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Macmillan Wars of the United States
The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy
..". a strong and stimulating book. It has no rival in either scope or quality. For libraries, history buffs, and armchair warriors, it is a must. For political science students, career diplomats, and officers in the armed services, its reading should be required." --History
"A particularly timely account." --Kansas City Times
"It reads easily but is not a popularized history... nor does the book become a history of battles.... Weigley's analyses and interpretations are searching, competent, and useful." --Perspective
"A particularly timely account." --Kansas City Times
"It reads easily but is not a popularized history... nor does the book become a history of battles.... Weigley's analyses and interpretations are searching, competent, and useful." --Perspective
608 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1973
30 people are currently reading
1689 people want to read
About the author
Russell F. Weigley
28 books17 followersRussell Frank Weigley, PhD, was the Distinguished University Professor of History at Temple University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and a noted military historian. His research and teaching interests centered on American and world military history, World War II, and the American Civil War. One of Weigley's most widely received contributions to research is his hypothesis of a specifically American Way of War, i.e. an approach to strategy and military operations, that, while not predetermined, is distinct to the United States because of cultural and historical constraints.
Weigley was born in Reading, Pennsylvania on July 2, 1930. He graduated from Albright College in 1952, attended the University of Pennsylvania for his masters degree and doctorate, and wrote his dissertation under Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, Roy F. Nichols. It was published as Quartermaster General of the Union Army: A Biography of M.C. Meigs (Columbia University Press, 1959). After receiving his degree, Weigley taught at Penn from 1956 to 1958, and from 1958 to 1962 at Drexel University. Then he joined the faculty at Temple as an associate professor and remained until his retirement in 1998 as Distinguished University Professor. The school considered him the heart and soul of the History department, and at one point he had over 30 PhD candidates working under him concurrently. He also was a visiting professor at Dartmouth College and the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
Weigley's graduate teaching emphasized military history defined in a broadly comprehensive way, including operational, combat history but also extending to the larger issues of war and its significance; to the history of ideas about war, peace, and the armed forces; and to the place of the soldier in the state and in society.
Weigley was awarded a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 1969-70. He received the Athenaeum of Philadelphia Award for Non-Fiction in 1983 and the Samuel Eliot Morison Prize of the American Military Institute in 1989. His Age of Battles received the Distinguished Book Award of the Society for Military History for 1992 for a work in non-American military history. He has served as President of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania and the American Military Institute. In recognition of his scholarly achievements, Weigley was named Distinguished University Professor at Temple in 1985.
- from Wikipedia
Weigley was born in Reading, Pennsylvania on July 2, 1930. He graduated from Albright College in 1952, attended the University of Pennsylvania for his masters degree and doctorate, and wrote his dissertation under Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, Roy F. Nichols. It was published as Quartermaster General of the Union Army: A Biography of M.C. Meigs (Columbia University Press, 1959). After receiving his degree, Weigley taught at Penn from 1956 to 1958, and from 1958 to 1962 at Drexel University. Then he joined the faculty at Temple as an associate professor and remained until his retirement in 1998 as Distinguished University Professor. The school considered him the heart and soul of the History department, and at one point he had over 30 PhD candidates working under him concurrently. He also was a visiting professor at Dartmouth College and the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
Weigley's graduate teaching emphasized military history defined in a broadly comprehensive way, including operational, combat history but also extending to the larger issues of war and its significance; to the history of ideas about war, peace, and the armed forces; and to the place of the soldier in the state and in society.
Weigley was awarded a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 1969-70. He received the Athenaeum of Philadelphia Award for Non-Fiction in 1983 and the Samuel Eliot Morison Prize of the American Military Institute in 1989. His Age of Battles received the Distinguished Book Award of the Society for Military History for 1992 for a work in non-American military history. He has served as President of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania and the American Military Institute. In recognition of his scholarly achievements, Weigley was named Distinguished University Professor at Temple in 1985.
