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Lincoln and His Generals
Evaluates Lincoln's ability as a director of war and his influence on the development of a modern command system.
From the Trade Paperback edition.
From the Trade Paperback edition.
363 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1952
40 people are currently reading
794 people want to read
About the author
T. Harry Williams
68 books32 followersT. Harry Williams (Thomas Harry Williams) was an historian at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge whose writing career began in 1941 and extended for thirty-eight years until his death in 1979. Williams is perhaps best known for his American Civil War study, Lincoln and His Generals, a "Book of the Month" selection from 1952, and Huey Long, winner of both the National Book Award and the Pulitzer Prize in 1970.
Williams passed away approximately two months after retirement due to complications from pneumonia.
In 1998, Williams was posthumously inducted into the Louisiana Political Museum and Hall of Fame in Winnfield.
Williams passed away approximately two months after retirement due to complications from pneumonia.
In 1998, Williams was posthumously inducted into the Louisiana Political Museum and Hall of Fame in Winnfield.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 44 reviews
July 7, 2022
Lincoln and His Generals is a focused examination of Lincoln as commander in chief. Williams states in his preface:
“my theme is Lincoln as a director of war and his place in the high command and his influence in developing a modern command system for his nation."
This theme is expertly develops throughout this fascinating book. This is a well written and reasoned account of the topic, an important contribution both to Civil War and Lincoln studies.
William's views Lincoln as a genius - a man, who came into office with no military knowledge, yet had the flexibility of mind to adapt and learn from his mistakes, enabling him to guide his country to victory through its greatest wartime crisis. He states that:
“Lincoln, by the power of his mind, became a fine strategist...a better natural strategist than were most of the trained soldiers."
He further claims that Lincoln grasped the war's big picture from the very beginning. Williams goes so far as to suggest that Grant's final end-game strategy from 1864 on was fundamentally Lincoln's plan, though the details and execution were Grant's. I believe that he overreaches with some of these claims, yet he still makes a great case for Lincoln's genius, and his role as the indispensable man behind Union victory.
Williams examines as well the generals who were Lincoln's tools for winning the war. McClellan and Grant get the most ink, the former because, despite his great talent, he was ultimately a failure and Lincoln's greatest disappointment and the latter because, in William's estimation, he was the greatest general on either side of the war. Of Lincoln's other generals, Williams writes more about the ineffective, incompetent ones such as Fremont and Banks than he does of effective and even great generals like Sherman and Thomas. He explains in his preface that the reason for this is that the incompetent generals were headaches to Lincoln, forcing him to have intimate command relationships with them, while much less interference was required for effective generals such as Sherman and Thomas.
Williams has written the definitive work on this topic. It is a launching point for discussion and debate on Lincoln's role as commander in chief. You may not always agree with him, but you can never ignore him. And he has done it in fine style, creating a clear, interesting, and well-written book that stands as a masterpiece in its field.
“my theme is Lincoln as a director of war and his place in the high command and his influence in developing a modern command system for his nation."
This theme is expertly develops throughout this fascinating book. This is a well written and reasoned account of the topic, an important contribution both to Civil War and Lincoln studies.
William's views Lincoln as a genius - a man, who came into office with no military knowledge, yet had the flexibility of mind to adapt and learn from his mistakes, enabling him to guide his country to victory through its greatest wartime crisis. He states that:
“Lincoln, by the power of his mind, became a fine strategist...a better natural strategist than were most of the trained soldiers."
He further claims that Lincoln grasped the war's big picture from the very beginning. Williams goes so far as to suggest that Grant's final end-game strategy from 1864 on was fundamentally Lincoln's plan, though the details and execution were Grant's. I believe that he overreaches with some of these claims, yet he still makes a great case for Lincoln's genius, and his role as the indispensable man behind Union victory.
Williams examines as well the generals who were Lincoln's tools for winning the war. McClellan and Grant get the most ink, the former because, despite his great talent, he was ultimately a failure and Lincoln's greatest disappointment and the latter because, in William's estimation, he was the greatest general on either side of the war. Of Lincoln's other generals, Williams writes more about the ineffective, incompetent ones such as Fremont and Banks than he does of effective and even great generals like Sherman and Thomas. He explains in his preface that the reason for this is that the incompetent generals were headaches to Lincoln, forcing him to have intimate command relationships with them, while much less interference was required for effective generals such as Sherman and Thomas.
