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What Are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology
From the time of Locke, discussions of personal identity have often ignored the question of our basic metaphysical whether we human people are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. The result of this neglect has been centuries of wild proposals and clashing intuitions.
What Are We? is the first general study of this important question. It beings by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines in some depth the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature, detailing both their theoretical virtues and the often grave difficulties they face.
The book does not endorse any particular account of what we are, but argues that the matter turns on more general issues in the ontology of material things. If composition is universal--if any material things whatever make up something bigger--then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then we too are simples--perhaps the immaterial substances of Descartes--or else we do not exist at all (a view Olson takes very seriously). The intermediate view that some things compose bigger things and others do not leads almost inevitably to the conclusion that we are organisms. So we can discover what we are by working out when composition occurs.
What Are We? is the first general study of this important question. It beings by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines in some depth the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature, detailing both their theoretical virtues and the often grave difficulties they face.
The book does not endorse any particular account of what we are, but argues that the matter turns on more general issues in the ontology of material things. If composition is universal--if any material things whatever make up something bigger--then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then we too are simples--perhaps the immaterial substances of Descartes--or else we do not exist at all (a view Olson takes very seriously). The intermediate view that some things compose bigger things and others do not leads almost inevitably to the conclusion that we are organisms. So we can discover what we are by working out when composition occurs.
- GenresPhilosophyMetaphysics
264 pages, Hardcover
First published August 29, 2007
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
March 23, 2009
An interesting book but painfully inconclusive. Further, Olson lingers obsessively on the "too many thinkers" argument, typically used against constitutionalism, but apparently applicable to every theory but Animalism.
This book raises some important questions, but fails to answer any of them.
This book raises some important questions, but fails to answer any of them.
October 30, 2017
Very lucid intro to personal ontology and identity (think more ontology than questions about 'what matters' in personal identity). Olson argues that we are human animals. This is one of those books that is very enjoyable to read and also makes it difficult to explain what it is exactly philosophers spend their time thinking about.
Check out this argument:
There is a human animal writing this review.
The human animal writing this review is thinking.
I am the thinking human animal writing this review.
Therefore, I am a human animal.
Awesome.
Still recommended, if you're interested in these questions.
Check out this argument:
There is a human animal writing this review.
The human animal writing this review is thinking.
I am the thinking human animal writing this review.
Therefore, I am a human animal.
Awesome.
Still recommended, if you're interested in these questions.
May 23, 2022
It’s a good book. I think it gives a solid overview of the different views of personal ontology. However the critique I have isn’t specific to this book but the conversation of personal ontology in general. I think it’s over simplified. Why do we think we can be boiled down to just a brain or soul or bundle of perceptions? I think we’re far too complex for that and when I refer to I, I am referring to the combination of different aspects. Something that is impossible in the mutually exclusive language of different views.
May 31, 2017
This covers a broad range of theories of personal identity. A good introduction to the topic.
June 17, 2014
As a clearly written catalog of general theories as to what a human person actually is, it served me well as an introduction to to the topic and a jumping-off point for getting into more of the literature. For all this clarity, you may not be satisfied with the choices you have left, so it's also a great book to read on the subject if you only plan on reading one.
What the book really succeeds in illustrating is the uncomfortable point that it's hard to pin down what the human 'essence' is, drawing out the appeal of an elegant theory of 'souls' to even the most staunch materialist. Better, it draws out the Wittgensteinian point that no rigid definition fits all relevant ordinary language phrases: you're going to end up with some awkward results. Olson really beats you over the head with a particular type of awkwardness concerning two things occupying the space of one.
What the book really succeeds in illustrating is the uncomfortable point that it's hard to pin down what the human 'essence' is, drawing out the appeal of an elegant theory of 'souls' to even the most staunch materialist. Better, it draws out the Wittgensteinian point that no rigid definition fits all relevant ordinary language phrases: you're going to end up with some awkward results. Olson really beats you over the head with a particular type of awkwardness concerning two things occupying the space of one.
November 6, 2013
If you want to read a book on the main views in human ontology; this is it.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews