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Cambridge Military Histories
On a Knife Edge
Stand der Ausgang des Ersten Weltkriegs auf Messers Schneide? 100 Jahre nach der deutschen Niederlage zeichnet Holger Afflerbach die militärischen Entwicklungen nach, analysiert die politisch-strategischen Entscheidungen und zeigt, dass der Krieg auch anders hätte ausgehen können. Ein deutscher Sieg war schon nach dem Scheitern der Westoffensive im Herbst 1914 in weite Ferne gerückt. Doch gibt es nicht nur Sieg oder Niederlage. In seinem dicht argumentierenden, auf zahlreichen neuen Archivrecherchen basierenden Buch zeigt Holger Afflerbach, dass ein Unentschieden das logische Ergebnis des Ersten Weltkriegs gewesen wäre – wenn die deutsche Führung nicht schwere Fehler begangen hätte. Doch auch die Politik der Alliierten muss sehr viel kritischer gesehen werden, als es heute geschieht. Die deutsche Politik war nicht so eindeutig auf umfassende Eroberungen festgelegt, wie es dem allgemeinen Urteil entspricht, und die deutschen Friedensvorstöße hätten die Möglichkeit geboten, den Krieg zu beenden, bevor er Europa in den Abgrund riss. Doch die Alliierten gingen nicht auf sie ein, weil sie auf den Sieg gegen Deutschland fixiert waren und an ihren eigenen imperialistischen Plänen festhielten.
696 pages, Paperback
First published October 31, 2022
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Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews
November 13, 2022
Fantastic exciting account of ww1 seen from the German standpoint.
I have often mused why it was that Germany had lost this war. I had read that early in 1918 they had been on the offensive and yet within 3 months it was all over . I couldn’t imagine how that had happened.
This work takes you behind the scenes during before and at the closing stages of the conflict and makes sense of things for the reader. Most of the attention of the writer is on the “ strategic management “ or lack of , of the war effort - the various pieces that made up the management team as it were - the chancellor, the army leaders the OHL , the politicians in reichstag and finally the ultimate decision maker the Kaiser.
It’s clear that a major problem for the Germans was their unsatisfactory strategic decision making process which requires sign off by willhelm - a man whose talents were not up to the task.
In summary the Germans made 2 main mistakes. Invading Belgium which forever tainted them morally , but also ensures Britain entered the war . And secondly committing to the 1917 U Boat war against all shipping which brought the Americans into the conflict in April 1917.
In the final year the Germans who decided to go Sh1t or bust , lost 1 million men on their 5 assaults on the western front. That same year the Americans added 1 million fresh new soldiers to that front. That decided the outcome.
The peace which followed was supposed to respect Wilson’s 14 points but it did not leaving the Germans bitter ans resentful
The allies have the reputation for having prolonged the war by refusing to negotiate a peace in 16 17 or early 18. Instead of a peace of equals - Wilsons preferred outcome - it became a peace of victory, and therein were sown the seeds of the terrible conflicts which followed.
Written by a German this is a disarmingly honest account of German fallibility but also points up the role the allies played in prolonging and extending the agony and the catastrophe that followed
Magnificent
I have often mused why it was that Germany had lost this war. I had read that early in 1918 they had been on the offensive and yet within 3 months it was all over . I couldn’t imagine how that had happened.
This work takes you behind the scenes during before and at the closing stages of the conflict and makes sense of things for the reader. Most of the attention of the writer is on the “ strategic management “ or lack of , of the war effort - the various pieces that made up the management team as it were - the chancellor, the army leaders the OHL , the politicians in reichstag and finally the ultimate decision maker the Kaiser.
It’s clear that a major problem for the Germans was their unsatisfactory strategic decision making process which requires sign off by willhelm - a man whose talents were not up to the task.
In summary the Germans made 2 main mistakes. Invading Belgium which forever tainted them morally , but also ensures Britain entered the war . And secondly committing to the 1917 U Boat war against all shipping which brought the Americans into the conflict in April 1917.