Williams has written the definitive work on this topic. It is a launching point for discussion and debate on Lincoln's role as commander in chief. You may not always agree with him, but you can never ignore him. And he has done it in fine style, creating a clear, interesting, and well-written book that stands as a masterpiece in its field.
March 10, 2024
Third Reading
I added this book to my shelf in 2014 when I joined Goodreads. I only got around to reviewing it in March 2024.
T. Harry Williams (1909-1979) wrote in the preface to Lincoln and His Generals (1952):
With the exception of brief service in the Illinois militia during the so-called Black Hawk War, Lincoln did not have any experience or training to guide him. (The Black Hawk War was a war in name only. Lincoln’s company saw no action as the Sac and Fox Indians, led by Black Hawk, tried to return from Iowa to their homeland in Illinois.)
Nevertheless, in March 1861, he became commander in chief of the Union forces that would soon face the prospect of attempting to suppress the rebellion of eleven southern states.
In the beginning, because of a lack of military experience, Lincoln was forced to rely on the professional people who commanded the army, at least those who did not join the rebellion. He also found that some of those who remained were not up to the tasks of fighting the enemy. Therefore, he had to choose, promote, and sometimes remove military officers until he found competent people who could lead the army to victory over the Confederacy.
He especially struggled to find generals to command the Army of the Potomac in the eastern theater, a difficulty that he experienced until he eventually transferred Grant from the west to the east; finally, he had discovered a general who would fight. In the process, he became a tough wartime president, flexing his presidential muscles and expanding his war powers whenever necessity demanded.
Though he possessed extraordinary patience, he did sometimes lose patience with generals who didn’t seem to want to fight. One of his early commanders in the east was General George B. McClellan. Greatly irked by the general’s inactivity, Lincoln once wrote: “Dear General, if you do not want to use the army I would like to borrow it for a few days.”
And he sometimes gave as good as he got. When McClellan, irritated by one of Lincoln’s orders requiring detailed reports to the White House, sent Lincoln a telegraph saying, “We have just captured six cows. What shall we do with them?”
Lincoln telegraphed back: “Milk them.”
One of his later commanders in the east was John Pope. One day Lincoln received a message from Pope which said, “My army is on the move. My headquarters are in my saddle.” Lincoln said to one of his aides: “Now I know what is wrong with General Pope. His headquarters are where his hindquarters should be.”
At a time of grave crisis during the war, Lincoln was awakened at night by an opportunistic fellow who reported that the head of customs had just died. “Mr. President, would it be all right if I took his place?”
“Well,” replied Lincoln. “If it’s all right with the undertaker, it’s all right with me.”
When the war began, Lincoln was less prepared than his Southern counterpart, Jefferson Davis. Davis was a West Point graduate (in the lower third of his class, but nevertheless a graduate), was a regimental commander in the Mexican-American War, and served as Franklin Pierce’s secretary of war.
However, Williams concludes that “Lincoln stands out as a great war president, probably the greatest in our history, and a great natural strategist, a better one than any of his generals,” while Davis, on the other hand, was at best a mediocre commander in chief.
This is my third full reading of Lincoln and His Generals, not to mention the many other times that I have reread excerpts to refresh my memory for some project involving Lincoln and/or the Civil War. When I do I am always reminded of the fact that this accomplished historian was also a fine writer, one who did not resort to technical language and whose sharply drawn character sketches are a treat to read.
I added this book to my shelf in 2014 when I joined Goodreads. I only got around to reviewing it in March 2024.
T. Harry Williams (1909-1979) wrote in the preface to Lincoln and His Generals (1952):
I have written in this book the story of Abraham Lincoln the commander in chief. I have not written a military history of the Civil War or a group biography of the principal Union generals or a description of the military organization of the North, although there is something of all of these in the book. My theme is Lincoln as a director of war and his place in the high command and his influence in developing a modern command system for this nation….
With the exception of brief service in the Illinois militia during the so-called Black Hawk War, Lincoln did not have any experience or training to guide him. (The Black Hawk War was a war in name only. Lincoln’s company saw no action as the Sac and Fox Indians, led by Black Hawk, tried to return from Iowa to their homeland in Illinois.)
