Nouveaux Essais sur L'Entendement Humain

by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain (2e edition) / Leibniz ; publies, avec une introduction, des notes et un appendice, par Henri Lachelier,...Date de l'edition originale : 1898Ce livre est la reproduction fidele d'une oeuvre publiee avant 1920 et fait partie d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande editee par Hachette Livre, dans le cadre d'un partenariat avec la Bibliotheque nationale de France, offrant l'opportunite d'acceder a des ouvrages anciens et souvent rares issus des fonds patrimoniaux de la BnF.Les oeuvres faisant partie de cette collection ont ete numerisees par la BnF et sont presentes sur Gallica, sa bibliotheque numerique.En entreprenant de redonner vie a ces ouvrages au travers d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande, nous leur donnons la possibilite de rencontrer un public elargi et participons a la transmission de connaissances et de savoirs parfois difficilement accessibles.Nous avons cherche a concilier la reproduction fidele d'un livre ancien a partir de sa version numerisee avec le souci d'un confort de lecture optimal. Nous esperons que les ouvrages de cette nouvelle collection vous apporteront entiere satisfaction.Pour plus d'informations, rendez-vous sur www.hachettebnf.frhttp://gallica.bnf....

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Classics, France, Metaphysics, German Literature, Essays

276 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1704

About the author

German philosopher and mathematician Baron Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz or Leibnitz invented differential and integral calculus independently of Isaac Newton and proposed an optimist metaphysical theory that included the notion that we live in "the best of all possible worlds."

Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, a polymath, occupies a prominent place in the history. Most scholars think that Leibniz developed and published ever widely used notation. Only in the 20th century, his law of continuity and transcendental homogeneity found implementation in means of nonstandard analysis. He of the most prolific in the field of mechanical calculators. He worked on adding automatic multiplication and division to calculator of Blaise Pascal, meanwhile first described a pinwheel in 1685, and used it in the first mass-produced mechanical arithmometer. He also refined the binary number system, the foundation of virtually all digital computers.

Leibniz most concluded that God ably created our universe in a restricted sense, Voltaire often lampooned the idea. Leibniz alongside the great René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza advocated 17th-century rationalism. Applying reason of first principles or prior definitions, rather than empirical evidence, produced conclusions in the scholastic tradition, and the work of Leibniz anticipated modern analytic logic.

Leibniz made major contributions to technology, and anticipated that which surfaced much later in probability, biology, medicine, geology, psychology, linguistics, and computer science. He wrote works on politics, law, ethics, theology, history, and philology. Various learned journals, tens of thousands of letters, and unpublished manuscripts scattered contributions of Leibniz to this vast array of subjects. He wrote in several languages but primarily Latin and French. No one completely gathered the writings of Leibniz.

Reviews

[Xeon · Rating 3 out of 5]

Leibniz, the person who co-invented calculus besides Newton, responds to An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by Locke. (Words can not encompass the exhilaration of typing that.)

In the spirit of Leibniz selecting sections of text, and for the sake of simplicity, I shall do the same here. A review of a review of sorts.

"There was an Italian who knew this very well: when he was going to be tortured he resolved to keep the gallows continually before his mind's eye, the better to bear up under his agonies; he was heard from time to time saying' I see you', and he explained what he meant later on, after his deliverance. Unless we resolve firmly to keep our minds on true good and true evil, so as to pursue the one and avoid the other, we find ourselves carried away, and the most important needs of this life are treated in the same way as heaven and hell are, even by their truest believers:"

Initially I had misread this as the Italian saying such to those who were torturing him. As a result of this misread I wonder whether, in specific situations of witnessing evil or having evil done to oneself, those few words can act akin to a spell to make a perpetrator uncomfortable, less forceful, or stop altogether?

"But there is no need for us to fix upon logically lowest species: we can indeed go on endlessly varying them, as is illustrated by the many varieties of oranges, limes and lemons which expert people can name and tell apart. The same thing happened with tulips and carnations when these flowers were in fashion. In any case, man's combining or not combining such and such ideas - or indeed their being or not being actually combined in nature - has no bearing on essences, genera and species, since they depend only upon possibilities, and these are independent of our thinking."

"Thus, although nature can furnish more perfect and more convenient ideas, it will not give the lie to any ideas we have which are sound and natural even if they are perhaps not the soundest and most natural."

"although I really believe that languages are the best mirror of the human mind, and that a precise analysis of the significations of words would tell us more than anything else about the operations of the understanding."

