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Reformers to Radicals: The Appalachian Volunteers and the War on Poverty
A “well researched and vigorously written” account of social activism, radical politics, and the failed War on Poverty in 1960s Appalachia (Journal of American History).In 1964, a group of young social activists formed the Appalachian Volunteers with the intention of eradicating poverty in eastern Kentucky and the rest of the Southern mountains. In Reformers to Radicals, author Thomas Kiffmeyer documents the history of this organization as their youthful enthusiasm led to radicalism and controversy.These reformers sought to improve the lives of the Appalachian poor while making strides toward economic change in the region. Their efforts included refurbishing schools and homes and offering educational opportunities. But in time, these volunteers faced nationwide accusations that they were “seditious” and “un-American.” After losing the support of the federal and state governments and of many Appalachian people, the group to disband in 1970.Reformers to Radicals examines the various factors that led to the Appalachian Volunteers’ ultimate failure, from infighting within their ranks to tensions with the very people they sought to help. It chronicles a critical era in Appalachian history and investigates the impact the 1960s' reform attitude on the region.
- GenresGovernment
287 pages, Kindle Edition
First published October 10, 2008
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October 9, 2019
This is a good book to read for information on how the mid-60's War on Poverty shook out in eastern Kentucky by way of the cooperation or lack thereof among the leading nonprofit and governmental organizations involved: the Council of the Southern Mountains (from which spun off the Appalachian Volunteers), the US Office of Economic Opportunity, and Kentucky state and county governments. The CSM's and OEO's bureaucratic determination to work inside the local good ol' boy network drove the field-based AV's -- younger and more in tune with the civil rights and anti-war radicalism of the time -- to break off from the CSM in order to develop a grassroots challenge to the local power structure. The challenge failed dramatically: the AV's were essentially tarred and feathered as Commie outsiders by the legislative Kentucky Un-American Activities Committee. With the ensuing loss of state support and OEO funds, the organization came to an end after a career of less than five years.
The problem with the book is Kiffmeyer's interpretive platform. "Outsider" is with him seemingly as important a concept as it was to the KUAC. He doesn't use it in the same way, and there are a number of inconsistencies in his use of it. Primarily he uses it to drive the narrative that, at bottom, the problem all along with the AV was its use of volunteers from outside Appalachia. Even in the beginning, when CSM was still in control and the field-work involved shoring up dilapidated school houses, Kiffmeyer hears an ominous knell in the use of someone from New Jersey as a supervisor.
Not only is this an ironic interpretation at many levels -- it buys into the KUAC propaganda propped up by testimony of the very "elites" against whose interests the AV was working; it also ignores the fact that the CSM descends from such outsiders as John C. Campbell and Berea College president William Goodell Frost -- but it also exercises such parochial power that it blinds Kiffmeyer to a deeper reality that he himself reports: the influence on the "outsiders" of the Appalachians with whom they're working. Says one AV, "I felt that I was radicalized or politicized or whatever by the people that lived in the mountains themselves -- the natives."
Also available to Kiffmeyer is his account of the critical phase of AV activity -- representing it at its most radical -- that involved using OEO funds to pay for interns recruited from the very people AV was trying to help. That AV was successful in building a local base of supporters is readily apparent. Whether they were paid or unpaid, they were locals, and they were ruffling feathers. It was that fact that got the AV into trouble. They wouldn't have gotten into trouble otherwise.
It would seem possible to interpret the actions of the AV's as similar to the Highlander Folk School, where Miles Horton pioneered the leadership role of providing reins without taking them. Indeed, Kiffmeyer reports some training of AV's occurred at Highlander; he also reports activities simply to organize and make available encyclopedic public information about state and local government for use by AV's local interns and volunteers.
But Kiffmeyer is largely silent on the details of cooperation among radical AV's and their local interns, insofar as they relate to pissing off local school boards to the extent that they call in the KUAC. Maybe the details just aren't there in the record. But there's enough information to infer some kind of genuine, on-the-level, mutual working relationship with give and take on both sides. But Kiffmeyer won't give up the spectacles that see outsiders as the problem. Instead he writes that, even early on, "The Volunteers were, as we have seen no longer truly Appalachian, and the consequences for reform efforts in the region were profound. For one thing, the inclusion of more and more outsiders meant the importation of more and more ideas and mores that were foreign to Appalachia."
