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The World of Perception
'Painting does not imitate the world, but is a world of its own.'
In 1948, Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote and delivered on French radio a series of seven lectures on the theme of perception. Translated here into English for the first time, they offer a lucid and concise insight into one of the great philosophical minds of the twentieth-century.
These lectures explore themes central not only to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy but phenomenology as a whole. He begins by rejecting the idea - inherited from Descartes and influential within science - that perception is unreliable and prone to distort the world around us. Merleau-Ponty instead argues that perception is inseparable from our senses and it is how we make sense of the world.
Merleau-Ponty explores this guiding theme through a brilliant series of reflections on science, space, our relationships with others, animal life and art. Throughout, he argues that perception is never something learned and then applied to the world. As creatures with embodied minds, he reminds us that we are born perceiving and share with other animals and infants a state of constant, raw, unpredictable contact with the world. He provides vivid examples with the help of Kafka, animal behaviour and above all modern art, particularly the work of Cezanne.
A thought-provoking and crystalline exploration of consciousness and the senses, The World of Perception is essential reading for anyone interested in the work of Merleau-Ponty, twentieth-century philosophy and art.
In 1948, Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote and delivered on French radio a series of seven lectures on the theme of perception. Translated here into English for the first time, they offer a lucid and concise insight into one of the great philosophical minds of the twentieth-century.
These lectures explore themes central not only to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy but phenomenology as a whole. He begins by rejecting the idea - inherited from Descartes and influential within science - that perception is unreliable and prone to distort the world around us. Merleau-Ponty instead argues that perception is inseparable from our senses and it is how we make sense of the world.
Merleau-Ponty explores this guiding theme through a brilliant series of reflections on science, space, our relationships with others, animal life and art. Throughout, he argues that perception is never something learned and then applied to the world. As creatures with embodied minds, he reminds us that we are born perceiving and share with other animals and infants a state of constant, raw, unpredictable contact with the world. He provides vivid examples with the help of Kafka, animal behaviour and above all modern art, particularly the work of Cezanne.
A thought-provoking and crystalline exploration of consciousness and the senses, The World of Perception is essential reading for anyone interested in the work of Merleau-Ponty, twentieth-century philosophy and art.
125 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2002
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About the author
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
124 books612 followersFrench phenomenological philosopher, strongly influenced by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger in addition to being closely associated with Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. At the core of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is a sustained argument for the foundational role that perception plays in understanding the world as well as engaging with the world. Like the other major phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty expressed his philosophical insights in writings on art, literature, and politics; however Merleau-Ponty was the only major phenomenologist of the first half of the Twentieth Century to engage extensively with the sciences, and especially with descriptive psychology. Because of this engagement, his writings have become influential with the recent project of naturalizing phenomenology in which phenomenologists utilize the results of psychology and cognitive science.
Merleau-Ponty was born in Rochefort-sur-Mer, Charente-Maritime. His father was killed in World War 1 when Merleau-Ponty was 3. After secondary schooling at the lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris, Maurice Merleau-Ponty became a student at the École Normale Supérieure, where he studied alongside Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Simone Weil. He passed the agrégation in philosophy in 1930.
Merleau-Ponty first taught at Chartres, then became a tutor at the École Normale Supérieure, where he was awarded his doctorate on the basis of two important books: La structure du comportement (1942) and Phénoménologie de la Perception (1945).
After teaching at the University of Lyon from 1945 to 1948, Merleau-Ponty lectured on child psychology and education at the Sorbonne from 1949 to 1952. He was awarded the Chair of Philosophy at the Collège de France from 1952 until his death in 1961, making him the youngest person to have been elected to a Chair.
Besides his teaching, Merleau-Ponty was also political editor for Les Temps Modernes from the founding of the journal in October 1945 until December 1952.
Aged 53, he died suddenly of a stroke in 1961, apparently while preparing for a class on Descartes. He was buried in Le Père Lachaise Cemetery in Paris.
Merleau-Ponty was born in Rochefort-sur-Mer, Charente-Maritime. His father was killed in World War 1 when Merleau-Ponty was 3. After secondary schooling at the lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris, Maurice Merleau-Ponty became a student at the École Normale Supérieure, where he studied alongside Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Simone Weil. He passed the agrégation in philosophy in 1930.
Merleau-Ponty first taught at Chartres, then became a tutor at the École Normale Supérieure, where he was awarded his doctorate on the basis of two important books: La structure du comportement (1942) and Phénoménologie de la Perception (1945).
After teaching at the University of Lyon from 1945 to 1948, Merleau-Ponty lectured on child psychology and education at the Sorbonne from 1949 to 1952. He was awarded the Chair of Philosophy at the Collège de France from 1952 until his death in 1961, making him the youngest person to have been elected to a Chair.
Besides his teaching, Merleau-Ponty was also political editor for Les Temps Modernes from the founding of the journal in October 1945 until December 1952.
Aged 53, he died suddenly of a stroke in 1961, apparently while preparing for a class on Descartes. He was buried in Le Père Lachaise Cemetery in Paris.
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August 19, 2020
“We have to deal with human reality as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is.”
― Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness
What could be the utility of such perceived world, from our naïve eyes when we have methodical findings of science which may evade any sort of delusional gains, our senses might provide us; what is the point of reading such discourse when we have ventured into untouched realms of nature, when we have brought fields such as psychology into the domain of basic sciences, arguably though. It is characteristic of such philosophy to hold science and knowledge in such high esteem that all our lived experience of the world seems to be of little value. What could it do to consult our senses over these sensitive matters related to life? Perhaps we are not here to refute the basic foundation of science but rather to re-establish it in its truest sense.
As we know perception is more or less confused beginning of scientific inquisitiveness. The question mainly raised by modern thought or Maurice Merleau-Ponty himself is not to challenge the very right of the scientific domain to exist but to rather question the ability of the science to present a complete, self-sufficient and exhaustive picture of nature, beyond which it won’t be necessary to challenge the nature, somewhat like our religions. In other words, the French philosopher challenges the scientific dogma, as any other dogmas should be, which thinks itself to be complete and absolute. So, we may confidently say that it would further enhance our sensory perception and human experience of the world as a whole.
The book has seven lectures of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, delivered during post-War-era, integrating art and politics with philosophy, especially the way he used painting to provide the best possible introduction to his philosophy. He takes the classical thought as his subject and uses his creative philosophy to point out the flaws of the classical thought or more correctly how it overlooks the fallibility of nature per se since nothing is absolute. The main attack of the philosopher is on Descartes as he used the Cartesian philosophy of Descartes as the premise of elucidates his point.
The speeches of Merleau-Ponty moves from the emphasis on our myopic view to put the world of perception in dim light against the scientific inquiry, to space itself. The space which according to Newtonian thought was supposed to absolute, independent, self-sufficient medium in which things are arranged in three dimensions, was ripped apart by the theory of relativity by Einstein which posited space and time are interdependent. In the same way, philosophy and psychology have been investigated to show the interdependence of mind and body against the Cartesian concept that mind or soul is the being of the world.
As we move on through the speeches of Merleau-Ponty, we are being taken from the introduction of phenomenology to the concepts of existentialism such as ‘being’ and ‘the other’ which were made popular by Sartre in Being and Nothingness. Merleau-Ponty uses art- painting to convey the meaning of sensory objects, as per him, the unity of the object does not lie behind its qualities, but is reaffirmed by each of them: each of its qualities is the whole- existential view as propagated by Sartre.
The speeches of Merleau-Ponty further investigated the perception of the world through the eyes of animals, as they perceive it and in turn, expose our indifference or rather inability to considers other animals as unconscious beings which indicates that we are not modern in our thought at all. If we may through our arrogance and indifference, we may appreciate the fact that there are other animals or even plants for that matter which (who) have evolved in their own scope and ability and developed consciousness but perhaps we are caught up with wrong questions. It further puts our myopia, shamelessly naked in front of nature as we take a similar attitude towards children, madmen, primitive people, or supposedly inferior people as per different strata. The classical view of philosophy kept us blinded from the fact that develops a view of himself, only after seeing himself through the eyes of others. The Cartesian concept the mind and body exist oblivious to each other forces us to see ourselves or our world being existed in our spirit or mind, indifferent to our bodies as if they are not part of our being.
Other human beings are never pure spirit for me: I only know them through their gestures, their speeches in other words, through their bodies. Of course other human being is certainly more than simply a body to me: rather, this other is a body animated by all manner of intentions, the origin of numerous actions and words.
Merleau-Ponty uses very simple text to explain the phenomenology of perception, he masterfully fuses impressionist painting, particularly of Cezanne with philosophical themes to explain it quite eruditely. He takes us through the commonly unnoticed worlds of painting, cinema, music, and literature wherein we are exposed to art criticism through the eyes of various artists such as Cezanne, Valery, Mallarme, and Blanchot to explain that what is said and the way in which it is said- cannot exist separately from one another. As per Blanchot:
A successful novel would thus consist not of a succession of ideas or theses but would have the same kind of existence as an object of the senses or a thing in motion, which must be perceived in its temporal progression by embracing its particular rhythm and which leaves in the memory, not a set of ideas but rather the emblem and the monogram of those ideas.
Merleau-Ponty gradually moves on to illustrate his point that modern thought, as we moved from classical philosophy, idealism to modernism and from there onto post-modernism, is more truthful towards ambiguities of the human condition and which makes it possible to be optimistic, to look forward without illusion to the creation of something whose value is ‘solid and lasting’ even if it lacks the rational clarity of the classical ideal. Here, Merleau-Ponty takes an existential approach and affirms the existential angst of human life but takes a self-conflicting stance of post-modernism.
Human life confronts itself from one side of the globe to the other and speaks to itself in its entirety through books and culture. In the short term, the loss in quality is evident, yet this cannot be remedied by restoring the narrow humanism of the classical period.
4/5
― Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness
What could be the utility of such perceived world, from our naïve eyes when we have methodical findings of science which may evade any sort of delusional gains, our senses might provide us; what is the point of reading such discourse when we have ventured into untouched realms of nature, when we have brought fields such as psychology into the domain of basic sciences, arguably though. It is characteristic of such philosophy to hold science and knowledge in such high esteem that all our lived experience of the world seems to be of little value. What could it do to consult our senses over these sensitive matters related to life? Perhaps we are not here to refute the basic foundation of science but rather to re-establish it in its truest sense.
As we know perception is more or less confused beginning of scientific inquisitiveness. The question mainly raised by modern thought or Maurice Merleau-Ponty himself is not to challenge the very right of the scientific domain to exist but to rather question the ability of the science to present a complete, self-sufficient and exhaustive picture of nature, beyond which it won’t be necessary to challenge the nature, somewhat like our religions. In other words, the French philosopher challenges the scientific dogma, as any other dogmas should be, which thinks itself to be complete and absolute. So, we may confidently say that it would further enhance our sensory perception and human experience of the world as a whole.
The book has seven lectures of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, delivered during post-War-era, integrating art and politics with philosophy, especially the way he used painting to provide the best possible introduction to his philosophy. He takes the classical thought as his subject and uses his creative philosophy to point out the flaws of the classical thought or more correctly how it overlooks the fallibility of nature per se since nothing is absolute. The main attack of the philosopher is on Descartes as he used the Cartesian philosophy of Descartes as the premise of elucidates his point.
The speeches of Merleau-Ponty moves from the emphasis on our myopic view to put the world of perception in dim light against the scientific inquiry, to space itself. The space which according to Newtonian thought was supposed to absolute, independent, self-sufficient medium in which things are arranged in three dimensions, was ripped apart by the theory of relativity by Einstein which posited space and time are interdependent. In the same way, philosophy and psychology have been investigated to show the interdependence of mind and body against the Cartesian concept that mind or soul is the being of the world.
As we move on through the speeches of Merleau-Ponty, we are being taken from the introduction of phenomenology to the concepts of existentialism such as ‘being’ and ‘the other’ which were made popular by Sartre in Being and Nothingness. Merleau-Ponty uses art- painting to convey the meaning of sensory objects, as per him, the unity of the object does not lie behind its qualities, but is reaffirmed by each of them: each of its qualities is the whole- existential view as propagated by Sartre.
The speeches of Merleau-Ponty further investigated the perception of the world through the eyes of animals, as they perceive it and in turn, expose our indifference or rather inability to considers other animals as unconscious beings which indicates that we are not modern in our thought at all. If we may through our arrogance and indifference, we may appreciate the fact that there are other animals or even plants for that matter which (who) have evolved in their own scope and ability and developed consciousness but perhaps we are caught up with wrong questions. It further puts our myopia, shamelessly naked in front of nature as we take a similar attitude towards children, madmen, primitive people, or supposedly inferior people as per different strata. The classical view of philosophy kept us blinded from the fact that develops a view of himself, only after seeing himself through the eyes of others. The Cartesian concept the mind and body exist oblivious to each other forces us to see ourselves or our world being existed in our spirit or mind, indifferent to our bodies as if they are not part of our being.
Other human beings are never pure spirit for me: I only know them through their gestures, their speeches in other words, through their bodies. Of course other human being is certainly more than simply a body to me: rather, this other is a body animated by all manner of intentions, the origin of numerous actions and words.
Merleau-Ponty uses very simple text to explain the phenomenology of perception, he masterfully fuses impressionist painting, particularly of Cezanne with philosophical themes to explain it quite eruditely. He takes us through the commonly unnoticed worlds of painting, cinema, music, and literature wherein we are exposed to art criticism through the eyes of various artists such as Cezanne, Valery, Mallarme, and Blanchot to explain that what is said and the way in which it is said- cannot exist separately from one another. As per Blanchot:
A successful novel would thus consist not of a succession of ideas or theses but would have the same kind of existence as an object of the senses or a thing in motion, which must be perceived in its temporal progression by embracing its particular rhythm and which leaves in the memory, not a set of ideas but rather the emblem and the monogram of those ideas.