Nevertheless, in March 1861, he became commander in chief of the Union forces that would soon face the prospect of attempting to suppress the rebellion of eleven southern states.
In the beginning, because of a lack of military experience, Lincoln was forced to rely on the professional people who commanded the army, at least those who did not join the rebellion. He also found that some of those who remained were not up to the tasks of fighting the enemy. Therefore, he had to choose, promote, and sometimes remove military officers until he found competent people who could lead the army to victory over the Confederacy.
He especially struggled to find generals to command the Army of the Potomac in the eastern theater, a difficulty that he experienced until he eventually transferred Grant from the west to the east; finally, he had discovered a general who would fight. In the process, he became a tough wartime president, flexing his presidential muscles and expanding his war powers whenever necessity demanded.
Though he possessed extraordinary patience, he did sometimes lose patience with generals who didn’t seem to want to fight. One of his early commanders in the east was General George B. McClellan. Greatly irked by the general’s inactivity, Lincoln once wrote: “Dear General, if you do not want to use the army I would like to borrow it for a few days.”
And he sometimes gave as good as he got. When McClellan, irritated by one of Lincoln’s orders requiring detailed reports to the White House, sent Lincoln a telegraph saying, “We have just captured six cows. What shall we do with them?”
Lincoln telegraphed back: “Milk them.”
One of his later commanders in the east was John Pope. One day Lincoln received a message from Pope which said, “My army is on the move. My headquarters are in my saddle.” Lincoln said to one of his aides: “Now I know what is wrong with General Pope. His headquarters are where his hindquarters should be.”
At a time of grave crisis during the war, Lincoln was awakened at night by an opportunistic fellow who reported that the head of customs had just died. “Mr. President, would it be all right if I took his place?”
“Well,” replied Lincoln. “If it’s all right with the undertaker, it’s all right with me.”
When the war began, Lincoln was less prepared than his Southern counterpart, Jefferson Davis. Davis was a West Point graduate (in the lower third of his class, but nevertheless a graduate), was a regimental commander in the Mexican-American War, and served as Franklin Pierce’s secretary of war.
However, Williams concludes that “Lincoln stands out as a great war president, probably the greatest in our history, and a great natural strategist, a better one than any of his generals,” while Davis, on the other hand, was at best a mediocre commander in chief.
This is my third full reading of Lincoln and His Generals, not to mention the many other times that I have reread excerpts to refresh my memory for some project involving Lincoln and/or the Civil War. When I do I am always reminded of the fact that this accomplished historian was also a fine writer, one who did not resort to technical language and whose sharply drawn character sketches are a treat to read.
April 8, 2020
Masterful narrative combining the best elements of prose and history. T. Harry Williams is hitting on all cylinders with this effort. He tells us of the trials and tribulations Lincoln faced trying to manage the domestic war effort. Along the way we are introduced to a varied cast of characters including George B. McClellan, Ambrose Burnside and "Fighting Joe" Hooker. Williams is sometimes labeled a revisionist historian, but over time many of his controversial conclusions have borne fruit. A fantastic book, whether it's your first, third, or tenth time reading it.
March 10, 2022
In this book Lincoln can do no wrong and McClellan can do nothing right. While Williams' work did signal the shift in scholarship where Lincoln is a "military genius" (hahahahahahaha) the work of Rafuse alone buries this simplistic book. Any close look at the sources reveals that Grant, far from confirming Lincoln's Virginia strategy, tried to get around it but bended to political pressure, resulting in a campaign that saw Union causalities soar and morale drop. Civil War scholarship is all the worse for this poorly researched and vapid work, which made Lincoln into more than he is, conforming to the trite St. Abraham tradition that still dogs scholarship. It is all the more stunning since Williams' Beauregard biography was top notch.
March 8, 2014
Having been very favorably impressed by his Huey Long biography and having this earlier book by him on the shelf, I picked up Williams' Lincoln and His Generals immediately, reading it in two days. While good, Lincoln is not as excellent as the Long book, Williams' writing abilities having apparently improved substantially during the years between their dates of composition. Still, it's a good book.
This is not suitable as an introduction to the Civil War. Prior knowledge of the war is necessary. Nor is this a general overview of military activities during the war. The focus is entirely on Lincoln's relations with his generals and on Lincoln's accomplishments as commander-in-chief and, occasionally, as a hands-on director of military actions.