In the final year the Germans who decided to go Sh1t or bust , lost 1 million men on their 5 assaults on the western front. That same year the Americans added 1 million fresh new soldiers to that front. That decided the outcome.
The peace which followed was supposed to respect Wilson’s 14 points but it did not leaving the Germans bitter ans resentful
The allies have the reputation for having prolonged the war by refusing to negotiate a peace in 16 17 or early 18. Instead of a peace of equals - Wilsons preferred outcome - it became a peace of victory, and therein were sown the seeds of the terrible conflicts which followed.
Written by a German this is a disarmingly honest account of German fallibility but also points up the role the allies played in prolonging and extending the agony and the catastrophe that followed
Magnificent
July 20, 2022
I have just finished my read of "On a Knife Edge: How Germany Lost the First World War," by Holger Afflerbach. It was made available to me in the form of an ARC by Cambridge University Press, and I am very grateful to them. This text examines specifically the commitment of the German High Command and the various political constituencies in the Second Reich to "winning" the war. In the course of accomplishing this, the author examines both how "victory" might have been conceptualized by the very different constituencies in play as well as the very different views of those who were simply searching for a way to end the catastrophe of World War on somewhat equitable terms. Note how different this picture of a very divided Reich on the subject of winning the war and what costs might have to be paid is from the more accepted view of Germany stubbornly insisting on an all or nothing approach to the question of victory or a negotiated settlement. Therein lies the principle contribution of this work to studies of World War I. Not simply (or even primarily) a military history, this text embraces a much more holistic approach to examining the complex interplay of political and social forces that played out behind the scenes of the great military campaigns. While the author's interest is primarily focused on events relating directly to the Kaiser's Reich, it is obvious that these can only be understood in the broader context of European politics at the time. Well written and often startling in its analysis, this book should be a must read for anyone attempting to come to terms with the cataclysmic events of the Great War. Just to make one point that struck me as I was reading the author's analysis; it is fascinating how war and the horrors it encompassed came to dominate the discussions of alternative endings instead of traditional victory. I was put in mind of those who look at a conflict like Vietnam or Afghanistan and become increasingly trapped by the resources (in both blood and treasure) which they have already expended. This leads to a kind of straightjacket which comes to dominate discussions of withdrawal or war objectives, often leaving little resemblance to the more "logical" motives which had propelled things from the beginning. In short, the violence takes on a life of its own hushing the voices of those who could see where things were going. Read this book; the world of the Great War will look very different when you are finished.
December 15, 2023
An accessible, well-researched and well-written work.
The narrative is straightforward, and events are covered chronologically. The translation is pretty good, with a few awkward parts here and there. The book can be a bit dense or repetitive. The maps are good. Most of the book deals with wartime politics in Germany, and readers will have to look elsewhere for the history of the campaigns or the war at the tactical level. Afflerbach notes the dysfunction in government, headed nominally by the weak and inept Kaiser, with chancellor after chancellor that proved just as weak (he calls it “polycratic chaos”), and a high command full of hubris and totally out of its depth in the political and diplomatic spheres. Throughout the war, German war aims kept evolving, and often increased simply because German leaders wanted to justify the immense carnage with immense gains. Even when they inquired about peace, they didn’t moderate their demands.
There is little coverage of the war at sea. The Entente side isn’t covered much, except when it directly affects the Germans. There are several points in the narrative where Afflerbach argues that Germany was on the verge of a breakthrough or victory (hence the title), though perhaps not all readers will be as convinced (also, Afflerbach himself notes that the Germans never really set specific objectives for these offensives in 1918). The author also blames the Entente for prolonging the war, but that argument could have been developed better. There could have been more discussion of how the military situation affected diplomacy. At one point he suggests that the Germans were fighting a “limited war,” in contrast to the Allies, who “wanted to fight to victory,” and had done so “since 1914.” Statements like this could have been expanded on more.
