Au début des années 2020, le consensus de la Silicon Valley se délite. Inégalités folles, stagnation de la productivité, instabilité endémique… la nouvelle économie n’est pas advenue. Les algorithmes sont omniprésents, mais ce n’est pas pour autant que le capitalisme s’est civilisé. Au contraire. La thèse de ce livre est qu’avec la digitalisation du monde se produit une grande régression. Retour des monopoles, dépendance des sujets aux plateformes, brouillage de la distinction entre l’économique et le politique : les mutations à l’œuvre transforment la qualité des processus sociaux et donnent une actualité nouvelle au féodalisme. L’ouvrage commence par proposer une généalogie du consensus de la Silicon Valley et met en évidence les cinq paradoxes qui le minent. La thèse centrale est ensuite déroulée, rythmée par des développements sur les GAFA, les chaînes globales de valeur ou encore le système de crédit social chinois. Les grandes firmes se disputent le cyberspace pour prendre le contrôle sur des sources de données. Les sujets sont attachés à la glèbe numérique. Dans l’ordre économique qui émerge, les capitaux délaissent la production pour se concentrer sur la prédation.
Cédric Durand est économiste à l’université Sorbonne Paris-Nord. Ses recherches portent sur la mondialisation, la financiarisation et les mutations du capitalisme contemporain. Il a publié de nombreux articles sur ces thèmes. Il est l’auteur de Le Capital fictif (Les Prairies ordinaires, 2014).
J'avais hâte de lire ce livre et de m'immerger dans l'économie numérique, que je ne connaissais que très peu. Malheureusement, et malgré un début intriguant, j'ai eu du mal à accrocher. J'ai eu le sentiment parfois de lire une suite d'énumérations et de ne pas savoir où l'auteur voulait aller. Cela donne l'impression de seulement effleurer le sujet, c'est dommage.
En este libro el autor trata de mostrar (ni de lejos demostrar) su hipótesis de que la sociedad actual podría estar encaminándose hacia una suerte de sociedad feudal en donde las grandes corporaciones tecnológicas, actúan como los feudos medievales socavando la autoridad real del gobierno. Empieza comentando en forma de anécdotas o de ejemplos puntuales como funcionan algunas grandes empresas de tecnología, habla de la absorción de empresas pequeñas, de la posición monopólica, de la cadena de suministros y de cómo algunas empresas utilizan algoritmos y recopilación de datos personales como activos para mejorar sus ventas o su experiencia de usuario. Sin embargo el autor parece no dominar del todo algunos conceptos tecnológicos, en particular cuando habla de los "Big Data" y yo diría que "toca de oído". Luego habla de forma sintética de como estaba estructurada la sociedad feudal medieval y da cuenta de la opinión de diversos autores en relación a la economía feudal. Por último y de forma muy ambigua expone su tesis marcando supuestas similitudes actuales con la economía feudal. Este libro carece de todo rigor científico y el discurso no está estructurado de forma coherente. Por ejemplo, el autor habla de que empresas de tecnología podrían erosionar la democracia, pero no explica por qué otras empresas monopólicas no implican un riesgo para la democracia. Tampoco deja claro qué sería una empresa de tecnología desde su punto de vista, si solo aquellas que se dedican al area de TI como Google, Apple o Facebook o si una petrolera que tenga informatizados sus sistemas también lo sería. No aclara si los riesgos que ve son solo en Estados Unidos, Europa o en todo el mundo. Menciona muchas empresas Chinas, pero no explica si la situación sería igual que en otros países con gobiernos democráticos. De hecho toma al gobierno Chino como otro ejemplo de corporación. Omite completamente el Software Libre y proyectos sin ánimos de lucro como Wikipedia. No hace una trastrabillad con los modelos de publicidad anteriores a la era digital. No presenta estudios científicos que arrojen indicios a favor de lo que sostiene. Y por último no queda clara su hipótesis, es demasiado vaga.
un libro necesario para entender el inmenso poder de las plataformas digitales en nuestras vidas y hasta qué punto unos pocos pijos estadounidenses son propietarios de nuestros deseos, pensamientos, intimidades y hasta del tiempo de nuestras vidas.