The thesis of this book is that Lincoln not only established the modern command structure of the U.S. military--and that only towards the war's conclusion--but that he was a gifted military strategist, far more involved in military command than he is often credited as being. Generals Grant and Sherman also come across well (unlike virtually every other senior officer in the GAR), but even Grant himself, after being named supreme commander, was, in Williams' opinion, often correctly overruled by his presidential superior.
As stated, I read this because of the Huey Long book. In so doing I learned something about the author. Both books are similar in that they examine effective leadership and the qualities of character and the actions which make for such efficacy. As with Long, Lincoln was exemplary in being a pragmatist who was capable, when necessary, of subordinating means to ends, the ends in both cases, Long's and Lincoln's, being of such merit that such compromises with convention, even ethics, are defensible.
I'm not certain I agree with Williams' values, personally, but it is always good to challenge one's own beliefs as both of his books have done.
This is not suitable as an introduction to the Civil War. Prior knowledge of the war is necessary. Nor is this a general overview of military activities during the war. The focus is entirely on Lincoln's relations with his generals and on Lincoln's accomplishments as commander-in-chief and, occasionally, as a hands-on director of military actions.
The thesis of this book is that Lincoln not only established the modern command structure of the U.S. military--and that only towards the war's conclusion--but that he was a gifted military strategist, far more involved in military command than he is often credited as being. Generals Grant and Sherman also come across well (unlike virtually every other senior officer in the GAR), but even Grant himself, after being named supreme commander, was, in Williams' opinion, often correctly overruled by his presidential superior.
As stated, I read this because of the Huey Long book. In so doing I learned something about the author. Both books are similar in that they examine effective leadership and the qualities of character and the actions which make for such efficacy. As with Long, Lincoln was exemplary in being a pragmatist who was capable, when necessary, of subordinating means to ends, the ends in both cases, Long's and Lincoln's, being of such merit that such compromises with convention, even ethics, are defensible.
I'm not certain I agree with Williams' values, personally, but it is always good to challenge one's own beliefs as both of his books have done.
October 11, 2019
If you’re interested in the Late Unpleasantness and have read a number of works on it, you’re not likely to find much that is new here. Bruce Catton, Stephen W. Sears, and many other authors have covered the same ground. What this book does is concentrate on Lincoln’s relationships with his generals; there are no detailed battle narratives here.
Williams holds that Lincoln was a brilliant military strategist, but I didn’t divine much in support of this. It looked to me Lincoln’s contributions stemmed more from a great store of common sense. He early realized that the Army of the Potomac’s target was not Richmond, but the enemy army, mainly the Army of Northern Virginia. Remove that from the board and Richmond will follow. What was also novel to me was Lincoln’s interactions with Grant; there were times when he had to be the commander-in-chief even with the general who won the war. Also new were more reasons he needed the “political” generals who were important more for their connections and administrative talent than for their meager military ability. I wish there was more included on Lincoln’s relationship with his third commander of Union forces, Henry W. Halleck.
This was a quick and easy read; sorry to say more detailed information may have to be found in individual biographies of the president and generals themselves.
Williams holds that Lincoln was a brilliant military strategist, but I didn’t divine much in support of this. It looked to me Lincoln’s contributions stemmed more from a great store of common sense. He early realized that the Army of the Potomac’s target was not Richmond, but the enemy army, mainly the Army of Northern Virginia. Remove that from the board and Richmond will follow. What was also novel to me was Lincoln’s interactions with Grant; there were times when he had to be the commander-in-chief even with the general who won the war. Also new were more reasons he needed the “political” generals who were important more for their connections and administrative talent than for their meager military ability. I wish there was more included on Lincoln’s relationship with his third commander of Union forces, Henry W. Halleck.
This was a quick and easy read; sorry to say more detailed information may have to be found in individual biographies of the president and generals themselves.
July 13, 2013
I think this is an under-appreciated book in the Lincoln cannon. It's not concentrated on flashy narratives or dramatic events. It turns attention to characters and strategy. But what makes it compelling is just how masterfully Williams crafts the story. He moves slow through the events of the war that moved slow, concentrating an overwhelming amount of attention to McClellan. We get introduced to characters, like Grant, who will play a bigger role later in the war but he doesn't give into the temptation to be diverted too soon. He lets them stay in the shadows as the story ripens. He also doesn't feel the need to go into details about the battles and numbers about the loss of life. There are other books that fill that void well. He let's you sit in the tension of the wars gloomy years. His commentary on matters is perceptive and well informed. He gives people their dur when deserved and doesn't seem interested in Lincoln myths. It's an honest and absorbing book. I think the last chapter is the highlight. The narrative moves with more flourish and light, suitable to the changing tide of events.