At one point Adolf Wild von Hohenborn is called “von Wild.” Elsewhere Afflerbach briefly describes the 1916 presidential election in America, writing that Charles Evan Hughes “ran on a more decisively Entente-friendly and interventionist manifesto” (he did?) There's a small number of typos. A few times “shells” are translated as “grenades.” Afflerbach also mentions German moves to smuggle Lenin "through Germany in a sealed railway carriage and then send him on a neutral ship to Russia." He also writes that Lenin “had no fear that his own people might suspect him of being a German agent.” He almost certainly did, since he denied it so strongly. Kerensky’s provisional government investigated Lenin’s ties to the Germans and publicly stated that they were real, though it never published the evidence, and when the Bolsheviks came to power they locked these files away.
A clear, readable, and insightful work.
The narrative is straightforward, and events are covered chronologically. The translation is pretty good, with a few awkward parts here and there. The book can be a bit dense or repetitive. The maps are good. Most of the book deals with wartime politics in Germany, and readers will have to look elsewhere for the history of the campaigns or the war at the tactical level. Afflerbach notes the dysfunction in government, headed nominally by the weak and inept Kaiser, with chancellor after chancellor that proved just as weak (he calls it “polycratic chaos”), and a high command full of hubris and totally out of its depth in the political and diplomatic spheres. Throughout the war, German war aims kept evolving, and often increased simply because German leaders wanted to justify the immense carnage with immense gains. Even when they inquired about peace, they didn’t moderate their demands.
There is little coverage of the war at sea. The Entente side isn’t covered much, except when it directly affects the Germans. There are several points in the narrative where Afflerbach argues that Germany was on the verge of a breakthrough or victory (hence the title), though perhaps not all readers will be as convinced (also, Afflerbach himself notes that the Germans never really set specific objectives for these offensives in 1918). The author also blames the Entente for prolonging the war, but that argument could have been developed better. There could have been more discussion of how the military situation affected diplomacy. At one point he suggests that the Germans were fighting a “limited war,” in contrast to the Allies, who “wanted to fight to victory,” and had done so “since 1914.” Statements like this could have been expanded on more.
At one point Adolf Wild von Hohenborn is called “von Wild.” Elsewhere Afflerbach briefly describes the 1916 presidential election in America, writing that Charles Evan Hughes “ran on a more decisively Entente-friendly and interventionist manifesto” (he did?) There's a small number of typos. A few times “shells” are translated as “grenades.” Afflerbach also mentions German moves to smuggle Lenin "through Germany in a sealed railway carriage and then send him on a neutral ship to Russia." He also writes that Lenin “had no fear that his own people might suspect him of being a German agent.” He almost certainly did, since he denied it so strongly. Kerensky’s provisional government investigated Lenin’s ties to the Germans and publicly stated that they were real, though it never published the evidence, and when the Bolsheviks came to power they locked these files away.
A clear, readable, and insightful work.
January 6, 2024
This book concerns how Germany lost the first world war. Not so much the getting thumped on the battlefield, but the various lost chances of being able to negotiate peace. As a result, it feels quite fresh and I learnt a lot from it.
Although it's a very readable book, the last 30 pages or so felt a bit supplementary, but that's not the end of the world.
Although it's a very readable book, the last 30 pages or so felt a bit supplementary, but that's not the end of the world.
April 30, 2024
Before I started this work, I really had no sense who Holger Afflerbach was, then, when looking over the bibliography, it turns out that about a page and a half of it lists Dr. Afflerbach's own contributions to the field; meaning that this book is the digest of a career.
Next, the title does nicely sum up one of Afflerbach's main points, that though the war could have ended to the benefit of all parties anytime after 1914, the two alliance systems could always find some development that would allow them to justify continuing the war. This is until the German ruling complex (government is too respectful a word for this lot) found ways to provoke American participation in the war, and the German military lost its bet that its great 1918 offensive would be a winner.
That's the thing, and perhaps the real core of this book, the reality that the German ruling complex collectively did not know themselves, nor did they know their enemy, apart from the simple bean count. This is not really news, but Afflerbach really drives home how much the German war effort was driven by pious hopes and misplaced optimism, not to mention that there was no real leveling with the German public, so it was a total shock when the roof caved in come 1918. This misplaced sense of hope is also what leads to the image of the Great War being a premeditated German war of conquest, as something had to be won to justify the sacrifices, and thus save a cranky political and social system.