Hell of a first book of the year. I should have read Varoufakis first, but I didn't. Durand is a capable and diligent thinker and this is a great complement to Technofeudalism - and a useful aide to understanding the current US Administration including its ex officio members and their oligarchial force.
Cédric Durand is a simpleton who lives, breathes, and hopes to become one with the Machine. Normally, Durand would have had the need to get a honest job and push the Society forward. Instead he is kept on a good wage paid by the taxes to push the Society backward into the pit of darkness.
Why is he a simpleton? Well, the whole book is a theology book in which sentient Gods fight, pretty much like in the fairy tales made by the 19th century Europeans based on the Greek Mythology. Hence, there are no individuals. There is a Silicon Valley god who acts to do this, and of course, the Saviour, the employer of Durand, and his only true God: the Messianic Government.
Assez intéressant mais manque de fil directeur dans certaines parties. Pas réellement compris certaines explications trop théoriques, avec un manque important d’exemple. Pourquoi le relire pour peut-être mieux comprendre
Ce livre montre les contradictions de l'économie numérique, en exposant clairement ses 5 paradoxes principaux. L'économie numérique promettait (i) une prolifération de start-ups toutes plus innovantes les unes que les autres, (ii) de l'autonomie et de la créativité dans le travail, (iii) une mobilité accrue, (iv) une croissance retrouvée par l'innovation et (v) un recul du rôle de l'État. Mais, dans les faits, l'économie numérique produit (i) un contrôle monopolistique par quelques firmes, (ii) un contrôle algorithmique du travail, (iii) une ségrégation spatiale plus prononcée des bassins d'emploi, (iv) les innovations n'engendrent pas de croissance et (v) l'État est indispensable pour mettre en place les droits de propriété intellectuelle ou la collecte de données nécessaires aux profits des entreprises du numérique. Au fur et à mesure de son développement, l'économie numérique est devenue une nouvelle incarnation du féodalisme : (i) les entreprises monopolistiques se comportent en seigneurs dispensieux en cherchant toujours plus à étendre leur sphère d'influence, (ii) les autres entreprises satellites ont besoin de l'accès aux services de ces monopoles et (iii) les coûts de sortie pour les utilisateurs ou les entreprises satellites sont dissuasifs pour se passer des services de ces monopoles.
Focuses on the 'Californian ideology' - a blend of 1960s hippieness and free market economics. Whilst these initially seem at odds with each other, its proponents saw this being overcome by technology. Following Marshall McLuhan, they saw technology as a force promoting individualism and disdain for authority. By the 2000s this was being interpreted as a shift away from power concentrated in states and governments towards economically powerful individuals. Techno-optimism was promoted during the years of the Clinton presidency and by the turn of the millennium had also become the ideologies of the mature capitalists countries represented in the OECD. Prospects for economic growth became associated with technological innovation. All of this required the freeing up of entrepreneurialism and the flexibility of product, labour and capital. Durand points to 'five paradoxes of the new capitalism. These are: "1/ The continuous reinvigoration of economic structures thanks to start-uppers' thirst for adventure. "2/ The pinnacle of workplace autonomy and creativity. "3/ A culture of openness and mobility. "4/ The promise of share prosperity; and "5/ The ideal of the state becoming obsolete." In practice these ideals are confounded by real movements within the circuits of capital accumulation. Among these he highlights the return to monopoly which absorbs 'friendly start-ups' into giant corporations. This also suppresses the initial tendency towards increased competition, seen in the 1990s when innovative companies were joisting for their places in the market. This challenged the dominant companies that were around at the time (IBM, Xerox, etc) but gave way to the underlying forces of centralisation which marked the 2000s. In the place of a stable structure of competitive firms, the process returned to a "densification of techno-economic links between organisations, and to a bigger international, if not global, projection for large firms and the production networks which they dominate." This ended the hope for creative and autonomous workplaces. Exactly the opposite dynamic kicked in. Information technologies were used in the workplace to suppress non-productive time and standardise the actions of workers. This produces another paradox: the skills required of workers increases but their ability to use this as part of a creative process is diminished, leading to alienation and discontent. Durand discusses the polarisation of space, between the dynamic core of the ICT (information, communication, technology) firm, which rests on innovation fostered in cooperative networks, and the structures which turn this innovation into saleable products. At one end of this spacial divide there is silicon valley, where the high added value jobs are concentrated, and at the other a dispersal of production across supply chains dominated by intensively worked, comparatively low-paid jobs. The consequences of this for regions beyond California are considered, with Europe a case in point. Its share of global GDP as fallen form 25.8 