October 4, 2013
William's views Lincoln as a military genius: a man, who came into office with little knowledge of military affairs and almost no military experience (other than brief militia service) and yet he was mentally flexible enough to adapt to the rapidly shifting situation and learn from his errors to guide his nation to victory through its greatest national crisis. Some of Williams’ claims seemed over the top; he claims, for example, that Lincoln grasped the war's big picture from the very beginning, and even claims that Grant's final strategy for victory from 1864 on was fundamentally Lincoln's plan, although the details and execution were Grant's. I think these claims are a bit of a stretch, but Williams makes a good case for Lincoln's wartime genius, and his role as the indispensable man behind the ultimate Union victory.
Williams also describes the generals under lincoln's command. McClellan and Grant, of course, receive dense coverage, the former because, despite his gifts, he was ultimately a failure and Lincoln's greatest disappointment and the latter because Williams believes, as do I, that he was the greatest general and the most effective strategist on either side of the war. Of Lincoln's other generals, Williams writes more about the the incompetent ones such as Fremont and Banks than he does of more effective generals like Sherman and Thomas, which is somewhat irritating. Williams writes in his preface that the reason for this is that the incompetent generals were problems for Lincoln, forcing him to have closer command relationships with them, while he had to interfere very little with the moves of more effective generals.
The book is not focused on a speedy narrative or a specific story but rather turns attention to strategy and those who made it. This story is told rather well. The narrative slows when the war moved slow, concentrating an lot of attention on McClellan. We get introduced to characters, like Grant, who will play a bigger role later in the war but he doesn't give into the temptation to be diverted too soon. Williams lets them stay on the sidelines as the story ripens. He also doesn't feel the need to go into details about the battles and numbers about the loss of life. There are other books that fill that void well. He lets you sit in the tension of the war’s gloomy years. His commentary on matters is perceptive and well informed. He gives people their due when deserved and doesn't seem interested in Lincoln myths. It's an honest and absorbing book. I think the last chapter is the highlight. The narrative moves with more flourish and light, suitable to the changing tide of events.
While Williams concludes that Lincoln was our greatest war president, there is, thankfully, no hero worship in this book. The author relies on facts, as shown by telegrams (Lincoln pretty much lived at the telegraph office during battles), letters, journals and memoirs. Lincoln wrote some wonderfully pithy telegrams, like the one to Grant as he was flanking Lee's army down to Petersburg ("Hold on with a bulldog grip, and chew and choke as much as possible").
Williams provides an interesting discussion of the Second Battle of Manassas, where McClellan failed to send reinforcements to Pope, while Halleck, as General-in-Chief, refused to take control of the situation, allowing McClellan to do as he pleased. Williams also discusses Burnside's failure at Fredericksburg, in part due to Halleck's delay in getting the pontoon bridges ready for crossing over the Rappahannock by Union troops, and in part due to Burnside's failure to concentrate all his available troops, instead using useless piecemeal attacks against Lee's impregnable fortifications.
Lincoln proved masterful in combining war and politics. He would appoint political generals, such as Butler, Banks, Fremont and McClernand, recongnizing their value in raising popular support for the Northern war effort. Yet he would not hesitate to cashier them or remove them to lesser involved positions when their military usefulness had been exhausted or military necessity demanded it.
Lincoln finally found the generals he needed to win the war in Grant, Thomas, Sherman and Sheridan. These generals proved quite willing to fight. They possessed that dogged determination and self-reliance which was often lacking in many of the generals of the Army of the Potomac. Rosecrans was an exceedingly talented general, who seemed to have lost his poise and equilibrium during the crisis at the Battle of Chickamauga. Lincoln came to lose confidence in "Old Rosy" and replaced him with Major General George Thomas, "The Rock of Chickamauga," soon after the Battle of Chickamauga, noting that since Chickamauga Rosecrans acted "confused and stunned like a duck hit on the head." Whether Lincoln may have been a bit precipitous in coming to that conclusion was difficult to determine based on the amount of information presented by the author on this particular issue. It was Rosecrans' first loss after a consistent string of victories. I think "Old Rosy" deserved a second chance, though if there was anyone to replace him, I can't think of a better general than Thomas.
