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Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy
Book by Ruse, Michael
320 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1987
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83 people want to read
About the author
Michael Ruse
131 books99 followersMichael Escott Ruse was a British-born Canadian philosopher of science who specialised in the philosophy of biology and worked on the relationship between science and religion, the creation–evolution controversy, and the demarcation problem within science. Ruse began his career teaching at The University of Guelph and spent many years at Florida State University.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
April 20, 2016
The description above is rather misleading as this book is not (except the brief new chapter at the end) about creationism or religion, but about what Darwinian evolutionary theory can contribute to philosophy. The book focuses on two fundamental areas of philosophy: epistemology (the theory of knowledge) and ethics (the theory of morals). An older and a newer way of looking at these areas in the light of evolutionary thinking are contrasted. More philosophers should adopt Ruse's empirically informed and reasoned perspective!
March 30, 2009
Excellent work on the philosophical side of evolutionary science.
February 27, 2014
I agree with much of Ruse's general approach, but I think he's inclined to over-constrain behavioral traits to biology - his epigenetic rules for morality, for instance, strike me as a little too specific. Personally, I think Dennett does a much better job of tracking the relevance to philosophy of Darwin (and of cognitive science and other current investigations). But Ruse was worth reading.
Ruse's moral theory, in particular, shows his unwillingness to let go of certain traditional philosophical ideas, even when contra-indicated by data. He seems to believe his epigenetic rules can lead to a morality that is universal (or nearly so), and also consistent and coherent. My own belief is that our biologically-based moral imperatives are ad hoc, evolved to solve particular problems, and therefore they inevitably come into conflict with each other, as well as with our non-moral impulses, with which they are exactly on par. I thus put conflict (and conflict resolution) at the very core of moral behavior. I think moral philosophers traditionally, and Ruse, have tended to hope it can be somehow sidelined, turned into an unfortunate imperfection that sometimes seems to occur, despite their best efforts. (I over-simplify, of course.) I've written about my ideas on http://persistentwondering.com, especially in the second half of 2009.
Ruse is not a particularly clear writer, so I'm not always 100% certain that I am interpreting him correctly, at least in his more subtle points.
Ruse's moral theory, in particular, shows his unwillingness to let go of certain traditional philosophical ideas, even when contra-indicated by data. He seems to believe his epigenetic rules can lead to a morality that is universal (or nearly so), and also consistent and coherent. My own belief is that our biologically-based moral imperatives are ad hoc, evolved to solve particular problems, and therefore they inevitably come into conflict with each other, as well as with our non-moral impulses, with which they are exactly on par. I thus put conflict (and conflict resolution) at the very core of moral behavior. I think moral philosophers traditionally, and Ruse, have tended to hope it can be somehow sidelined, turned into an unfortunate imperfection that sometimes seems to occur, despite their best efforts. (I over-simplify, of course.) I've written about my ideas on http://persistentwondering.com, especially in the second half of 2009.
Ruse is not a particularly clear writer, so I'm not always 100% certain that I am interpreting him correctly, at least in his more subtle points.
May 30, 2024
One of my (probably overambitious) intellectual projects is to understand the full philosophical and theological implications of the theory of evolution. As this book purports to deal with both the epistemological and ethical implications of the theory, it seemed to be a good way to feed two birds with one scone (to use the animal-friendly version of an old idiom, assuming the scone is vegan.)
The main quality of the book is its clear structure: first it examines wrong ways of doing evolutionary epistemology and ethics (chapters 2 and 3); then, because Ruse thinks it the precondition for doing them right (through the concept of "epigenetic rules"), it surveys human evolution and the way it shaped our cognitive faculties; and finally, it develops Ruse's own approach to the two topics.