"Very good. Words are just as much reminders (notae) for oneself - in the way that numerals and algebraic symbols might be - as they are signs for others; and the use of words as signs occurs when general precepts are being applied in daily life,"

"This iambic hexameter from Latin tragedy: Cuivis potest accidere, quod cuiquam potest [Publilius Syrus], which is a more elegant way of saying' What can happen to one can happen to any', merely serves to remind us of the human condition, 'that we ought not to regard anything human as alien to us ' [Terence]. The jurists' rule which says: qui jure suo utitur, nemini facit injuriam (he who exercises his rights does wrong to nobody) appears trifling."

"In it M. Conring reproved Pappus for saying that analysis undertakes to discover the unknown by assuming it and then proceeding by inference from it to known truths. This, he said, is contrary to logic, which teaches that truths can be inferred from falsehoods."

"I maintain, that the principle of principles really amounts to making good use of ideas and of experiments;"

"This is because men judge things only in accordance with their experience, which is extremely limited, and whatever does not conform with it appears to them absurd."

"One wishes that the men who have power had knowledge in proportion: even if it did not include detailed knowledge of the sciences, the [practical] arts, history, and languages, it might suffice if they had sound, practised judgment and knowledge of broad and general matters - in brief, of the most important points."

I would add that the general ability to think and reason may be a necessary yet distinct component. For example, there are many a student who are knowledgeable yet fail at thinking beyond the syllabus or solving real world problems.

"Just as a hundred horses run no faster than one, although they can haul a greater load, so with a hundred men as compared with a single man: they cannot walk any straighter, but they will work more effectively; they cannot judge better, but they will be able to provide more of the materials on which judgment may be exercised. That is the meaning of the proverb' Two eyes see more than one'. This can be observed in assemblies, where vast numbers of considerations are presented which one or two people might never have thought of; though there is often a risk that the best decision will not be reached through these considerations, because no competent people have been given the task of thinking them over and weighing them up."

An interpretation of this may be that all the effort and resources of the world are utterly useless if not directed properly. In practice though, it is likely an optimization of (near) inconceivable degrees and types.

"I know of two main ways of organizing the totality of doctrinal truths. Each has its merits, and is worth bringing in. One is synthetic and theoretical: it involves setting out truths according to the order in which they are proved, as the mathematicians do, so that each proposition comes after those on which it depends. The other arrangement is analytic and practical: it starts with the goal of mankind, namely with the goods whose sum total is happiness, and conducts an orderly search for means which will achieve those goods and avoid the corresponding ills. These two methods are applicable to the realm of knowledge in general, and some people have also used them within particular sciences."

"To these two kinds of arrangement we must add a third. It is classification by terms, and really all it produces is a kind of Inventory. The latter could be systematic, with the terms being ordered according to certain categories shared by all peoples, or it could have an alphabetical order within the accepted language of the learned world. This Inventory is needed if one is to assemble all the propositions in which a given term occurs in a significant enough way. For in the other two procedures, where truths are set out according to their origins or according to their use, the truths which concern some one term cannot all occur together."

"Well, now, it strikes me as curious that these three kinds of arrangement correspond to the ancient division, revived by you, which divides science or philosophy into theoretical, practical and deductive, or into natural philosophy, ethics and logic. The synthetic arrangement corresponds to the theoretical, the analytic to the practical, and the one with an Inventory according to terms corresponds to logic."

As with Locke, another unsatisfying conclusion. Though, Leibniz has much that is good in those last three quotes.

[path · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have never seen anything quite like this book. It is almost a line-by-line refutation of John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding which I had previously only read in part. By the end of this volume, however, I feel that I have a good understanding of both Locke’s and Leibniz’s arguments. The heart of their disagreement concerns how humans develop an understanding about the world. For Locke, humans are born blank slates and on their minds are printed, via the senses, ideas about the world that they manage to put into words and arrange propositionally to create testable claims about the world. For Leibniz, humans are born with an innate sense of the world and the “pre-established harmony” of its contents, constructed by God’s design. In this pre-harmonized world all things have a way of fitting together and we are gradually building our understanding of it. Knowing becomes a way of understanding the synthesis of ideas that resolve into a fuller picture of the harmony. Within the limits of our inherent capabilities, guided by the historical accumulation of knowledge, and guided by the universal language of pure logic (a priori reasoning) we can achieve provisional understanding of the world.

Compared to Locke, Leibniz puts a different emphasis on reasoning. Locke believes reason is the faculty by which we form propositional knowledge from ideas that are created by the senses and translated into words. Leibniz believes reason is a recognition or “awareness” of harmony with nature, the way that contingent truths align with necessary truths which are a reflection of the way things can be and are already. Reason is not construction but discovery. To Locke understanding is systematically perceiving. To Leibniz understanding is the formation of distinct ideas accompanied by the power to reflect and recognize truths in those observations (173). It is similar to the model of “knowledge as recollection” that Platos voices through Socrates in Meno As Leibniz presents it, mind is a process of understanding that unfolds in time and is not expanded upon by adding ideas, end to end, to form a fuller mind capable of understanding. There must be a synthesis of the truth that the facts belong to, which happens in time rather than in space (203).

