Deleuze—ere he embarks upon an excellent and edifying exegesis of the three great Kantian Critiques over sixty-five dense and still difficult pages—sets the stage for the reader by proffering four poetic formulas which might summarize the Kantian philosophy that, in my opinion, manage quite nicely in doing just that:
The time is out of joint:
Time undergoes a dramatic change as conceived in the Kantian revolution, reversing itself from its abstract theological perch as flatly perduring eternity or circular, periodic spiraling as a determiner hitched to motive objects; it becomes unraveled into a singular, forward stretched thread, straight and ominous in its simplistic linearity: time is no longer related to the movement which it measures, but movement is related to the time which conditions it. Time has become an a priori form of our inner sensible intuitions—but even more than that, everything is now subordinated under its determining suzerainty: permanence, succession, and simultaneity are modes and relationships of time. The Kantian revolution reveals a time flush with profound conundrums.
I is another:
Another remarkable element of Kant's thought is that the subject is bifurcated with prejudice: we retain the I, the enactive self, performing under the past-present-future parceling syntheses of conditioning time—but it receives an antipodal twin in the ego, our passive and receptive selves aswim within the time that sees it ever changeable, changed and changing. It's a paradox in that the self has been split in twain by the form of time and yet conditioned by the latter such that it synthesizes into a unity: that inner form the thread that stitches the mirrored pairing together. Kant observes how time moves into the subject, that he might discern how the mind affects itself. In this endless dance of acting I and attributive ego—because time has neither beginning nor end—we are split from ourselves through an infinite modulation.
The Good is what the Law says:
From Greek thought of old, the Law has come into existence because man might know not what the Good is and/or how to conform himself to it: it thus derives from the Good, and of which it serves us as secondary imitation. But as he so did with time and space, Kant inverts this relationship so that the Law stands revealed as the highest form and that from which the Good is derived. The Law does not tell us what we must do, it merely tells us You must!, leaving us to deduce from it the Good. The Law has no content and is not known, but reveals itself to us through its action—practical, not theoretical. We know it only through its imprint on our heart and our flesh: we are guilty, necessarily guilty.
A disorder of all the senses:
Prior to Kant's Critiques, there was determined to be a harmony between the subject and object whose guarantor was God: and this harmony was maintained by Kant through his first two Critiques, wherein though different faculties were interactive in relation to each other, one was always dominant in imposing its legislative rule. However, by the time of The Critique of Judgement, Kant had determined that if the faculties were capable of entering into relationships where one was regulative, then all of them together could reach an accord that was yet unregulated: a harmony achieved at the highest level by the spontaneous, intertwined, mysterious accord reached under the conditions of a beautiful Nature—or, striving ever higher, under the Sublime. As such we have a maelstromic mélange in which reason, imagination, understanding and the inner sense engage to stir the other to ever higher limits that simultaneously urge them to reach above and beyond their own—it is a tempest in the depths of a chasm opened up in the subject, and which paradoxically allows an accord to emerge from discord: a music of disharmony that sources time with its own accord, a unity threaded from a falling away.
As for the meaty part of Deleuze's effort—it assisted me greatly in finally getting my head around the methodology of the Prussian genius, for Deleuze uses the master's own terminology (twice rendered though it be, first into French and then one step further to our Anglo-Saxon tongue) while unfolding its development at a level high enough to see the entirety of the ends whilst yet sufficiently leveled down that the means aren't lost in the heightened view. And Kant truly is a genius: the immensity of the task he set himself would be enough to fold one up like a cheap suit ere the most basic foundations had been attempted. Such overarching ambition perhaps required such hypertrophied language in daring its achievement; in any event, that the myriad enigmatic processes with which the waves of our oceanic interiority drive in towards and break upon the cognitive shore were systematized and ordered such that a coherent whole could be established from their complex ephemerality—well, I think that is just mighty fucking impressive, however much one's head might be hurt in trying to piece it all together direct from the horse's mouth.
What those four poetic formulas do not allude to is the focal importance of Kant's Copernican Revolution as delineated by Deleuze in toto: that is was the point at which philosophy made the full shift from a metaphysics of being towards one of will—particularly in the transcendental duality inscribed within the subject, and represented by such antipodes as intelligible vs. sensible, reason vs. experience, concept vs. intuition, and logical vs. aesthetic, as well as the inversion that saw the supra-sensible, the thing-in-itself and divine engenderer become dependent upon our reason's ability to determine their status. So it is that, with the above in mind, what I find most fascinating—and, in its grasping, comprehend as the theological and faith-form lethality it proved to be—is how Kant managed to configure man as the last end of sensible nature via the history achieved by his synthetic activity: the being who superseded God as the harmonizer of subject and object in how we legislate the latter in submission to the former, though we be but finite ourselves—and in this performed determination, are positioned as the bridge between the supra-sensible and the sensible wherein finality is found in the human foundation of theology. You gave 'em hell, Immanuel...