I found few problems with the book, but allow me to touch on the ones I did. The first problem with the book is that Williams somewhat misleads the reader. He contradicts his own guidelines for the book by writing about things that he says he is not going to focus on. He claims in the preface that the book is an account of Lincoln as commander in chief, not a history of the Civil War. This is false. Most of the book is a detailed, chronological account of events during the Civil War. Specific events and how Lincoln and his generals faced those events are described in the book. He discusses McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign, the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, the Battle of Antietam, and many others. The book focuses on Lincoln as commander in chief, but his generals, and the elements of a chronological history of the war, are still very large portions of the book.
Williams also writes that the book is not a collection of biographies on specific generals. This is also false. McClellan, Pope, Halleck, Fremont, and many other generals are described in detail.
So not only is Williams's statement very misleading, but also the title of the book contradicts this statement. As the reader finds out through the course of the book, Williams individually describes many of the generals. On the whole, more time is spent describing generals and their command decisions than is spent describing Lincoln and his functions as commander in chief. In fact, for most of the first third of the book McClellan upstages Lincoln as the focus of the book. Williams takes a lot of time in describing the relationship between Lincoln and McClellan, and Lincoln's growing realization that McClellan is inept as a commander.
Finally, Williams says that the book is not going to give a description of the organization or the command structure of the Northern armies. This is not totally truthful either. Many paragraphs are devoted to describing the inefficiency of the command system and Lincoln's annoyance with the problem. In actuality, Lincoln is not even mentioned in the book until after all the organizational issues have been covered. Prior to that, the book gives details on the unorganized and inadequate command system. This is exactly what Williams said he was not going to focus on.
But, in all, I enjoyed.
Williams also describes the generals under lincoln's command. McClellan and Grant, of course, receive dense coverage, the former because, despite his gifts, he was ultimately a failure and Lincoln's greatest disappointment and the latter because Williams believes, as do I, that he was the greatest general and the most effective strategist on either side of the war. Of Lincoln's other generals, Williams writes more about the the incompetent ones such as Fremont and Banks than he does of more effective generals like Sherman and Thomas, which is somewhat irritating. Williams writes in his preface that the reason for this is that the incompetent generals were problems for Lincoln, forcing him to have closer command relationships with them, while he had to interfere very little with the moves of more effective generals.
The book is not focused on a speedy narrative or a specific story but rather turns attention to strategy and those who made it. This story is told rather well. The narrative slows when the war moved slow, concentrating an lot of attention on McClellan. We get introduced to characters, like Grant, who will play a bigger role later in the war but he doesn't give into the temptation to be diverted too soon. Williams lets them stay on the sidelines as the story ripens. He also doesn't feel the need to go into details about the battles and numbers about the loss of life. There are other books that fill that void well. He lets you sit in the tension of the war’s gloomy years. His commentary on matters is perceptive and well informed. He gives people their due when deserved and doesn't seem interested in Lincoln myths. It's an honest and absorbing book. I think the last chapter is the highlight. The narrative moves with more flourish and light, suitable to the changing tide of events.
While Williams concludes that Lincoln was our greatest war president, there is, thankfully, no hero worship in this book. The author relies on facts, as shown by telegrams (Lincoln pretty much lived at the telegraph office during battles), letters, journals and memoirs. Lincoln wrote some wonderfully pithy telegrams, like the one to Grant as he was flanking Lee's army down to Petersburg ("Hold on with a bulldog grip, and chew and choke as much as possible").
Williams provides an interesting discussion of the Second Battle of Manassas, where McClellan failed to send reinforcements to Pope, while Halleck, as General-in-Chief, refused to take control of the situation, allowing McClellan to do as he pleased. Williams also discusses Burnside's failure at Fredericksburg, in part due to Halleck's delay in getting the pontoon bridges ready for crossing over the Rappahannock by Union troops, and in part due to Burnside's failure to concentrate all his available troops, instead using useless piecemeal attacks against Lee's impregnable fortifications.