percent in 1980 to 14.5 in 2023. This is attributed to the gap between the EU's institutional sophistication in terms of macroeconomic management and its failures in promoting growth, employment, and the absence of EU firms in the top tier of IT companies. Its move towards deregularisation and liberalisati0on in the 2000s weakened its indigenous firms at a point when China and South Korea was promoting public investment in its industrial businesses. The discussion so far concerns the initial success of ICT in reshaping the capitalist economy as well as its limitations. But what about the 'feudalism' part of the critique? Durand writes that the hopes for economic growth fostered by the Californian ideology have fizzled out and, in parallel, its promotion of an enhanced democratic accountability has gone south. Meanwhile, the rise of authoritarian leaders in Europe and the USA, and the alliances nurtured by China and Russia is generating other methods of rule that are fully compatible with ICT capitalism. There is frank contempt shown for individual freedom and democratic rights by Silicon Valley forms. Liberal democracy is revealed as extremely fragile under the new dispensation and renewed interest is being shown in the 'refeudalisation of the public sphere formulated by Jurgen Habermas in the 1960s. Refeudalisation has been set on its way, in its early stages by the incursion of the mass media into households and the consumerist transformation of the family sphere. Public conversation is dominated by a discourse which aims to attract a mass audience for consumer goods - ie advertising. This is detrimental to the quality of public debate. "The business of information and debate seeks to manufacture consensus, or, rather, what we might call cognitive centres around which subjectivities converge." There are two senses in which this operates: firstly, the convergence of opinions supports the personification of political orientations behind leader-figures in ways which echo the feudal incarnation and representation of power. (All of this pps 66 onwards). Secondly, the fusion of mass entertainment with advertising leads to a mixture of genres... from which the state itself is not immune. Private enterprise evokes the idea that in their consumption decisions people act in the capacity of citizens, meaning that the state also has to address its citizens like consumers. Moving on to discuss the strategies of ICT firms, the point is made, citing Jeff Bezos, that through opportunities provided by digitalisation and personalisation of information, companies are able to get ahead of consumers in the shaping of choice. Cyberspace has been created over which individuals roam and maintain the assumptions of the previous dispensati0n (liberal capitalism) that they are free, self-determining individuals. In reality, the rules that govern this space are made by ICT corporations and they require individuals to confirm to these standards. "This new land to be conquered stretches far and wide, and covers everything that can be digitised [...] The colonisation of these new data-rich lands is the result of a wide variety of technical and legal devices. But in all cases it involves a form of territorial appropriation: the idea is to plant markers whenever data can be extracted . This is the extractivist moment in the formation of Big Data, the moment of capturing sources." Referencing Zuboff, the point is made that the goal of surveillance capitalism is to make behaviour more predictable. As Big Data grows to bigger scales, awareness of its effects on social life become a matter for scientists and other specialists. It becomes harder for the multitude to take matters into its own hands. The concentration of value in the higher reaches of the value chain makes technical knowledge amenable to being cast as intellectual property which also creates obstacles for people outside the charmed circle of the knowledge elite to break in and challenge monopoly power. At this point the argument merges with the Keynesian critique of rentier capitalism. Rather than promote innovation it has the effect of closing the door to competition as prospective new entrants find themselves challenged over intellectual property infringement. New investment opportunities are restricted and innovation slowed down, leading to a rise in the amount of capital sitting idle - further fuelling financial instability. As Durand put it, "The digital boom is fuelling a gigantic rentier economy; and this is not because information is a new source of value, but because the control of information and knowledge - intellectual monopolisation - has become the most powerful means of capturing value." (p141) The objection to techno-feudalism is succinctly state: "The rise of digital technology is overturning competitive relations in favour of dependence, upsetting the overall mechanism, and tending to give precedence to predation over production." (p191) It becomes all about mechanisms for capturing value. How are these negative forces to be countered? Not easily. Liberal responses point to a forced breakup of anti-competitive monopolies but, as the major firms in the sector point out, this implies destroying the use value represented by comprehensive data pools and agile algorithms that support utility. Something more radical is needed and Durand points towards a democratic economy, something within reach precisely because digital algorithms have the potential to become the 'invisible hand' that guides the workings of the economy.
Les autres lecteurs on déjà touché l'une des principales critiques que j'avais envers ce livre -début intéressant, mais faible argumentation et conclusion décevante- ainsi qu'une manque de direction pendant l'argumentation, donc en lieu de ça vais rajouter 2/3 (autres) petites critiques:
Le "vrai" problème de ce livre est que L'auteur a une connaissance superficielle des technologies du numérique. Apres tout, c'est un prof d’économie politique pas un ingé.
Mais néanmoins, c'est impardonnable de ne rien connaître sur la tech alors que t’écris un livre dessus. Construire la plupart de tes arguments sur des articles de presse ou sur des parutions de journaux d’économie politique, c'est même pas essayer.
Cela donne direction a des arguments qui sonnent creux. Exemple:
1) Quand c'est le privé qui se sert des technologies de l'information, c'est du Neo-Feodalisme (mauvais) mais quand c'est l’état qui se sert de ces technologies, c'est du capitalisme de surveillance (mauvais).
ou
2) La neutralité du net, c'est bien, mais l’inévitable radicalisation qu'engendre un traitement égal des flux c'est mauvais.
Et j'en passe...
Il y a peu d'encre versé sur les effets de réseau qui aide les monopoles comme Facebook a grandir, la théorie des graphs qui joue un rôle avec la radicalisation ou encore comment fonctionne l'IA (pas si complique que ça a comprendre).
J'ai également l'impression que l'auteur est aveuglé par son paradigme Marxiste (lutte des classes, Matérialisme Dialectique, conflit inévitable, pas de "bien" ou de "mal" juste la domination qui compte au final). Il insiste de voir le monde d'une certaine manière qui le rend aveugle aux véritables enjeux qu'on les technologies du numérique.
Fin bref. A force de vouloir faire l'expert dans un milieu qu'on connaît pas, on coule. C'est un livre qui fait plouf.
Un recorrido genealógico de la era digital, fundado en datos y lógicas de funcionamiento empresariales, que devela la desnudez de los modos de ejercer el poder a través de la ventana digital. Comienza abordando la etiología del relato que impone a lo digital como la nueva era de oro del capitalismo, haciendo hincapié en la doctrina ideológica del siglo XXI y el consenso de Silicon Valley. Para luego derivar en las nuevas formas de dominación mediante lo digital, y el vínculo corporativo a través de sus lógicas algorítmicas con lógicas políticas y económicas, tomando el ejemplo de crédito social de China. Siguiendo por las consecuencias económicas que tienen que ver con el desarrollo de la TIC (tecnologías de información y comunicación) como activos en términos económicos. Haciendo que la industrialización de procesos informáticos engrosen aún más los monopolios. Y culminando con las implicancias a nivel del modo de producción, que conlleva un avasallamiento sobre el sujeto. Para ello propone una hipótesis tecnofeudal: El resurgimiento de modos de funcionamiento anacrónicos en las sociedades contemporáneas. De modo tal que los monopolios se vuelven feudos, debilitando al estado en comparación con las corporaciones. La gobernabilidad mediante los algoritmos reduce al sujeto a las probabilidades, haciendo que las subjetividades pierdan su potencia. Y el beneficio de las relaciones de dependencia y la prevalencia de la depredación sobre la producción, terminan siendo efectos de la lógica que acompaña el auge de las tic. Como ilustración, una frase de Lawrence Page, fundador de Google. “El problema de Google es que hay que hacerle preguntas, mientras que debería saber lo que usted quiere y decírselo antes de que usted se lo pregunte”.
Durand’s book stood out to me as one of the sharpest analyses of how Big Tech has changed the logic of capitalism. Instead of announcing the “death” of capitalism, Durand maps how companies like Google, Amazon, and Apple extract value by owning and managing the infrastructures we all depend on search, cloud, logistics, payments.
What I found especially interesting is how Durand positions himself between Yanis Varoufakis’s view that we’ve entered “technofeudalism” and Evgeny Morozov’s argument that we’re still inside capitalism. His middle ground feels convincing: we’re seeing feudal-like dependence and rent extraction, but still within capitalist circuits.
