The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition

by David Carr

Much effort in recent philosophy has been devoted to attacking the metaphysics of the subject. Identified largely with French post-structuralist thought, yet stemming primarily from the influential work of the later Heidegger, this attack has taken the form of a sweeping denunciation of the whole tradition of modern philosophy from Descartes through Nietzsche, Husserl, and Existentialism. In this timely study, David Carr contends that this discussion has overlooked and eventually lost sight of the distinction between modern metaphysics and the tradition of transcendental philosophy inaugurated by Kant and continued by Husserl into the twentieth century. Carr maintains that the transcendental tradition, often misinterpreted as a mere alternative version of the metaphysics of the subject, is in fact itself directed against such a metaphysics.
Challenging prevailing views of the development of modern philosophy, Carr proposes a reinterpretation of the transcendental tradition and counters Heidegger's influential readings of Kant and Husserl. He defends their subtle and complex transcendental investigations of the self and the life of subjectivity. In Carr's interpretation, far from joining the project of metaphysical foundationalism, transcendental philosophy offers epistemological critique and phenomenological description. Its aim is not metaphysical conclusions but rather an appreciation for the rich and sometimes contradictory character of experience. The transcendental approach to the self is skillfully summed up by Husserl as "the paradox of human being a subject for the world and at the same time being an object in the world."

Proposing striking new readings of Kant and Husserl and reviving a sound awareness of the transcendental tradition, Carr's distinctive historical and systematic position will interest a wide range of readers and provoke discussion among philosophers of metaphysics, epistemology, and the history of philosophy.

Genres: Philosophy

168 pages, Hardcover

First published April 1, 1998

About the author

David Carr is a Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Emory University. His works included books on 19th and 20th century European philosophy, the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, and the philosophy of history and historiography.

Reviews

[Alex Lee · Rating 5 out of 5]

Carr presents us with an interesting puzzle, that speaks about the role of self in the transcendental tradition. In some sense, it's not a puzzle at all. Kantian scholars often look to the point of "subjectivity" as central to Kant's critique in inquiry. This is not so. If you read Critique of Pure Reason closely, you will see that Kants main critique is about reason itself; the way in which reason works to supplement understanding, often extending understanding beyond the bounds of what is "reasonable" for reason to speculate on.

Carr shows us at first, the bumbling that rises from the transcendental tradition. He starts off with Heidegger in order to critique him, going through Husserl and then ending later on with Kant. About halfway through we get a glimpse that the two "selves" empirical and transcendental have in fact no bearing within the tradition as a kind of truth. Rather these two points are bracketed speculations. Towards the end then, Carr, goes against the tradition of scholars that wish to push Husserl and Kant into "metaphysical" speculation, tentatively stating that

Both philosophers recognized, I think, that their transcendental procedure did not authorize the transition to metaphysical claims

And this is so! The paradox is rightly present because the scholars that follow misread and wished to pursue their own agenda of subjectivity. In this sense, this already short book, could be even shorter, as the paradox lies wholly within trying to make a round hole squared. For what Carr sets out to do, he does it quite well. Not an easy book to read, because of its heavy terminology, but it is in fact still an introductory book, although it serves as an introduction to a very complex topic.

[Chris Nagel · Rating 3 out of 5]

I am inclined toward David Carr's view that Husserl's phenomenology is mis-read as a transcendental "idealism" and either explicitly or implicitly a metaphysics of the subject. He makes the argument clearly, draws from both early and later Husserl to show that his commitment to transcendental philosophical critique of experience (yep) was constant, and that Heidegger's lumping Husserl in with metaphysicians is missing the critical point of phenomenological philosophy. Where I think the book is not as helpful as it could be is in examining this issue in greater depth. It will not convince anyone in the Heidegger mob, and may not be convincing to those without such a view, because the idea that Husserl's phenomenology is a transcendental philosophy like Kant's, and therefore a critical philosophy rather than a doctrinal philosophy, is not widely understood to begin with. This may have something to do with the way Husserl presented phenomenology--"critical" is not a word that comes to mind to describe his approach, so it can appear that he was building up an account of the existence of consciousness, rather than the series of the appearance of conscious experience.