Where I'm a little dubious in places is that though Afflerbach puts blame for enabling the war firmly on the back of Berlin, he also attempts to place blame for the long duration of the war on London and Paris, as they pursued maximalist gains. Afflerbach may insist that he is simply assigning responsibility where it belongs, at points though it does come close to blaming the victim. Still, this is the time when it was possible to believe that war was a viable tool of statecraft, and knocking down simplistic notions of military victory is another issue that Afflerbach is dealing with.
Finally, when accounting for the damage left in the wake of World War I, Afflerbach suggests that the greatest loss might have been Russia falling away from being part of the European family of nations. The impact of that branching of history continues to be a gift that keeps on giving.
Next, the title does nicely sum up one of Afflerbach's main points, that though the war could have ended to the benefit of all parties anytime after 1914, the two alliance systems could always find some development that would allow them to justify continuing the war. This is until the German ruling complex (government is too respectful a word for this lot) found ways to provoke American participation in the war, and the German military lost its bet that its great 1918 offensive would be a winner.
That's the thing, and perhaps the real core of this book, the reality that the German ruling complex collectively did not know themselves, nor did they know their enemy, apart from the simple bean count. This is not really news, but Afflerbach really drives home how much the German war effort was driven by pious hopes and misplaced optimism, not to mention that there was no real leveling with the German public, so it was a total shock when the roof caved in come 1918. This misplaced sense of hope is also what leads to the image of the Great War being a premeditated German war of conquest, as something had to be won to justify the sacrifices, and thus save a cranky political and social system.
Where I'm a little dubious in places is that though Afflerbach puts blame for enabling the war firmly on the back of Berlin, he also attempts to place blame for the long duration of the war on London and Paris, as they pursued maximalist gains. Afflerbach may insist that he is simply assigning responsibility where it belongs, at points though it does come close to blaming the victim. Still, this is the time when it was possible to believe that war was a viable tool of statecraft, and knocking down simplistic notions of military victory is another issue that Afflerbach is dealing with.
Finally, when accounting for the damage left in the wake of World War I, Afflerbach suggests that the greatest loss might have been Russia falling away from being part of the European family of nations. The impact of that branching of history continues to be a gift that keeps on giving.
November 18, 2022
A terrific book.
Explains the political and the big military mistakes that Imperial Germany made in world war One. Imperial Germany leadership whas not a dictatroship of Kaiser Whilem II but a messed up crab basket of competing factions , Der Kaiser, the military, the social democrat party and the industrialist who all had the own war aims and trying to deal together with compromises and conficting views.
Actually Imperial Germany just wanted a limited war and actually wanted to go abck to its 1914 with Tsarist Russia. Its only with the collapse of Tsarist Russia and the seizure of power of the communits that Imperial Germany did get greedy but even there the aims of the factions where in total conflict.
Imperial Germany did make peace oveture but the lack of some of theirs leaders of foreing contry did blurr their vision of peace. Germany wanted to keep some of its conquest but no European domination. Actually in the war making mistakes there the 1918 western offensive and the total U boat war in 1917. Even there in this writing you can feel sorry for the Germans who in some way where clumsy , did try to get peace feelers in 1916-18 and did try some alternatives even.
Another Great facts in the book is the under rated comtribution of the Ottoman Empire to the Central powers in their war efforst in tying Entente armed forces.
Explains the political and the big military mistakes that Imperial Germany made in world war One. Imperial Germany leadership whas not a dictatroship of Kaiser Whilem II but a messed up crab basket of competing factions , Der Kaiser, the military, the social democrat party and the industrialist who all had the own war aims and trying to deal together with compromises and conficting views.
Actually Imperial Germany just wanted a limited war and actually wanted to go abck to its 1914 with Tsarist Russia. Its only with the collapse of Tsarist Russia and the seizure of power of the communits that Imperial Germany did get greedy but even there the aims of the factions where in total conflict.