The trouble that I have with Leibniz's notion of understanding is that it is only accountable to experience. He is careful to say that it must accord with our experience, but presumably all experiences, to the extent that these can be known. Of course, there are plenty of times that our experience about things is wrong but sensible in light of previous and concurrent experiences (e.g., spontaneous generation). Leibniz’s reason seems to rely too much on paradigms rather than empiricism; although the latter is acknowledged as playing a role in reasoning. And I think he is aware of this precarity, but like pragmatists, he seems to have faith that the way the world is can only be one way: the way it is. And whatever we get wrong now will, given enough time, resolve in what is right. However, when power is aligned to create truths it can subvert the process and will can cause convenient truths to hold sway longer than you would think.

More Details and Thoughts Than You May Want

Leibniz elaborates on why the senses are insufficient as a basis for reasoning: “Although the senses are necessary for all our actual knowledge, they are not sufficient to provide it all, since they never give us anything but instances, that is particular or singular truths (49). The senses are fallible and only capable by themselves of giving us “truths of fact” (i.e., things true in our world) but not “necessary truths” (things true in all worlds) (73). The necessary truths within us are there in potential and they provide us with means of acting in the absence of clear and distinct ideas (86) meaning that they are innate and put there by God. Our capacity for understanding those truths has everything to do with our inherent capabilities to be open to illumination and to apply reason to discover that innate knowledge (95)

Ideas do not add up to truths via accretion and through concatenation (146). Each idea expands the wholeness of the idea it becomes more intricate in its operation. If we were to take a proposition and break it open, it cannot be decomposed into smaller propositions and then into discrete ideas because knowledge is not a collection of things so much as more and more complex machinery. Challenges the notion of distinct and clear ideas because of all the minutia that come along with sensory information, all of the stimuli that are inconsequential to the point of knowledge (133).

I very much like that this notion of knowing involves diversifying experience. Any kind of exposure to the world, whether scientific, religious, or via art adds to our experience of it and to the range of conceptions that we test against experience. The totality of what a thing is and is not counts as knowledge (355). Limited experience then makes one a poor judge of likelihood because you lack a sense of what is possible and not possible (375).

And this brings Leibniz’s argument up to his concept of the monad, which I have not read enough to understand fully, but the outline is that a monad is like an atom, a singular thing with capacities and possibilities for what it becomes. Some of what is possible for a monad to become are shared with other things (e.g., in the humans have similarities to them) but each, growing and becoming in light of its unique capabilities becomes something unique, for no matter how alike two monads are, they are never the same thing. “In so far as you conceive of the similarities amongst things, you are conceiving something in addition [to the things themselves], and that is all that universality is” (486).

Knowing this totality or universality is surely an impossibility (443) but it is clear that the attempt necessitates the formation of a diversity of experience that must, at some point, consolidate into axioms of what is generally possible to be and to cast doubt on that version of nature is “insanity” (445). But what things in the world can be is always bounded by what is necessary or possible as part of the universal pre-established harmony (440). Assuming harmony, it is possible to engage in reasoning via enthymeme (i.e., reasoning from missing premises) because those missing premises can be inferred from what must be possible given the nature of other things and the way that they are (i.e., given our emerging knowledge of the broader harmonized tapestry, what 1) explains the phenomenon under investigation and 2) is consistent with what is possible given all the other things we take as possible and true) (455). From these positions we form “judgements” about what is provisionally true (457).

[mohab samir · Rating 4 out of 5]

