The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century: Patterns of Change in Early Modern Natural Philosophy

by Peter R. Anstey (editor), John A. Schuster (Editor)

One of the hallmarks of the modern world has been the stunning rise of the natural sciences. The exponential expansion of scientific knowledge and the accompanying technology that so impact on our daily lives are truly remarkable. But what is often taken for granted is the enviable epistemic-credit rating of scientific science is authoritative, science inspires confidence, science is right. Yet it has not always been so. In the seventeenth century the situation was markedly competing sources of authority, shifting disciplinary boundaries, emerging modes of experimental practice and methodological reflection were some of the constituents in a quite different mélange in which knowledge of nature was by no means p- eminent. It was the desire to probe the underlying causes of the shift from the early modern ‘nature-knowledge’ to modern science that was one of the stimuli for the ‘Origins of Early Modern Thought 1543–1789’ conference held in Sydney in July 2002. How and why did modern science emerge from its early modern roots to the dominant position which it enjoys in today’s post-modern world? Under the auspices of the International Society for Intellectual History, The University of New South Wales and The University of Sydney, a group of historians and philosophers of science gathered to discuss this issue. However, it soon became clear that a prior question needed to be settled the question as to the precise nature of the quest for knowledge of the natural realm in the seventeenth century.

262 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 2005

Reviews

[Lette Hass]

…defining terms of reference for any practitioner of natural philosophy. Five strong claims regarding this distinction (Speculative and Experimental)

• This distinction is in evident, in some form or other, from the late 1650s until the early decades of the eighteenth century
• This distinction provides the primary methodological framework within which natural philosophy was interpreted and practised in the late seventeenth century
• This distinction is independent of disciplinary boundaries within and closely allied to natural philosophy
• This distinction crystallised in the 1690s when opposition to hypotheses in natural philosophical methodology intensified
• This distinction provides the terms of reference by which we should interpret Newton’s strictures on the use of hypotheses in natural philosophy


(Peter Anstey….216)