At the end of World War I, the German military machine lay devastated, forbidden any attempt to rebuild. But by the dawn of World War II, its army and air forces had both been rejuvenated to sufficient vigor to conquer most of Europe. As James Corum shows, the Luftwaffe's dramatic resurrection underscored the remarkable success of Germany's visionary interwar planning.
A superb example of both military and intellectual history, Corum's study provides a complete and accurate account of the evolution of German military aviation theory, doctrine, war games, and operations between the two world wars. It reveals how the Germans, in defiance of Versailles, thoroughly studied and tested the lessons of World War I, analyzed the emerging air doctrines of other nations, and experimented with innovative aviation technology to create the world's most powerful air force by 1940.
Drawing heavily upon archival sources, Corum discloses the debates within the General Staff—led by the likes of Hans van Seeckt, Helmuth Wilberg, Wolfram von Richthofen, and Walter Wever—about the future role of airpower and the problems of aligning aviation technology with air doctrine. He challenges previous accounts and demolishes a number of myths, for example demonstrating that Germany did not dismiss the potential of strategic bombing or embrace terror bombing of civilian populations, and was not heavily influenced by its popular culture's romance with aviation.
Corum also illuminates Germany's comprehensive approach to highly mobile combined-arms warfare, its secret research and training in the Soviet Union, and its remarkable successes during the Spanish Civil War. While focusing primarily on the interwar period, he extends his analysis into the early years of World War II to examine the Luftwaffe's effectiveness in Poland and France, and expose its flaws in the Battle of Britain.
As a companion to Corum's acclaimed study of the German army between the wars, The Luftwaffe reminds us how operational doctrine, combined with one of the greatest fighting forces ever assembled, indelibly altered the fate of nations.
An excellent history of the rise of the Luftwaffe, beginning with the remnants of World War I and concluding with the commencement of the Second World War, at which point Corum gives a rather brief overview of the campaigns against Poland, France and the Low Countries, and the Battle of Britain. His work is extensively researched and argued with great clarity. Truly a must-read for any Luftwaffe historian or enthusiast!
The Luftwaffe was established in 1933. Six years later it was the best operational air force in the world. How on earth did this happen? Read this book to find out.
First of all, it had the typical German advantages: World-class aeronautical engineering. Sound practical military thought. Thorough joint training and exercise. Well-organized logistics and support that allowed operations from airfields close to the front, allowing pilots to fly 3-4 sorties per day.
Then there was carefully evaluated operational experience in the Spanish Civil War.
And the German airmen were not mesmerized by the vision of strategic bombing quickly winning a war all by itself, as the USAAF and the RAF were. The Germans recognized the value of strategic bombing, and even viewed it at the primary mission of the Luftwaffe, but they also recognized the importance of cooperating with the army in a joint campaign. It's true that the Luftwaffe never deployed an effective heavy bomber, but it wasn't for lack of trying; they were just a few years behind the US and the UK in the high-power engines necessary, and their development took a wrong turn to focus on dive bombing after that proved so effective in Spain. Anyway, their primary possible adversaries (France, Poland, Czechoslovakia) were well within medium bomber range.
By the way, the horrifying terror bombing of Guernica, made infamous by Picasso, was no such thing. Guernica was a small town of 5000 not far behind the front lines. It was bombed because it was thought to be a center for reinforcing the front. All the rest was Spanish Republican propaganda.
Too much of an apologist for the men of the Luftwaffe for my taste. Feels like Corum is going out of his way to try to prove they weren't really bad Nazi's, would have been better if he'd just avoided that judgement altogether and focused on writing a history centered on the operational military lessons we can learn from them. Insofar as the book does focus on operational military lessons it is quite good.