رغم طول الفترة التى إمتدت خلالها قرائتى لهذا الكتاب ورغم كل الحرص والتأنى الذى بذلته أثناء قراءته إلا أنى أجد صعوبة بالغة الآن فى التعبير عن محتواه وجودته .
إعترفت فى تعليقى على كتاب مقالة فى الميتافيزيقا بوحدة فكر ليبنتز وقوة فلسفته ولازلت عند هذا الرأى بعد قراءتى لأبحاثه فى الفهم الإسانى .
فهنا وجدت فكره الشمولى المتوسط الذى لا يعترف بعامل واحد لأى ظاهرة ولا يتطرف فى إنحيازاته وإع��قاداته وإنما يشمل جميع العوامل ويستطيع أن يحدد نسبة تأثير كل منها على موضوع دراسته عن طريق براعته التحليلية للمسائل الفلسفية والعلمية .
إلا أن موضوع الكتاب وهو موضوع بالغ الإتساع وجاء حديثه فيه مستفيضا فى صورة محاورة بين فيلاليت وتيوفيل والحق أن فى مقدمة الكتاب يستطيع القارىء أن يفهم أن أحدهما يمثل لايبنتز والآخر يمثل جون لوك وهو محاولة لدحض التجريبية البحتة كمصدر للمعرفة الإنسانية عند جون لوك إلا أننى عند القراءة لم أجد هذا الهجوم الذى توقعت أن أراه والحق أنى وجدت كلا المتحاورين فى تفاهم وتناغم بحيث يكمل كل منهما موضوع الآخر وإن كان هنا وهناك فى أماكن متفرقة بعض التلميحات الناقدة لتجريبية لوك المتعصبة .
والحق أن لايبنتز يعترف بأهمية التجربة ولكنه يحدد مجالاتها وأهميتها فى حياة الإنسان فى إطار معين كالعلوم والتعاملات الإنسانية وغيرها إلا أنه يعترف مع ديكارت بوجود أفكار قبلية فى العقل الإنسانى وإن لم يغالى فى وجودها كماً ونوعاً وهى عنده كالأفكار ذات الضرورة المنطقية كقانون عدم التناقض الذى لا يحتاج لخبرة أو تجربة ليدركه الإنسان وكالحساب الذهنى وإن كان بدون معرفة العمليات الحسابية وإستعان فى هذا الجزء من المقال بشهادة أفلاطون فى محاورة مينون عندما إستعان بعبد لم يتعلم أى نوع من الهندسة والحساب وجعله يجيب عن أسئلته الهندسية والحسابية بشكل إرتجالى .
وإن كان لايبنتز يؤمن بأهمية العقل وضرورة تجكيمة حتى فى الأمور الدينية إلا أنه يقر ضرورة الإيمان بالله والمعجزات والأنبياء والكتاب المقدس على أنه حقائق منطقيتها حدسية وليست برهانية وضرورتها عنده مطلقة وهو يحاول فى فصل أو أكثر التوفيق بين العقل الذى بدأ يفرض سيطرته ويخلع الإيمان الدينى عن عرشه وبين الدين الذى ضعفت أركانه مع تطور العلم وتقدم الفلسفة ومرور قرن من الحروب الدينية فى أوروبا .
لن أوفق أبداً فى محاولتى لتوضيح محتوى الكتاب لكنه تجربة مثمرة بالتأكيد .

[Campbell Rider]

Ostensibly a 'dialogue', Leibniz basically gives a line by line, paragraph by paragraph summary of Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" with his own responses in between, sometimes outright quoting blocks of the original text. that's an advantage really: you're basically reading two books in one. but it does make it more difficult to interpret the text as a unified work that develops a single argument representative of Leibniz's mature philosophy.
There are some key themes Leibniz latches onto in Locke's text, which is great because it helps clarify what was at stake in the book to begin with: are there innate ideas? what is the contribution of the intellect (if any) to the formation of ideas and concepts? are there real essences, or only nominal ones? how do words attach to ideas?

Leibniz also goes into some appropriately batshit territory: if there are aliens on the moon, and they appear to have rationality, should we baptise them? (it's a tricky one because jesus only died for the sins of mankind — leibniz says we should baptise them provisionally, just in case).
I enjoyed Leibniz's treatment of molyneux's problem—he's just about the only major philosopher from that period to figure out that since blind people can do geometry, then spatial ideas probably aren't just visual in character.
In fact, these little asides are probably what's most memorable about the text as a whole, and they do give you a good idea of some key Leibnizian themes: yes we should baptise aliens, because they possess rational souls (which are the essence of humanity); of course blind experience is transferable to vision, because clearly understood ideas reside in the intellect, not the sense organs.
but there's plenty of boring shit in here, like Leibniz's speculative etymology and his long theological ramblings about whether unborn children go to heaven etc etc
overall i give it four 'monads' out of five !! haha

[John · Rating 5 out of 5]

What an amazing work this is!!!! Written near the end of Leibniz's life (1703-1705), not too long before his "Essays on Theodicy" (1710), the Essays are the work of the mature philosopher explaining his point of view in relation to Locke's thought. Almost all of these views were already set before he wrote this work and are found in other works (as Leibniz often notes), but on occasion we can see that Locke's ideas inspire Leibniz to consider his views from a different stance. In some ways, the "New Essays" has an ease about it, compared to Leibniz's professional articles, that makes his philosophy a bit clearer at times. It also at points offers a good summary of his philosophy, though not as focused or detailed as his articles. Some object to the artificial dialogue structure, but I did not find it that cumbersome. There are so many high points, including when Leibniz moves away from the philosophy and lashes out at his society. Unlike many philosophers, Leibniz had a life in the world and saw first-hand the problems of governing, education, and commerce. I particularly enjoyed the Preface and Chapter XXI of Book II, on power and freedom.