If you’re into political economy, platform labour, or the politics of digital power, this book is definitely worth your time.
Vivimos en un mundo del revés, pero bastante menos simpático que el cantado por María Elena Walsh. En nuestro mundo del revés, todo parece disfrazarse de su opuesto al tiempo que acusa al otro de ser lo que en realidad es él. Así, por ejemplo, el supuesto capitalismo de pequeños emprendedores de la industria digital deviene cuasi feudal; los liberales apelan a la vigilancia sistemática para un control totalitario (paradójicamente acercándose al autoritarismo chino); los pequeños emprendedores que empezaron en un garage devienen monopolios; o los que ponen el grito en el cielo en contra de la intervención estatal son los primeros en beneficiarse de políticas estatales específicas.
Très facile à aborder et passionnant, il permet une remise en contexte et une meilleure compréhension du fonctionnement de notre monde. Ce n'est pas un livre technique d'économie mais une critique analytique empirique qui permet de mieux appréhender les évolutions induites par l'essor des compagnies du Big Data et leurs impacts dans l'économie et la production. Honnêtement, c'est un livre qu'il me faudra relire et compléter par d'autres lectures pour en tirer une appréhension plus complète et durable, mais c'est définitivement un livre que je peux volontiers vous recommander.
The photo from Trump's second inauguration of Big Tech titans all sitting in the front row is a perfect encapsulation of the age of capitalism in which we now live. But is there anything new about this age?
Cedric Durand explores the concept of "techno-feudalism," explaining why Silicon Valley's business model of monopolization, rent-seeking, and predatory regulation advances a feudal vision for the economy, one that is fundamentally opposed to the rhetoric of capitalists who extol markets and competition and fundamentally opposed to the interests of the public and the working class.
i fear we lost the plot somewhere in the second part of the book. or at least i did. the tone shifted. now, that might be just due to the translation issues .... but then i get the feeling that the author writes better when he has conviction and can relate his theory to specific things happening in current times than when he goes purely theoretical.
anyway i would recommend everyone to read Capital's Grave: Neofeudalism and the New Class Struggle by Jodi Dean. she did a fantastic job, and her theoretical framework gives, what this book wanted to give.
On apprend comment les technologies sont aujourd'hui utilisée pour contrôler les sociétés. Une bataille contre le bien et le mal. Dommage en revanche de ne pas aller vraiment dans le sujet, ça commence bien, mais on reste sur notre faim. Peut être qu'il manque une immersion dans les sphères qu'il critique...
Interesante libro sobre la reflexión de los nuevos paradigmas económicos que enfrentamos desde principios de siglo. El libro es bastante detallista y por momentos tedioso, pero plantea una idea llevadera que posteriormente desarrolla de manera innovadora. Recomendado.
Sans adhérer à la thèse développée dans le bouquin, ça reste une passionnante application du marxisme permettant de le dépoussiérer un peu. Tout en apprenant le fonctionnement de l'économie numérique
If you lower your expectations, it’s a four-star read. But the main issue is that the entire content of the book is basically summed up in the title—there’s little else of substance.
Excellent essai économique couvrant la montée des GAFAM et proposant la thèse que l'économie numérique nous pousse vers un modèle de société techno-féodale. Bien argumenté et bien sourcé.
An important read that is all the more timely (I’m writing this review in April of 2025) for having been written last year. It has some awkwardness in places likely as a result of the translation process but overall it is a compelling discussion about the current state of economics and Silicon Valley tech in particular. It’s very much from a Marxist perspective (though the exact views of the author aren’t always clear - he mostly writes about other people’s views and isn’t always clear whether he agrees with the mostly or not at all.
So four stars - worth reading and important and in dialogue with a lot of works that I’ve read (or are sitting on my shelves waiting to be read such as Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance Capitalism which has long been on my tbr piles.
As I have been living and working in Silicon Valley for a few decades now I also think his perspective on technology and tech firms is a bit simplistic in places (reflective of echoing back and taking them at their own word about some of their technologies and advantages. I think the full story is a bit more nuanced and complex. Both in Silicon Valley and externally.
But it also, alas, is a book that is very relevant in light of the craziness of the past few months.