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Fires & Furies: The L. A. Riots- What Really Happened
Book by James D. Delk
376 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 1994
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July 15, 2025
A “MILITARY” PERSPECTIVE ON THE 1992 RODNEY KING RIOTS
General James D. Delk was the Military Field Commander of the National Guard for the Los Angeles riots in April-May 1992 prior to federalization.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1995 book, “The Los Angeles riots of 1992 were influenced by long-standing tensions between civilians and the Los Angeles Police Department, though sparked by the Rodney King incident. While this book is written from the military perspective, the tensions between the citizenry and law enforcement, politicians and law enforcement, and between the citizenry and law enforcement, politicians and law enforcement, and between various law enforcement agencies, played a key role and are briefly explored. Problems also developed between the Governor and his National Guard. I take Governor Pete Wilson to task for his actions during the 1992 riots.” (Pg. xii)
He says of the 1965 Watts riots, “The riots hastened the decline in the area as many burned-out businesses decided not to rebuild. Comparatively few of the large chain stores can be found in South Central Los Angeles even twenty-five years later, where the void was filled by small businesses.” (Pg. 3)
He recounts, “The first call to the police was recorded at about 4:30 p.m. Police from the department’s 77th Street Division responded. Rocks, bricks, pieces of concrete and bottles were being thrown at cars, people and through shop windows, as the situation rapidly deteriorated. In a highly controversial decision, the police retreated from the scene rather than being reinforced. Later there were several explanations for pulling out. One was that there were not enough police officers, and they were poorly equipped for a riot. Another was the conviction that police were the targets of the anger, so removing the targets should defuse the crowd’s anger. This … didn’t work any better this time than it did back [in the Watts riot]. Pulling the police out seemed to merely embolden the rioters.” (Pg. 27)
He notes, “Company B of Glendale headed into the East Los Angeles area… [which] was an entirely different atmosphere … than experienced for troops in South Central Los Angeles. The gangs here were primarily Hispanic, and unlike gangs elsewhere … told Guardsmen they weren’t going to ‘trash’ their own neighborhoods. There was no looting or burning to speak of, and very little violence. Gun shots were heard, but they seemed to come from a considerable distance away. Soldiers of company B, which has many Hispanic soldiers, soon found themselves adopted by the community.” (Pg. 79)
He continues, “Company D … was strung out along Pico Boulevard… Automatic fire was heard from an alleyway a couple of blocks east… When the troops investigated, gangbangers tried to entice them into the dark alley… The troops knew that would have been stupid and waited for the police to arrive. The police advised the Guardsmen to just ignore their taunts. They did, although it wasn’t always easy. Drug dealing occurs all through the area. We… watched very conspicuous drug dealing. They watched us watching them, almost with a ‘what are you going to do about it?’ attitude… the arrogant blatancy has to be seen to be believed.” (Pg. 124-125)
He goes on, “The first concern of the troops was Korean shopkeepers, who were armed to the teeth. This made soldiers uneasy, and they tried to convince the Koreans to put their guns away. The Koreans were reluctant because they had been targeted by gangbangers early in the riots when law enforcement was over-extended. As a result, many Koreans had been injured, some seriously.” (Pg. 125)
He admits, “Troops did occasionally make mistakes they later regretted. One occurred in the university area. A platoon heard gunfire, and thought they had identified the apartment building that was the source of the problem. The troops emptied the building, but it was quickly apparent that the building contained ordinary folks, primarily Hispanic… The next morning the troops bought what they called ‘goodies,’ returned to the apartment building, and gave them to the people while again apologizing for the error.” (Pg. 170)
On the fifth day, “it appeared as though certain of the gangs had declared a truce… Blue and red bandanas had been found tied together as a symbol of solidarity. Various law enforcement agencies became increasingly apprehensive as … some Crips and Bloods that were normally mortal enemies were seen together. A few of the gangs having looted gun stores, had a lot of weapons to spare. It was even reported that a Crip gang had given some captured weapons to their rivals in a show of good faith.” (Pg. 183)
He observes, “The demonstrations sponsored by the Nation of Islam … continued well into the night. Louis Farrakhan had not shown up as advertised, but Minister Khallid Abdul Muhammad spoke on his behalf. Speakers were scattered throughout the neighborhood to widen the impact… Speeches to the demonstrators (as many as five hundred at one time) called for guerilla warfare against whites, and denounced anyone calling for peace.” (Pg. 217)
One of the soldiers stated, “Driving the streets, we can feel the hostility in the air. People look at us with a hardened, indifferent gaze. I believe they see us as a temporary impediment to the crime in the streets, nothing more. As we seized the streets when we arrived, the criminals will take it back when we leave. It seems the whole place is a violent ecosystem in which humans are in the food chain.” (Pg. 255)
He points out, "Far too many soldiers were called, approaching 15,000 at one point. That was a political, not a military decision. We went from hundreds to literally thousands of soldiers sitting around armories and staging areas with nothing to do… Morale suffered as they were kept from family, schools and their normal civilian jobs, almost always at greatly reduced pay. Soldiers always remember that political leaders kept them on duty for an unconscionably long time, much longer than any previous riot in California, or any other state for that matter.” (Pg. 318-319)
He concludes, “No narrative would be complete without again mentioning the heartwarming attitude of Angelenos to the troops deployed into their streets. That is an enduring memory almost always recalled by the soldiers. They will never forget the ‘thumbs up,’ waves, horn blowing, smiles, and words of welcome when they first hit the streets. They remember the hugs and kisses from a surprising number of folks, and the incredible amount of food and drink that was offered… They recall the parents and children who wanted photos taken with the troops. The troops will always remember the businesses that refused to take their money, and those businesses that donated everything from food and drink to office supplies and newspapers.” (Pg. 331)
This book will be of great interest to those wanting the perspective of the Guardsmen on the 1992 actions.