Merleau-Ponty gradually moves on to illustrate his point that modern thought, as we moved from classical philosophy, idealism to modernism and from there onto post-modernism, is more truthful towards ambiguities of the human condition and which makes it possible to be optimistic, to look forward without illusion to the creation of something whose value is ‘solid and lasting’ even if it lacks the rational clarity of the classical ideal. Here, Merleau-Ponty takes an existential approach and affirms the existential angst of human life but takes a self-conflicting stance of post-modernism.
Human life confronts itself from one side of the globe to the other and speaks to itself in its entirety through books and culture. In the short term, the loss in quality is evident, yet this cannot be remedied by restoring the narrow humanism of the classical period.
4/5
May 2, 2025
یه مختصر مینویسم، بعدا میام کاملتر میکنم این مرور رو.
0-موریس مرلو-پونتی از پدیدارشناسان مهم قرن 20 است. از مساعدتهای جدی مرلو-پونتی در فلسفه، توجه به وجه پدیدارشناسانه ساحت ادراک، مسئله بدنمندی در ادراک و رابطهٔ بین پدیدارشناسی و ادراک هنری است.
1- مرلو-پونتی در این کتاب که پیادهشدهٔ سخنرانیهای خودش در رادیو ملی فرانسه در سال (فکر کنم) 1949 است، تلاش کرده است شئون مختلف پروژه فکری خود را در ارائههایی کوتاه برای مخاطب شرح دهد.
2- یکی از راههای اساسی و قابل دفاع برای فهم پدیدارشناسیم، پیادهسازی روش پدیدارشناسی و حتی اصلاح پدیدارشناسی، عطف توجه کردن به تجربه ادراک آثار هنری است؛ یعنی آثار هنری به عنوان اعیان/برابرایستاهای پدیدارشناسانه در موقعیت مواجهه بیننده با اثر چه نحوی از پدیدار شدن را نمایندگی میکنند. یعنی عطف توجه کنیم به ماهیت مواجهه با اثر هنری که این همانا تدقیق و تعمق پدیدارشناسانه است.
3- نقاشیهای پل سزان نقاش امپرسیونیست مشهور، آن اعیانی است که مرلو-پونتی به عنوان اثر هنری واجد ارزش توجه انتخاب کرده است و مسئلهٔ فهم پدیدارشناسانه این آثار در این سلسله سخنرانیها برای مرلو-پونتی اساسی است.
4- یکی از المانهای اساسی در این سلسله سخنرانیها مسئلههای مربوط به جهان مدرن است. اصلا فهم نقاشیهای پل سزان نیز با عنوان مولود جهان مدرن، از این حیث نیز برای مرلو-پونتی واجد ارزش است. بیشتر از این وقت نمیکنم این بخش رو بنویسم. پس از بازخوانی اثر بیشتر بسط خواهم داد این مورد را.
5- خیلی خوشحالم که پس از خواندن یکسری اثر معتبر در کلیت پدیدارشناسی و مشخصتر فلسفه مرلو-پونتی خودم جرئت کردم و اثری مختصر از ایشون رو خوندم. خواندن متن اصلی یک فیلسوف به قدری مهم و اساسی است که هر چقدر از اهمیتاش بگویم حق مطلب را ادا نمیکند.
6- فعلا همین.
0-موریس مرلو-پونتی از پدیدارشناسان مهم قرن 20 است. از مساعدتهای جدی مرلو-پونتی در فلسفه، توجه به وجه پدیدارشناسانه ساحت ادراک، مسئله بدنمندی در ادراک و رابطهٔ بین پدیدارشناسی و ادراک هنری است.
1- مرلو-پونتی در این کتاب که پیادهشدهٔ سخنرانیهای خودش در رادیو ملی فرانسه در سال (فکر کنم) 1949 است، تلاش کرده است شئون مختلف پروژه فکری خود را در ارائههایی کوتاه برای مخاطب شرح دهد.
2- یکی از راههای اساسی و قابل دفاع برای فهم پدیدارشناسیم، پیادهسازی روش پدیدارشناسی و حتی اصلاح پدیدارشناسی، عطف توجه کردن به تجربه ادراک آثار هنری است؛ یعنی آثار هنری به عنوان اعیان/برابرایستاهای پدیدارشناسانه در موقعیت مواجهه بیننده با اثر چه نحوی از پدیدار شدن را نمایندگی میکنند. یعنی عطف توجه کنیم به ماهیت مواجهه با اثر هنری که این همانا تدقیق و تعمق پدیدارشناسانه است.
3- نقاشیهای پل سزان نقاش امپرسیونیست مشهور، آن اعیانی است که مرلو-پونتی به عنوان اثر هنری واجد ارزش توجه انتخاب کرده است و مسئلهٔ فهم پدیدارشناسانه این آثار در این سلسله سخنرانیها برای مرلو-پونتی اساسی است.
4- یکی از المانهای اساسی در این سلسله سخنرانیها مسئلههای مربوط به جهان مدرن است. اصلا فهم نقاشیهای پل سزان نیز با عنوان مولود جهان مدرن، از این حیث نیز برای مرلو-پونتی واجد ارزش است. بیشتر از این وقت نمیکنم این بخش رو بنویسم. پس از بازخوانی اثر بیشتر بسط خواهم داد این مورد را.
5- خیلی خوشحالم که پس از خواندن یکسری اثر معتبر در کلیت پدیدارشناسی و مشخصتر فلسفه مرلو-پونتی خودم جرئت کردم و اثری مختصر از ایشون رو خوندم. خواندن متن اصلی یک فیلسوف به قدری مهم و اساسی است که هر چقدر از اهمیتاش بگویم حق مطلب را ادا نمیکند.
6- فعلا همین.
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August 19, 2024Proust says - " the only real journey would be to travel not towards new landscapes, but with new eyes, to see the universe through the eyes of another, of a hundred others, to see the hundred universes that each of them can see. "
For what are landscapes, if not mere backdrops for the big stage of our senses ? The verdant hills, the cobblestone streets, they are enlivened, but it's our eyes the translator of their murmurs into meaning - donning new eyes, their irises like prisms refracting life, with these borrowed orbs, we step into the shoes of a thousand souls. The beggar on the corner - his eyes, etched with stories of hunger and resilience, reveal a universe of longing. The artist, brush in hand - sees colors that elude us, a canvas pregnant with dreams, and dreams about dreams. The lovers - map uncharted territories, in their eyes, we glimpse passion, vulnerability, the magic pull of connection. The universe, neither benign, nor hostile, but vast and indifférent, now folds into a shared heartbeat.
Perception isn't confined to eyes alone. Our skin, the tactile parchment, reads the world. The rough bark of an ancient oak, the silkiness of a lover's hair - they inscribe themselves upon our consciousness - we touch, and the universe responds - a mix of pressure, texture, and memory. Perception is inherently subjective. One might see monsters everywhere, while another might only see milk and honey - everywhere. However, we can't talk about à " bad/ right " perception, context matters a lot. Perception it is not an objective mirror. Epistemic relativism acknowledges that different perspectives exist, and there's no absolute truth, it doesn't necessarilly lead to a Brave New World scénario, where perception is controlled. To approach a " right " perception, one only need critical thinking, empathy, self-awareness, and a willingness to learn.
Language too, isn't mere communication, it's communion - a bridge between minds, a lexicon of existence.
And here we arrive at Merleau-Ponty's threshold. His vision melds the body and the world, because perception isn't passive observation, it's a dialogue. The apple in our hand isn't just a fruit, it is hunger, memory, Newton's falling epiphany. In this game of senses, we become brushstrokes on the canvas of being, the horizon stretches, and suddenly, we're both observer and observed. The hundred universes, the beggar's hunger, the artists palette, the lover's gaze - converge within us.
I watch a stranger on the subway, the curve of her neck, the way she cradles her phone. Proust whisper in my ear - " See her as if you'II never see her again . " Suddenly, she's not just a passenger, she's a sonnet waiting to be written. The perception overwhelms me, like a burden that becomes an extension of my being.
Borrow Merleau-Ponty's eyes - their irises like stained glass - and see anew. The universe isn't out there. It is within, into your skin, into your memories, into your world of perception.
For what are landscapes, if not mere backdrops for the big stage of our senses ? The verdant hills, the cobblestone streets, they are enlivened, but it's our eyes the translator of their murmurs into meaning - donning new eyes, their irises like prisms refracting life, with these borrowed orbs, we step into the shoes of a thousand souls. The beggar on the corner - his eyes, etched with stories of hunger and resilience, reveal a universe of longing. The artist, brush in hand - sees colors that elude us, a canvas pregnant with dreams, and dreams about dreams. The lovers - map uncharted territories, in their eyes, we glimpse passion, vulnerability, the magic pull of connection. The universe, neither benign, nor hostile, but vast and indifférent, now folds into a shared heartbeat.
Perception isn't confined to eyes alone. Our skin, the tactile parchment, reads the world. The rough bark of an ancient oak, the silkiness of a lover's hair - they inscribe themselves upon our consciousness - we touch, and the universe responds - a mix of pressure, texture, and memory. Perception is inherently subjective. One might see monsters everywhere, while another might only see milk and honey - everywhere. However, we can't talk about à " bad/ right " perception, context matters a lot. Perception it is not an objective mirror. Epistemic relativism acknowledges that different perspectives exist, and there's no absolute truth, it doesn't necessarilly lead to a Brave New World scénario, where perception is controlled. To approach a " right " perception, one only need critical thinking, empathy, self-awareness, and a willingness to learn.
Language too, isn't mere communication, it's communion - a bridge between minds, a lexicon of existence.
And here we arrive at Merleau-Ponty's threshold. His vision melds the body and the world, because perception isn't passive observation, it's a dialogue. The apple in our hand isn't just a fruit, it is hunger, memory, Newton's falling epiphany. In this game of senses, we become brushstrokes on the canvas of being, the horizon stretches, and suddenly, we're both observer and observed. The hundred universes, the beggar's hunger, the artists palette, the lover's gaze - converge within us.
I watch a stranger on the subway, the curve of her neck, the way she cradles her phone. Proust whisper in my ear - " See her as if you'II never see her again . " Suddenly, she's not just a passenger, she's a sonnet waiting to be written. The perception overwhelms me, like a burden that becomes an extension of my being.
Borrow Merleau-Ponty's eyes - their irises like stained glass - and see anew. The universe isn't out there. It is within, into your skin, into your memories, into your world of perception.
October 4, 2009
Mid-twentieth century revolutions in thought have overturned much of the basis for any easy acceptance of Descartes and later Kant as guides to life, with Kierkegaard and Nietzche as early pioneers in unravelling the presumptions of essentialism.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is a very significant figure in this context, not merely within modern continental philosophy but in preparing the ground for what looks likely to be seen as a much wider and consequent cultural revolution, one derived from the extension of the insights of the existentialist, phenomenological and hermeneutic schools, first into art and culture and increasingly into society and politics.
This slim volume represents seven radio lectures given by Merleau-Ponty in 1948. The form should warn you about the content. They are slight, an attempt to popularise complex thoughts and ideas, equivalent to the sort of 'Brains Trust'-type talks given by intellectuals like Bertrand Russell or JB Priestley in Britain (as well as the Brains Trust itself) around the same time.
They are of their place and time. Some of the ideas will seem oddly obvious to a later generation but the lectures were bringing ideas that were reasonably well understood at the leading edge of the French intelligenstia to the educated French middle classes.
Radio was an essential medium of public education at this time and Merleau-Ponty appears to be doing a reasonable job here of boilinmg down complex and radical thought to the level of a reasonably educated member of the French general public.
But the book could be slimmer. Thomas Baldwin's introductory notes add little to appreciation of material that stands on its own merits and his determination to put his own critique of Merleau-Ponty's claims is irritating when what we really want is an explication of what Merleau-Ponty was trying to get across to a mass audience - and why.
Similarly, the first four lectures are scene-setting potboilers. Complex research and thought is boiled down to short gobbets of information that are not always entirely clear.
The lectures only come alive, to become a useful summary of his ideas, in the last three: a sensitive critique of Cartesianism from what is clearly an existentialist point of view; how art must be seen as distinct from reality; and a powerful, short and, in my view, important critique of the assumptions of the Enlightenment.
To be honest, this book is for completists in French philosophy or for those interested in how philosophy was communicated to the French public in the vibrant 1940s. Merleau-Ponty's views are probably best investigated through more substantal works or through one of the very many general works on existentialism - even perhaps from Wikipedia.
Where the book is useful is in providing unusually succinct (for a working philosopher) expressions of his position. This reader is wholly persuaded by his approach. Merleau-Ponty seems to be describing not how educated people should think (as was the case in the 1940s) but how educated people actually think today, sixty years on.
This shows the extent of a revolution that marks out the wiser part of the liberal West today both from its ideological rivals overseas and from the fundamentalist version of liberal thinking that is fighting its own rear-guard action to preserve the dominance of its absolute values in a changing society.
Merleau-Ponty's legacy is the challenge being undertaken, as I write, to sustain in place some of the rigidities and essentialisms that were the consensus in 1948. These still hold sway in the elites of the West (though not necessarily in the general population) and are the basis of all the 'grand projets' that are so damaging within Western politics - from the American Empire through Israel to the European Union.
In essence, Merleau-Ponty's project is an extended critique of classical rationalism (though not, it should be said, a call for the rule of unreason).
For Merleau-Ponty, the rule of pure reason is neither possible nor truly human because we are, as human beings, embedded in our perceptions. We must be seen in the context of our history and of social reality and its history - as well as of the constant negotiation of our position with our own drives and with other persons.
