Adorno's Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the Possibility of Critical Rationality

by Brian O'Connor

The purely philosophical concerns of Theodor W. Adorno's negative dialectic would seem to be far removed from the concreteness of critical theory; Adorno's philosophy considers perhaps the most traditional subject of "pure" philosophy, the structure of experience, whereas critical theory examines specific aspects of society. But, as Brian O'Connor demonstrates in this highly original interpretation of Adorno's philosophy, the negative dialectic can be seen as the theoretical foundation of the reflexivity or critical rationality required by critical theory. Adorno, O'Connor argues, is committed to the "concretion" of his thesis of nonidentity attempts to show that reality is not reducible to appearances. This lays the foundation for the applied "concrete" critique of appearances that is essential to the possibility of critical theory. To explicate the context in which Adorno's philosophy operates—the tradition of modern German philosophy, from Kant to Heidegger—O'Connor examines in detail the ideas of these philosophers as well as Adorno's self-defining differences with them. O'Connor discusses Georg Lucàcs and the influence of his "protocritical theory" on Adorno's thought; the elements of Kant's and Hegel's German idealism appropriated by Adorno for his theory of subject-object mediation; the priority of the object and the agency of the subject in Adorno's epistemology; and Adorno's important critiques of Kant and the phenomenology of Heidegger and Husserl, critiques that both illuminate Adorno's key concepts and reveal his construction of critical theory through an engagement with the problems of philosophy.

Genres: Philosophy

224 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2004

Reviews

[TL · Rating 5 out of 5]

In response to Rosen's critique: For Adorno, objects are not inherently meaningful (conceptual), but we are probably unable to have a pure experience of/access to that inherent meaninglessness (nonconceptuality). Impure experience of it is certainly possible (and, for Adorno, necessary for the—endless—'dialectical' revision of our concepts in a direction of greater rationality, which is simultaneously an ethical task of doing justice to the object in its [finally unattainable] fullness), but not purity, in the sense of experiencing nonconceptuality unmixed with, 'uncontaminated by' conceptuality (which is always-already socio-historical, mediated through the historically-developed and developing social totality). Objects' inherent nonidentical nonconceptuality is above all glimpsed somewhere in our physical, somatic relations with them (seeing, hearing, feeling, etc.), but in full actual experience it is mixed too 'promiscuously' into our non-physical, non-somatic (conceptual, meaningful) relations with them. A full split between these two types of relations can be accomplished theoretically, but I doubt that they can ever be decisively separated out experientially. But: a non-decisive separation? This is possible—indeed, happens regularly in non-reified experience—and is what enables (or perhaps simply is) the very dialectical experience of 'contradiction' of object and concept that makes revision, and thus improved concepts, possible and desirable in turn. The inherent material (non-ideal) nonconceptuality of the object, while unavailable as its absolute purity and fullness, gives it a kind of determinate independence in itself and priority over the subject such that it circumscribes the field of concepts we might subsume it under within certain boundaries (boundaries which, once more, we will probably never 'bump up against' and understand completely). It accomplishes this negatively, as revealed in the experience of contradiction. Rational, non-reified, properly full experience, psychedelic experience, is thus transcendentally a matter of mediation: of dynamic interdetermination of object and subject, in which both parties are necessary, but wherein the object gets priority. The object is more determining of the intermediated result—actual lived experience—than the subject is. This is why Adorno describes the subject as the how and the object as the what.

And I wonder if practices of the self such as Buddhist sitting meditation can, by quieting the 'loudness' of discursive thought, allow the nonconceptual aspect of experience of objects to reveal itself more acutely, more vivaciously. An increase in one's capacity to experience nonconceptuality, but only up to a certain limit. No purity here. But conceptuality, for its own part, isn't so bad! As such, not bad at all, and—in any case—it can't be avoided. Conceptuality has its own joys and its own liberatory potentialities. We need not desire a definitive 'either-or'.

[Marco · Rating 5 out of 5]

In this brilliant book Brian O'Connor provides a reading of Adorno as a transcendental philosopher who is concerned with the necessary structures and conditions of our experience. Negative Dialectics, in O'Connor's view, is attempting nothing less than to "give philosophical foundation to the very practice of critical theory, to the very possibility of a rationality that lies latent—although not always recognized—within experience itself" (p.173).