Lincoln proved masterful in combining war and politics. He would appoint political generals, such as Butler, Banks, Fremont and McClernand, recongnizing their value in raising popular support for the Northern war effort. Yet he would not hesitate to cashier them or remove them to lesser involved positions when their military usefulness had been exhausted or military necessity demanded it.
Lincoln finally found the generals he needed to win the war in Grant, Thomas, Sherman and Sheridan. These generals proved quite willing to fight. They possessed that dogged determination and self-reliance which was often lacking in many of the generals of the Army of the Potomac. Rosecrans was an exceedingly talented general, who seemed to have lost his poise and equilibrium during the crisis at the Battle of Chickamauga. Lincoln came to lose confidence in "Old Rosy" and replaced him with Major General George Thomas, "The Rock of Chickamauga," soon after the Battle of Chickamauga, noting that since Chickamauga Rosecrans acted "confused and stunned like a duck hit on the head." Whether Lincoln may have been a bit precipitous in coming to that conclusion was difficult to determine based on the amount of information presented by the author on this particular issue. It was Rosecrans' first loss after a consistent string of victories. I think "Old Rosy" deserved a second chance, though if there was anyone to replace him, I can't think of a better general than Thomas.
I found few problems with the book, but allow me to touch on the ones I did. The first problem with the book is that Williams somewhat misleads the reader. He contradicts his own guidelines for the book by writing about things that he says he is not going to focus on. He claims in the preface that the book is an account of Lincoln as commander in chief, not a history of the Civil War. This is false. Most of the book is a detailed, chronological account of events during the Civil War. Specific events and how Lincoln and his generals faced those events are described in the book. He discusses McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign, the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, the Battle of Antietam, and many others. The book focuses on Lincoln as commander in chief, but his generals, and the elements of a chronological history of the war, are still very large portions of the book.
Williams also writes that the book is not a collection of biographies on specific generals. This is also false. McClellan, Pope, Halleck, Fremont, and many other generals are described in detail.
So not only is Williams's statement very misleading, but also the title of the book contradicts this statement. As the reader finds out through the course of the book, Williams individually describes many of the generals. On the whole, more time is spent describing generals and their command decisions than is spent describing Lincoln and his functions as commander in chief. In fact, for most of the first third of the book McClellan upstages Lincoln as the focus of the book. Williams takes a lot of time in describing the relationship between Lincoln and McClellan, and Lincoln's growing realization that McClellan is inept as a commander.
Finally, Williams says that the book is not going to give a description of the organization or the command structure of the Northern armies. This is not totally truthful either. Many paragraphs are devoted to describing the inefficiency of the command system and Lincoln's annoyance with the problem. In actuality, Lincoln is not even mentioned in the book until after all the organizational issues have been covered. Prior to that, the book gives details on the unorganized and inadequate command system. This is exactly what Williams said he was not going to focus on.
But, in all, I enjoyed.
February 4, 2015
On the NY Times Bestseller List the week I was born (for that Shelfari group challenge.) This was an interesting look at Lincoln's role in the military conduct of the war, especially before Grant took the top command. The author spends much time explaining the problems with McClellan et al. on the basis of their personal characters, as well as the lack of a modern command structure, but what comes through between the lines is that the basic problems were political; Lincoln chose conservative generals to placate the opposition Democrats and they had a different view of what was needed to win the war -- perhaps a different concept of what winning the war meant. I haven't read much US history since high school, and always preferred political to military history, but this book shows clearly that the two cannot be separated, even if that was not exactly the author's intent.
April 28, 2016
This book, one of quite a few spoken of my my local congregational pastor [1], is one of many books about Abraham Lincoln that have been written over the years, and like many books written since its publishing in 1952, it seeks to differentiate itself from other books on the subject of Abraham Lincoln and the American Civil War, about which many books have been written [2]. In the Preface, which is important for readers to seriously examine, the author notes that his particular focus on generals is based on Lincoln’s involvement with them, which explains why much is said about generals like McClellan, Banks, Fremont, and Hunter, despite their mediocre to poor military record, and why comparatively little is said about able generals like Sherman and Thomas who Lincoln did not deal with as closely. Understanding the author’s focus, in this case the demonstration of Lincoln’s genius as a military and political grand strategist, is vital to correctly understanding and evaluating this book.