This is the middle ground between matter and intellect where we actually live. As he puts it, rather than accepting the Cartesian dualism of their being, here, a mind and, there, a body, we should see ourselves and others as minds with bodies - "a being who can only get to the truth of things because its body is, as it were, embedded in those things." Let the man speak for himself:
Lecture 5
" Humanity is not an aggregate of individuals, a community of thinkers, each of whom is guaranteed from the outset to be able to reach agreement with the others because all participate in the same thinking essence. Nor, of course, is it a single Being ... humanity is precarious: each person can only believe what he recognises to be true internally, and, at the same time, nobody thinks or makes up his mind without already being caught up in certain relationships with others, which leads him to opt for a particular set of opinions. Everyone is alone and yet nobody can do without other people ... there is no 'inner' life that is not a first attempt to relate to another person, In this ambiguous position, which has been forced on us because we have a body and a history (both personally and collectively), we can never know complete rest. We are continually obliged to work on our differences, to explain things that we have said that have not been properly understood, to reveal what is hidden within us and to perceive other people."
Lecture 6
" The meaning 'table' will only interest me insofar as it arises out of all the 'details' which embody its present mode of being. If I accept the tutelage of perception, I find I am ready to understand the work of art. For it too is a totality of flesh in which meaning is not free, so to speak, but bound, a prisoner of all the signs, or details, which reveal it to me. Thus the work of art resembles the object of perception: its nature is to be seen or heard and no attempt to define or analyse it, however valuable that may be as a way of taking stock of this experience, can ever stand in place of the direct perceptual experience."
Lecture 7
" In modernity, it is not only works of art that are unfinished: the world they express is like a work which lacks a conclusion."
" ... absolutely objective historical knowledge is inconceivable, because the act of interpreting the past and placing it in perspective is conditioned by the moral and political choices which the historian has made in his own life ... Trapped in this circle, human existence can never abstract from itself in order to gain access to the naked truth: it merely has the capacity to progress towards the objective and does not possess objectivity in fully-fledged form."
" ... if ambiguity and incompletion are ... written into the very fabric of our collective existence rather than just the works of intellectuals, then to seek the restoration of reason ... would be a derisory response ... liberal regimes should not be taken at their word ... noble ideologies can sometimes be convenient excuses."
Merleau-Ponty's message in these lectures is optimistic, far from the doom-and-gloom often ascribed to those moving in existentialist circles at this time.
Contestability and ambiguity are not becessarily bad things to Merleau-Ponty because they permit self- and social creation that accords with our complex natures. He stands in opposition to rationalist and intellectual models that bend humanity into fixed shapes.
Not only God but Reason are 'dead'. This is to be embraced but not from a position of reactionary conservatism. On the contrary, while clearly highly critical of the Soviet model, he is equally critical of Liberal nostrums (as he should be). The strong implication is that we can change things for us personally and for society in a progressive way through embracing uncertainty and making humane judgements for which we must take personal responsibility.
Of course, it is hard not to see this as part of the same movement that embraced Sartre, De Beauvoir, Camus and Arendt and so it is - but Merleau-Ponty should, I believe, be considered differently. His humane phenomenological approach leads him to existentialist conclusions but it does not lock him into its 'system' (such as it is) or ideology.
His ideological approach is, in fact, anti-ideological. He is sensibly respectful of science and is determined not to be led by the nose by Sartre whose genius and ego may place him amongst the 'greats' of Western philosophy but who must always be taken with a pinch of salt as a guide to life. For Merleau-Ponty, life need not be 'absurd' if we do not wish it to be.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is a very significant figure in this context, not merely within modern continental philosophy but in preparing the ground for what looks likely to be seen as a much wider and consequent cultural revolution, one derived from the extension of the insights of the existentialist, phenomenological and hermeneutic schools, first into art and culture and increasingly into society and politics.
This slim volume represents seven radio lectures given by Merleau-Ponty in 1948. The form should warn you about the content. They are slight, an attempt to popularise complex thoughts and ideas, equivalent to the sort of 'Brains Trust'-type talks given by intellectuals like Bertrand Russell or JB Priestley in Britain (as well as the Brains Trust itself) around the same time.
They are of their place and time. Some of the ideas will seem oddly obvious to a later generation but the lectures were bringing ideas that were reasonably well understood at the leading edge of the French intelligenstia to the educated French middle classes.
Radio was an essential medium of public education at this time and Merleau-Ponty appears to be doing a reasonable job here of boilinmg down complex and radical thought to the level of a reasonably educated member of the French general public.
But the book could be slimmer. Thomas Baldwin's introductory notes add little to appreciation of material that stands on its own merits and his determination to put his own critique of Merleau-Ponty's claims is irritating when what we really want is an explication of what Merleau-Ponty was trying to get across to a mass audience - and why.
Similarly, the first four lectures are scene-setting potboilers. Complex research and thought is boiled down to short gobbets of information that are not always entirely clear.
The lectures only come alive, to become a useful summary of his ideas, in the last three: a sensitive critique of Cartesianism from what is clearly an existentialist point of view; how art must be seen as distinct from reality; and a powerful, short and, in my view, important critique of the assumptions of the Enlightenment.
To be honest, this book is for completists in French philosophy or for those interested in how philosophy was communicated to the French public in the vibrant 1940s. Merleau-Ponty's views are probably best investigated through more substantal works or through one of the very many general works on existentialism - even perhaps from Wikipedia.
Where the book is useful is in providing unusually succinct (for a working philosopher) expressions of his position. This reader is wholly persuaded by his approach. Merleau-Ponty seems to be describing not how educated people should think (as was the case in the 1940s) but how educated people actually think today, sixty years on.
This shows the extent of a revolution that marks out the wiser part of the liberal West today both from its ideological rivals overseas and from the fundamentalist version of liberal thinking that is fighting its own rear-guard action to preserve the dominance of its absolute values in a changing society.
Merleau-Ponty's legacy is the challenge being undertaken, as I write, to sustain in place some of the rigidities and essentialisms that were the consensus in 1948. These still hold sway in the elites of the West (though not necessarily in the general population) and are the basis of all the 'grand projets' that are so damaging within Western politics - from the American Empire through Israel to the European Union.
In essence, Merleau-Ponty's project is an extended critique of classical rationalism (though not, it should be said, a call for the rule of unreason).
For Merleau-Ponty, the rule of pure reason is neither possible nor truly human because we are, as human beings, embedded in our perceptions. We must be seen in the context of our history and of social reality and its history - as well as of the constant negotiation of our position with our own drives and with other persons.
This is the middle ground between matter and intellect where we actually live. As he puts it, rather than accepting the Cartesian dualism of their being, here, a mind and, there, a body, we should see ourselves and others as minds with bodies - "a being who can only get to the truth of things because its body is, as it were, embedded in those things." Let the man speak for himself:
Lecture 5
" Humanity is not an aggregate of individuals, a community of thinkers, each of whom is guaranteed from the outset to be able to reach agreement with the others because all participate in the same thinking essence. Nor, of course, is it a single Being ... humanity is precarious: each person can only believe what he recognises to be true internally, and, at the same time, nobody thinks or makes up his mind without already being caught up in certain relationships with others, which leads him to opt for a particular set of opinions. Everyone is alone and yet nobody can do without other people ... there is no 'inner' life that is not a first attempt to relate to another person, In this ambiguous position, which has been forced on us because we have a body and a history (both personally and collectively), we can never know complete rest. We are continually obliged to work on our differences, to explain things that we have said that have not been properly understood, to reveal what is hidden within us and to perceive other people."
Lecture 6
" The meaning 'table' will only interest me insofar as it arises out of all the 'details' which embody its present mode of being. If I accept the tutelage of perception, I find I am ready to understand the work of art. For it too is a totality of flesh in which meaning is not free, so to speak, but bound, a prisoner of all the signs, or details, which reveal it to me. Thus the work of art resembles the object of perception: its nature is to be seen or heard and no attempt to define or analyse it, however valuable that may be as a way of taking stock of this experience, can ever stand in place of the direct perceptual experience."
Lecture 7
" In modernity, it is not only works of art that are unfinished: the world they express is like a work which lacks a conclusion."
" ... absolutely objective historical knowledge is inconceivable, because the act of interpreting the past and placing it in perspective is conditioned by the moral and political choices which the historian has made in his own life ... Trapped in this circle, human existence can never abstract from itself in order to gain access to the naked truth: it merely has the capacity to progress towards the objective and does not possess objectivity in fully-fledged form."
" ... if ambiguity and incompletion are ... written into the very fabric of our collective existence rather than just the works of intellectuals, then to seek the restoration of reason ... would be a derisory response ... liberal regimes should not be taken at their word ... noble ideologies can sometimes be convenient excuses."
Merleau-Ponty's message in these lectures is optimistic, far from the doom-and-gloom often ascribed to those moving in existentialist circles at this time.
Contestability and ambiguity are not becessarily bad things to Merleau-Ponty because they permit self- and social creation that accords with our complex natures. He stands in opposition to rationalist and intellectual models that bend humanity into fixed shapes.
Not only God but Reason are 'dead'. This is to be embraced but not from a position of reactionary conservatism. On the contrary, while clearly highly critical of the Soviet model, he is equally critical of Liberal nostrums (as he should be). The strong implication is that we can change things for us personally and for society in a progressive way through embracing uncertainty and making humane judgements for which we must take personal responsibility.
Of course, it is hard not to see this as part of the same movement that embraced Sartre, De Beauvoir, Camus and Arendt and so it is - but Merleau-Ponty should, I believe, be considered differently. His humane phenomenological approach leads him to existentialist conclusions but it does not lock him into its 'system' (such as it is) or ideology.
His ideological approach is, in fact, anti-ideological. He is sensibly respectful of science and is determined not to be led by the nose by Sartre whose genius and ego may place him amongst the 'greats' of Western philosophy but who must always be taken with a pinch of salt as a guide to life. For Merleau-Ponty, life need not be 'absurd' if we do not wish it to be.
December 1, 2019
This little book contains 7 brief public lectures of the French Philosopher known for his contribution in the philosophy of Phenomenology alongside Sartre and de Beauvoir. He starts with objective of the seven lectures is to rediscover the perceived world through means of art, literature and philosophy. Those which start with exploring the perception from concepts of the relatively better ordered towards the complex chaos: Science, Space, Sensory Objects, Animals (including savages, children, illiterates), perceptions outside of Man, art and literature ending with the modern and classical world view.
The book sort of provided a really good idea behind the gist of the ocean that is Phenomenology and act as a dummy's guide to his bigger book the Phenomenology of Perception (1945).
One specific positive thing for philosophy enthusiasts is that it has various references to Sartre's Being and Nothing where some of the excerpts were used for deconstruction. Maybe I'll be able to read Sartre by myself.
Bad jokes apart, he suggests that the modern consciousness is more truthful to the ambiguities of the human condition makes it possible to be optimistic, to look forward without illusion to the creation of something whose value is ‘solid and lasting’ even if it lacks the rational clarity of the classical ideal.
Here's some quotes >>>
"Philosophy is not the reflection of a pre-existing truth, but, like art, the act of bringing truth into being."
"In modernity, we have a representation of the world which excludes neither fissures nor lacunae, a form of action which is unsure of itself, or, at any rate, no longer blithely assumes it can obtain universal assent."
"I never become aware of my own existence until I have already made contact with others; my reflection always brings me back to myself, yet for all that it owes much to my contacts with other people. An infant of a few months is already very good at differentiating between goodwill, anger and fear on the face of another person, at a stage when he could not have learned the physical signs of these emotions by examining his own body."
The book sort of provided a really good idea behind the gist of the ocean that is Phenomenology and act as a dummy's guide to his bigger book the Phenomenology of Perception (1945).
One specific positive thing for philosophy enthusiasts is that it has various references to Sartre's Being and Nothing where some of the excerpts were used for deconstruction. Maybe I'll be able to read Sartre by myself.
Bad jokes apart, he suggests that the modern consciousness is more truthful to the ambiguities of the human condition makes it possible to be optimistic, to look forward without illusion to the creation of something whose value is ‘solid and lasting’ even if it lacks the rational clarity of the classical ideal.
Here's some quotes >>>
"Philosophy is not the reflection of a pre-existing truth, but, like art, the act of bringing truth into being."
"In modernity, we have a representation of the world which excludes neither fissures nor lacunae, a form of action which is unsure of itself, or, at any rate, no longer blithely assumes it can obtain universal assent."
"I never become aware of my own existence until I have already made contact with others; my reflection always brings me back to myself, yet for all that it owes much to my contacts with other people. An infant of a few months is already very good at differentiating between goodwill, anger and fear on the face of another person, at a stage when he could not have learned the physical signs of these emotions by examining his own body."
September 24, 2021
این کتاب مجموعهی هفت سخنرانیِ رادیویی از مرلوپونتیه؛ بههمراهِ مقدمهای مفصل.
علیرغم حجم کماش، ایدههای مفید و جدیدی برای من داشت.
علیرغم حجم کماش، ایدههای مفید و جدیدی برای من داشت.
July 22, 2020
These seven talks, originally broadcasted on the radio by Merleau-Ponty in october and november 1948, are generally considered to be a (very general) introduction to his philosophy of perception. The talks themselves are all rather short with some of them more than half filled with examples and illustrations - albeit very intriguing ones.
Merleau-Ponty's main thesis is very easy to grasp.
He thought, wrote and published in the era when classical science was overthrown with relativity and quantum mechanics, and when philosophy was radically re-oriënted - on the continent towards phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, etc.) and overseas towards logic and linquistics (Russell, Wittgenstein, etc.). During the same time, art was radically re-defined. Gone were the objective representations of things, people and events, to make room for impressionism, expressivism and surrealism. In short: the old way of looking at the world was being replaced by a new way of looking at the world.
What changed?
