A SERIES OF KANT'S LECTURES, EDITED BY ONE OF HIS STUDENTS
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was a German philosopher who is perhaps the founder of "modern" philosophy, with his focus on epistemology (theory of knowledge).
The Translators’ Introduction states, “The importance of Kant’s ‘Logic’ has never been fully appreciated. This is one of the reasons why this work, published in 1800, is only now appearing in a complete English translation. Its importance lies not only in its significance for the ‘Critique of Pure Reason,’ the second part of which is a restatement of fundamental tenets of the Logic, but in its position within the whole of Kant’s work… if one does not take into consideration the meanings of fundamental terms as found in the Methodology and in greater detail in the Logic, one flounders in his understanding of the Critique.” (Pg. xv)
They continue, “it gives us many insights into his work aside from the ‘Critique of Pure Reason.’ In this respect, the ‘Logic’ is an introduction to Kant’s system. Nowhere does Kant specifically set down the fundamentals of both his critical and practical philosophy; but his Logic lectures developed into such an introduction. One will find in this book a transcendental critique, a moral philosophy, a rational theology, a history of philosophy, even an anthropology, all rolled into one---besides, of course, a masterful introduction to the logic of his time.” (Pg. xvii)
Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche, one of Kant’s pupils, notes in his Preface to the book, “It is already a year and a half since Kant instructed me to edit his Logic for the press as presented by him in public lectures to his listeners, and to submit it to the public in the form of a compendious manual. To that end I received from him the very manuscript he had used in his lectures, with an expression of the special honorable confidence in me that I… would readily enter into the course of his ideas; and that I would not distort or falsify his thoughts but exhibit them with the requisite clarity and definiteness and at the same time in the appropriate order.” (Pg. 5)
Kant’s Introduction states, “If, now, we set aside all cognition that we must borrow from objects and reflect solely upon the use of the understanding in itself, we discover those of its rules which are necessary throughout… because without them we could not think at all. Insight into these rules can therefore be granted a priori and independently of any experience, because they contain, without discrimination between objects, merely the conditions of the use of the understanding itself, be it pure or empirical. And it also follows from this that the universal and necessary rules of thought in general can concern solely its form, and not in any way its matter. Accordingly, the science containing these universal and necessary rules is a science of the mere form of our intellectual cognition or of thinking. And we can therefore form for ourselves the idea of the possibility of such a science, just as that of a general grammar which contains nothing beyond the mere form of a language in general, without words, which belongs to the matter of language. Now this science of the necessary laws of the understanding and reason in general, or… of the mere form of thinking, we call ‘logic.’” (Pg. 14-15)
He notes, “In logic… the question is not one of CONTINGENT but of NECESSARY rules, how we think, but how we ought to think. The rules of logic, therefore, must be taken not from the contingent but from the necessary use of the understanding, which one finds, without any psychology, in oneself. In logic we do not want to know how the understanding is and thinks, and how it hitherto has proceeded in thinking, but how it ought to proceed in thinking. Logic shall teach us the right use of the understanding, i.e., the one that agrees with itself.” (Pg. 16)
He states, “Logic is a science of reason not only as to mere form but also as to matter; a science a priori of the necessary laws of thinking, not, however, in respect of particular objects but all objects generatim: it is a science, therefore, of the right use of the understanding and of reason as such, not subjectively i.e., not according to empirical (psychological) principles of how the understanding thinks, but objectively, i.e., according to a priori principles of how it ought to think.” (Pg. 18)
He explains, “The field of philosophy in this cosmopolitan meaning may be summed up in the following questions: 1) What can I know? 2) What ought I to do? 3) What may I hope? 4) What is man? The first question is answered by metaphysics, the second by morality, the third by religion, and the fourth by anthropology. At bottom all this could be reckoned to be anthropology, because the first three questions are related to the last. The philosopher, therefore, must be able to determine 1) the sources of human knowledge, 2) the extent of the possible and advantageous use of all knowledge, and finally 3) the limits of reason.” (Pg. 28-29)
He outlines, “The formal criteria of logic are: 1) the principle of contradiction, 2) the principle of sufficient reason. By the former is determined the logical POSSIBILITY, by the latter, the LOGICAL ACTUALITY of a cognition. To the logical truth of a cognition, namely, belongs: First: That it be logically possible, that is, not CONTRADICT itself. This characteristic of the INTERNAL logical truth, however, is only negative; for a cognition that contradicts itself is indeed false, but if it does not contradict itself, it is not always true. Second: That it be logically grounded, that is, have (a) reasons, and (b) no false consequences. This second criterion of the EXTERNAL logical truth or of the RATIONALITY of cognition, which concerns the logical connection of a cognition with reasons and consequences, is positive.” (Pg. 57)
He continues, “We shall thus be able to state here three principles as universal, merely formal or logical criteria of truth; these are: 1) the principle of contradiction and identity… by which the inner possibility of a cognition is determined for problematic judgments. 2) the principle of sufficient reason … on which rests the (logical) actuality of a cognition---that it is grounded, as material for assertoric judgments; 3) the principle of excluded middle… on which the (logical) necessity of a cognition is based---that it is necessary to judge thus and not otherwise, i.e., that the opposite is false---for apodeictic judgments.” (Pg. 58-59)
While far from one of Kant’s “major works,” this book has some fascinating material, that indeed sheds light on other aspects of Kant’s philosophy.