The regime of Kim Jong-Il has been called "mad," "rogue," even, by the Wall Street Journal , the equivalent of an "unreformed serial killer." Yet, despite the avalanche of television and print coverage of the Pyongyang government's violation of nuclear nonproliferation agreements and existing scholarly literature on North Korean policy and security, this critical issue remains mired in political punditry and often misleading sound bites. Victor Cha and David Kang step back from the daily newspaper coverage and cable news commentary and offer a reasoned, rational, and logical debate on the nature of the North Korean regime.
Coming to the issues from different perspectives―Kang believes the threat posed by Pyongyang has been inflated and endorses a more open approach, while Cha is more skeptical and advocates harsher measures―the authors together have written an essential work of clear-eyed reflection and authoritative analysis. They refute a number of misconceptions and challenge much faulty thinking that surrounds the discussion of North Korea, particularly the idea that North Korea is an irrational nation. Cha and Kang contend that however provocative, even deplorable, the Pyongyang government's behavior may at times be, it is not incomprehensible or incoherent. Neither is it "suicidal," they argue, although crisis conditions could escalate to a degree that provokes the North Korean regime to "lash out" as the best and only policy, the unintended consequence of which are suicide and/or collapse. Further, the authors seek to fill the current scholarly and policy gap with a vision for a U.S.-South Korea alliance that is not simply premised on a North Korean threat, not simply derivative of Japan, and not eternally based on an older, "Korean War generation" of supporters.
This book uncovers the inherent logic of the politics of the Korean peninsula, presenting an indispensable context for a new policy of engagement. In an intelligent and trenchant debate, the authors look at the implications of a nuclear North Korea for East Asia and U.S. homeland security, rigorously assessing historical and current U.S. policy, and provide a workable framework for constructive policy that should be followed by the United States, Japan, and South Korea if engagement fails to stop North Korean nuclear proliferation.
This book is an attempt to argue for DPRK policy from the positions of a hard-liner and a DPRK apologist. However, the biggest issue with this framing is that Prof. Cha isn't particularly a hardliner. Thus, both sides of this debate argue for pursuing a policy of engagement with the DPRK with the only difference being one of degrees.
That said, it's interesting to read this book in 2020. The past two decades have shown just how naive Prof. Kang's arguments are in this book. He frequently argues that the DPRK is stable and there have been no mass purges of officials. This is no longer the case after Kim Jong Un took power. Further, the DPRK has killed ROK civilians at Kumkangsan, Yeonpyeongdo, and most recently in the Yellow Sea near Yeonpyeongdo. The DPRK has also attempted to assassinate defectors in the ROK, has continued to develop and deploy ICBMs, and continued to develop nuclear warheads and SLBMs. Moreover, the DPRK has attacked South East Asian, Eastern European, and Latin American financial institutions along with cryptocurrency exchanges.
One of the biggest misunderstandings from the apologists is that the international community has pursued a strategy of containment that didn't work against the DPRK. In reality, comprehensive sanctions against the DPRK did not exist until 2017 and were starting to work before the Trump Administration caved in 2018. Yet, despite agreements with the ROK, the DPRK blew up the inter-Korean liaison building, fired on a ROK guardpost, continued to deploy ICBMs and fire SRBMs, and continued its cyberattacks against the ROK and other nations. The DPRK threat is no longer limited to the ROK and Japan, it is now an international issue with multiple nations targeted by the DPRK.
The conclusion in this book has proven to be naive as well. Both authors advocate for deepening US, Korea, Japan relations and claim that liberal democratic values can take the trilateral alliance beyond a security-centric relationship. They point to NATO, but again, 2020 has shown the naiveté of this analysis. NATO has its own issues with surviving a post-Cold War world, but the ROK is increasingly moving away from a liberal democratic system. And both sides of the Japan-Korea leg continue to exploit historical grievances for domestic considerations, indicating that hopes for increased cooperation 20 years ago was a pipe dream.