I read the book beside the original French and found the translation at times free and even paraphrased, especially in Parts III and IV, as if one person then another was translating. As a translator myself, I know how easy it is to simply avoid the cumbersome way an author writes and make it more elegant in English. Nonetheless, they rarely missed Leibniz's intent (I think), and I'm not an expert in 17th century French. I did wonder why certain translation decisions were made.

The "Notes" in this edition are quite exceptional and important as a work of their own. Some of them are little essays on important ideas or people connected to Leibniz or his contemporaries. Indeed one might purchase the book for the "Notes" and not be disappointed.

This Cambridge edition is useful and worth buying especially for the great notes and the clarification of Locke's words. As in all translations of important works, it would be helpful to know the original language for reference.

[inès :) · Rating 4 out of 5]

Je triche je le mets alors que j’ai lu que la partie au programme…
Mais en vrai merci Leibniz, je suis jamais déçue ? J’avais vrmt la flemme de le lire et finalement c’est un BANGER (shoutout au chap 21 de ma khôlle <3)

[JoJo · Rating 4 out of 5]

don't know if it's cheating to say I "finished" this when I really cannot tell you anything Leibniz said except that it was prob the exact opposite of whatever Locke said that chapter bc he's a hater, but the summaries were pretty helpful, even if the formatting of the book as a "dialogue" was laughable and the tangents were generally boringly redundant /the math scary /the logic scarring

[Juliette · Rating 3 out of 5]

J’avoue n’avoir lu que la moitié mais il y a tellement de passages que j’ai lus deux fois que c’est comme si je l’avais lu en entier non ?
(Je finirais peut-être un jour)

[Liedzeit Liedzeit · Rating 3 out of 5]

I can never decide who I think was the greater philosopher. Wittgenstein or Leibniz. Wittgenstein is closer to my heart but when I read Leibniz I am amazed by the sheer magnitude of his insight into things. But having said this, I must admit that I dislike this book thoroughly. It is a dialogue where the two proponents discuss everything under the sun under the pretext of discussing the philosophy of Locke.

The dialogue form in itself was a bad idea going all the way back to Plato. Because it is impossible for one author to really give justice to opposing views. Sometimes when it is clear that one of the talkers is obviously stupid (as with Galileo) this can be quite amusing but mostly it is annoying.

But with Leibniz it is different. He really did believe that there is truth in everything and everyone. And reading this I never knew who of the two I was supposed to root for.

So there were long stretches of time when I avoided taking up the book again. And when I had finished it I could not write a review because I had no idea what to say about the book.

Well, it is probably brilliant. But there is nothing in it that Leibniz has not said somewhere else, more clearly and more succinctly.

[Stephen Hanna · Rating 2 out of 5]

I read the first two books (of four) as part of a self-made curriculum en route to reading Kant's critiques. Many of the ideas discussed are interesting, especially so if you've read Locke's essay being responded to. But the writing can be dense, redundant, and tedious to work through without a significant payoff. The best discussions are on those of identity, definining infinity (whether infinitely small or large), and innate ideas.

Lessons: Identity is based on all discernible characteristics of an object, including spatio-temporal ones. This is an interesting opposition to Locke's stream of consciousness theory of identity, but I'm not sure it's one I agree with. I still lean towards Locke's theory of identity.
Non-infinity objects are not pieces of infinity, rather infinity is an abstract concept defined as NOT any finite set of objects.
We are born with innate ideas with the implication that these ideas are inclinations (such as a tendency to avoid brightly patterned animals, which may be coded into our genome to be seen as poisonous)

[Laurent Dv]

Ce livre est une réponse à l’Essai sur l’entendement de Locke (déjà mort à ce moment) après un dialogue vivant manqué entre Locke (qui l’esquive) et Leibniz. Il se présente sous la forme d’un dialogue socratique mais dépourvu de réalisme, d’humour et d’enthousiasme qu’on y retrouve habituellement. On a Philalète qui défend Locke et sort des citations mots pour mots de l’Essai et Théophile qui répond à ces arguments avec le point de vue de Leibniz. Beaucoup de fois, Leibniz reconnaîtra de nombreux accords (par exemple que les sens donnent des connaissances, qu’il faut faire attention aux préjugés reçus sans esprit critique) avec Locke mais ira plus loin dans les capacités de l’homme dans sa connaissance (plus optimiste que Locke).