- from Wikipedia
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 34 reviews
July 21, 2014
Weigley covers American military history from the Revolutionary War to the Vietnam War, showing that since the Civil War the US has preferred the "strategy of annihilation" over both the Napoleonic strategy of the decisive battle (followed by Lee in the Civil War) and the strategy of attrition, pursued by Washington in the Revolutionary War. The strategy of annihilation says that the military should focus on the destruction of the enemy's military forces through the application of overwhelming force. The US pursued the strategy of annihilation for several reasons. From the time of the Civil War on, we had the resources and manpower to batter enemy forces into submission, as Grant did to Lee in the 1864-1865 campaigns. As a democracy, the strategy of annihilation serves the public need for a relatively rapid victory by defeating the enemy quickly and decisively, avoiding long drawn-out conflicts that would undermine electoral support. Finally, the US has avoided having to compromise at the end of wars because the strategy of annihilation renders foes completely prostrate, at least before the Cold War.
What makes this book so valuable is the clear thinking and presentation of complex ideas about strategy, one of the most overused and misunderstood terms of the present day. Weigley walks the reader through the problems faced by the US at different times, the doctrinal theorizing, and the successes and failures of the application of doctrine. The most interesting part of the book is the final section about strategy in the Cold War. The Atomic Revolution rendered the strategy of annihilation moot against America's principle foe, because pursuing the annihilation of the foe would virtually guarantee one's own annihilation. Ike's massive retaliation policy reflected the American annihilation tradition, but it was unsuited to stopping Communist advances below the level of nuclear or even conventional war. Therefore, the US developed limited war capabilities, including unconventional war, new tactics like airmobile infantry, expanded military aid missions, and counterinsurgency. The military, however, chafed under increased political restrictions on the use of force in both Korea and Vietnam. Despite the push of JFK and others to change the military's strategic thinking, pursuing the annihilation of the foe's military forces remained the default strategic concept. When the US started putting forces in Vietnam, the civilian leaders at the DoD and the military leadership were thinking in very different terms. The DoD under McNamara pursued a limited war strategy called graduated response, in which force is used at calibrated levels to communicate resolve to and punish North Vietnam. The military, however, expanded their mission rapidly from protecting airbases and carving out enclaves (limited war) to search and destroy missions, huge troops requests, and massive aerial bombing (. In a sense, these two parties saw the use of force in very different ways, and both strategies were probably erroneous for Vietnam. Weigley concedes that if the US had actually pursued a COIN-type strategy in Vietnam, they would have had a better chance at succeeding. It's important to keep in mind here that the military's shift to limited war did not necessarily mean a shift away from conventional strategy or thinking.
Weigley ends the book with a provocative idea "Because the record of nonnuclear limited war in obtaining acceptable decisions at tolerable cost is also scarcely heartening, the history of usable combat may at last be reaching its end." I may be missing his meaning here, but I think he's pretty off, and not just in hindsight. Limited war failed in Vietnam, but that doesn't mean that the use of force, carefully calibrated to one's political goals, the interests of other nations such as the USSR, and the realities on the ground, can't be useful. He's right to say that the strategy of annihilation is less applicable than in the past, but the vast spectrum of military intervention below that remains potentially useful to the US and other nations. 477 pages.
