A bit of a mixed bag for me - certainly there's plenty packed in here that I found myself agreeing with: (e.g. the selective use of "originalism" to arrive at predetermined results in deciding cases, the ultimate failure of the Obama administration to seize the 2008 financial crash as a moment to reorient the economic system). But overall, I found this book tried to do a little too much, as it set out to piece together essentially a "one grand theory" narrative to explain the current state of U.S. (and at times, global) politics and socioeconomics. The argument, as I read it, is essentially that "neoliberalism" was an overarching framework (taking several different shapes) that was designed and implemented (except, at the same time, not really? More below on that...) to reorient the political and legal systems away from pursuing aims like fairness, justice, and equality, and toward the entrenchment of the status quo and enrichment of the selective few.
Yet, according to the author, there was also "no conspiracy or coordinated group of bad guys", which strikes me as a strange assertion given the detail paid to the fact that there very much were organized groups and networks of well-funded organizations very deliberately trying to reshape the political system and the courts (for instance, the portions of the book linking Law and Economics movements and the Federalist Society to wealthy, reactionary donors). At the same time, the argument also seems to overlook the roots of neoliberalism located within the (dare I say better intentioned?) left/liberal leaning bureaucrats who saw neoliberal solutions as a more "efficient" form of government action (thinking here of books like The Economist's Hour by Binyamin Appelbaum and "Thinking Like an Economist" by Elizabeth Popp Berman). Perhaps this stems from the vague nature of the term "neoliberalism" itself, as Baradaran notes in the very beginning of the book, but certainly these neoliberals, who advocated for market-oriented solutions rather than direct government spending programs and cost-benefit analysis laid much of the groundwork for the dismantling of government spending and social safety net programs.
I sympathize strongly with the author's note about doing far too much research and having to cut much from the book, but it did feel as though often times the book set out to cover too much territory and made many assertions that could have been explored further (for instance, the statement that theory of the tragedy of the commons had been debunked - perhaps? But how so?).
Particularly, I found the ending of the book to be a letdown - though probably because I just disagree with the prescriptions. I did not expect to read a conclusion offering a grand, simple solution to the many issues Baradaran highlights, but I found the assertion that "we do not need to create new programs and policies or laws and regulations", disheartening despite the fact that "historically, the federal government was best suited to dedicate the resources required to make long-term investments in people and technologies". Instead, the author proposes "investment vehicles that could invest in people and communities using simple structures and complete transparency". In essence, the argument seems to be that the political system is too far gone at this point (though given the history of the gilded age to the roaring twenties to the New Deal, I'm not as convinced, but maybe I just haven't reached total despondency yet), so our best hope is just taking our dollars out of current investments and redirecting them toward more noble aims (notwithstanding the fact, as the book acknowledges, that the vast majority of wealth is held by the very few, so unclear how this proposed solution would have a meaningful impact), which has shades of the proposals for "green capitalism" as a solution for climate change, rather than public action through governing.
Minor editing note: on Pg 132: the Dred Scott decision was in 1857, not 1957.