Classical thought aimed at establishing systems of absolute, certain knowledge - with Descartes and Newton being typical examples. This was all replaced with modern physics, when humanity learned that nature is at its core uncertain, ambiguous and relative. A similar line of development is seen in the life sciences, with the dynamism of evolutionary change replacing the Aristotelean or Biblical essentialism of species. Notions like space, time, and indeed all aspects of human nature, were now seen in a new light - or rather in an amalgam of many, many new lights.
Nietzsche already foresaw this with his perspectivism, while Husserl already developed a method with which to methodically study all aspects of human nature in a new, phenomenological way. Heidegger then shifted Husserl's focus on pure (inner) consciousness towards human nature in its general existence. And along comes Merleau-Ponty, who develops Heidegger's ideas into a bodily theory of perception.
That is, according to Merleau Ponty, all art, knowledge and action (i.e. aethetics, science, ethics) is founded on human perception. First, we are confronted with others in the world. This confrontation makes us aware of our own feelings, motivations, intentions, etc. as well as attributing these to other people. In other words: we first and foremost exist as subjects in relation to other subjects (as objects), and it is both these relations and the objects themselves which perception is concerned with.
Merleau-Ponty's claim is that our bodies fulfil a crucial role - we perceive through our bodies, perceptions do not exist in a pure form - like Descartes and people after them claimed. Whence does this illusion come from? Well, we become aware of other people and things, and we start to reflect on our relationship to those people and things, in all their aspects. Out of this reflection is born our self-consciousness. This Ego is not an entity, a Cartesian 'ghost in the machine', an immaterial soul steering our material body - it simply is the product of our mind reflecting on our perceptions.
Classical thinkers - both philosophers and scientists - started from this Ego and then attempted to establish it, somehow someway, as the foundation of knowledge. Cf. Descartes, Locke, Kant, Husserl, etc.
The reality is that we simply perceive things and people, and this is a process, not a simple act. This means that what we perceive and how we become aware of these aspects, is intrinsically connected to our bodily relationship with these objects. And this means that we can perceive any object in any kind of way. When I look at a table, the table is not a thing-in-itself, an unknowable object as cause of all its appearances (colors, texture, etc.). No, this table is the collection of all my perspectives on this table - and these perspectives in their turn are relationships between my body and this table. For example, when I think about how this table resists gravity it will determine my particular perspective on this table, while this perspective is still one of the many (infinite?) possible perspectives I could take.
With this theory of perception, Merleau-Ponty is able to cut the Gordian knot that ties empricism and rationalism together. This age old debate is senseless. The rationalist claims his knowledge of the mentioned table derives from a priori structures in his consciousness, while the empiricist claims his knowledge of the mentioned table derives from an un-knowable object an-sich that causes all the appearances of this table. Both are wrong - they both overlook the fact that they already assume (!) the perception of the table. That is, both empiricism and rationalism attempt to explain how a perception is caused, but they fail to ask the prior question about the perception itself.
Merleau-Ponty claims we perceive the world, first and foremost, and only afterwards start to rationalize. These attempts have failed. Just like an artwork offers the spectator a world, to perceive in all its aspects, so does nature offer the scientist a world, to perceive in all its aspects. There is no absolute knowledge, just like there is no absolute space.
The final paragraphs of this little book are interesting, since Merleau-Ponty here ponders how it is that this post-modern phase is only now (1940's France) arising. He concludes that while it might be due to "the honest awareness of this culture" that we acknowledge the uncertainty in the world, it is more likely that this uncertain and unfinished state of affairs has always been with us. According to him, people like Da Vinci and Balzac left many unfinished works, yet we perceive these classical geniuses to be complete, to be whole. This might be simply a "retrospective illusion".
He mentions that objectivity is not possible. The scholar brings his own preconceived notions to his observations and reports. E.g. the historian has to select what he writes down, how he writes it, even the order and internal structure. All these choices are fueled by his culture, education, language, etc. This means that any work in history is intimately tied to the scholar who wrote it down. In a similar vein, any observer in any location in space-time, will have his own frame of reference - there is no absolute, objective space (à la Newton).
Although I have more to read from Merleau-Ponty to really offer any serious insight on these affairs, I do think he has a point. Socrates - generally considered to be the (if not one of the) founder(s) of philosophy - is mostly remember for his way of questioning people. Most of the Socratic dialogues end in aporia's. That is, Socrates, as prototype of the artist-philosopher, was looking for knowledge, yet had an "honest awareness" of the uncertainty of all knowledge claims. Perhaps it is just the human mind that impresses its hunger for certainty and completeness on the world.
I do wonder, though, if this does not mean the breakdown of any pursuit of knowledge whatsoever. If all there is are personal perceptions, arising from our bodily relationships to objects; and all we can do is try to learn the (many, many) perspectives of others; where does this leave room for any meaningful insights? For example, how do we know relativity theory is true?
I am reading Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception next - I hope to get some answers from that work...
Merleau-Ponty's main thesis is very easy to grasp.
He thought, wrote and published in the era when classical science was overthrown with relativity and quantum mechanics, and when philosophy was radically re-oriënted - on the continent towards phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, etc.) and overseas towards logic and linquistics (Russell, Wittgenstein, etc.). During the same time, art was radically re-defined. Gone were the objective representations of things, people and events, to make room for impressionism, expressivism and surrealism. In short: the old way of looking at the world was being replaced by a new way of looking at the world.
What changed?
Classical thought aimed at establishing systems of absolute, certain knowledge - with Descartes and Newton being typical examples. This was all replaced with modern physics, when humanity learned that nature is at its core uncertain, ambiguous and relative. A similar line of development is seen in the life sciences, with the dynamism of evolutionary change replacing the Aristotelean or Biblical essentialism of species. Notions like space, time, and indeed all aspects of human nature, were now seen in a new light - or rather in an amalgam of many, many new lights.
Nietzsche already foresaw this with his perspectivism, while Husserl already developed a method with which to methodically study all aspects of human nature in a new, phenomenological way. Heidegger then shifted Husserl's focus on pure (inner) consciousness towards human nature in its general existence. And along comes Merleau-Ponty, who develops Heidegger's ideas into a bodily theory of perception.
That is, according to Merleau Ponty, all art, knowledge and action (i.e. aethetics, science, ethics) is founded on human perception. First, we are confronted with others in the world. This confrontation makes us aware of our own feelings, motivations, intentions, etc. as well as attributing these to other people. In other words: we first and foremost exist as subjects in relation to other subjects (as objects), and it is both these relations and the objects themselves which perception is concerned with.
Merleau-Ponty's claim is that our bodies fulfil a crucial role - we perceive through our bodies, perceptions do not exist in a pure form - like Descartes and people after them claimed. Whence does this illusion come from? Well, we become aware of other people and things, and we start to reflect on our relationship to those people and things, in all their aspects. Out of this reflection is born our self-consciousness. This Ego is not an entity, a Cartesian 'ghost in the machine', an immaterial soul steering our material body - it simply is the product of our mind reflecting on our perceptions.
Classical thinkers - both philosophers and scientists - started from this Ego and then attempted to establish it, somehow someway, as the foundation of knowledge. Cf. Descartes, Locke, Kant, Husserl, etc.
The reality is that we simply perceive things and people, and this is a process, not a simple act. This means that what we perceive and how we become aware of these aspects, is intrinsically connected to our bodily relationship with these objects. And this means that we can perceive any object in any kind of way. When I look at a table, the table is not a thing-in-itself, an unknowable object as cause of all its appearances (colors, texture, etc.). No, this table is the collection of all my perspectives on this table - and these perspectives in their turn are relationships between my body and this table. For example, when I think about how this table resists gravity it will determine my particular perspective on this table, while this perspective is still one of the many (infinite?) possible perspectives I could take.
With this theory of perception, Merleau-Ponty is able to cut the Gordian knot that ties empricism and rationalism together. This age old debate is senseless. The rationalist claims his knowledge of the mentioned table derives from a priori structures in his consciousness, while the empiricist claims his knowledge of the mentioned table derives from an un-knowable object an-sich that causes all the appearances of this table. Both are wrong - they both overlook the fact that they already assume (!) the perception of the table. That is, both empiricism and rationalism attempt to explain how a perception is caused, but they fail to ask the prior question about the perception itself.
Merleau-Ponty claims we perceive the world, first and foremost, and only afterwards start to rationalize. These attempts have failed. Just like an artwork offers the spectator a world, to perceive in all its aspects, so does nature offer the scientist a world, to perceive in all its aspects. There is no absolute knowledge, just like there is no absolute space.
The final paragraphs of this little book are interesting, since Merleau-Ponty here ponders how it is that this post-modern phase is only now (1940's France) arising. He concludes that while it might be due to "the honest awareness of this culture" that we acknowledge the uncertainty in the world, it is more likely that this uncertain and unfinished state of affairs has always been with us. According to him, people like Da Vinci and Balzac left many unfinished works, yet we perceive these classical geniuses to be complete, to be whole. This might be simply a "retrospective illusion".
He mentions that objectivity is not possible. The scholar brings his own preconceived notions to his observations and reports. E.g. the historian has to select what he writes down, how he writes it, even the order and internal structure. All these choices are fueled by his culture, education, language, etc. This means that any work in history is intimately tied to the scholar who wrote it down. In a similar vein, any observer in any location in space-time, will have his own frame of reference - there is no absolute, objective space (à la Newton).
Although I have more to read from Merleau-Ponty to really offer any serious insight on these affairs, I do think he has a point. Socrates - generally considered to be the (if not one of the) founder(s) of philosophy - is mostly remember for his way of questioning people. Most of the Socratic dialogues end in aporia's. That is, Socrates, as prototype of the artist-philosopher, was looking for knowledge, yet had an "honest awareness" of the uncertainty of all knowledge claims. Perhaps it is just the human mind that impresses its hunger for certainty and completeness on the world.
I do wonder, though, if this does not mean the breakdown of any pursuit of knowledge whatsoever. If all there is are personal perceptions, arising from our bodily relationships to objects; and all we can do is try to learn the (many, many) perspectives of others; where does this leave room for any meaningful insights? For example, how do we know relativity theory is true?
I am reading Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception next - I hope to get some answers from that work...
October 16, 2023
if you like this review i now have website: www.michaelkamakana.com
200228: third review. written 70 years ago and i am still inspired!
second review: i have read this before but it is this time, having read so much more m-p, that the concision and skill of this work is more apparent. perhaps because these brief spoken essays, these radio talks, no longer suffer the burden I ask that they answer in total his thought, that they can serve as do those clear, short, precise poetic rendering of zen Buddhist ideas, that they can serve both as intriguing intros and emblematic summations. for indeed, if you read on m-p, you will certainly learn his way that the world is and of, perception...
200201: more Merleau-Ponty's Ontology
Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Basic Writings
The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology: The Problem of Ideal Objects
The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty
The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty's Ontology
The Visible and the Invisible
Merleau-Ponty's Last Vision: A Proposal for the Completion of "The Visible and the Invisible"
Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logic and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception
bonus
Ark of the Possible: The Animal World in Merleau-Ponty
200228: third review. written 70 years ago and i am still inspired!
second review: i have read this before but it is this time, having read so much more m-p, that the concision and skill of this work is more apparent. perhaps because these brief spoken essays, these radio talks, no longer suffer the burden I ask that they answer in total his thought, that they can serve as do those clear, short, precise poetic rendering of zen Buddhist ideas, that they can serve both as intriguing intros and emblematic summations. for indeed, if you read on m-p, you will certainly learn his way that the world is and of, perception...
200201: more Merleau-Ponty's Ontology
Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Basic Writings
The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology: The Problem of Ideal Objects
The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty
The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty's Ontology
The Visible and the Invisible
Merleau-Ponty's Last Vision: A Proposal for the Completion of "The Visible and the Invisible"
Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logic and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception
bonus
Ark of the Possible: The Animal World in Merleau-Ponty
Read
June 11, 2025i knew absolutely nothing about phenomenology before starting this book and after reading this, i still know very little despite giving my best effort to understand it. it guess it just didn't click with me much. this is a series of lectures and they are written in a very accessable manner, so that's a plus. but on a minus side, you're like, well this is great, but what do i do with this information? idek but hey, phenomenology, cool stuff.
May 2, 2015
If only all philosophers had a text like this; MMP introduces himself and his thought very well in this series of lectures. I knew almost nothing about him going in, and now I feel ready to think through his harder works. Very readable!
The introduction was excellent, as well, despite the unpromising "summary of each lecture" format. Baldwin is sympathetic, but he also isn't afraid to point out MMP's failures, whether of factual understanding (his grasp of physics doesn't seem to have been particularly good) or reasoning (you can't analyze painting, music and literature in the same terms).
As for the thought itself, MMP seems to me to be a left-wing Heidegger variation. He is critical of 'science', which means something like analytical thought + materialism, and insists that human experience can only be properly explained if we give attention to 'perceptual' life (hence the title). Perception turns out to be very broad: looking at tables, yes, but also intersubjectivity, stimmung, and so on. He's usually reasonable--making a plea to include 'perception' in our understanding of human experience, rather than insisting that *all* human experience is non-cognitive. But sometimes he seems to lean too far in that direction, suggesting that "naive" experience is opposed to intellectual experience altogether, rather than insisting, rightly, that all experience is both intellectual and bodily. In Kantian cant, he is content to admit the existence and necessity of regulative ideas; he just doesn't think we should fool ourselves into thinking that those ideas are anything other than regulative, nor that they are sufficient for understanding.
I was also pleasantly surprised to see him applying all this to a specific time period: he is writing, he says, about a particularly modern way of understanding. But here we run up against philosophy's usual issue: on the one hand, MMP wants to laud the emergence of a new way of understanding (roughly, a more holistic and less 'classical' way) in modernity. On the other hand, he can't help himself, and insists that "modern consciousness has not discovered a modern truth but rather a truth of all time which is simply more visible--supremely acute--in today's world." So... if it's a truth of all time, why was it so unacknowledged until now? If we can come to understand this consciousness differently, why can't the consciousness itself be liable to change?