Victor Cha and David Kang are two scholars who opposes each other in their perspectives on the North Korea's nuclear crisis. This book represents their debate on the intentionality and the appropriate responses to North Korea. It is a great introduction for those who are unfamiliar with the topic and wish to know more. As the authors have stated themselves, the ongoing debate is filled with smear and name-calling. It has become impossible to discuss the topic without taking sides. However, the book has shown that there could exist a constructive and critical debate on strategies and making sense of the North Korea's nuclear program that can actually helps progress. Overall, the book presented convincing arguments, using empirical observations and logical causation that stood beyond regular newspaper article analysis to give the readers a more thorough and in-depth account on North Korea. The book has given me invaluable insight when doing my research paper on the failure of international counter-proliferation efforts in North Korea. Even though the book contains some short-comings, I would highly recommend this book for those who want a preliminary view onto the debate about North Korea.
David Kang and Victor Cha present two different views on what the US strategy in foreign policy should be towards South Korea. This book is even more fascinating when reading current events. Cha was recently considered for an envoy position to South Korea and got written off when he didn’t concur with the “bloody strike,” option the Trump Administration was considering. The “bloody strike” would allow the US to target key sites in NK, hit them and expect zero retaliation in return. Cha, who presents a more hardline view in this text than Kang, told the administration they were wrong to think that retaliation would not occur from the NK regime. I think this is an excellent book for students who need to understand what civil academic discourse looks like.
This book was one of the first that made me question the whole North Korea issue. It is easy to ready and puts two different opinions in contrast so that the reader can see at least two of the possible solutions to the issue. It also has a good referencing system, which sometimes this kind of books don't include. Whether you're a student, an academic or just someone interested in the Korean Peninsula, I vividly recommend this book.
In this book Victor Cha and David Kang promise to apply social science to the debate of how to engage with North Korea, and step back from the histrionics [to] offer a reasoned, rational, and logical debate on the nature of the North Korean regime and the policy that should be followed by the United States, Japan, and South Korea?(4). Cha calls his position hawk engagement,?and it is that as North Korea becomes poorer, more castigated and generally more a vestige of a bygone era, it becomes more likely to lash out with force. Through prospect theory,Cha shows that North Korea is particularly susceptible to double-or-nothing logic, and that preemptive lashing out on its part would not be surprising. He believes, therefore, that North Korea should be engaged to mitigate potential risky behavior by North Korea. Kang, on the other hand, believes that because containment has worked so far, there is no reason to fundamentally change it.
Kang takes a more traditionally realist/deterrence approach in that he believes that because the DPRK has no real chance of winning a war against the ROK, it would never launch one. Engagement should be based on the belief that North Korea would like to terminate its rogue status. On balance, Kang's view and engagement proposal toward North Korea is more optimistic than Cha's. Cha stresses the punitive measures that should be taken against North Korea, should engagement fail to curb its nuclear appetite. Kang, on the other hand, believes that the DPRK is truly trying to reform itself, would like to be a part of the community of nations, and does not touch on issues regarding North Korean belligerence.
Kang and Cha do, however, agree on many issues, and they collaborate to write the last two chapters of the book. The most interesting contribution is their view on the future regional stability should the Korean peninsula reunify. They stress that better U.S-Japan-Korean trilateral relations are crucial to regional stability. They reject the notion that a threat must be present for alliances to exist. This strikes me as overly optimistic, and naive. They countenance such criticism by pointing to the alliances that exists between the U.S. and the U.K., and the U.S. and Australia. Perhaps also taking a page from the continued existence of NATO after the fall of the USSR, they state that such alliances can become permanent unions after the threat disappears because the alliances have identities based on common liberal-democratic values, norms, and institutions(180, 185). Aside from the many problems with such thinking, Cha himself wrote a book on the U.S.-Japan-Korean alliance and showed that Korea and Japan became closer only when the U.S. backed away from its commitment to Asian stability. They answer such criticism by stating that "the American position in Asia should therefore be recessed enough in this new arrangement to impart responsibilities on the allies to consolidate their relationship, but not so recessed that Japan and South Korea choose self-help solutions outside the alliance framework . . . "(176)
Such an assertion seems based more on hope than solid theory. The dynamic that Cha analyzes in the aforementioned book whereby Korean and Japanese relations improved when American commitment was on the wain existed during the Cold War when a bipolar system was in effect. In today's multipolar, or perhaps unipolar, world the same dynamic may not, and probably does not, exist. More thinking on alliance behavior in a multipolar environment needs to be done before we can begin to speculate on the best American options in a post-unified Korean Asia.
Very thorough exam of the situation and problems in North Korea. A good call for more deliberative foreign policy, rather than the current short term thinking.