Meaning, apparently, long hair, short skirts, and partying. There is no indication that these things bothered anybody besides the people who hated the AV's to start with, wanted them gone, and used these kinds of things to tar them as godless Commies. In Kiffmeyer's telling, the one real thing that came between one AV and his client community was his decision -- once the KUAC had gotten his Vietnam-era draft deferment killed -- to become a conscientious objector. This his grassroots supporters could not abide. After all, their kids were in harms way. It was only fair that the AV run the same risk.
It bears repeating that the "outsiders were the problem" label was one pinned on the AV by the KUAC. It's almost as if Kiffmeyer just accepts this assertion at face value, when the record as he reports it belies that interpretation by suggesting a more complicated story that he either cannot or refuses to tell.
So this is a strange kind of book: some good details , but an odd and ultimately unconvincing "take."
The problem with the book is Kiffmeyer's interpretive platform. "Outsider" is with him seemingly as important a concept as it was to the KUAC. He doesn't use it in the same way, and there are a number of inconsistencies in his use of it. Primarily he uses it to drive the narrative that, at bottom, the problem all along with the AV was its use of volunteers from outside Appalachia. Even in the beginning, when CSM was still in control and the field-work involved shoring up dilapidated school houses, Kiffmeyer hears an ominous knell in the use of someone from New Jersey as a supervisor.
Not only is this an ironic interpretation at many levels -- it buys into the KUAC propaganda propped up by testimony of the very "elites" against whose interests the AV was working; it also ignores the fact that the CSM descends from such outsiders as John C. Campbell and Berea College president William Goodell Frost -- but it also exercises such parochial power that it blinds Kiffmeyer to a deeper reality that he himself reports: the influence on the "outsiders" of the Appalachians with whom they're working. Says one AV, "I felt that I was radicalized or politicized or whatever by the people that lived in the mountains themselves -- the natives."
Also available to Kiffmeyer is his account of the critical phase of AV activity -- representing it at its most radical -- that involved using OEO funds to pay for interns recruited from the very people AV was trying to help. That AV was successful in building a local base of supporters is readily apparent. Whether they were paid or unpaid, they were locals, and they were ruffling feathers. It was that fact that got the AV into trouble. They wouldn't have gotten into trouble otherwise.
It would seem possible to interpret the actions of the AV's as similar to the Highlander Folk School, where Miles Horton pioneered the leadership role of providing reins without taking them. Indeed, Kiffmeyer reports some training of AV's occurred at Highlander; he also reports activities simply to organize and make available encyclopedic public information about state and local government for use by AV's local interns and volunteers.
But Kiffmeyer is largely silent on the details of cooperation among radical AV's and their local interns, insofar as they relate to pissing off local school boards to the extent that they call in the KUAC. Maybe the details just aren't there in the record. But there's enough information to infer some kind of genuine, on-the-level, mutual working relationship with give and take on both sides. But Kiffmeyer won't give up the spectacles that see outsiders as the problem. Instead he writes that, even early on, "The Volunteers were, as we have seen no longer truly Appalachian, and the consequences for reform efforts in the region were profound. For one thing, the inclusion of more and more outsiders meant the importation of more and more ideas and mores that were foreign to Appalachia."
Meaning, apparently, long hair, short skirts, and partying. There is no indication that these things bothered anybody besides the people who hated the AV's to start with, wanted them gone, and used these kinds of things to tar them as godless Commies. In Kiffmeyer's telling, the one real thing that came between one AV and his client community was his decision -- once the KUAC had gotten his Vietnam-era draft deferment killed -- to become a conscientious objector. This his grassroots supporters could not abide. After all, their kids were in harms way. It was only fair that the AV run the same risk.
It bears repeating that the "outsiders were the problem" label was one pinned on the AV by the KUAC. It's almost as if Kiffmeyer just accepts this assertion at face value, when the record as he reports it belies that interpretation by suggesting a more complicated story that he either cannot or refuses to tell.
So this is a strange kind of book: some good details , but an odd and ultimately unconvincing "take."
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