L'édition flammarion est insupportable : le texte est ultra petit (comme dans les bibles à 1 €). Dommage comme l'introduction et les notes sont utiles et de bonne qualité.

Leibniz défend l’existence de vérités innées sans nier pour autant l’efficacité de sens pour acquérir de la connaissance.

1. Il répond au principal argument de Locke : s’il y avait vraiment des vérités innées, alors tout le monde les connaîtrait aisément. Leibniz répond que c’est faux car il n’y a pas d’implication nécessaire de inné à évident pour tous. Ainsi, c’est normal que tous les enfants ne connaissent pas ces vérités dès leur jeune âge : elles nécessitent beaucoup d’attention et de travail.
2. Leibniz donne son argument que les sens ne peuvent pas être notre seule et unique source de connaissance car ils n’arrivent jamais à nous faire connaître des lois générales et universelles (que le soleil va se lever le lendemain comme tous les jours avant). La seule alternative, c’est donc que ces connaissances universelles viennent de notre fond, qu’elles sont innées.
3. D’après Leibniz, Locke se contredit lui-même puisque que lui en personne croit implicitement aux idées innées comme il autorise deux manières de connaître : la sensation et la réflexion (indépendante des sens qui implique donc des idées innées).
4. A l’argument selon lequel les principes innés sont inutiles puisqu’on peut connaître des choses sans le principe général. Par exemple, on sait que le bleu n’est pas jaune (une application du principe de non contradiction). Mais Leibniz répond que bien qu’on ne l’utilise ou même le connaît pas explicitement, on utilise implicitement le principe général ou on suppose sa validité, tout comme quand on omet une des deux prémisses dans un enthymème sans pour autant que cela remette en cause le bien-fondé des syllogismes en général.
5. Leibniz défend aussi qu’il y a des vérités innées en morale. A l’argument de Locke que si c’était le cas, tous les peuples auraient les mêmes avis moraux, Leibniz répond que c’est à cause de notre mauvaise volonté et de nos passions qu’on ne reconnaît pas les lois naturelles en nous (il cite Romains 2.15 comme lieu commun). Il y a deux manières de les connaître de façon innée : par l’instinct (on est attiré par les bénéfices du plaisir) et par la raison (par la loi naturelle).

Il rejette la position de Locke sur le fait que l’âme ne pense pas toujours : la preuve en est qu’on dort, on est inactif. Leibniz répond qu’on est toujours “allumé” mais que de façon très légère, tellement légère qu’on ne s’en rend pas compte.

Leibniz rejette la tabula rasa de Locke.

Il rejette aussi la position selon laquelle les qualités secondaires sont purement subjectives car elles ne sont jamais les mêmes en fonction des personnes (par exemple, la sensation d’un objet est froid pour quelqu’un, chaud pour un autre).

Il trouve les remarques de Locke sur l’inquiétude utiles mais n’en ferait pas la principale et exclusive cause de nos choix. Pour lui, elle ne contredit pas l’axiome des anciens que le bien est ultimement ce qui gouverne nos actions.

A relire sur le libre-arbitre. Pour lui il n’y a pas de liberté d’indifférence totale sinon on serait des bêtes qui font des choix sans raison et arbitraires. Au contraire, une fois que l’entendement fixe le choix, le choix est déterminé. Il y a forcément des raisons qui déterminent nos choix.

Le critère de la conscience de Locke pour l’identité personnelle ne suffit pas car on peut oublier des fois des choses sur nous. On a donc aussi besoin du témoignage des autres hommes. C’est l’âme qui permet de la fonder, on ne peut pas se baser que sur le corps (à relire).

Leibniz fait la distinction entre idée et image, que Locke confond selon lui, et ce qui est la cause de ses incompréhensions et de certaines de ses thèses erronées.

Il dit son accord avec Locke que l’homme est un animal sociétal et qu’il se lie naturellement entre hommes. Il compare cela aux animaux qui se mettent naturellement en société pour assurer leur bien commun autrement impossible comme les oiseaux ou les castors qui s’assemblent pour construire des barrages en bois et pécher les poisson dedans.

Leibniz défend contre Locke l'utilité et la fécondité de la distinction traditionnelle entre genres et espèces.

Il défend la définition de la vérité correspondance.

Contre le conceptualisme de Locke, le principal argument de Leibniz c’est que ce n’est pas parce que nous avons beaucoup de mal à connaître les essences des choses mais plutôt leurs accidents qu’on a du mal à relier qu’elles n’existent pas. Cela ne nous empêche pas non plus de dire des propositions universelles vraies. Par exemple on peut dire que l’or est fixe (proposition universelle vraie) sans pour autant connaître son essence.