Imperial Germany did make peace oveture but the lack of some of theirs leaders of foreing contry did blurr their vision of peace. Germany wanted to keep some of its conquest but no European domination. Actually in the war making mistakes there the 1918 western offensive and the total U boat war in 1917. Even there in this writing you can feel sorry for the Germans who in some way where clumsy , did try to get peace feelers in 1916-18 and did try some alternatives even.
Another Great facts in the book is the under rated comtribution of the Ottoman Empire to the Central powers in their war efforst in tying Entente armed forces.
March 17, 2024
Fresh accounts of the Great War (particularly from a German perspective) are few and far between. This is possibly the most thorough and detailed account both from a military and political lens.
February 16, 2023
Long ago as I was beginning my career in history and the study of war and warfare, I learned that it was very important to always read works from and about both sides of a battle, a campaign, a war, the forces that fought them, and the commanders who led them. Holger Afflerbach has given us a great look into the thoughts and decisions made by the German generals and politicians that led to and which prolonged the First World War - beyond reason. He also compares and contrasts this information with a peek behind the lines on the opposite side so that we can see how both the powers of the Entente (the Allies) and the Central Powers processed the events of the war and made decisions that continued it for four hard years.
He starts with the plans and decisions that led to the war and then follows through decision point by decision point as the war continues, expands and extends beyond Europe, and other nations are brought into the conflict. The narrative continues across 21 chapters supported by 11 maps, 34 illustrations, and 70 pages of endnotes. There is also a extensive bibliography at almost 40 pages of sources.
The author successfully presents the ideas, thoughts, views, and experiences behind the decisions made by the Central Powers. At times it felt to me like he was verging on apologizing for them but it is very possible that I was hearing my own inherent biases about the Great War as I was looking for his. I think the final account presented here is a balanced presentation of the history of this war from the far side of the trenches. It definitely has added to my knowledge and understanding of the war that sadly failed to end all wars. Highly recommended.
He starts with the plans and decisions that led to the war and then follows through decision point by decision point as the war continues, expands and extends beyond Europe, and other nations are brought into the conflict. The narrative continues across 21 chapters supported by 11 maps, 34 illustrations, and 70 pages of endnotes. There is also a extensive bibliography at almost 40 pages of sources.
The author successfully presents the ideas, thoughts, views, and experiences behind the decisions made by the Central Powers. At times it felt to me like he was verging on apologizing for them but it is very possible that I was hearing my own inherent biases about the Great War as I was looking for his. I think the final account presented here is a balanced presentation of the history of this war from the far side of the trenches. It definitely has added to my knowledge and understanding of the war that sadly failed to end all wars. Highly recommended.
February 24, 2023
4.75/5 very good about Germany's failure in World War One. Would recommend if you are interested in WWI and have an ok knowledge of it.
Despite the book being translated into English I felt it was quite readable, not dry. The arguments suggested by the author, although I'm not sure I entirely agree with them, are well presented in a clear way. I've read quite a few books on the First World War by now and the author's takes feel fresh and new to me, I haven't really seen them in other things I've read. The bulk of the book is focussed on the decision making of the German political and military leadership - what decisions they made, why they made them, the factors that influenced the decisions made (public opinion, ideology, fear etc) and the consequences. Additionally there is also a lot on the disputes between the different factions and indivdiuals within the German political and military elite. There is a lot of information on the German peace efforts at the end of 1916 and also the role of the Reichstag compared to pretty much every other WWI book I've read.
