In this book Professor Kissinger examines the framework of our foreign policy, the stresses to which that framework is being subjected, and the prospects for world order in an era of high international tension. The three essays were written before Professor Kissinger took leave from Harvard to serve as Assistant to President Nixon for National Security Affairs.
Henry Alfred Kissinger (born Heinz Alfred Kissinger) was a German-born American bureaucrat, diplomat, and 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the Richard Nixon administration. Kissinger emerged unscathed from the Watergate scandal, and maintained his powerful position when Gerald Ford became President.
A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente.
During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.
Love him or hate him, Kissinger is a monumental academic in foreign policy. In this work, he discusses how nuclear weapons change the landscape of international relations amongst great powers and lesser powers.
If you're a student of global politics, this is a must read.
Lot to think about here. When he wrote this book Kissinger clearly wasn’t a realist by modern terms. A couple of the chapters were outdated but I was shocked how relevant much of his thinking was. Well written and thought provoking- he’s not always right but he’s definitely worth reading.
Kissinger gives a well-informed inside scoop of foreign policy, up to the book's publishing in 1969. I read the abridged version, which seemed to include mostly relevant info. Perhaps most interesting is the analysis regarding the feasibility of "limited" nuclear war. Kissinger highlights an aspect of deterrence that the community is just remembering--deterrence only works if you view it through the eye of the force whom one wishes to deter.
A fascinating exploration of the changes necessitated in foreign policy by the introduction of nuclear weapons. Also offers perennially valid observations about the nature of relationships between "revolutionary" and "status quo" powers. Finally, his observations about ascendent powers (USSR, then) are worthy of note and provide excellent context for ascendent powers today (especially China).
As a nation, we have used power almost shamefacedly, as if it were inherently wicked. We have wanted to be liked for our own sakes, and we have wished to succeed because of the persuasiveness of our principles rather than through our strength. Our feeling of guilt with respect to power has caused us to transform all wars into crusades, and then apply our power in the most absolute terms... But foreign policy cannot be conducted without an awareness of power relationships.
This is an interesting analysis on the challenges that nuclear weapons bring and the dangers of ‘mutually assured destruction’. I found the idea that America and it’s allies couldn’t afford to lose the Korean War because of the shift in power dynamics would be too drastic rather than because of protecting democracy very interesting.
Worth reading for understanding the where we came from in the 50s but the ideas presented here don't necessarily hold up given the advancements in other realms of warfare and national defense.
The framework of US foreign policy in the 50’s, stresses that this framework was subjected to and the prospects of world order in an era of high tension is discussed by the author.
Kissinger is truly one of the easiest guys to hate. That does not take away from his academic genius, and from the way he makes pages turn regardless of the weight of the contents.
I read the abridged version because "we need a diverse set of nuclear options because you can't trust the Soviets" gets repetitive after the 168547th time.
Says that reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent may actually deter US from meeting Soviet challenges, unless we are prepared to engage in limited nuclear war as a tool of statecraft. All out nuclear war will not occur if we use skilled diplomacy.
Ironic that China wasn't really on Kissinger's radar when he wrote this. Still, it gives incredible insight into the mind of the man who defined American diplomacy for a quarter of a century.