He also gets a bit carried away in a very French philosophical way (classical painting kills the "trembling life" of the world; Chinese (sic) rock gardens express "a preference for death"; art is always the attempt to create a self-sufficient object), but certainly isn't the worst offender in this regard.
Anyway, I look forward to learning more about MMP; anyone who can be this clear and interesting in such a restricted format can surely be interesting in more professional texts. And I do suspect that he'll tell me what I want to hear, things like this:
"To look at human beings from the outside is what makes the mind self-critical and keeps it sane. But the aim should not be to suggest that all is absurd, as Voltaire did. It is much more a question of implying, as Kafka does, that human life is always under threat and of using humour to prepare the ground for those rare and precious moments at which human beings come to recognise, to find, one another."
Reason, he tells us, is waiting for us; we'll never inherit it, but nor will we give up on it. Has anyone compared MMP with Adorno? That would be fruitful, I think.
The introduction was excellent, as well, despite the unpromising "summary of each lecture" format. Baldwin is sympathetic, but he also isn't afraid to point out MMP's failures, whether of factual understanding (his grasp of physics doesn't seem to have been particularly good) or reasoning (you can't analyze painting, music and literature in the same terms).
As for the thought itself, MMP seems to me to be a left-wing Heidegger variation. He is critical of 'science', which means something like analytical thought + materialism, and insists that human experience can only be properly explained if we give attention to 'perceptual' life (hence the title). Perception turns out to be very broad: looking at tables, yes, but also intersubjectivity, stimmung, and so on. He's usually reasonable--making a plea to include 'perception' in our understanding of human experience, rather than insisting that *all* human experience is non-cognitive. But sometimes he seems to lean too far in that direction, suggesting that "naive" experience is opposed to intellectual experience altogether, rather than insisting, rightly, that all experience is both intellectual and bodily. In Kantian cant, he is content to admit the existence and necessity of regulative ideas; he just doesn't think we should fool ourselves into thinking that those ideas are anything other than regulative, nor that they are sufficient for understanding.
I was also pleasantly surprised to see him applying all this to a specific time period: he is writing, he says, about a particularly modern way of understanding. But here we run up against philosophy's usual issue: on the one hand, MMP wants to laud the emergence of a new way of understanding (roughly, a more holistic and less 'classical' way) in modernity. On the other hand, he can't help himself, and insists that "modern consciousness has not discovered a modern truth but rather a truth of all time which is simply more visible--supremely acute--in today's world." So... if it's a truth of all time, why was it so unacknowledged until now? If we can come to understand this consciousness differently, why can't the consciousness itself be liable to change?
He also gets a bit carried away in a very French philosophical way (classical painting kills the "trembling life" of the world; Chinese (sic) rock gardens express "a preference for death"; art is always the attempt to create a self-sufficient object), but certainly isn't the worst offender in this regard.
Anyway, I look forward to learning more about MMP; anyone who can be this clear and interesting in such a restricted format can surely be interesting in more professional texts. And I do suspect that he'll tell me what I want to hear, things like this:
"To look at human beings from the outside is what makes the mind self-critical and keeps it sane. But the aim should not be to suggest that all is absurd, as Voltaire did. It is much more a question of implying, as Kafka does, that human life is always under threat and of using humour to prepare the ground for those rare and precious moments at which human beings come to recognise, to find, one another."
Reason, he tells us, is waiting for us; we'll never inherit it, but nor will we give up on it. Has anyone compared MMP with Adorno? That would be fruitful, I think.
September 2, 2021
Me gusta su forma de entender el arte, la ciencia y la filosofía, pero más: su noción de las cosas porque a mí también me gustan las cosas del mundo (me obsesionan, de hecho, como también me obsesiona lo inacabado). Ojo nomás a lo de "primitivo", pero, pues, era 1948.
March 6, 2022
Only in France would a leading public intellectual be invited to give a series of radio talks to introduce his philosphical theories to the general public. This book is a transcription of those talks. Mr. Merleau-Ponty's ideas are perhaps simplified and condensed a bit for the radio audience, but not dumbed down.
It is easy to agree with the first episode which discusses how science cannot provide the answers to all questions, but then science doesn't purport to do so. It was also easy to agree with the idea that our minds are trained to perceive the world in ways that do not correspond in any meaningful way to underlying truth. But the thing I liked best was the discussion of art as a medium for shaking up our false perceptions and causing us to see the world in a different and truer way. For some time now I have been working out in my own mind a theory that the essence of all art is to cause us to see the world differently, so I was thrilled to discover that someone as smart as Mr. Merleau-Ponty has thought along the same lines.
I didn't buy into all of Mr. Merleau-Ponty's theories. I'm not so sure that perception is the gateway to truth or to understanding the essence of being. Some of his ideas about perception and the mind seemed to be tied to 1940s science that would have to be revised today. And his idea that essential truth in communication between humans could be found in a shared moment of emotion (anger in his example) seemed wrong to me. But none of it was entirely stupid. Even the things that I did not agree with made me pause to think.
It is easy to agree with the first episode which discusses how science cannot provide the answers to all questions, but then science doesn't purport to do so. It was also easy to agree with the idea that our minds are trained to perceive the world in ways that do not correspond in any meaningful way to underlying truth. But the thing I liked best was the discussion of art as a medium for shaking up our false perceptions and causing us to see the world in a different and truer way. For some time now I have been working out in my own mind a theory that the essence of all art is to cause us to see the world differently, so I was thrilled to discover that someone as smart as Mr. Merleau-Ponty has thought along the same lines.
I didn't buy into all of Mr. Merleau-Ponty's theories. I'm not so sure that perception is the gateway to truth or to understanding the essence of being. Some of his ideas about perception and the mind seemed to be tied to 1940s science that would have to be revised today. And his idea that essential truth in communication between humans could be found in a shared moment of emotion (anger in his example) seemed wrong to me. But none of it was entirely stupid. Even the things that I did not agree with made me pause to think.
December 6, 2025
"Ressamlarda, yazarlarda, kimi filozoflarda ve modern fiziğin yaratıcılarında saptadığımız algı dünyasına dönüş, klasik bilimin, sanatın ve felsefenin arzularına oranla bir gerileme göstergesi sayılamaz mı acaba? Doğanın eksiksiz bilgisine baş koyulduğundan ve insan bilgisinden her türlü gizemin eleneceğinden zerre kuşku yoktur klasiklerde. Oysa insanın bilgisine ve eylemine ilkece açık olan bu akılcı evren yerine zorlu bir bilgi ve zorlu bir sanat var modernlerde, sakıncalarla ve kısıtlamalarla dolu, çatlaklı eksikli bir dünya temsili var, eylem kendinden kuşku duyuyor, en azından artık bütün insanların onayını elde etmekle övünmüyor..."
"Bir kere şunu kabul etmeli ki sanatta olsun, bilgide olsun, eylemde olsun, modernlerde klasiklerdeki o dogmatizm de yok, o özgüven de. Modern düşünce hem bir yarım kalmışlık hem de bir ikircik sunuyor ve bu bakımlardan burada bir gerilemeden ya da bir düşüşten söz edebilir isteyen herkes. Biz bütün bilim yapıtlarını geçici ve yaklaşık yapıtlar diye düşünüyoruz, oysa Descartes Tanrı'nın özniteliklerinden cisimlerin etkileşim yasalarını kesin olarak çıkarsayabileceğine inanıyordu. Müzeler artık hiçbir şey eklenemezmiş gibi duran yapıtlarla dolu, oysa bizim ressamlarımız kimi zaman ancak taslak gibi görünen yapıtlar sunuyor kamuya. Dahası bu yapıtlar sonu gelmeyen çözümlemelere konu oluyor, tek bir anlamı olan yapıtlar değil çünkü. Görünen o ki günümüz sanatçısı kendi üstüne gizemleri topluyor, şimşekleri çekiyor. Proust gibi birçok bakımdan klasikler kadar açık ve net yazdığında bile günümüz sanatçısının betimlediği dünya yetkin bir dünya olmadığı gibi tek anlamlı bir dünya da değil. Modern insan ayran gönüllü bir insan, daha kendi kendini bile tanıyamıyor. Modernlerde eksikli gedikli kalan şey yalnızca sanat yapıtları değil, dışavurdukları dünyanın ta kendisi sonuca bağlanmayan ve bir sonuca bağlanıp bağlanmayacağı belli olmayan bir yapıt gibi."
"Bilgi alanını bırakıp yaşam ve eylem alanına bakacak olursak, modern insanların belki daha da çarpıcı ikirciklerin pençesinde olduğunu göreceğiz. Siyaset dilimizde "modern" kadar değişik ve hatta karşıt gerçeklikleri belirten bir sözcük yoktur: özgürlük, sosyalizm, demokrasi, yeniden yapılandırma, yenidendoğuş, sendika özgürlüğü... Bugün varolan bütün büyük partiler bu sözcükleri en az bir kez sahiplenmeye çalışmıştır. Parti başkanlarının hınzırlığı değil bu - hınzırlık şeylerin kendilerinde.
Aslında biz Hegel'in diplomatik durum adını verdiği bir noktadayız, yani sözcüklerin (en az) iki anlama geldiği, şeylerin tek sözcükle söylenemediği bir noktada."
"Ama ikircik ve yarım kalmışlık yalnızca aydınların yapıtlarına değil, tam da toplum yaşamımızın dokusuna işlemişse, bu durum karşısında 1815 rejimini restore eder gibi aklı restore etmek istemek saçma olur. Çağımızın ikirciklerini çözümleyebiliriz ve çözümlemeliyiz, o ikirciklere dalıp içlerinden geçerek alnımızın akıyla, doğrulukla izlenebilecek bir yol çizmeye çalışmalıyız. Babalarımızın akılcılığını olduğu gibi devralamayacak kadar iyi tanıyoruz. Örneğin biliyoruz ki sırf söz düzleminde liberal rejimlere inanmamalı, eşitliği ve kardeşliği ilke edinirken iş uygulamaya gelince onları izlemeyebiliyorlar ve yüce emeller peşinde koşan ideolojiler sıklıkla insanları oyalamaktan başka bir işe yaramayabiliyor. Eşitlik olabilmesi için üretim araçlarının mülkiyetini devlete aktarmanın yeterli ol-madığını da başka yerlerden biliyoruz. Dolayısıyla ne sosyalizme ne de liberalizme ilişkin sorgulamalarımız sakınmasız ve koşulsuz olamaz; olayların akışıyla insanların bilinci bu ikircikli dizgelerin aşılmasını sağlamadıkça bu sallantılı zeminde kalacağız daha."
"Klasik dünya diye bize sıklıkla sunulan imgenin bir söylence olup olmadığını da sorgulamamız gerek: Bizim yarım kalmışlıklarımızı ve ikirciklerimizi klasik dünya hiç mi yaşamadı? Yarım kalmışlığın ve ikirciğin varlığını resmen tanımayı reddetmekle kalmadılar mı? Dolayısıyla bir çöküşün kanıtı olmak şöyle dursun, bizim kül-türümüzdeki kararsızlık durumu, her zaman doğru olmuş olan şeyin en keskin ve en dürüst biçimde farkına varılması değil mi? Bir düşüşten çok, bir kazanım değil mi?
"Klasik bir yapıttan söz edilirken onun eksiksiz bir yapıt olduğu söylendiği zaman anımsamalıyız ki Leonardo da Vinci ve başka birçokları da yapıtlarını yarım bırakmışlardı; Balzac'a göre bir yaratıcının yapıtında, o dillere destan "olgunluk dönemine" ne zaman ulaştığını söylemenin hiçbir yolu yoktur ve gerekirse yaratıcı aslında yapıt üzerinde çalışmayı hep sürdürebilir, olsa olsa yapıta biraz olsun netlik kazandırmak için son verir çalışmasına; öte yandan Cézanne bütün yapıtının aslında aradığı şeye yakınsamakla kaldığını düşünmesine karşın bize sık sık bir tamamlanmışlık ya da yetkinlik duygusu vermez değildir. Kimi resimlerde aşılamayacak bir bütünlük bulmamız, geçmişe dönüp bakınca oluşan bir yanılsamadan kaynaklanıyordur belki de; çünkü yapıt kendisini devralamayacağımız kadar, izleyemeyeceğimiz kadar uzakta ve farklıdır bizden. O yapıtı ortaya çıkaran ressam onu bir deneme ya da bir başarısızlık gibi görüyordu belki.
"Siyasi durumumuzun belirsizliklerinden söz ederken sanki geçmişteki siyasi durumlar hiç bizimkilere benzer çelişkiler ve bilinmezlikler taşımamış gibi konuşuyorduk - Fransız Devrimi'ni alın, Lenin'in ölümüne kadar Rus Devrimi'nin "klasik" dönemini alın... Öyleyse "modern" bilincin bulduğu şey modern bir haki-kat değil, tüm zamanların bir hakikati; şu var ki bu hakikat bugün daha görünür ve olanca vehametiyle ortada. Bilincimizin bu artışı ve tartışmaya daha açık olmamız düşüş halindeki bir insanlığın ürünü değil; yaşamı artık üç-beş takımadayla, üç-beş körfezle sınırlı olmayan, dünyanın dört bir ucunda kendiyle yüzleşen, kültür ya da kitaplar aracılığıyla tümden kendi kendine seslenen bir insanlığın ürünü bu...