Il pointe des défauts dans la preuve théiste de Locke : on ne peut déduire qu’il y a toujours eu une chose qui existe de toute éternité que cette chose est éternelle.

Il accepte l’argument ontologique qu’il réduit à la dispute primordiale sur la possibilité ou non de l’existence d’un être parfait. Il rejette l’argument de l’idée de Dieu en l’homme. Il donne sa preuve par l’harmonie préétablie sans quoi l’action des choses resteraient inexpliquée. C’est là qu’on trouve sa meilleur explication des monades.

Il défend l’utilisation des maximes (propositions universelles immédiates) car la connaissance repose (ou se ramène à) ultimement sur le général et pas juste le particulier.

Il accepte l’importance du syllogisme contra Locke mais reconnaît qu’on n’a pas besoin de tout formuler en syllogisme explicite comme souvent on le suppose dans des formes plus simples comme des enthymèmes.

Pour Leibniz, ce qui est au-dessus de la raison, ce n'est pas ce qui n'est pas connaissable car dépassant nos capacités de sensation ou de réflexion. Car on peut imaginer que Dieu améliore nos capacités de sensation par exemple, et alors nous pourrions connaître des choses qui nous sont pourtant jusqu'alors inconnaissables. C'est donc plutôt ce qu'on ne peut pas connaître par nos capacités naturelles sans révélation divine.

Leibniz acquiesce la distinction entre foi et raison de Locke car sans la raison, il n'y a aucun critère pour départager les différentes religions et révélations contradictoires. Il reconnait la distinction entre nature et grâce, le premier ordre étant celui des connaissances accessibles par la raison seule, le second, celles par la révélation qu'on doit accepter après vérification de sa fiabilité.

[John · Rating 5 out of 5]

In many ways better than the book Leibniz is reviewing because Leibniz explains more clearly the implications of each point and helped me understand Locke. But beyond that, Leibniz's own philosophy is revealed so well and after reading this book, I have a renewed appreciation for the great depth of his thinking.

[Jean-françois Virey · Rating 5 out of 5]

J'étais à deux doigts de mettre quatre étoiles à ce livre, ce que l'édition que j'ai lue mériterait peut-être: une typographie trop petite et des notes insuffisantes (notamment comparées à celles, exemplaires, de la Théodicée, dans la même collection.) Mais ce serait chipoter. Ce que j'ai trouvé frustrant dans le livre lui-même, c'est que contrairement aux apparences, il ne s'agit pas vraiment d'un dialogue philosophique: en réalité, Philalèthe cite des passages de Locke l'un après l'autre (jusqu'à deux pages), et Théophile/Leibniz lui répond, mais alors que Leibniz a lu Locke, Locke, lui, n'entend pas Leibniz et ne peut donc lui répondre et continue sur sa lancée en bon sourd qu'il est. Par ailleurs, comme Leibniz est purement réactif, c'est Locke qui décide du programme, ce qui fait que l'expression des idées de Leibniz suit la logique de celles de Locke (ou du moins l'ordre que celui-ci leur impose), alors qu'il aurait été beaucoup plus profitable qu'elles suivent la leur.

[Trounin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Лейбниц выступил в качестве препятствия для английского философа Джона Локка. Будучи амбициозным человеком, Готфрид любил обсуждать чужие размышления, делая так сугубо из желания вступить в спор с ещё одним оппонентом. К чести Локка, Лейбниц не встретил понимания. Переписки между ними не получилось. Титаническое переосмысление Готфридом трудов Локка ни к чему не привело. Его оппонент умер в 1704 году, и Лейбниц не стал публиковать, написанный им к тому моменту, труд, в котором он, словно философ древности — на основе диалога между двумя мужами, старался опровергнуть часть воззрений, предоставив вместо них собственный вариант трактовки. Такой подход — напрасное распыление сил. Но Лейбниц иначе не умел — ему всегда требовалась мишень, на мнение которой он будет опираться: иным образом он не умел философствовать.

(c) Trounin

[Pardis TD · Rating 5 out of 5]

He remains one of my favorite jurists of all time (he was also a mathematician). He blended the two subjects extremely well and it worked really good for him, as his knowledge was due to the expression of ethics and empiricism he had gained as a jurist into his mathematics, making it so practical. I highly recommend his ideas that can be found in his book, as they are centered and they are 100% accurate, which is unlikely for past science, past science isn't naturally perfectionist, but because he was a jurist too, he did his best to just establish fact-based theories, and that is how they stood the test of time. To date, we still cannot confute his works. Objectivity is everything in science, otherwise it's just another paradigm shift and it may work for some time, but then it can get discarded or refuted when new technology comes along.