In the course of the exposition we learn about Adorno's complicated relationship to German Idealism, the priority of the object, the role of the subject and what identitity thinking has to do with the subject-object relationship. Moreover, Adorno's critique of various philosophers (e.g. Heidegger, Husserl, Hegel and Kant) is given sufficient attention. In doing so, O'Connor highlights both the strenghts of Adorno's reading of these figures as well as the limits of Adorno's ability to represent the positions and arguments of those with whom he engages correctly.
The contemporary relevance of Adorno's thought is further clarified by relating his ideas to the thought of John Searle and Thomas Nagel.
Furthermore, O'Connor's book is valuable insofar as it defends Adorno against accusations of the incoherence of his thought. Objections by Habermas and Michael Rosen are considered and discussed in some detail. At this point the reader will have learned how Adorno's commitment to a subjectivity that plays a role in the shaping experience can be reconciled with his commitment to materialism.

All in all it can be said that O'Connor succeeded in writing a marvellous book about Adorno's complicated and often seemingly incoherent thought that might serve as a key to break at least some of the seals that have kept the insights contained in Negative Dialektik from being appreciated by a larger audience.

[Michael A. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really enlightening and helpful analysis of Adorno's interpretation of the subject-object relationship. Strong recommendation.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

Since there's still no acceptable translation of Adorno's Negative Dialectics, I went ahead with this one. It's heavy going, but really fun. I've always been more drawn to Adorno's pessimism and negativity anyway, but this book nicely argues that he did indeed have a complex, nuanced, and worthwhile general philosophical project as well that undergirded and supported his relentless critique of World. I'm looking forward to getting back to Adorno himself, and his difficult, difficult prose which I love, with this overarching sketch of that philosophical project in mind. It should enrich that engagement.

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the more pleasant experiences of having books comes from discovering something you forgot about on your shelf. I do not remember buying this book. I am pretty sure I know the rationale for the purchase. But still. It has sat on my shelf for years, hidden by a picture of my parents, nestled among other works I either have or have not read. When I picked it up I wondered if I had read it. I opened the pages, and there were no notes. The spine was not cracked. Some pictures of my wife were in among the pages. Almost certainly I had not even attempted this book yet, so I opened it up and began reading. What a treasure I discovered!

Adorno has constructed a philosophy as rich, complex, and esoteric as any late modernist. Like James Joyce and TS Elliot, he uncompromisingly challenges his readers’ intellectual stamina and concentration in order to bring them through to a philosophy of resistance to cultural domination. O’Connor’s Adorno’s Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the Possibility of Critical Rationality does a lot to help bring us closer to understanding both the philosophical problems that Adorno’s negative dialectic addresses and the necessary complexity of Adorno’s philosophical prose.

Simply put, Adorno’s philosophical project is a materialist investigation into the subject-object relation. But that is kind of like saying, Einstein’s physics is reducible to understanding the math of water spinning in a bucket. There is a lot more to it. O’Connor brings this more to light by providing the philosophical context and key concepts that shape Adorno’s thought, particularly as it pertains to the Negative Dialectics. By delineating the arguments for the primacy of the object, the nonidentity of experience, mediation and dialectic, O’Connor unlocks a great deal of Adorno’s argument in a way that reveals how the subject-object relation takes on new meaning for a world experienced as the wrong state of things. In other words: if the object is prior to the subject and condition of the possibility of subjectivity, how does one acquire philosophical truth, when the object world is false?

Adorno’s decision to prioritize the object over against philosophies of subjectivity presents a complex counter argument to idealism and empiricism. But he complicates the argument by drawing from Lukacs and Marx in describing the object world. The dialectic of the reified world of the object expresses subjective domination as reification of consciousness. Adorno’s philosophy attempts to break the mold of reification, free the object for the subject and rescue experience as a mediation of subject-object in which the dialectic experience of mediation is both correct and just.

O’Connor finds a way to delineate the hidden suppositions in Adorno’s philosophy, bring them to the light and present them in a way that is clear and concise. I really enjoyed reading this book.