What makes this book so valuable is the clear thinking and presentation of complex ideas about strategy, one of the most overused and misunderstood terms of the present day. Weigley walks the reader through the problems faced by the US at different times, the doctrinal theorizing, and the successes and failures of the application of doctrine. The most interesting part of the book is the final section about strategy in the Cold War. The Atomic Revolution rendered the strategy of annihilation moot against America's principle foe, because pursuing the annihilation of the foe would virtually guarantee one's own annihilation. Ike's massive retaliation policy reflected the American annihilation tradition, but it was unsuited to stopping Communist advances below the level of nuclear or even conventional war. Therefore, the US developed limited war capabilities, including unconventional war, new tactics like airmobile infantry, expanded military aid missions, and counterinsurgency. The military, however, chafed under increased political restrictions on the use of force in both Korea and Vietnam. Despite the push of JFK and others to change the military's strategic thinking, pursuing the annihilation of the foe's military forces remained the default strategic concept. When the US started putting forces in Vietnam, the civilian leaders at the DoD and the military leadership were thinking in very different terms. The DoD under McNamara pursued a limited war strategy called graduated response, in which force is used at calibrated levels to communicate resolve to and punish North Vietnam. The military, however, expanded their mission rapidly from protecting airbases and carving out enclaves (limited war) to search and destroy missions, huge troops requests, and massive aerial bombing (. In a sense, these two parties saw the use of force in very different ways, and both strategies were probably erroneous for Vietnam. Weigley concedes that if the US had actually pursued a COIN-type strategy in Vietnam, they would have had a better chance at succeeding. It's important to keep in mind here that the military's shift to limited war did not necessarily mean a shift away from conventional strategy or thinking.
Weigley ends the book with a provocative idea "Because the record of nonnuclear limited war in obtaining acceptable decisions at tolerable cost is also scarcely heartening, the history of usable combat may at last be reaching its end." I may be missing his meaning here, but I think he's pretty off, and not just in hindsight. Limited war failed in Vietnam, but that doesn't mean that the use of force, carefully calibrated to one's political goals, the interests of other nations such as the USSR, and the realities on the ground, can't be useful. He's right to say that the strategy of annihilation is less applicable than in the past, but the vast spectrum of military intervention below that remains potentially useful to the US and other nations. 477 pages.
March 3, 2010
As a foundational text for understanding not only American strategy, but basic concepts of national strategy itself, this book is unsurpassed. It’s one of the few I can truly call “epic.”
Beginning with George Washington’s “strategy of attrition” during the Revolutionary War, Weigley traces the scope of American strategic thought up to the closing days of the Vietnam War. Structurally, American strategy falls into several phases. Washington eventually gives way to Halleck, who is then replaced by Ulysses Grant. Grant’s approach to war – “a strategy of annihilation” – then serves as the United States’ guiding principle until well into the twentieth century.
As was the case in most arenas, nukes changed everything. The beginning of the Cold War was a return to Marshall and MacArthur’s styles from World War II, but that emphasis on conventional war didn’t last long. Deterrence soon became the word of the day, and the strategic legacies that the army had inherited from Washington, Greene, Grant, and a host of other thinkers fell completely by the wayside.
The modern U.S. Navy is, of course, born out of the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahanian naval thought went relatively unchanged until after World War II, but the dominance of battleships remained alive and well until relatively late in the war. The Air Force gets a similar ‘father figure’ in Billy Mitchell, and the struggle to become an independent branch of the armed services bears particular resonance now, with that very independence being questioned. The turf war between the navy and air force in the early days of the Cold War is very well-documented, with the emphasis on strategic bombers versus carrier aviation shown to be more important than a mere interservice spat.
Weigley’s writing is accessible in that rarest of ways – intelligible yet sophisticated. At times he explains fairly complex concepts, but manages to avoid getting too caught up in minutiae while still covering all the important details. Thinkers in every echelon of the military get a fair hearing, from the usual generals and Joint Chiefs down to the occasional major or even captain (Boyd: curiously absent). And while the overall relevance of The American Way of War is unquestionable, the rather abrupt stopping-point of 1973 is somewhat jarring, and one wishes that Weigley had continued to examine the evolution of American strategy.
For career strategists, The American Way of War might seem oversimplified, but for everyone else, it’s a perfect introduction to not just American doctrine, but national strategy as a concept. And perhaps most important, Weigley demonstrates just where we’ve come from, and how far we have – or haven’t – come since Washington and Valley Forge.
