I've been away for a while...
A cynical practitioner once said that making foreign policy is like making sausage--you don't want to see what that's like! Fortunately, Brendan Simms is not the least bit squeamish as he pulls back the curtain on how foreign policy and grand strategy were crafted in 18th century Britain. "Three Victories and a Defeat" is aptly subtitled "The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire," for it is through empire that Britain becomes an outsized player in European power politics. This rise was a necessity, as Britain had to ensure no further threat of invasion from the Continent.
Simms "begins before the beginning", looking at English grand strategy during the waning years of the Stuart dynasty. Navalism, trade and colonies were the foundations of this outlook, which enriched England, but did not necessarily make it safer from invasion. An independent Scotland was always up for grabs via alliance with any continental power that wanted to check England's strength. Repeated naval clashes with the Netherlands meant having an unfriendly nation well -placed to support an invasion of the home country.
The Glorious Revolution puts an end to the Stuart Outlook, as William of Orange crosses the Channel with his army to take his (invited) -lace upon the throne. The Dutch and English interests converge, as necessity forces an alliance to keep the French out of the Low Countries, the natural springboard for invasion of England.
The outlook broadens and deepens with sophistication upon the rise of the Hanoverian Dynasty and the crowning of George I early in the 18th century. While the notion o f having a German prince sit on the British throne did not go down well with the populace, the British interest in European affairs deepens. Now holding a position in Germany mattered, as this protected the fortress line in the Low Countries from being outflanked by France. The added benefit was forcing France to devote resources to supporting land wars in Europe while depriving its navy of resources needed to surpass Britain's Royal Navy. Savvy British shuffling of continental allies also ensured that neither France nor Spain could ever array overwhelming strength to threaten Britain, thus keeping the home country safe.
George I, and later George II, ruled as "dual-crowned" monarchs. As princes of Hanover and electors of the Holy Roman Empire, they maintained a continental outlook. They could influence, but not dictate, grand strategy. But the continental outlook harmonized very nicely with the Whig faction in parliament, which put into action those influences and interests that made Great Britain an outsized actor in European affairs. Repeated wars throughout the 18th century required changing alliances to suit changing circumstances, sometimes with France, Austria or Prussia. But this played well to Britain's strengths,allowing it to use colonial gains as bargaining chips to enhance its European positions in post-war negotiations. Hanover provided the base of any British military deployment in Europe, while the navy's strength and freedom to operate remained unconstrained by budgetary limitations, thus protecting European and colonial trade. It was a clever system.
The system falls apart with the coronation of George III, whose narrow views on British power were more in harmony with the Tory opposition outlook of navalism, colonies and non-alliance. George III was born and raised in England, didn't travel much and thus had a narrow, small-minded view of British interests being exclusively British. Enemies and allies were snubbed. Diplomacy atrophied. Recent gains in overseas territory, especially in America, increased the expense of military protection at a time of tight budgets. But lacking allies, Britain lost any flexibility through diplomacy to protect its dominions.
The American Revolution became the one critical card, that brought down George III's and the Tory strategy. By avoiding defeat long enough, the Americans secure direct aid an alliance from France, now free to strengthen its fleet without any continental diversion. Spain signs on. So does the Netherlands. Other European countries follow Russia's lead on armed neutrality, basically threatening Britain with war if the Royal Navy interdicts neutral merchantmen which may or may not be carrying cargoes to any of Britain's enemies. After fighting alone for three years, suffering the loss of all colonies in America as well as barely avoiding catastrophic defeat elsewhere, Britain sues for peace.
Simms recitation and analysis are both lengthy and detailed. He parses the 18th century into blocks of 4-6 years, detailing all the micro-moves and ministerial debates that revolved around all foreign policy issues great and small, no matter how vexing the tangle may be. That may bore the reader at first, but from this chaotic tapestry a pattern emerges of sophisticated policy-making, well grounded in facts and sure in national self-knowledge. Yes, crafting a grand strategy is messy work, and Simms will keep no detail of it from the reader. Simms does have an ax to grind by stressing the continental over the colonial outlook in British policy, but he backs up his biased outlook with a surefooted presentation of cause and effect, showing how Britain strengthened when it played to its strengths through diplomacy and weakened when it ignored the diplomats. Influence was backed by power, but power was no substitute for influence. For the American reader of today, that is an important point to ponder while looking back at the past two decades of U.S. foreign policy.