The book is mildly helpful in its two critical chapters, though it is not too meticulous in its presentation of earlier thinkers' thought. Ruse's eleven-line summary of Descartes's philosophy of mind (p103), for instance, is a caricature. He also thinks the difference between utilitarians and Kantians is no big deal (they "agree nearly all the time on moral matters" (p247.)) And though I know very little about Kant, I am very dubious of the claim that according to him "the claims of mathematics are... constructions in space and time" (p179.)
The weakest part of the book (as is often the case) is the constructive chapters. Ruse believes that the only reality of morality is that we cannot help but think in invariant moral terms, because this is what evolution has made us like: "You would believe what you do about right and wrong, irrespective of whether or not a 'true' right and wrong existed!... Hence the objective foundation for morality is redundant" (p254.) (notice the scare quotes on "true", as you will find on the words "right" and "wrong".)
Despite this, Ruse still considers himself a moral realist: "I am certainly not saying that morality is unreal. Of course it is not! What is unreal is the apparent reference of morality... Morality is part of human nature, and... an effective adaptation.... I would not say that we could not escape morality- presumably we could get into wholesale, anti-morality, genetic engineering- but I strongly suspect that a wholesale attempt to ignore it will fail." (p253)
Although Ruse considers his epistemology and ethics to be broadly speaking Humean (that was a red flag for me...), he manages to avoid Hume's razor with a dubious metaphor: "the Darwinian does an end-run around the is/ought barrier. He/she realizes that you cannot go through it, but argues that you can go around it" (p256.)
But what worries me most about Ruse's approach is that he holds Darwinism, an explanatory theory, to the same standards as utilitarianism and Kantianism, normative/ prescriptive theories. For instance, he asks "which theory, Darwinism or utilitarianism, better accords with our moral feelings?" (p241.) The verb "accord" is equivocal here. Obviously, Darwinism "accords" with our moral feelings, since it is precisely the feelings we do have that it seeks to explain. And obviously, utilitarianism will not "accord" perfectly with our moral feelings, since, like all normative ethical theories, it may lead to conclusions that contradict those pre-theoretic feelings. But since Ruse seems to hold that the "job of the philosopher" is not to "spout" moral injunctions "as a font of moral wisdom" (p207) but to "capture the major elements of moral experience" (p208), I guess that Darwinism, utilitarianism and Kantianism are all in the same business of doing such captures, in a highly equivocal sense of "capturing".
In epistemology, Ruse claims that "Darwinism denies... that we have some non-'subjective' knowledge" (p199) and that "the Darwinian subscribes to a coherence theory of truth", directing his readers to Rorty "for a powerful attack on the correspondence theory" (p202.) "To speak of something which really exists, independent and beyond human awareness (direct or indirect), immune to the limitations of human sensory and intellectual powers, does not make too much sense... This kind of reality- something outside the sensing, intepreting subject- is meaningless" (p194.) What evolution has adapted us and the other living beings to, in this worldview, is a mystery to me.
Ruse is also a determinist, which makes ethics rather redundant: "We have a strong sense of personal freedom. And this sense persists, despite the fact that there is much evidence to humans being part of the causal nexus." (p181)
My last objection is to Ruse's rather careless philosophising. On p192, he writes: "I confess to feeling little sympathy for the scholastic (and Popperian) practice of making ever more minute divisions". I had figured that out by then. He also has little patience with the hard slog of analytic philosophy: "the literature on the explanatory/ prediction connection is as long as it is boring" (p151.) But all this is to be expected from a book that does not claim to be academic ("I have delierately written in a non-technical way, trying to be readable to students of more than one specialized discipline" (pxvii)) and that does not give any page numbers in its bibliographical references, but is content with recommending "good introductions" to or "balanced overviews" of the various topics it deals with.
The main quality of the book is its clear structure: first it examines wrong ways of doing evolutionary epistemology and ethics (chapters 2 and 3); then, because Ruse thinks it the precondition for doing them right (through the concept of "epigenetic rules"), it surveys human evolution and the way it shaped our cognitive faculties; and finally, it develops Ruse's own approach to the two topics.