Beginning with George Washington’s “strategy of attrition” during the Revolutionary War, Weigley traces the scope of American strategic thought up to the closing days of the Vietnam War. Structurally, American strategy falls into several phases. Washington eventually gives way to Halleck, who is then replaced by Ulysses Grant. Grant’s approach to war – “a strategy of annihilation” – then serves as the United States’ guiding principle until well into the twentieth century.
As was the case in most arenas, nukes changed everything. The beginning of the Cold War was a return to Marshall and MacArthur’s styles from World War II, but that emphasis on conventional war didn’t last long. Deterrence soon became the word of the day, and the strategic legacies that the army had inherited from Washington, Greene, Grant, and a host of other thinkers fell completely by the wayside.
The modern U.S. Navy is, of course, born out of the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahanian naval thought went relatively unchanged until after World War II, but the dominance of battleships remained alive and well until relatively late in the war. The Air Force gets a similar ‘father figure’ in Billy Mitchell, and the struggle to become an independent branch of the armed services bears particular resonance now, with that very independence being questioned. The turf war between the navy and air force in the early days of the Cold War is very well-documented, with the emphasis on strategic bombers versus carrier aviation shown to be more important than a mere interservice spat.
Weigley’s writing is accessible in that rarest of ways – intelligible yet sophisticated. At times he explains fairly complex concepts, but manages to avoid getting too caught up in minutiae while still covering all the important details. Thinkers in every echelon of the military get a fair hearing, from the usual generals and Joint Chiefs down to the occasional major or even captain (Boyd: curiously absent). And while the overall relevance of The American Way of War is unquestionable, the rather abrupt stopping-point of 1973 is somewhat jarring, and one wishes that Weigley had continued to examine the evolution of American strategy.
For career strategists, The American Way of War might seem oversimplified, but for everyone else, it’s a perfect introduction to not just American doctrine, but national strategy as a concept. And perhaps most important, Weigley demonstrates just where we’ve come from, and how far we have – or haven’t – come since Washington and Valley Forge.
June 1, 2022
Best book I've ever read 10/10, added so much to my life. I am not the same person after reading this masterpiece. Even though I did not read the last chapter bc it's not relevant for my thematic seminar essay and bc it was time to let thematic seminar go and start working on my exams, I still read the whole ass book for that one chapter, that was about the Korean War. Also walking around in the silent area with that huge ass book made me look super smart. It really hurts to say bye to Russel Weigley and the American Way of War, something I made my personality since March <3 It will be hard to return this book to the library for the summer holidays, but it's time to say goodbye :( I'll miss u. I'll miss reading about how Americans used fancy ways to engage in wars that wasn't even about them. Bye-bye... :''')
December 10, 2023
An interesting book that looks at how the US Military developed the strategy of crush your foe with all your abilities and weapons systems. In this case, the enemy is the military of whatever opponent you are facing at the time. It starts out with the US Army before there was actually a US. going over the tactics of Washington in the Revolution and moving up through the US involvement in Vietnam. It studies the way that strategy was developed and how it was applied in the wars that followed. It shows that in the time after WWII and moving through Vietnam the US Military struggled with the concepts of what to do post-atomic weapons phase.
The book brings some things to light but sticks to strategy without getting into the tactics involved. It does bring up some things that individuals will find upsetting, like his assessment of Robert E. Lee, or his thoughts on the bombing campaign during WWII. While these may be upsetting I found them thought-provoking, which is the best way to deal with a strategic situation after all.
The book brings some things to light but sticks to strategy without getting into the tactics involved. It does bring up some things that individuals will find upsetting, like his assessment of Robert E. Lee, or his thoughts on the bombing campaign during WWII. While these may be upsetting I found them thought-provoking, which is the best way to deal with a strategic situation after all.