In terms of arguments presented the main ones are that 1 - The result of World War One was a lot closer than traditionally argued and that if Germany had made better decisions it could've been a draw (hence the focus of the book on decision making). 2 - Germany didn't set out at the beginning of WWI to have massive territorial conquests and that this goal came later as a consequence of the war rather than as a cause. so if Germany eventually had to return these territories as part of a compromise peace then it wouldn't represent a major defeat (although this would've been very hard to get the German public to agree to). 3 - Compared to other historians he takes the German requests for peace at the end of 1916 as legitimate attempts, rather than cynical propaganda for domestic audiences. 4 - The biggest mistakes Germany made was the invasion of Belgium (making it very easy for the British government to justify entry into the war) and the continuation of unrestricted submarine warfare, based on misjudging the attitudes of the Americans. 5 - The Central Powers made various 'moral mistakes' (my words) that gave the Entente motivation not to agree to a compromise peace, The Rape of Belgium, the Armenian Genocide, the harshness of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that justified to the continued fighting. 6 - That the Entente's refusal to agree to consider a compromise peace was the main reason for the continuation of the war and in the long-term was a major mistake, as the radicalisation and outcome of the war caused the future catastrophes of European history like the Nazis and the Second World War (this is one of the ones I'm iffy about, I'm not sure I agree with the view that the Entente's decision to fight to a full military victory was a mistake) . There are the main arguments but there are some shorter ones focused on military outcomes such as alternative outcomes of the Schlieffen Plan or what Germany could've done instead of the 1918 Spring Offensive.
Despite the book being translated into English I felt it was quite readable, not dry. The arguments suggested by the author, although I'm not sure I entirely agree with them, are well presented in a clear way. I've read quite a few books on the First World War by now and the author's takes feel fresh and new to me, I haven't really seen them in other things I've read. The bulk of the book is focussed on the decision making of the German political and military leadership - what decisions they made, why they made them, the factors that influenced the decisions made (public opinion, ideology, fear etc) and the consequences. Additionally there is also a lot on the disputes between the different factions and indivdiuals within the German political and military elite. There is a lot of information on the German peace efforts at the end of 1916 and also the role of the Reichstag compared to pretty much every other WWI book I've read.
In terms of arguments presented the main ones are that 1 - The result of World War One was a lot closer than traditionally argued and that if Germany had made better decisions it could've been a draw (hence the focus of the book on decision making). 2 - Germany didn't set out at the beginning of WWI to have massive territorial conquests and that this goal came later as a consequence of the war rather than as a cause. so if Germany eventually had to return these territories as part of a compromise peace then it wouldn't represent a major defeat (although this would've been very hard to get the German public to agree to). 3 - Compared to other historians he takes the German requests for peace at the end of 1916 as legitimate attempts, rather than cynical propaganda for domestic audiences. 4 - The biggest mistakes Germany made was the invasion of Belgium (making it very easy for the British government to justify entry into the war) and the continuation of unrestricted submarine warfare, based on misjudging the attitudes of the Americans. 5 - The Central Powers made various 'moral mistakes' (my words) that gave the Entente motivation not to agree to a compromise peace, The Rape of Belgium, the Armenian Genocide, the harshness of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that justified to the continued fighting. 6 - That the Entente's refusal to agree to consider a compromise peace was the main reason for the continuation of the war and in the long-term was a major mistake, as the radicalisation and outcome of the war caused the future catastrophes of European history like the Nazis and the Second World War (this is one of the ones I'm iffy about, I'm not sure I agree with the view that the Entente's decision to fight to a full military victory was a mistake) . There are the main arguments but there are some shorter ones focused on military outcomes such as alternative outcomes of the Schlieffen Plan or what Germany could've done instead of the 1918 Spring Offensive.
December 13, 2024
This was the 7th book in a row dealing with the First World War that I have read this fall, so I think my grasp on the historiography is as good as it will ever be. This newly translated work is absolutely the best text I've taken in on the First World War and paints a very different picture than the anglophile tradition that exists in english language WW1 history. The author's careful consideration of the German perspectives at the time is enlightening to the confusion guiding the nation, and he is not afraid to use hindsight to evaluate the decision making of both the German Empire and their Entente enemies. This aids in a significant intervention in the rather dormant world of WW1 historiography and gives the entire work a level of cohesion many books on this subject lack. The teetering on a Knife's Edge that drove the 19th Century world to it's destruction paints a pretty dismal picture of the decision makers of the times and their 0-sum view of the world. The conclusion floats the possibility that perhaps a 1916 armistice, and the implied message that no war of this scale could be 'won' will rattle around my head for the foreseeable future. It begs the real question, did the Entente actually win by any measure of the 1914 war aims?