The book is mildly helpful in its two critical chapters, though it is not too meticulous in its presentation of earlier thinkers' thought. Ruse's eleven-line summary of Descartes's philosophy of mind (p103), for instance, is a caricature. He also thinks the difference between utilitarians and Kantians is no big deal (they "agree nearly all the time on moral matters" (p247.)) And though I know very little about Kant, I am very dubious of the claim that according to him "the claims of mathematics are... constructions in space and time" (p179.)
The weakest part of the book (as is often the case) is the constructive chapters. Ruse believes that the only reality of morality is that we cannot help but think in invariant moral terms, because this is what evolution has made us like: "You would believe what you do about right and wrong, irrespective of whether or not a 'true' right and wrong existed!... Hence the objective foundation for morality is redundant" (p254.) (notice the scare quotes on "true", as you will find on the words "right" and "wrong".)
Despite this, Ruse still considers himself a moral realist: "I am certainly not saying that morality is unreal. Of course it is not! What is unreal is the apparent reference of morality... Morality is part of human nature, and... an effective adaptation.... I would not say that we could not escape morality- presumably we could get into wholesale, anti-morality, genetic engineering- but I strongly suspect that a wholesale attempt to ignore it will fail." (p253)
Although Ruse considers his epistemology and ethics to be broadly speaking Humean (that was a red flag for me...), he manages to avoid Hume's razor with a dubious metaphor: "the Darwinian does an end-run around the is/ought barrier. He/she realizes that you cannot go through it, but argues that you can go around it" (p256.)
But what worries me most about Ruse's approach is that he holds Darwinism, an explanatory theory, to the same standards as utilitarianism and Kantianism, normative/ prescriptive theories. For instance, he asks "which theory, Darwinism or utilitarianism, better accords with our moral feelings?" (p241.) The verb "accord" is equivocal here. Obviously, Darwinism "accords" with our moral feelings, since it is precisely the feelings we do have that it seeks to explain. And obviously, utilitarianism will not "accord" perfectly with our moral feelings, since, like all normative ethical theories, it may lead to conclusions that contradict those pre-theoretic feelings. But since Ruse seems to hold that the "job of the philosopher" is not to "spout" moral injunctions "as a font of moral wisdom" (p207) but to "capture the major elements of moral experience" (p208), I guess that Darwinism, utilitarianism and Kantianism are all in the same business of doing such captures, in a highly equivocal sense of "capturing".
In epistemology, Ruse claims that "Darwinism denies... that we have some non-'subjective' knowledge" (p199) and that "the Darwinian subscribes to a coherence theory of truth", directing his readers to Rorty "for a powerful attack on the correspondence theory" (p202.) "To speak of something which really exists, independent and beyond human awareness (direct or indirect), immune to the limitations of human sensory and intellectual powers, does not make too much sense... This kind of reality- something outside the sensing, intepreting subject- is meaningless" (p194.) What evolution has adapted us and the other living beings to, in this worldview, is a mystery to me.
Ruse is also a determinist, which makes ethics rather redundant: "We have a strong sense of personal freedom. And this sense persists, despite the fact that there is much evidence to humans being part of the causal nexus." (p181)
My last objection is to Ruse's rather careless philosophising. On p192, he writes: "I confess to feeling little sympathy for the scholastic (and Popperian) practice of making ever more minute divisions". I had figured that out by then. He also has little patience with the hard slog of analytic philosophy: "the literature on the explanatory/ prediction connection is as long as it is boring" (p151.) But all this is to be expected from a book that does not claim to be academic ("I have delierately written in a non-technical way, trying to be readable to students of more than one specialized discipline" (pxvii)) and that does not give any page numbers in its bibliographical references, but is content with recommending "good introductions" to or "balanced overviews" of the various topics it deals with.
August 5, 2009
Dumbed down too much, and a lot of typos. Plus, Ruse has the habit of excluding page numbers in his references, which I find sloppy.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews