Now that it's a museum piece, historians feel safe in looking back at the history of the Communist Party, USA with all its glory and disaster. In the heyday of American communism the CPUSA built trade unions and helped found the CIO, defended African-Americans from lynchings, militated for full equality for women, led rent strikes, and filled its ranks with Broadway dancers (yes, there really were dancing Stalins), Hollywood celebrities and prized authors, including Theodore Dreiser and Langston Hughes. Maurice Isserman, an ex-member of Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), has written a history of the Party from a right-wing, social democratic perspective. Since the ins and outs of early Party history are thoroughly covered in Theodore Draper's two volumes, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM and AMERICAN COMMUNISM AND SOVIET RUSSIA, I will focus on three controversies that defined American Communism and sealed its fate quickly after 1945. The first American Communists found it difficult to disassociate themselves from the charge that they constituted a foreign party grafted onto the skin of American politics, thus Lenin's famous inquiry of John Reed, "Are you an American? An AMERICAN American?". He meant, are you native born? An unpatriotic party with a large immigrant membership would never catch on with American workers. But, a much more crucial point was the Party's allegiance. Did it put American or Soviet interests first? Those who argued for the former, such as Jay Lovestone with his theory of "American exceptionalism", got chucked out of the Party once Stalin took over from Lenin. (Lovestone later became a CIA asset and union-buster; take that, Uncle Joe). Reed had been instrumental in forging Party policy on the Negro question in the United States. Negro workers had been fully integrated into the American working class, at the bottom, and Black nationalist fantasies of independence, like those of Marcus Garvey, were regarded by most Negroes as a pipe dream. Armed with this insight the Party proceeded to fight for integrated trade unions and civil rights. Unfortunately, the CPUSA abandoned abandoned this strategy in the Thirties to advocate the ridiculous and fatal vision of a "Black Nation" in the United States located in the Black Belt of the South, losing it key support among Negro industrial workers. A third point of contention: What was the Party's attitude towards working with progressives? Party policy in the early Thirties followed Chairman William Foster's line of fighting for "a Soviet America" and denouncing other leftists as "social fascists". When Moscow imposed a Popular Front policy on the Communist International in 1935 the new line, pushed by next Party Chair Earl Browder, was to build alliances with all political forces opposed to fascism and for the New Deal. (The CPUSA has not abandoned this tactic; witness its "Kamela, We're Here to Help" campaign in the 2024 election.) If so, Party critics wondered, how was the CPUSA any different from the Democrats? Why did the Party even exist? Isserman sees in these strange formulations and reformulations of strategy the heavy hand of Moscow, placing the CPUSA in a straight jacket from which it never emerged. By the late Forties, with the coming of the Red Scare and McCarthyism, the Party found itself isolated, diminished in numbers and persecuted by its wartime allies. Was this wretched fate inevitable? If the CPUSA had shown some backbone and defied Stalin would it have flourished on native soil? The history of American Communism is tragic, a bit absurd, all those funny twists and turns in policies, and now consigned to the land of "never was".