[Nick Walsh · Rating 4 out of 5]

Leibniz is great for fantasy, imagination, make believe, games. Leibniz is a one of a kind from a gone era. I can never finish this damn book. It's pedantic. A greatest hits edition of this book is needed.

[louwize · Rating 2 out of 5]

j’avoue que ça m’a pas trop convaincue et même pas mal ennuyée

[Yann · Rating 3 out of 5]

Je connaissais surtout Leibniz par des souvenirs de taupe, pour ces travaux sur le calcul différentiel, mais pas du tout par ses écrits philosophiques, et en particulier, je n'ai pas lu sa théologie. Par contre, j'ai été très intéressé de lire ses réactions à l'essai sur l'entendement humain de Locke, ouvrage qui m'avait beaucoup profité. Leibniz était déjà très connu lorsque la philosophie de Locke a été portée à sa connaissance, et il a cherché par divers moyens de rentrer en contact avec lui, sans succès. Il a donc travaillé en dilettante sur ces nouveaux essais, qui sont construit sous la forme d'un dialogue entre Théophile (qui aime Dieu), qui représente l'auteur, et Philalèthe (qui aime la Vérité), qui représente un admirateur de Locke (sinon Locke lui-même, car il se borne le plus souvent à citer avec exactitude de larges passages de l'essai de l'entendement humain). Le plan de l'ouvrage reprend exactement celui de l'ouvrage de celui dont il veut être une réponse, si bien que la forme du dialogue est quelque peu artificielle et inadaptée, car à chaque passage cité par Philalèthe, Théophile émet des objections, mais sans que Philalèthe puisse en tenir aucun compte, puisqu'il se borne à suivre à livre, si bien Théophile s'impatiente sans raison lorsqu'il entend Philalèthe reprendre des arguments qu'il croyait déjà réfuté. A la décharge de Leibniz, il n'avait pas prévu de publier cet ouvrage: la mort de Locke étant survenue avant qu'il l'ai finit, il l'abandonna par désintérêt.
Le style de Leibniz est agréable et facile : son érudition alimente sa faconde, et il puise de la vaste étendue de son savoir une foule d'exemples et d'anecdotes qui illustrent ses propos et égaient des sujets parfois abstraits et arides. Il rivalise d'amabilité avec Locke, ce qui le rend bien sûr beaucoup plus crédible que s'il s'était borné à un pamphlet.
Sur quoi porte la controverse ? Principalement, puisqu'il s'agit d'étudier les facultés de l'esprit humain, sur les modalités suivant lesquelles l'homme acquiert des connaissances, ou, pour parler grec, l'épistémologie. La controverse est ancienne : on la retrouve déjà dans le Thééthète de Platon et dans la métaphysique d'Aristote : elle continue avec Hume, puis Kant, pour ceux que j'ai pu pratiquer. Pour l'informaticien que je suis, c'est une activité quotidienne que de modéliser la réalité, créer des catégorie, concevoir des ontologies, et donc ce sujet me passionne. Le fondement de la thèse de Locke et de réfuter l'existence d'idées innées, reçues universellement par tout être humain, et à partir desquelles, par l'usage de la raison, peuvent être déduites toutes les connaissance, à condition que l'on se dégage de l'erreur dans lesquelles pourraient nous conduire les sens: au contraire, Locke considère que l'esprit de l'homme est une page blanche à ses débuts, sur lesquelles s'impriment les expériences, et à partir desquelles il créé des connaissances en utilisant les facultés que sont l'intelligence (capacité à lier les objets), le discernement (capacité à identifier des caractéristiques discriminantes) et la mémoire (stockage, mais aussi restitution de l'information, plus ou moins rapide et plus ou moins exacte).
Aller plus dans le détail m'entrainerait sans doute trop loin, mais qui s'intéresse à ce sujet trouveras dans cet ouvrage de Leibniz des objections, qu'il trouvera fondées ou non, propres à alimenter sa réflexion.

[Reinhard Gobrecht · Rating 5 out of 5]

Das Buch ist in Dialogform geschrieben. Eine Person des Dialoges vertritt die Meinung John Lockes, die andere Person die Meinung von Leibniz. Es werden interessante Diskussionen geführt, z. B. über Ideen, Prinzipien, angeborenes Wissen, Verstand und Vernunft. Ein sehr informatives und gründliches Werk der Philosophie.

[Austen · Rating 5 out of 5]

My favorite work by Leibniz.

[SØren · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very concise, very intelligent.