This vital new liberal account of multiculturalism combines an analysis of the policy dilemmas faced by multiethnic states around the world with a philosophical consideration of multiculturalism and nationalism. Jacob T. Levy boldly argues that liberalism should not be centrally concerned with either preserving or transcending cultural communities, practices, and identities. Rather, he contends that liberalism should focus on mitigating evils such as inter-ethnic civil wars and state violence against ethnic minorities. In order for this "multiculturalism of fear" to be grounded in the realities of ethnic politics and conflict, it must take seriously the importance people place on their ethnic identities and cultural practices without falling into a celebration of cultural belonging.
Levy applies his approach to a variety of policy problems, including the regulation of sexist practices inside cultural communities, secession and national self-determination, land rights, and customary law, and draws on cases from such diverse states as Australia, Canada, Israel, India, South Africa, and the United States.
This is a wonderful book. Levy argues with care and subtlety for a "multiculturalism of fear." That is, the best we can hope for in a world diverse in ethnicities, religions, and states is to avoid the "supreme evils" of cruelty and humiliation. These ethnicities, religious traditions, and states overlap with and interpenetrate one another, have deep histories with one another that may involve obligations or antagonisms, and have unavoidable conflicts with one another. The questions of multiculturalism can thus not be simply avoided. And the problems are hard, often insoluble in ways that are truly satisfactory or fair to all parties. But cruelty and humiliation can be avoided.
The book is rich in examples of these hard problems. One of my favorites was a discussion of female genital cutting in a Western Democratic state. A panel put together at a public hospital determined that, to serve their community which included many East African immigrants, they would be willing to perform a procedure that removed no tissue and left no damage to sexual function. What to do in this case? Forbid a procedure deemed deeply wrong by the surrounding majority community in an effort to protect innocent young girls who have not consented to the procedure? Or allow the largely symbolic procedure out of the justified fear that these families would find a way to perform the traditional (far more damaging) procedures instead in secrecy, perhaps while traveling back home to visit relatives?
Levy's nuanced and thorough discussions of such fraught, no-right-answer issues is the highlight of the book, whether these issues are about protecting individuals from internal minority culture cruelty, or indigenous land rights, official state apologies, rights of secession, special exemptions or rights of assistance for religious minorities, etc.
Levy takes the rich diversity and fluidity of individuals within and between cultures as a simple fact about the world. He doesn't romanticize either the individual in their capacity to reason and choose or the community in the meaning it often provides for people's lives. This provides a good counter both to those multiculturalists who tend toward cultural relativism and collectivism and to those libertarians who would "solve" problems of cultural conflict by simply ignoring them via a shallow individualism.
I do have one complaint about the book. While roughly the first half of the book is riveting, around the middle there's a long section where it reads more like a legal textbook than philosophy. This was too dry for my taste, but it does pick up with a fascinating final chapter.