February 19, 2022
I was privileged to have Dr. Weigley as a teacher and advisor in undergrad and grad schools at Temple University, where he was a star, and the heart and soul of the History Department. This fine overview of American war-making traces the rise of commiserate American power: leading to strategies of total annihilation, as per the Indians, the Confederacy and the Nazis. Of course, it didn't always work out so well, so Weigley deftly reveals how a lack of understanding of the truths on the ground can derail the best-laid plans of any superpower, and does so with a stately prose that reminds me of SE Morison. I very important book if the history of how the USA has applied its military efforts.
June 16, 2013
I used to teach out of this text--discussing Jomini's influence on West Point in the 19th century and therefore how the Civil War was fought, for instance--but I wanted to finally sit down and read the entire "Big Pink Book." I wanted to start at George Washington and end at "Vietnamization" to view the common threads in the way U.S. military and civilian strategists viewed our commitments to war. Dr. Weigley's book does all this, linking the events we read about in high school history classes with decisions on weapons procurement, national interests, and plans to defend those interests both on-shore and abroad. I have spent the last 25 years studying the Cold War, but I found that Weigley's treatment of the early American air- and sea-power theorists brought out the details for me in topics like Strategic Air Command, the MacArthur/Ridgway transition in Korea, and JFK's fight to create and nurture a SOF capability to counter Soviet support for "Wars of National Liberation." I have always suspected that General Maxwell Taylor was more complex than the personality McMaster describes in "Dereliction of Duty" (you're not going to change my mind on LBJ or McNamara, though, which I think McMaster nailed down well) and this is elucidated in the Weigley book. I also think Weigley makes a pretty good case for Dien Bien Phu's deleterious effect on the Eisenhower Administration's attempts to defend the free world on the cheap (and pushing most of the resources to one of our armed forces at the expense of the others). Admittedly, it's a big doorstop of a book, but I found reading a chapter a week gave me time to ruminate on each of them and I'd recommend that approach to anyone interested in American military history and how the U.S. views its interaction with the rest of the world.
November 28, 2011
For anyone interested in the history of military tactics, well, specifically American military tactics, this is definitely the most comprehensive book on the subject I've found.
I give 3 stars because while it was very informative, I found the writing to be uneven - it was dull and difficult to read at times, while at others I raced along. It felt almost as if several people wrote the book, though perhaps it's just because I found certain subjects more interesting than others.
I give 3 stars because while it was very informative, I found the writing to be uneven - it was dull and difficult to read at times, while at others I raced along. It felt almost as if several people wrote the book, though perhaps it's just because I found certain subjects more interesting than others.
April 9, 2020
This was a recommended read for a college course I took back in 2015 combining military history and psychology, the class was titled "Principles of War." I really enjoyed the course and learned a lot. Unfortunately that was 4+ years ago since the time of this review and I honestly don't remember anything specifically remarkable that sticks out in my mind about this book. However, I do remember it did enhance my experience for the class.
I may re-read this again one day, however for the time being I have quite the queue going and I am looking forward to getting through those before I start any sort of "re-read journey."
I may re-read this again one day, however for the time being I have quite the queue going and I am looking forward to getting through those before I start any sort of "re-read journey."
January 9, 2020
A deserved classic.
Weigley provides an engaging and insightful analysis of the evolution and development of US strategic practice and thought. This book demonstrates the power of ideas - namely the long standing jominian preference for 'annihilation', meaning the direct destruction of the enemies main armed force - as the primary US way of war from the Civil War to the 1970s.
Occasionally it gets bogged down into the details of military operations, but it is largely an impressive analysis of the strategic level. An all too rare achievement. There are also engaging analyses of US strategic thinkers and their key work.
Weigley provides an engaging and insightful analysis of the evolution and development of US strategic practice and thought. This book demonstrates the power of ideas - namely the long standing jominian preference for 'annihilation', meaning the direct destruction of the enemies main armed force - as the primary US way of war from the Civil War to the 1970s.
Occasionally it gets bogged down into the details of military operations, but it is largely an impressive analysis of the strategic level. An all too rare achievement. There are also engaging analyses of US strategic thinkers and their key work.
