The Influence of Air Power Upon History

by Walter J. Boyne

A thorough examination of the development of air-power philosophy, approached by examining the theory and practice of air power and the innovators who have developed it. Walter J. Boyne is a recognized authority on aviation.

Genres: Aviation, History, Military Fiction, Germany, Nonfiction

448 pages, Hardcover

First published May 31, 2003

Reviews

[Vheissu · Rating 3 out of 5]

Walter J. Boyne offers a readable but fairly standard history of the development of air power in the twentieth century. That he mostly fails to explain the "influence of air power upon history" is perhaps a consequence of the overly ambitious task Boyne sets for himself, or maybe because, whatever his understanding of air power, he seems to have a poor understanding of the broader social, economic, and political factors that defined the last century and the relationship of air power to them.

Boyne identifies two important contributions of air power to recent history: the defeat of Nazi German and Imperial Japan, and the successful (mostly) containment of the Soviet Union by the West (pp. 367-8). He mentions in passing the influence of air power on civilian air travel, which "before the advent of terrorism in its present form, seemed (with electronic media) to be the swiftest way to democratize and internationalize the people of the word," and on "technology for vast improvements in agriculture, in disease control, and for compassionate relief of disaster victims." Rather than such passing reflections, Boyne would have served the reader better by more fully exploring the implications of global transportation and communication made possible by air power for the politics and economics of the twentieth century.

Elsewhere, Boyne describes the impact of air power on world public opinion (p. 14), which was fascinated by the accomplishment of heavier-than-air flight at first, but later horrified by the potential reign of terror such flight made possible. Boyne argues convincingly that French and British appeasement of Hitler was fueled largely by fears of Germany's air force and the perceived inadequacy of Allied defenses against it in 1936-38 (pp. 171-7), a fear crystallized in Stanley Baldwin's unfortunate (and inaccurate) statement that "the bombers always get through." Fears of German air superiority were overblown and unwarranted--and British air defenses were much better than anticipated--but nevertheless had a decisive impact on public opinion, including political leaders in Britain, France, Austria, and Czechoslovakia.

Boyne utterly fails, however, to explain the impact of air power on public opinion (and the impact of public opinion on air power) after World War II. In short, world public opinion was appalled by the indiscriminate carpet-bombing of German and Japanese civilians conducted by the RAF and USAAF during the war and frightened by the specter of a global, thermonuclear holocaust afterward. Military leaders and their apologists were mostly impervious to these opinions, dismissing humanitarian claims as so much soft-hearted hand-wringing and exaggerating the contribution of strategic bombing to ultimate victory in World War II. The advocates of strategic bombing dominated the senior leadership of the U.S. Air Force until at least Vietnam and came to rely on the doctrine of mutually assured destruction as America's first line of defense against Soviet aggression.

Boyne briefly acknowledges these humanitarian sentiments, writing:

Written by scholars and less often by military officers, many of the books have a subtext in which the immorality of bombing is highlighted. Those that do so often receive the greatest critical acclaim, for it is easy to appreciate the view that bombing, and indeed all warfare, is immoral (p. 319).

This statement completely obscures the point: Critics do not condemn bombing, they condemn indiscriminate bombing directed against civilians. Boyne defends the early advocates of air power by claiming that "Not one of these leaders would have preferred to slaughter tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians if they could instead have killed the ten or twenty key people who stood in the way of peace (p. 356). In my opinion, Winston Churchill and Arthur "Bomber" Harris are exceptions to Boyne's presumed humanitarian sentiments of the advocates of air power.

World public opinion and political leaders nevertheless coalesced after World War II, enshrining a ban on indiscriminate bombing of civilians in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention IV in 1977, Article 51 of which states, in part:

2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.

Boyne fails to mention the Geneva Convention, which was signed by Jimmy Carter but rejected by Ronald Reagan. In his recommendation to the U.S. Senate that it not ratify the Protocol Additional, Reagan wrote about the provision:

It would give special status to "wars of national liberation," an ill-defined concept expressed in vague, subjective, politicized terminology. Another provision would grant combatant status to irregular forces even if they do not satisfy the traditional requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian population and otherwise comply with the laws of war. This would endanger civilians among whom terrorists and other irregulars attempt to conceal themselves. These problems are so fundamental in character that they cannot be remedied through reservations, and I therefore have decided not to submit the Protocol to the Senate in any form, and I would invite an expression of the sense of the Senate that it shares this view. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also concluded that a number of the provisions of the Protocol are militarily unacceptable.

Irrespective of whether the Protocol Additional is or ought to be legally binding upon the United States, the opinion that it reflects is real, placing actual political constraints on the actions of national leaders, and Boyne's failure to acknowledge this reality helps explain his muddled if popular explanations for the failures of air power in Vietnam.

Like almost all apologists for U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Boyne blames American failings in Vietnam to a lack of "political will," and not to any necessary inadequacy of air power (p. 333). He blames Lyndon Johnson and Robert S. McNamara for "stupid policy decisions" (p. 328) , illustrated by the president's insistence on approving all bombing targets (p. 325). Boyne states that "Curtis LeMay, like most military leaders, had bitterly opposed entering the conflict in Vietnam" (p. 327), but advocated massive conventional bombing once the United States entered the war. That Johnson and McNamara may have been constrained by the political fallout of massive bombing is something that Boyne is unwilling to concede. This military advice was only implemented once Richard Nixon became president, culminating in the Christmas bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong in 1972 (LINEBACKER II). Nixon surmised, correctly as it turned out, that Russia and China would do nothing in response to the bombing. What Boyne omits, however, is the worldwide condemnation of the bombings, not only by America's enemies but also by its own allies. Not only did the NATO allies not lift a hand in Vietnam, but they universally condemned American action there, including Canada, which humiliated the United States by granting asylum to U.S. draft dodgers. The damage to America's reputation because of Vietnam has never been completely erased.

The Vietnam War occurred at a time of transition for air power, ushering in exquisitely precise ammunition, stealth technology, and satellite-based global command and control capabilities, all of which proved decisive in the First Gulf War. The Second Gulf War, on the other hand, demonstrated that the remarkable advances in air power are no substitute for wise leadership and effective intelligence. The very technology that today allows pilots in Nevada to target individual enemies in Yemen has neither eliminated collateral damage (permissible under the laws of war) nor resolved issues concerning the due process rights of Americans targeted and killed abroad (probably impermissible under the U.S. Constitution). Those weapons and the space-based command and control systems are also vulnerable to hacking; see:
by P.W. Singer

The influence of air power upon society, politics, and economics is a story that probably cannot be satisfactorily described in a single volume. Notwithstanding his glaring omissions, Boyne's book is probably a good start.

[Tami · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Influence of Air Power upon History tells the tale of flight from the first balloon travels through to the modern era. As one would expect, much of this history is more accurately termed military history as the evolutionary process and specific modifications to the various crafts were often driven by military need.

This book contains good detail about flight history while still managing to be an interesting read. Moreover, the chapters are separated into useful time periods or specific changes in technology that will allow this book to also serve as a useful reference for those individuals looking for information on a particular craft, wanting to explore the influence of flight in particular campaigns, or wanting to understand the air power strategies that each country used in these battles.

The Influence of Air Power upon History is a very good all round reference on the history of air power. This book is suitable for those with very little knowledge of flight and is also useful as a reference for those individuals wanting to look deeper into these aspects.

[Robert Nash · Rating 3 out of 5]

Had promise, but the inexorable degeneration into boosterism for the Air Force of the United States and patronising attitude that accompanied it took the shine off of a reasonably good survey of the subject.