Creech Blue - Gen. Bill Creech and the Reformation of the Tactical Air Forces, 1978-1984

by James C. Slife

Gen Wilbur L. “Bill” Creech was a leader, a visionary, a warrior, and a mentor. Just as Gen Curtis E. LeMay shaped the Air Force of the Cold War through his development of Strategic Air Command in the 1950s, General Creech shaped the Air Force of today through his actions as the commander of Tactical Air Command (TAC) from 1978 until 1984. Under the leadership of General Creech, TAC—and the Tactical Air Forces (TAF) writ large—underwent a transformation that, in large measure, built the Air Force that has fought so brilliantly in campaigns from Operation Desert Storm to the present global war on terrorism. In Creech Blue, Lt Col James C. Slife chronicles the influence General Creech had in the areas of equipment and tactics, training, organization, and leader development. His study is among the first to describe what, to historians in years to come, will surely be seen as the revolutionary developments of the late 1970s and early 1980s and General Creech’s central role. While not a biography, Creech Blue is certainly biographical and captures the general’s professional convictions in so many areas. General Creech’s career spanned three and a half decades, which attests to how his experiences prepared him to assume command of TAC at the pivotal time that he did. As a young fighter pilot in Korea, he worked closely with Army maneuver units on the ground and was involved in the first all-jet aerial dogfight. These experiences helped shape his thoughts on the role of technology in warfare. Afterwards, General Creech was an aerial-demonstration pilot and an instructor at the Air Force Fighter Weapons School. In these assignments, he learned the value of disciplined flying and the need for tactics appropriate to the enemy. As aide-de-camp to TAC commander Gen Walter “Cam” Sweeney, General Creech learned much about the value of relationships at the highest levels of our service while also experiencing firsthand the destructive nature of interservice squabbles. In Vietnam he reinforced his ideas on the value of technology, particularly the need for an ability to fight at night. Twice a wing commander in Europe during the height of the Cold War, General Creech developed his strongly held convictions on how organization and leadership can set the stage for a unit’s success. As commander of Air Force Systems Command Center and as assistant vice-chief of staff, he learned much about systems development and acquisition that would serve him well in the years to come. When General Creech assumed command of TAC in May 1978, there was no one more prepared to lead the TAF into a new era. Creech Blue serves as a first corrective to much that has been published in the last decade as our service has become more intellectually and doctrinally aware. Colonel Slife addresses such controversial topics as the development of the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine and what it meant to Airmen. As the TAC commander during this period, General Creech was intimately involved in the development of AirLand Battle doctrine; contrary to popular opinion, he entered into these discussions with the Army with his eyes wide open. Another central issue of the time was the powerful movement within many government and media circles to “reform” the Defense Department. While others are given much credit for moving the debate forward, little has been written on why the Air Force was institutionally resistant to many of the reformers’ proposals. Given his position at the time, General Creech was often the spokesman for the Air Force’s programs and frequently found himself at odds with the reform movement. This study enlightens the Air Force on its convictions during that period and challenges the idea that by 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Air Force had forgotten how to wage a “strategic” air campaign and was dangerously close to plunging into a costly and lengthy war of attrition had it not been for the vision of a small cadre of thinkers on the Air Staff.

164 pages, Paperback

First published October 1, 2004

Reviews

[Jim Mullen · Rating 2 out of 5]

Good for strategic defense planning enthusiast.

[Levie Galapon · Rating 3 out of 5]

Summary:

General Creech was an influential figure in the U.S. air force. He brought about developments and changes in tactical, technological, and organizational thinking. These developments and changes would eventually pay dividends during the gulf war.

Analysis:

General Creech sought after two tactical changes as head of the Tactical Air Command. The first was the development of the ability to fight at night. It was from Creech’s experiences in Korea and Vietnam where he learned that the air force needed the ability to conduct “tactical air operations at night”. According to Creech, having the ability to fight at night will essentially work as a force multiplier. This is important in the context of the Cold War since they were expecting the USSR to always have the numerical advantage. With this in mind, it could also be seen how the U.S. would look for technological solutions for tactical problems. Furthermore, there are psychological reasons why fighting at night provides benefits. Creech states that fighting in the dark will deny enemies of the “sanctuary of darkness” and instead this “sanctuary” is given to our forces. Another interesting tactical development brought about by Creech is the defensive roll-back strategy. This requires attacking SAM sites instead of avoiding them. This is an interesting development because it provides for a safer and logical way to conduct air warfare. Creech stressed that this strategy is necessary to avoid Anti-air artillery placed at lower altitudes.
In terms of technological developments, they were mostly meant to meet the standards of Creech’s tactical developments. One such development was Creech’s involvement with the LANTIRN project. This “LANTIRN system” would provide for “true night, under-the-weather capability…coupled with a formidable precision-munition employment capability”. It is easy to see that this “system” is in accordance to Creech’s ideas that the air force should be able to fight at night. Another interesting technological development Creech helped bring along was the different jamming and anti-jamming technology. These materialized in the form of the “Compass Call”, “Have Quick” and “Compass Call jamming system”. These technological developments came about Creech’s desire to conduct “electronic warfare”. It could be seen that electronic warfare is meant to disrupt enemy lines of communications while keeping our lines open.
In terms of organizational changes and developments they were designed to decentralize and improve. Creech sought to decentralize the TAC by “organizing in small teams” and “limiting flying rules”. These two changes would help bring down accident rates while bringing up productivity. Another organizational change brought about by Creech was the increase of professionalism to the TAC. An interesting account in increasing professionalism came from the “dedicated crew chief program”. This program allowed crew chiefs to work on a specific aircraft instead of any random aircraft. This helped instill “pride” to the crew chiefs that would essentially work harder on an aircraft since it was assigned to them. It could be seen that professionalism and decentralization helped bring about positive change by basically helping people understand the importance of their duty.
Overall, besides from all the well-known “flag” exercises Creech was known for, Creech implemented many developments and changes that helped the air force as a whole. From changes and developments in tactics, technology, and organization the air force would be better prepared to face the challenges of the gulf war. In the post-gulf war era, it is important to understand the effectiveness of Creech’s leadership in the TAC to see where similar improvements could be used today