"Kısa vadede nitelik düşüklüğü gün gibi ortada ama bu durumu klasiklerin dar insancılığını restore ederek düzeltemeyiz. Aslında klasikler kendi çağlarında ne yapmışlarsa, bizim sorunumuz da aynı şeyi kendi çağımızda kendi deneyimlerimizle yapmak. Cézanne'ın sorunu buydu: "izlenimcilikle müzelerdeki sanat gibi sağlam bir şey kurmak. "
"Bir kere şunu kabul etmeli ki sanatta olsun, bilgide olsun, eylemde olsun, modernlerde klasiklerdeki o dogmatizm de yok, o özgüven de. Modern düşünce hem bir yarım kalmışlık hem de bir ikircik sunuyor ve bu bakımlardan burada bir gerilemeden ya da bir düşüşten söz edebilir isteyen herkes. Biz bütün bilim yapıtlarını geçici ve yaklaşık yapıtlar diye düşünüyoruz, oysa Descartes Tanrı'nın özniteliklerinden cisimlerin etkileşim yasalarını kesin olarak çıkarsayabileceğine inanıyordu. Müzeler artık hiçbir şey eklenemezmiş gibi duran yapıtlarla dolu, oysa bizim ressamlarımız kimi zaman ancak taslak gibi görünen yapıtlar sunuyor kamuya. Dahası bu yapıtlar sonu gelmeyen çözümlemelere konu oluyor, tek bir anlamı olan yapıtlar değil çünkü. Görünen o ki günümüz sanatçısı kendi üstüne gizemleri topluyor, şimşekleri çekiyor. Proust gibi birçok bakımdan klasikler kadar açık ve net yazdığında bile günümüz sanatçısının betimlediği dünya yetkin bir dünya olmadığı gibi tek anlamlı bir dünya da değil. Modern insan ayran gönüllü bir insan, daha kendi kendini bile tanıyamıyor. Modernlerde eksikli gedikli kalan şey yalnızca sanat yapıtları değil, dışavurdukları dünyanın ta kendisi sonuca bağlanmayan ve bir sonuca bağlanıp bağlanmayacağı belli olmayan bir yapıt gibi."
"Bilgi alanını bırakıp yaşam ve eylem alanına bakacak olursak, modern insanların belki daha da çarpıcı ikirciklerin pençesinde olduğunu göreceğiz. Siyaset dilimizde "modern" kadar değişik ve hatta karşıt gerçeklikleri belirten bir sözcük yoktur: özgürlük, sosyalizm, demokrasi, yeniden yapılandırma, yenidendoğuş, sendika özgürlüğü... Bugün varolan bütün büyük partiler bu sözcükleri en az bir kez sahiplenmeye çalışmıştır. Parti başkanlarının hınzırlığı değil bu - hınzırlık şeylerin kendilerinde.
Aslında biz Hegel'in diplomatik durum adını verdiği bir noktadayız, yani sözcüklerin (en az) iki anlama geldiği, şeylerin tek sözcükle söylenemediği bir noktada."
"Ama ikircik ve yarım kalmışlık yalnızca aydınların yapıtlarına değil, tam da toplum yaşamımızın dokusuna işlemişse, bu durum karşısında 1815 rejimini restore eder gibi aklı restore etmek istemek saçma olur. Çağımızın ikirciklerini çözümleyebiliriz ve çözümlemeliyiz, o ikirciklere dalıp içlerinden geçerek alnımızın akıyla, doğrulukla izlenebilecek bir yol çizmeye çalışmalıyız. Babalarımızın akılcılığını olduğu gibi devralamayacak kadar iyi tanıyoruz. Örneğin biliyoruz ki sırf söz düzleminde liberal rejimlere inanmamalı, eşitliği ve kardeşliği ilke edinirken iş uygulamaya gelince onları izlemeyebiliyorlar ve yüce emeller peşinde koşan ideolojiler sıklıkla insanları oyalamaktan başka bir işe yaramayabiliyor. Eşitlik olabilmesi için üretim araçlarının mülkiyetini devlete aktarmanın yeterli ol-madığını da başka yerlerden biliyoruz. Dolayısıyla ne sosyalizme ne de liberalizme ilişkin sorgulamalarımız sakınmasız ve koşulsuz olamaz; olayların akışıyla insanların bilinci bu ikircikli dizgelerin aşılmasını sağlamadıkça bu sallantılı zeminde kalacağız daha."
"Klasik dünya diye bize sıklıkla sunulan imgenin bir söylence olup olmadığını da sorgulamamız gerek: Bizim yarım kalmışlıklarımızı ve ikirciklerimizi klasik dünya hiç mi yaşamadı? Yarım kalmışlığın ve ikirciğin varlığını resmen tanımayı reddetmekle kalmadılar mı? Dolayısıyla bir çöküşün kanıtı olmak şöyle dursun, bizim kül-türümüzdeki kararsızlık durumu, her zaman doğru olmuş olan şeyin en keskin ve en dürüst biçimde farkına varılması değil mi? Bir düşüşten çok, bir kazanım değil mi?
"Klasik bir yapıttan söz edilirken onun eksiksiz bir yapıt olduğu söylendiği zaman anımsamalıyız ki Leonardo da Vinci ve başka birçokları da yapıtlarını yarım bırakmışlardı; Balzac'a göre bir yaratıcının yapıtında, o dillere destan "olgunluk dönemine" ne zaman ulaştığını söylemenin hiçbir yolu yoktur ve gerekirse yaratıcı aslında yapıt üzerinde çalışmayı hep sürdürebilir, olsa olsa yapıta biraz olsun netlik kazandırmak için son verir çalışmasına; öte yandan Cézanne bütün yapıtının aslında aradığı şeye yakınsamakla kaldığını düşünmesine karşın bize sık sık bir tamamlanmışlık ya da yetkinlik duygusu vermez değildir. Kimi resimlerde aşılamayacak bir bütünlük bulmamız, geçmişe dönüp bakınca oluşan bir yanılsamadan kaynaklanıyordur belki de; çünkü yapıt kendisini devralamayacağımız kadar, izleyemeyeceğimiz kadar uzakta ve farklıdır bizden. O yapıtı ortaya çıkaran ressam onu bir deneme ya da bir başarısızlık gibi görüyordu belki.
"Siyasi durumumuzun belirsizliklerinden söz ederken sanki geçmişteki siyasi durumlar hiç bizimkilere benzer çelişkiler ve bilinmezlikler taşımamış gibi konuşuyorduk - Fransız Devrimi'ni alın, Lenin'in ölümüne kadar Rus Devrimi'nin "klasik" dönemini alın... Öyleyse "modern" bilincin bulduğu şey modern bir haki-kat değil, tüm zamanların bir hakikati; şu var ki bu hakikat bugün daha görünür ve olanca vehametiyle ortada. Bilincimizin bu artışı ve tartışmaya daha açık olmamız düşüş halindeki bir insanlığın ürünü değil; yaşamı artık üç-beş takımadayla, üç-beş körfezle sınırlı olmayan, dünyanın dört bir ucunda kendiyle yüzleşen, kültür ya da kitaplar aracılığıyla tümden kendi kendine seslenen bir insanlığın ürünü bu...
"Kısa vadede nitelik düşüklüğü gün gibi ortada ama bu durumu klasiklerin dar insancılığını restore ederek düzeltemeyiz. Aslında klasikler kendi çağlarında ne yapmışlarsa, bizim sorunumuz da aynı şeyi kendi çağımızda kendi deneyimlerimizle yapmak. Cézanne'ın sorunu buydu: "izlenimcilikle müzelerdeki sanat gibi sağlam bir şey kurmak. "
February 10, 2025
Centraal in Merleau-Ponty’s filosofie is de fenomenologie, waarvan Husserl de grondlegger is. Fenomenologie is de filosofische studie van datgene wat zich aan ons verschijnt. De intentionaliteit is dan de betekenis van datgene wat zich aan ons verschijnt. Het staat volledig los van de vraag of het object dat zich aan ons verschijnt werkelijk bestaat of niet (zoals bij Plato), maar het gaat om de relatie tussen het waargenomen object en het subject dat waarneemt. Wanneer er geen waarneming is, kunnen we spreken van een gedachte aan of een herinnering over dat wat waargenomen werd.
Merleau-Ponty neemt deze basisgedachte van Husserl over intentionaliteit over maar breidt ze verder uit. Bij Husserl gaat het om een theoretische en bewuste relatie tussen subject en object (= bewustzijn van iets). Merleau-Ponty wil terug gaan naar een niveau dat voorafgaat aan bewuste en theoretische kennis. Waar in het verleden het lichaam altijd het status van object (een fysiologische zak met cellen) kreeg, geeft Merleau-Ponty het lichaam het status van subject. Het doorleefde lichaam is niet alleen iets wat je hebt, maar het is ook iets dat je bent door de zintuiglijke ervaring. Heidegger maakte een onderscheid tussen ‘voorhanden zijn’ en ‘ter handen zijn’ waarbij het laatste betekenis geeft aan datgene wat ‘voorhanden is’. Merleau-Ponty legt het doorleefde lichaam eigenlijk uit als wat ‘ter handen is’.
Voordat we een bewuste en reflectieve verhouding tot de wereld hebben, heeft deze wereld al een betekenis voor ons omdat ons lichaam er altijd al een pre-reflectieve verhouding tot heeft. De intentionaliteit ontstaat dus niet vanuit het bewustzijn maar vanuit het doorleefde lichaam. Aan de intentionaliteit van het ‘ik denk dat’ gaat die van het ‘ik kan’ vooraf. De dingen hebben een betekenis voor mij omdat ik er allereerst een lichamelijke verhouding mee heb. In deze benadering zien we een kritiek op de vorm van denken die sinds Descartes overheersend is.
Bij Descartes (het cartesianisme) wordt de waarneming gereduceerd tot een vorm van denken (= het oog van de geest) in de veronderstelling om zo tot de essentie (= kwaliteiten en eigenschappen) te komen. Dit rationalistisch denken gaat ervan uit dat onze zintuigen ons niets waardevols leren. De fenomenologie (van Merelau-Ponty) wil de wetenschap weer in contact brengen met haar eigen wortels in de voorwetenschappelijke leefwereld (via de zintuigen). Het is niet zijn bedoeling haar te beknotten of te bekritiseren, maar haar te vervolledigen. Hij stelt zich immers de vraag of de wetenschap een voorstelling van de wereld geeft of zal kunnen geven die compleet is. Iedere observatie is immers onlosmakelijk verbonden met de positie en de situatie van de observator. Er is geen Absolute Observator.
De dingen zijn dus geen eenvoudige neutrale objecten voor ons die we op contemplatieve wijze zouden kunnen beschouwen. Ieder ding symboliseert en herinnert ons aan een bepaald gedrag, het provoceert bij ons gunstige of ongunstige reacties. Dingen bestaan niet zomaar als vast staande feiten, maar zij beginnen pas te bestaan en krijgen pas een betekenis door de bepaalde relaties die we er mee hebben. Dit impliceert ook dat ik de ander nooit kan aanschouwen als een zuivere geest. Ik ken de ander slechts door zijn blikken, zijn gebaren, zijn woorden. Ik reduceer de ander niet tot zijn lichaam omdat het lichaam bezield is met allerlei intenties.
Merleau-Pony zegt dat er veel tijd, inspanning en cultuur nodig is om de wereld van de waarneming te onthullen. Misschien kan dit het best bewerkstelligd worden door kunst, literatuur en poëzie. Volgens Merleau-Ponty komt dit door het onderscheid tussen het gesproken woord en het sprekende woord. Het gesproken woord heeft een vaste betekenis tussen het woord en zijn betekenis. Het is abstract en staat voor eens en altijd vast. Het impliceert het vergeten van de wereld van de waarneming. Het gesproken wordt overgewaardeerd en is overheersend. Bij het sprekende woord staat de betekenis nog niet vast maar moet het nog gevormd worden, zoals bij kunstwerken het geval is. Hun betekenis komt telkens opnieuw tot stand. Vooral bij moderne kunst wordt die vanzelfsprekendheid doorbroken.
Daarom is het belangrijk om de traditionele opvatting over kunst te verwerpen, waarbij het kunstwerk verwijst naar iets in de werkelijkheid. Volgens Merleau-Ponty is het kunstwerk geen imitatie van de wereld, maar ‘het is een wereld op zichzelf’. Het gaat er niet zozeer om ‘wat’ afgebeeld wordt, maar de ‘manier waarop’ dit verschijnt. Het kunstwerk is een lichamelijke expressie die voorkomt uit de lichamelijke verbondenheid die de kunstenaar heeft met de wereld. Daardoor is het kunstwerk in staat de voor ons bekende en herkenbare wereld op een totaal nieuwe wijze te laten verschijnen. Daardoor heeft het kunstwerk iets verrassends, omdat het iets dat vertrouwd is op een nieuwe, vreemde of schokkende manier kan laten verschijnen. In deze verrassing kunnen we de terugkeer naar de wereld van de waarneming ervaren.
Verblind door een eenzijdig geloof in rationaliteit, hebben we het inzicht in onze alledaagse leefwereld, die ogenschijnlijk zo vanzelfsprekend is, verloren.
Het boekje start met een inleiding door Jenny Slatman waarbij ze de kern van de filosofie van Merleau-Ponty bondig toelicht. De eerste pagina’s stelde ik me even de vraag of dit betoog niet te abstract zou worden. Maar al snel blijkt dit een onnodige bezorgdheid. Jenny Slatman geeft een duidelijk beeld met eenvoudige voorbeelden waardoor het bijzonder vlot en boeiend leest.
Daarna volgt de transcriptie van zeven radiolezingen uit 1948 waarin Merleau-Ponty de hoofdlijnen van zijn denken weergeeft. De radiolezingen zijn een stuk abstracter dan de inleiding maar de duidelijkheid en concreetheid van deze inleiding vormen een grote meerwaarde bij de interpretatie van deze lezingen.