October 14, 2023
A great book, providing a full spectrum history of Germany in World War One. The author, German historian Holger Afflerbach, presents a revised history of WWI via the many strategic mistakes Germany made in the course of the war. Afflerbach starts with a basic thesis: that Germany was in an initial position to win the war, discounting the popular deterministic view of Germany as doomed following the results of August 1914. Over the course of the chronological history, the author shows that a mounting set of missed opportunities and poor decisions continually narrowed Germany’s chances for victory, or at least of achieving a status quo ante bellum. Afflerbach points to the successes on the Eastern Front and the strength of the defensive strategy in the West to show that up until 1917 the war was Germany’s to lose. The failure of German politicians to wrest the war away from the military establishment is, for Afflerbach, the foundational reason for Germany’s defeat. A great book for understanding the dynamics of WWI. Recommended as a case study for the Clausewitzian trinity.
December 28, 2023
Most chilling, as my own beloved country increasingly slides into the role of nemesis, is the way this book pinpoints the failure of states based on chauvinistic conservatism: the role to Germany escaping the trap of WWI, Afflerbach effectively argues, were the calls for armistice from even it's highest leadership from the very first month of the war. Germany fell into that trap because the fantasy world of a victorious peace helped keep the blood-bath go on...
June 9, 2023
Sehr detaillierte wiedergabe historischer Fakten und schilderung der (inner) deutschen Situation, Jahr für Jahr. Für WW1 interessierte ein muss!
Very detailed account of historical facts and potrayal of the Situation of the German Empire (specially within the Empire), year by year. If you're interested in WW1, this should be a must read.
Very detailed account of historical facts and potrayal of the Situation of the German Empire (specially within the Empire), year by year. If you're interested in WW1, this should be a must read.
August 23, 2022
A book that sets out to try and answer, like many books before, how Germany lost World War I. The title itself sets up the focus on Germany, but the Central Powers played a role too. Overall, a good book, that attempts to shake up current scholarly views.
July 27, 2024
Very underwhelming. This book promises to provide a fresh view on Word War I, but fails to present any new or original idea/view/interpretation on the subject. I also find rather questionable the structure of the book and its analycal framework.
September 25, 2025
Extremely informative and revealing book. The outlook of the Central Powers is not often explored in the Anglo-sphere, and Afflerbach provides a new prospective to consider the First World War from.
August 26, 2023
In the Great War which was between 1914-1918 , some 10 million soldiers and 8 million civilians were killed.This was a terrible price for both the victors and the vanquished. Victors? One is reminded of the words of Neville Chamberlain :"In each war there are no victors, only losers". There is also another saying by the famous Chinese philosopher Lao Tse: "The best thing is not to engage in any war at all"
Coming back to WW1, the horrible statistics show that at least 11000 people were killed each day.
By 1918, almost each British household had lost a relative or a friend.Ditto for France which became' in the words of the author' "a nations of mourning".
Enter this book which shows that the Central Powers were ready for a compromise in 1916. Among the most famous people in Germany who were for a compromise was Philipp Scheidermann, the German Social Democrat politician. He even threatened revolution if the war continued. But he had one problem: he could hardly provide any evidence that the other side was ready for talks to terminate the conflict. Then another British Concervative politician, Lord Lansdowne, was worried that the war might signal the end of European civilization. His words were ignored and "the Times" refused to publish them.If both sides hoped the war would once and for all settle political problems, they were very wrong.
Again , this book shows how this conflict was a very stupid act without any justification. Those millions who died paid a horrible price for the stupidity of boorish and ingnorant politicains from both sides.
Coming back to WW1, the horrible statistics show that at least 11000 people were killed each day.
By 1918, almost each British household had lost a relative or a friend.Ditto for France which became' in the words of the author' "a nations of mourning".
Enter this book which shows that the Central Powers were ready for a compromise in 1916. Among the most famous people in Germany who were for a compromise was Philipp Scheidermann, the German Social Democrat politician. He even threatened revolution if the war continued. But he had one problem: he could hardly provide any evidence that the other side was ready for talks to terminate the conflict. Then another British Concervative politician, Lord Lansdowne, was worried that the war might signal the end of European civilization. His words were ignored and "the Times" refused to publish them.If both sides hoped the war would once and for all settle political problems, they were very wrong.