January 28, 2018
This book is often referred to at the US Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) but was not required reading when I was there. Took the time to read it and wished I would have done so earlier. Very insightful into how American leaders and strategists have approached our wars. Recommended for operational planners, strategists, and military history readers so that they can understand underlining strategies in America's conflicts.
March 9, 2011
I read Weigley's monograph in 1990 as a textbook for a course on Military Policy. Weigley's study examines American miltary revolution to the Vietnam War. His comments apply to today's ongoing fights in Iraq and Afghanistan
August 28, 2008
Overview of military strategy and campaigns in American history - very interesting if you're interested in military strategy, very boring if you're not :)
August 12, 2011
A brilliant summation of America in war. I may not agree with everything in this book, but I respect it none the less.
January 5, 2010
History, history, history, with commentary on how it relates to current thought.
April 13, 2024
There are few people I would recommend this book to; not because it is poor, but because it is niche. I like to think of five star books as the kind that it is always a good idea for anyone to read. This five star book isn't that. But if like me, you like strategy, and the history of strategic thought, if you are familiar with the likes of Clauschwitz and Jomini, Mahan and Corbett, Douhett and Mitchell, Then his book is very much a Five star book.
Weigley moves chronologically through the conflicts of United States, starting with George Washington and Nathaniel Greene in the Revolutionary conflict. He maps the subsequent wars and fears of wars, and how America's geography, policy, and biases shaped their approaches to conflict.
I found the book most compelling in the chapters on World War Two. Here Weigley shows the Ulysses Grant style annihilation doctrine that motivated American Generals in the European theater. The industrial bombing raids, and eventual civilian bombing against Germany had their ideological roots in Sherman and his March to the Sea and the hard learned lesson of the Civil War that modern wars are wars of industry, and to defeat the enemy is not to beat his army, but his industry.
In the Pacific theater the beliefs of Alfred Thayer Mahan shaped both American and Japanese planners to seek Mahanian style grand fleet showdowns. If the World War One Battle of Jutland was inconclusive (Mahan said it would be decisive) then in World War Two both sides strove to prove the theory true, at Pearl Harbor, at Midway, the Philippine Sea, etc.
The final chapters on the Atomic age were also quite useful to me, in understanding the mood and mistakes around Korea, and the motivations and beliefs of United States, the new Superpower.
Weigley untangled the lines of thought around atomic and thermonuclear weapons, and helped explain some of the seemingly illogical ideas the militaries of the world experimented with (radioactive artillery shells anyone?)
My only real regret of this book (no fault of the author) is that it was written in 1973. this allowed the author to give some perspectives on the ongoing Vietnam War, but robbed him of the perspectives afforded after the War. I would love to read a part two that follows the fall and rise of American militarism through Vietnam to the Gulf War and beyond.
Overall, this book was simultaneously very readable and quite fascinating. I may read it again.
Weigley moves chronologically through the conflicts of United States, starting with George Washington and Nathaniel Greene in the Revolutionary conflict. He maps the subsequent wars and fears of wars, and how America's geography, policy, and biases shaped their approaches to conflict.
I found the book most compelling in the chapters on World War Two. Here Weigley shows the Ulysses Grant style annihilation doctrine that motivated American Generals in the European theater. The industrial bombing raids, and eventual civilian bombing against Germany had their ideological roots in Sherman and his March to the Sea and the hard learned lesson of the Civil War that modern wars are wars of industry, and to defeat the enemy is not to beat his army, but his industry.
In the Pacific theater the beliefs of Alfred Thayer Mahan shaped both American and Japanese planners to seek Mahanian style grand fleet showdowns. If the World War One Battle of Jutland was inconclusive (Mahan said it would be decisive) then in World War Two both sides strove to prove the theory true, at Pearl Harbor, at Midway, the Philippine Sea, etc.
