is quite short on analysis of the broader issues, and I suspect many historians would take great issue with the idea that England, as the world's leading naval and colonial power at the time, abolished slavery for principled reasons.