General James D. Delk was the Military Field Commander of the National Guard for the Los Angeles riots in April-May 1992 prior to federalization.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1995 book, “The Los Angeles riots of 1992 were influenced by long-standing tensions between civilians and the Los Angeles Police Department, though sparked by the Rodney King incident. While this book is written from the military perspective, the tensions between the citizenry and law enforcement, politicians and law enforcement, and between the citizenry and law enforcement, politicians and law enforcement, and between various law enforcement agencies, played a key role and are briefly explored. Problems also developed between the Governor and his National Guard. I take Governor Pete Wilson to task for his actions during the 1992 riots.” (Pg. xii)
He says of the 1965 Watts riots, “The riots hastened the decline in the area as many burned-out businesses decided not to rebuild. Comparatively few of the large chain stores can be found in South Central Los Angeles even twenty-five years later, where the void was filled by small businesses.” (Pg. 3)
He recounts, “The first call to the police was recorded at about 4:30 p.m. Police from the department’s 77th Street Division responded. Rocks, bricks, pieces of concrete and bottles were being thrown at cars, people and through shop windows, as the situation rapidly deteriorated. In a highly controversial decision, the police retreated from the scene rather than being reinforced. Later there were several explanations for pulling out. One was that there were not enough police officers, and they were poorly equipped for a riot. Another was the conviction that police were the targets of the anger, so removing the targets should defuse the crowd’s anger. This … didn’t work any better this time than it did back [in the Watts riot]. Pulling the police out seemed to merely embolden the rioters.” (Pg. 27)
He notes, “Company B of Glendale headed into the East Los Angeles area… [which] was an entirely different atmosphere … than experienced for troops in South Central Los Angeles. The gangs here were primarily Hispanic, and unlike gangs elsewhere … told Guardsmen they weren’t going to ‘trash’ their own neighborhoods. There was no looting or burning to speak of, and very little violence. Gun shots were heard, but they seemed to come from a considerable distance away. Soldiers of company B, which has many Hispanic soldiers, soon found themselves adopted by the community.” (Pg. 79)
He continues, “Company D … was strung out along Pico Boulevard… Automatic fire was heard from an alleyway a couple of blocks east… When the troops investigated, gangbangers tried to entice them into the dark alley… The troops knew that would have been stupid and waited for the police to arrive. The police advised the Guardsmen to just ignore their taunts. They did, although it wasn’t always easy. Drug dealing occurs all through the area. We… watched very conspicuous drug dealing. They watched us watching them, almost with a ‘what are you going to do about it?’ attitude… the arrogant blatancy has to be seen to be believed.” (Pg. 124-125)
He goes on, “The first concern of the troops was Korean shopkeepers, who were armed to the teeth. This made soldiers uneasy, and they tried to convince the Koreans to put their guns away. The Koreans were reluctant because they had been targeted by gangbangers early in the riots when law enforcement was over-extended. As a result, many Koreans had been injured, some seriously.” (Pg. 125)
He admits, “Troops did occasionally make mistakes they later regretted. One occurred in the university area. A platoon heard gunfire, and thought they had identified the apartment building that was the source of the problem. The troops emptied the building, but it was quickly apparent that the building contained ordinary folks, primarily Hispanic… The next morning the troops bought what they called ‘goodies,’ returned to the apartment building, and gave them to the people while again apologizing for the error.” (Pg. 170)
On the fifth day, “it appeared as though certain of the gangs had declared a truce… Blue and red bandanas had been found tied together as a symbol of solidarity. Various law enforcement agencies became increasingly apprehensive as … some Crips and Bloods that were normally mortal enemies were seen together. A few of the gangs having looted gun stores, had a lot of weapons to spare. It was even reported that a Crip gang had given some captured weapons to their rivals in a show of good faith.” (Pg. 183)
He observes, “The demonstrations sponsored by the Nation of Islam … continued well into the night. Louis Farrakhan had not shown up as advertised, but Minister Khallid Abdul Muhammad spoke on his behalf. Speakers were scattered throughout the neighborhood to widen the impact… Speeches to the demonstrators (as many as five hundred at one time) called for guerilla warfare against whites, and denounced anyone calling for peace.” (Pg. 217)
One of the soldiers stated, “Driving the streets, we can feel the hostility in the air. People look at us with a hardened, indifferent gaze. I believe they see us as a temporary impediment to the crime in the streets, nothing more. As we seized the streets when we arrived, the criminals will take it back when we leave. It seems the whole place is a violent ecosystem in which humans are in the food chain.” (Pg. 255)
He points out, "Far too many soldiers were called, approaching 15,000 at one point. That was a political, not a military decision. We went from hundreds to literally thousands of soldiers sitting around armories and staging areas with nothing to do… Morale suffered as they were kept from family, schools and their normal civilian jobs, almost always at greatly reduced pay. Soldiers always remember that political leaders kept them on duty for an unconscionably long time, much longer than any previous riot in California, or any other state for that matter.” (Pg. 318-319)
He concludes, “No narrative would be complete without again mentioning the heartwarming attitude of Angelenos to the troops deployed into their streets. That is an enduring memory almost always recalled by the soldiers. They will never forget the ‘thumbs up,’ waves, horn blowing, smiles, and words of welcome when they first hit the streets. They remember the hugs and kisses from a surprising number of folks, and the incredible amount of food and drink that was offered… They recall the parents and children who wanted photos taken with the troops. The troops will always remember the businesses that refused to take their money, and those businesses that donated everything from food and drink to office supplies and newspapers.” (Pg. 331)
This book will be of great interest to those wanting the perspective of the Guardsmen on the 1992 actions.
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