The final chapters on the Atomic age were also quite useful to me, in understanding the mood and mistakes around Korea, and the motivations and beliefs of United States, the new Superpower.
Weigley untangled the lines of thought around atomic and thermonuclear weapons, and helped explain some of the seemingly illogical ideas the militaries of the world experimented with (radioactive artillery shells anyone?)
My only real regret of this book (no fault of the author) is that it was written in 1973. this allowed the author to give some perspectives on the ongoing Vietnam War, but robbed him of the perspectives afforded after the War. I would love to read a part two that follows the fall and rise of American militarism through Vietnam to the Gulf War and beyond.
Overall, this book was simultaneously very readable and quite fascinating. I may read it again.
October 25, 2023
Portions of this book were required reading for Strategy & Policy course for JPME I (Joint Professional Military Education, phase I), a war college–level course of instruction that most officers complete by the O-5 level (lieutenant colonel or Navy commander rank). Years after I completed JPME I (in 2009 through the U.S. Naval War College), I went back and read the entire books from which portions had been selected for JPME.
I don't remember this book well. My memory of it blends in with most of the nine JPME I books that I read around this time. The book's five parts trace American high-level military strategy through five major periods of U.S. history from 1775 to when the book was written. Three stars only for my lack of specific memory about it. I recall that I read a different edition (one on loan from the War College) from the one that I own.
I don't remember this book well. My memory of it blends in with most of the nine JPME I books that I read around this time. The book's five parts trace American high-level military strategy through five major periods of U.S. history from 1775 to when the book was written. Three stars only for my lack of specific memory about it. I recall that I read a different edition (one on loan from the War College) from the one that I own.
August 10, 2025
The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy & Policy
By Russell F. Weigley
You probably need to be a real history fanatic or military buff, but this book is replete with fascinating information from the Revolutionary War (and before) through each American war and times of peace. How civil and foreign influences determined American military policy. It is enlightening to learn how a people who began with an intense distrust of standing armies became the world’s policeman.
By Russell F. Weigley
You probably need to be a real history fanatic or military buff, but this book is replete with fascinating information from the Revolutionary War (and before) through each American war and times of peace. How civil and foreign influences determined American military policy. It is enlightening to learn how a people who began with an intense distrust of standing armies became the world’s policeman.
October 22, 2023
Brief historical perspective of American strategy and policy. Very interesting and a great read. Our experiences and pasts shape strategies that create new issues and problems. Solutions for today are problems for tomorrow.
January 1, 2025
Excellent review of American strategy from the Revolutionary War to Vietnam. Published in 1973 the analysis is an interesting snapshot of conventional scholarship at that time. An important book for any student of military history and strategy.
October 28, 2017
Overrated.
January 1, 2020
Notes, as part of the US Navy War College's Strategy and War
December 26, 2022
An in-depth look at what America goes to war, what it’s strategy is, and what it postures America to do / not do.
September 26, 2024
Though it’s dated, there’s a reason this book remains a classic in the field.
February 20, 2025
Awesome book, insightful, all you need to know regarding how America fights, grand strategy, the modern industrial complex, training, logistics, finance - the whole gambit.
June 12, 2017
A seminal work tracing the history of US strategic thought and application. Weigley demonstrates that as often as not, the US has failed to adopt a coherent strategic approach and frequently enters conflicts without a clear strategy.
February 12, 2008
The 2/3s of this book I read were a good survey of American military policy and strategy.
Want to read
January 11, 2009Relatively abhorent to me, but - then again - we keep being involved in military conflict, so perhaps as a citizen I should be a bit more informed than I am.
May 16, 2009
A classic.
Read
February 8, 2010The American way of war; a history of United States military strategy and policy by Russell Frank Weigley (1973)
February 24, 2011
Very good work which traces the development of U.S. warfighting doctrine. The bibliography is a gold mine of hard-to-find works. This is a foundational text.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 34 reviews