Merleau-Ponty neemt deze basisgedachte van Husserl over intentionaliteit over maar breidt ze verder uit. Bij Husserl gaat het om een theoretische en bewuste relatie tussen subject en object (= bewustzijn van iets). Merleau-Ponty wil terug gaan naar een niveau dat voorafgaat aan bewuste en theoretische kennis. Waar in het verleden het lichaam altijd het status van object (een fysiologische zak met cellen) kreeg, geeft Merleau-Ponty het lichaam het status van subject. Het doorleefde lichaam is niet alleen iets wat je hebt, maar het is ook iets dat je bent door de zintuiglijke ervaring. Heidegger maakte een onderscheid tussen ‘voorhanden zijn’ en ‘ter handen zijn’ waarbij het laatste betekenis geeft aan datgene wat ‘voorhanden is’. Merleau-Ponty legt het doorleefde lichaam eigenlijk uit als wat ‘ter handen is’.
Voordat we een bewuste en reflectieve verhouding tot de wereld hebben, heeft deze wereld al een betekenis voor ons omdat ons lichaam er altijd al een pre-reflectieve verhouding tot heeft. De intentionaliteit ontstaat dus niet vanuit het bewustzijn maar vanuit het doorleefde lichaam. Aan de intentionaliteit van het ‘ik denk dat’ gaat die van het ‘ik kan’ vooraf. De dingen hebben een betekenis voor mij omdat ik er allereerst een lichamelijke verhouding mee heb. In deze benadering zien we een kritiek op de vorm van denken die sinds Descartes overheersend is.
Bij Descartes (het cartesianisme) wordt de waarneming gereduceerd tot een vorm van denken (= het oog van de geest) in de veronderstelling om zo tot de essentie (= kwaliteiten en eigenschappen) te komen. Dit rationalistisch denken gaat ervan uit dat onze zintuigen ons niets waardevols leren. De fenomenologie (van Merelau-Ponty) wil de wetenschap weer in contact brengen met haar eigen wortels in de voorwetenschappelijke leefwereld (via de zintuigen). Het is niet zijn bedoeling haar te beknotten of te bekritiseren, maar haar te vervolledigen. Hij stelt zich immers de vraag of de wetenschap een voorstelling van de wereld geeft of zal kunnen geven die compleet is. Iedere observatie is immers onlosmakelijk verbonden met de positie en de situatie van de observator. Er is geen Absolute Observator.
De dingen zijn dus geen eenvoudige neutrale objecten voor ons die we op contemplatieve wijze zouden kunnen beschouwen. Ieder ding symboliseert en herinnert ons aan een bepaald gedrag, het provoceert bij ons gunstige of ongunstige reacties. Dingen bestaan niet zomaar als vast staande feiten, maar zij beginnen pas te bestaan en krijgen pas een betekenis door de bepaalde relaties die we er mee hebben. Dit impliceert ook dat ik de ander nooit kan aanschouwen als een zuivere geest. Ik ken de ander slechts door zijn blikken, zijn gebaren, zijn woorden. Ik reduceer de ander niet tot zijn lichaam omdat het lichaam bezield is met allerlei intenties.
Merleau-Pony zegt dat er veel tijd, inspanning en cultuur nodig is om de wereld van de waarneming te onthullen. Misschien kan dit het best bewerkstelligd worden door kunst, literatuur en poëzie. Volgens Merleau-Ponty komt dit door het onderscheid tussen het gesproken woord en het sprekende woord. Het gesproken woord heeft een vaste betekenis tussen het woord en zijn betekenis. Het is abstract en staat voor eens en altijd vast. Het impliceert het vergeten van de wereld van de waarneming. Het gesproken wordt overgewaardeerd en is overheersend. Bij het sprekende woord staat de betekenis nog niet vast maar moet het nog gevormd worden, zoals bij kunstwerken het geval is. Hun betekenis komt telkens opnieuw tot stand. Vooral bij moderne kunst wordt die vanzelfsprekendheid doorbroken.
Daarom is het belangrijk om de traditionele opvatting over kunst te verwerpen, waarbij het kunstwerk verwijst naar iets in de werkelijkheid. Volgens Merleau-Ponty is het kunstwerk geen imitatie van de wereld, maar ‘het is een wereld op zichzelf’. Het gaat er niet zozeer om ‘wat’ afgebeeld wordt, maar de ‘manier waarop’ dit verschijnt. Het kunstwerk is een lichamelijke expressie die voorkomt uit de lichamelijke verbondenheid die de kunstenaar heeft met de wereld. Daardoor is het kunstwerk in staat de voor ons bekende en herkenbare wereld op een totaal nieuwe wijze te laten verschijnen. Daardoor heeft het kunstwerk iets verrassends, omdat het iets dat vertrouwd is op een nieuwe, vreemde of schokkende manier kan laten verschijnen. In deze verrassing kunnen we de terugkeer naar de wereld van de waarneming ervaren.
Verblind door een eenzijdig geloof in rationaliteit, hebben we het inzicht in onze alledaagse leefwereld, die ogenschijnlijk zo vanzelfsprekend is, verloren.
Het boekje start met een inleiding door Jenny Slatman waarbij ze de kern van de filosofie van Merleau-Ponty bondig toelicht. De eerste pagina’s stelde ik me even de vraag of dit betoog niet te abstract zou worden. Maar al snel blijkt dit een onnodige bezorgdheid. Jenny Slatman geeft een duidelijk beeld met eenvoudige voorbeelden waardoor het bijzonder vlot en boeiend leest.
Daarna volgt de transcriptie van zeven radiolezingen uit 1948 waarin Merleau-Ponty de hoofdlijnen van zijn denken weergeeft. De radiolezingen zijn een stuk abstracter dan de inleiding maar de duidelijkheid en concreetheid van deze inleiding vormen een grote meerwaarde bij de interpretatie van deze lezingen.
June 13, 2020
“Duyularimiz bize gecerli bir sey ogretemez diye, yalnizca tam anlamiyla nesnel bilgi izlenmeye degerdir diye sirt cevirdigimiz cevremizdeki bu dunyayi gormeyi ogreniyoruz boyle boyle. Icinde konumlandigimiz uzama yeniden dikkat eder oluyoruz: ancak sinirli bir perspektiften -kendi perspektifimizden- gorunen bir uzam bu; bizim barinagimiz ama bu uzam; onunla kurdugumuz baglar tensel baglar; insan tutumlarina ayna tutan belli varolma bicimi bulguluyoruz neye baksak. Son olarak da seylerle aramizda yeni bir bag kuruluyor; bu bag hali gibi serili bir nesne ya da uzam ile egemen bir zihin arasindaki saf baglardan degil, ete tene burunmus sinirli bir varlikla bilmeceli bir dunya arasindaki ikircikli bagdir: insan dunyayi belli belirsiz gorse bile surekli ona dadanir.”
November 28, 2023
“Our relationship with things is not a distant one: each speaks to our body and to the way we live. They are clothed in human characteristics (whether docile, soft, hostile or resistant) and conversely they dwell within us as emblems of forms of life we either love or hate.”
“Other human beings are never pure spirit for me: I only know them through their glances, their gestures, their speech – in other words, through their bodies. Of course another human being is certainly more than simply a body to me: rather, this other is a body animated by all manner of intentions, the origin of numerous actions and words. “
“Other human beings are never pure spirit for me: I only know them through their glances, their gestures, their speech – in other words, through their bodies. Of course another human being is certainly more than simply a body to me: rather, this other is a body animated by all manner of intentions, the origin of numerous actions and words. “
January 12, 2023
Compelling read
November 2, 2025
mieux que heidegger
February 26, 2025
A nice little introduction to phenomenology, even though it scatter at times over far fetched areas.
May 10, 2025
Some fair old/school philosophy, not super relevant to what I’m thinking about at the moment, but some colourful explorations of perception.
August 12, 2022
3.5 ستاره.
مرلوپونتی در هفت سخنرانیای که انجام داده و در این کتاب آورده شدن، سعی در هم آمیختن هنر و سیاست با فلسفه داره و از هنر به عنوان مدخلی برای فلسفهاش استفاده میکنه. مرلوپونتی شیوه تفکر سنتی و بهخصوص دکارت رو نقد میکنه و با تاثیرِ از فیزیک مدرن توضیح میده که هیچچیز مطلق نیست. مرلوپونتی برخلاف دکارت بر این باوره که جهانِ به ادراک درآمده، جهانِ واقعیه، درحالی ک�� جهان علم فقط نوعی تقریبه.
"اگر بخواهیم چگونگی اثبات امری را بیاموزیم، پژوهشی بی نقص را راهبری کنیم یا منتقد خود و پیش انگاشتههای خود باشیم، توسل به علم، حالا و همیشه، کاری درست و بجا خواهد بود. طبیعی بود که زمانی، وقتی علم هنوز به وجود نیامده بود، از آن انتظار داشتیم همه جوابها را برایمان فراهم آورد. پرسشی که فلسفه مدرن در مورد عـلم مطرح میکند درصدد نیست با حق موجودیت عـلم مقابله کند یا هر مسیری را بر پژوهش های آن ببندد. بلکه پرسش این است که آیا علم به واقع تصویری از جهان برای ما فراهم می آورد یا اصلا خواهد توانست فراهم آورد که کامل، خودبسنده و به نحوی منطبق بر خود جهان باشد، به طوری که دیگر هیچ پرسش بامعنایی بیرون از این تصویر وجود نداشته باشد. مسئله رد یا محدود کردن گستره دانش علمی در میان نیست، بلکه مسئله تعیین این امر است که آیا علم اجازه دارد تمامی آن صور پژوهش را که از اندازه گیری و مقایسه شروع نمیکنند و، با مرتبط ساختن عللی خاص به نتایجی خاص، به قوانینی از قبیل قوانین فیزیک کلاسیک نمیانجامند، به عنوان اموری توهم آمیز رد و طرد کند. این پرسش از سر خصومت با علم طرح نشده است. به عکس، در واقع خود علم ـ به ویژه در تازه ترین دستاوردهایش ـ است که ما را وامیدارد این پرسش را مطرح کنیم و تشویقمان میکند که به آن پاسخ منفی بدهیم. از پایان سده نوزدهم، دانشمندان این ایده را پذیرفتهاند که قوانین و نظریههای ایشان تصویری بی.نقص از طبیعت فراهـم نمیآورند، بلکه، به عکس، باید آنها را بازنمایی های اجمالی هرچه سادهتر رویدادهای طبیعی در نظر گرفت که قرار است با پژوهش هایی که مرتباً بر دقتشان افزوده میگردد صیقل یابند؛ یا، به بیان دیگر، این قوانین و نظریهها دانش را بر مبنای تقریب ایجاد میکنند. علم دادههای تجربیما را در معرض صورتی از تحلیل قرار میدهد که هرگز نمیتوان انتظار کامل شدنش را داشت، زیرا که هیچ محدودیت ذاتیای برای روند مشاهده وجود ندارد: همواره میتوان تصور کرد که امکان مشاهدهای دقیقتر و کاملتر از آنچه در هر لحظه مفروضی صورت گرفته وجود دارد."
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مرلوپونتی بهمون میگه که جهان ادراک (جهانی نه با حواسمون میبینیم و درک میکنیم) توهمه و واقعی نیست و دانش واقعیِ به جهان به واسطه science بهدست میاد، نه با توهمات انسانی، "جهان واقعی از امواج و ذراتی تشکیل شده که علم به ما میگوید در پس این توهمات حسی وجود دارند." "ادراک چیزی بیش از آغاز مبهم دانش علمی نیست. رابطه میان ادراک و دانش علمی، رابطه نمود است با بود."
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مرلوپونتی نه ادراک انسان رو کامل میدونه، نه علم رو و نقدی به هر دو وارد میکنه، "تنها چیزی که مورد حمله است، جزمیت آن علمی است که خود را حائز دانش مطلق و کامل میپندارد."
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مرلوپونتی با تاثیر زیادی که از فیزیک مدرن گرفته به تعریف فضا و توضیح اجسام میپردازه و از این یافتههای علمی برای تببین برخی مسائل مربوط به هنر و نقاشی استفاده میکنه.
مرلوپونتی در هفت سخنرانیای که انجام داده و در این کتاب آورده شدن، سعی در هم آمیختن هنر و سیاست با فلسفه داره و از هنر به عنوان مدخلی برای فلسفهاش استفاده میکنه. مرلوپونتی شیوه تفکر سنتی و بهخصوص دکارت رو نقد میکنه و با تاثیرِ از فیزیک مدرن توضیح میده که هیچچیز مطلق نیست. مرلوپونتی برخلاف دکارت بر این باوره که جهانِ به ادراک درآمده، جهانِ واقعیه، درحالی ک�� جهان علم فقط نوعی تقریبه.