Again , this book shows how this conflict was a very stupid act without any justification. Those millions who died paid a horrible price for the stupidity of boorish and ingnorant politicains from both sides.
June 14, 2023
A detailed study of the functioning, such as it was, of the German political and military leadership during the Great War.
Afflerbach argues convincingly that the German system, dependent as it was on the one hand on an Emperor who was incapable of providing good leadership and on the other on an excessively powerful military leadership that often ignored political realities, was seriously dysfunctional. There are similarities here with the Japanese condition in the 1930s and 1940s, which are probably not coincidental, as Japan’s constitution was strongly influenced by Germany’s. In both cases, poor strategic decisions resulted in a state fighting until exhaustion and then facing defeat.
Afflerbach argues that Germany and Austria-Hungary bore most of the weight of responsibility for the outbreak of the war in 1914, but the Entente powers were the ones most responsible for continuing the war into late 1918. Because the larger and more complex the Entente coalition became, the harder it was to find a compromise acceptable to everyone. However, this also reflects the basic strategic truth that it is folly to start a war that you can only win if it is short.
It’s a long book and its emphasis on strategy and politics makes it a bit dry. But it is insightful, and encompasses very interesting perspectives on Germany’s policies with respect to the fronts in the east and south, and on it attempts to seek peace. Too much of the history of WW1 was written from a British or French perspective, and this is a welcome antidote.
Afflerbach argues convincingly that the German system, dependent as it was on the one hand on an Emperor who was incapable of providing good leadership and on the other on an excessively powerful military leadership that often ignored political realities, was seriously dysfunctional. There are similarities here with the Japanese condition in the 1930s and 1940s, which are probably not coincidental, as Japan’s constitution was strongly influenced by Germany’s. In both cases, poor strategic decisions resulted in a state fighting until exhaustion and then facing defeat.
Afflerbach argues that Germany and Austria-Hungary bore most of the weight of responsibility for the outbreak of the war in 1914, but the Entente powers were the ones most responsible for continuing the war into late 1918. Because the larger and more complex the Entente coalition became, the harder it was to find a compromise acceptable to everyone. However, this also reflects the basic strategic truth that it is folly to start a war that you can only win if it is short.
It’s a long book and its emphasis on strategy and politics makes it a bit dry. But it is insightful, and encompasses very interesting perspectives on Germany’s policies with respect to the fronts in the east and south, and on it attempts to seek peace. Too much of the history of WW1 was written from a British or French perspective, and this is a welcome antidote.
March 11, 2024
Thoroughly enjoyed this book, in spite of some of the text being heavy going, possibly from translation.
The author really opens up the topic to a more global and political assessment of the War’s unexpected continuance in 1915, given that militarily it was lost by the Germans post battle of the Marne.
It also benefits from being a German version of events. The great western battles of the Somme and Verdun, are skilfully reduced to the ‘two of many’ when compared to the eastern front, the Ottomans and the Uboat Campaigns, which,as the author highlights, more strategically relevant to the Central Powers.
Overall a worthy addition to anyone’s collection of books on the Great War. And as repeated before in other revisionist books, no one country comes out of the War with much humanity with regard others. An imperialist’s war, whether Entente or Central Powers, that could have been stopped much sooner and saved millions of lives.
The author really opens up the topic to a more global and political assessment of the War’s unexpected continuance in 1915, given that militarily it was lost by the Germans post battle of the Marne.
It also benefits from being a German version of events. The great western battles of the Somme and Verdun, are skilfully reduced to the ‘two of many’ when compared to the eastern front, the Ottomans and the Uboat Campaigns, which,as the author highlights, more strategically relevant to the Central Powers.
Overall a worthy addition to anyone’s collection of books on the Great War. And as repeated before in other revisionist books, no one country comes out of the War with much humanity with regard others. An imperialist’s war, whether Entente or Central Powers, that could have been stopped much sooner and saved millions of lives.
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