"اگر بخواهیم چگونگی اثبات امری را بیاموزیم، پژوهشی بی نقص را راهبری کنیم یا منتقد خود و پیش انگاشتههای خود باشیم، توسل به علم، حالا و همیشه، کاری درست و بجا خواهد بود. طبیعی بود که زمانی، وقتی علم هنوز به وجود نیامده بود، از آن انتظار داشتیم همه جوابها را برایمان فراهم آورد. پرسشی که فلسفه مدرن در مورد عـلم مطرح میکند درصدد نیست با حق موجودیت عـلم مقابله کند یا هر مسیری را بر پژوهش های آن ببندد. بلکه پرسش این است که آیا علم به واقع تصویری از جهان برای ما فراهم می آورد یا اصلا خواهد توانست فراهم آورد که کامل، خودبسنده و به نحوی منطبق بر خود جهان باشد، به طوری که دیگر هیچ پرسش بامعنایی بیرون از این تصویر وجود نداشته باشد. مسئله رد یا محدود کردن گستره دانش علمی در میان نیست، بلکه مسئله تعیین این امر است که آیا علم اجازه دارد تمامی آن صور پژوهش را که از اندازه گیری و مقایسه شروع نمیکنند و، با مرتبط ساختن عللی خاص به نتایجی خاص، به قوانینی از قبیل قوانین فیزیک کلاسیک نمیانجامند، به عنوان اموری توهم آمیز رد و طرد کند. این پرسش از سر خصومت با علم طرح نشده است. به عکس، در واقع خود علم ـ به ویژه در تازه ترین دستاوردهایش ـ است که ما را وامیدارد این پرسش را مطرح کنیم و تشویقمان میکند که به آن پاسخ منفی بدهیم. از پایان سده نوزدهم، دانشمندان این ایده را پذیرفتهاند که قوانین و نظریههای ایشان تصویری بی.نقص از طبیعت فراهـم نمیآورند، بلکه، به عکس، باید آنها را بازنمایی های اجمالی هرچه سادهتر رویدادهای طبیعی در نظر گرفت که قرار است با پژوهش هایی که مرتباً بر دقتشان افزوده میگردد صیقل یابند؛ یا، به بیان دیگر، این قوانین و نظریهها دانش را بر مبنای تقریب ایجاد میکنند. علم دادههای تجربیما را در معرض صورتی از تحلیل قرار میدهد که هرگز نمیتوان انتظار کامل شدنش را داشت، زیرا که هیچ محدودیت ذاتیای برای روند مشاهده وجود ندارد: همواره میتوان تصور کرد که امکان مشاهدهای دقیقتر و کاملتر از آنچه در هر لحظه مفروضی صورت گرفته وجود دارد."
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مرلوپونتی بهمون میگه که جهان ادراک (جهانی نه با حواسمون میبینیم و درک میکنیم) توهمه و واقعی نیست و دانش واقعیِ به جهان به واسطه science بهدست میاد، نه با توهمات انسانی، "جهان واقعی از امواج و ذراتی تشکیل شده که علم به ما میگوید در پس این توهمات حسی وجود دارند." "ادراک چیزی بیش از آغاز مبهم دانش علمی نیست. رابطه میان ادراک و دانش علمی، رابطه نمود است با بود."
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مرلوپونتی نه ادراک انسان رو کامل میدونه، نه علم رو و نقدی به هر دو وارد میکنه، "تنها چیزی که مورد حمله است، جزمیت آن علمی است که خود را حائز دانش مطلق و کامل میپندارد."
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مرلوپونتی با تاثیر زیادی که از فیزیک مدرن گرفته به تعریف فضا و توضیح اجسام میپردازه و از این یافتههای علمی برای تببین برخی مسائل مربوط به هنر و نقاشی استفاده میکنه.
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November 12, 2020O’ooo Euclides! It’s too Liquid.
Alışılmış ressamlar baştan kontrollü giriyorlar işe. Tamamen önceden karar verilmiş bir anlaşmalı uzam kabuluyle paletlerini ellerine alıyorlar.
Karşılarındaki çokça nesneden birisine bakıyorlar önce, resmediyorlar. Sonra diğerine, sonra ötekine ayrı ayrı odaklanıyorlar. Ama sonuçta oluşan durumda resim, tek bakışın ürünü gibi yansıtılıyor. Bu önceden karar verilmiş, deforme edilmiş bir uzam anlayışıdır.
Halbuki göz hangi nesneye odaklandıysa ona göre diğer nesnelerin durumu her seferinde değişmektedir. Ressamın yaptığı bu görülenlerin ortalamasını yansıtmaktır.
Uzlaşımsal yol arayan bu ressam, resimlerinde herşey yolunda gibi görünse de algılayışın gerçek hakkını asla vermiş olmaz.
Ponty itiraz ediyor: “Ama algıyla temas ettiğimiz dünya kendisini öyle sunmuyor ki?” (1)
Ponty gibi düşünen, algıların elle uzlaştırılmasıyla bulunan sonucu reddeden ressam bizim gözümüzde perspektif sorunsal içerisindedir ya da geometri bilmiyordur. “Hesap hataları var” deriz belki de ilk bakışta. Ama aslında bu ortalama bakış anlayışını reddeden ressam, her noktadaki duyumu tek duyuma dönüştürme bileşkesi arayan ressamdan daha çok algıyla senkron çalışmaktadır. Ve dahası, algısının ona söylediğiyle çelişmemektedir.
Konumu, vücudu olmayan saf zihnin seyrinde bu farklı noktaların farklı algılanışı olmayacağından tek bir fotoğraf sahne oluşturmak olasıdır. Ama uzam dediğmiz şey homojen değildir, her boyutunda farklı değişikliklerin olması gerçektir, saf zihnin göreceği eşzamanlı şeyler ortamı değildir. Dolayısıyla ancak vücutsuz ve konumsuz bir ressamın gerçek algısının böyle olabileceği söylenebilir bu durumda.
Gördüğümüz şeyi baktığımz yer ve ânın bilincinde kabullenen ve bunu yansıtan, ne geometri bilmediiğinden bunu yapacaktır, ne dikkat çekme derdindedir, ne de perspektife ya da klasik sanat anlayışına kabalık ediyordur. O gördüğüne sadık kalıyordur.
“Teknik ölçüme kendini adamış ve nicelik aşkıyla yanıp tutuşan bir çağda kübist resim, zihnimizden çok gönlümüze seslenen bir alanda dünyayla insanın sarmaş dolaş oluşunu kendince sessiz sakin anlatmış sanki.” (2)
Dışımızdaki her varlığı ancak vücudumuz üzerinden erişebiliyoruz; dışımızdaki her varlık da böylelikle insan özelliklerine bürünüp br ruh ve vücut karışımı haline geliyor.
Uzamın artık nesneyi nasıl eğip bükebileceğini, yer değiştiren nesnenin bazen nasıl da değişebileceğini görüyoruz (3). Nesnenin kendisiyle mutlak bir özdeşlik içinde olduğu iddiası, biçimle içeriğin ayrık olduğu iddiası gibi silikleşiyor. Bu yeni fizik bakışını artık kabullenenlerin Euclides’in katı çerçevesinin tuzla buz olduğunu artık kabul etmesinin zamanı çoktan gelmedi mi?
Bunu fizikte ve psikolojide yavaş yavaş olduğu gibi artık her alanda kabul etmek zorunda değil miyiz?
K. Banu Köse
Alışılmış ressamlar baştan kontrollü giriyorlar işe. Tamamen önceden karar verilmiş bir anlaşmalı uzam kabuluyle paletlerini ellerine alıyorlar.
Karşılarındaki çokça nesneden birisine bakıyorlar önce, resmediyorlar. Sonra diğerine, sonra ötekine ayrı ayrı odaklanıyorlar. Ama sonuçta oluşan durumda resim, tek bakışın ürünü gibi yansıtılıyor. Bu önceden karar verilmiş, deforme edilmiş bir uzam anlayışıdır.
Halbuki göz hangi nesneye odaklandıysa ona göre diğer nesnelerin durumu her seferinde değişmektedir. Ressamın yaptığı bu görülenlerin ortalamasını yansıtmaktır.
Uzlaşımsal yol arayan bu ressam, resimlerinde herşey yolunda gibi görünse de algılayışın gerçek hakkını asla vermiş olmaz.
Ponty itiraz ediyor: “Ama algıyla temas ettiğimiz dünya kendisini öyle sunmuyor ki?” (1)
Ponty gibi düşünen, algıların elle uzlaştırılmasıyla bulunan sonucu reddeden ressam bizim gözümüzde perspektif sorunsal içerisindedir ya da geometri bilmiyordur. “Hesap hataları var” deriz belki de ilk bakışta. Ama aslında bu ortalama bakış anlayışını reddeden ressam, her noktadaki duyumu tek duyuma dönüştürme bileşkesi arayan ressamdan daha çok algıyla senkron çalışmaktadır. Ve dahası, algısının ona söylediğiyle çelişmemektedir.
Konumu, vücudu olmayan saf zihnin seyrinde bu farklı noktaların farklı algılanışı olmayacağından tek bir fotoğraf sahne oluşturmak olasıdır. Ama uzam dediğmiz şey homojen değildir, her boyutunda farklı değişikliklerin olması gerçektir, saf zihnin göreceği eşzamanlı şeyler ortamı değildir. Dolayısıyla ancak vücutsuz ve konumsuz bir ressamın gerçek algısının böyle olabileceği söylenebilir bu durumda.
Gördüğümüz şeyi baktığımz yer ve ânın bilincinde kabullenen ve bunu yansıtan, ne geometri bilmediiğinden bunu yapacaktır, ne dikkat çekme derdindedir, ne de perspektife ya da klasik sanat anlayışına kabalık ediyordur. O gördüğüne sadık kalıyordur.
“Teknik ölçüme kendini adamış ve nicelik aşkıyla yanıp tutuşan bir çağda kübist resim, zihnimizden çok gönlümüze seslenen bir alanda dünyayla insanın sarmaş dolaş oluşunu kendince sessiz sakin anlatmış sanki.” (2)
Dışımızdaki her varlığı ancak vücudumuz üzerinden erişebiliyoruz; dışımızdaki her varlık da böylelikle insan özelliklerine bürünüp br ruh ve vücut karışımı haline geliyor.
Uzamın artık nesneyi nasıl eğip bükebileceğini, yer değiştiren nesnenin bazen nasıl da değişebileceğini görüyoruz (3). Nesnenin kendisiyle mutlak bir özdeşlik içinde olduğu iddiası, biçimle içeriğin ayrık olduğu iddiası gibi silikleşiyor. Bu yeni fizik bakışını artık kabullenenlerin Euclides’in katı çerçevesinin tuzla buz olduğunu artık kabul etmesinin zamanı çoktan gelmedi mi?
Bunu fizikte ve psikolojide yavaş yavaş olduğu gibi artık her alanda kabul etmek zorunda değil miyiz?
K. Banu Köse
January 29, 2023
Short, but extraordinary.
That's the first thing I'm going to say about the book.
It contains a set of enormous determinations on the practice of understanding and perceiving a person, himself, his private and social environment, the society in which he is located, and from here on, the whole world. While reading the book, I remembered Berger's book Ways of Seeing. Also, we can have a very good cross-reading with this book. Ponty has pursued such beautiful philosophical questions about the human being and the created (kept at a certain limit) capacity of perception that it is impossible not to question yourself while reading. Therefore, it is also a tremendous practical book...
First, a phenomenological approach to knowledge, knowing and taking the form of knowledge refers to the subjective and objective effects of perception that occurs, and after that, dogmatic concepts created by mankind bumps into eternity your eyes, everything is for him himself with the arrogance of assuming that people who are from these illusions from Nature reveals the parsing is simpler and more humane person. In this way, he addresses the dynamics that keep people in a deception in a perceptual dimension. Apart from this, by explaining the reflections of perception in the field such as art with examples, he revealed how open human practices are to perception. I think it is a book that everyone should definitely read. It will offer a richer perspective on life. Have a pleasant reading.
That's the first thing I'm going to say about the book.
It contains a set of enormous determinations on the practice of understanding and perceiving a person, himself, his private and social environment, the society in which he is located, and from here on, the whole world. While reading the book, I remembered Berger's book Ways of Seeing. Also, we can have a very good cross-reading with this book. Ponty has pursued such beautiful philosophical questions about the human being and the created (kept at a certain limit) capacity of perception that it is impossible not to question yourself while reading. Therefore, it is also a tremendous practical book...
First, a phenomenological approach to knowledge, knowing and taking the form of knowledge refers to the subjective and objective effects of perception that occurs, and after that, dogmatic concepts created by mankind bumps into eternity your eyes, everything is for him himself with the arrogance of assuming that people who are from these illusions from Nature reveals the parsing is simpler and more humane person. In this way, he addresses the dynamics that keep people in a deception in a perceptual dimension. Apart from this, by explaining the reflections of perception in the field such as art with examples, he revealed how open human practices are to perception. I think it is a book that everyone should definitely read. It will offer a richer perspective on life. Have a pleasant reading.
May 13, 2022
A very urbane and humane little volume of lectures that restores some dignitas to qualia. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological and psychological perspective anticipates many ideas in modern neuroscience: it's easy to draw a line from the thought here to Damasio's view of embodied emotions in cognition, for example. One passage on the development of self-consciousness brought to mind the mimetic school of psychology building on René Girard's work.
Worth a read to help re-center the body and its perceptions in our being-in-the-world. These essays are brief and written for a general audience, but give a nice taste of Merleau-Ponty's larger body of work.
Worth a read to help re-center the body and its perceptions in our being-in-the-world. These essays are brief and written for a general audience, but give a nice taste of Merleau-Ponty's larger body of work.
November 26, 2023
“It is the sourness of the lemon which is yellow, it is the yellow of the lemon which is sour”
“Our relationship with things is not a distant one: each speaks to our body and to the way we life. They are clothed in human characteristics … humanity is invested in the things of the world and these are invested in it”
“Our relationship with things is not a distant one: each speaks to our body and to the way we life. They are clothed in human characteristics … humanity is invested in the things of the world and these are invested in it”
March 5, 2023
bir radyo programı metinleri nasıl bu kadar ağır olabilir diye düşünerek okudum kitabı. 7 metin ama 7 kitaplık gibi geldi. sanırım okumak için doğru zamanda da değilmişim. ileride tekrar okurum diye düşünüyorum.
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March 8, 2019Modern düşüncenin temellerini anlatan bu kitapta 'şeyler'e dair ayırdına varılacak detaylar var.
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May 17, 2020...modern resmin uzamı gönül gözüne görünen uzamdır.
s.24
s.24
April 14, 2022
Ottima introduzione alla fenomenologia.
September 6, 2024
I like this one… will prob have to read it again, but it’s short. Read for phenomenology class, and gave (increasing, incremental) meaning to it
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