In terms of the book’s organization and contents, the book follows a chronological order but one that is heavily slanted towards the beginning of the Civil War, with far fewer pages given to the second half of the war when the Union war machine was functioning far more smoothly. The first chapter covers the pattern of command at the beginning of the Civil War, looking at its conduct from a fair perspective and not an anachronistic one. The next chapter looks at Fremont in the West and McClellan in the East as self-professed men of destiny, while the next five chapters focus on Lincoln’s troubled relationship with McClellan and his efforts at prodding McClellan to advance, while also discussing the failures of generals like Banks, McDowell, and Pope, the problems of cooperation between Halleck and Buell before Halleck’s rise to the position of General-in-chief, and the early successes of Grant. After this the author discusses the choice of new generals like Burnside and Rosecrans, the desire for victories from those generals, and General Hooker, in early 1863, the victories of Grant at Vicksburg and the barren victory of Meade in Gettysburg, by which point the book is more than two-thirds complete, and then the failure of Rosecrans to recover after Chickamuga and the failure of Meade to advance in the autumn of 1863. The last three chapters discuss the modern command system overseen by Grant, the eventual success of coordinated movements with a great deal of input by Lincoln in 1864, and a short closing chapter that examines Lincoln at the hour of victory in the aftermath of his reelection win in late 1864. The book as a whole covers slightly more than 350 pages of text, and although it is largely unadorned text, it does contain intriguing photos of many of the leading generals it discusses.
While some readers may fault the balance in this book, it admirably serves its point in discussing the role of Lincoln in overseeing and directing the Union war effort to a greater degree than would be acceptable to the military establishment in contemporary warfare. The author is at some pains in correcting certain hagiography of Grant, as well as Grant’s occasional misstatements in his memoirs, but is generally very positive towards Grant, and even to Halleck, relative to the view of many other historians. Aside from Lee, the author has comparatively little to say about rebel generals. Among the more noteworthy and praiseworthy aspects of this book is the way that the author takes a great deal of text from Lincoln’s letters and telegrams and from the diaries of contemporaries, including the generals themselves, noting where variant accounts exist of a particular situation or interaction, and finding a great deal to praise in Lincoln’s humility as well as his natural strategic genius. For those authors who wish to understand the sorts of strains that the North was under and the mostly deft way in which Lincoln handled the situation, this book is an excellent and worthwhile examination of the difficult but ultimately successful relationship between Lincoln and his generals, once he found the right generals to put into place his grand strategic vision for Union victory.
[1] See, for example:
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[2] See, for example:
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In terms of the book’s organization and contents, the book follows a chronological order but one that is heavily slanted towards the beginning of the Civil War, with far fewer pages given to the second half of the war when the Union war machine was functioning far more smoothly. The first chapter covers the pattern of command at the beginning of the Civil War, looking at its conduct from a fair perspective and not an anachronistic one. The next chapter looks at Fremont in the West and McClellan in the East as self-professed men of destiny, while the next five chapters focus on Lincoln’s troubled relationship with McClellan and his efforts at prodding McClellan to advance, while also discussing the failures of generals like Banks, McDowell, and Pope, the problems of cooperation between Halleck and Buell before Halleck’s rise to the position of General-in-chief, and the early successes of Grant. After this the author discusses the choice of new generals like Burnside and Rosecrans, the desire for victories from those generals, and General Hooker, in early 1863, the victories of Grant at Vicksburg and the barren victory of Meade in Gettysburg, by which point the book is more than two-thirds complete, and then the failure of Rosecrans to recover after Chickamuga and the failure of Meade to advance in the autumn of 1863. The last three chapters discuss the modern command system overseen by Grant, the eventual success of coordinated movements with a great deal of input by Lincoln in 1864, and a short closing chapter that examines Lincoln at the hour of victory in the aftermath of his reelection win in late 1864. The book as a whole covers slightly more than 350 pages of text, and although it is largely unadorned text, it does contain intriguing photos of many of the leading generals it discusses.
While some readers may fault the balance in this book, it admirably serves its point in discussing the role of Lincoln in overseeing and directing the Union war effort to a greater degree than would be acceptable to the military establishment in contemporary warfare. The author is at some pains in correcting certain hagiography of Grant, as well as Grant’s occasional misstatements in his memoirs, but is generally very positive towards Grant, and even to Halleck, relative to the view of many other historians. Aside from Lee, the author has comparatively little to say about rebel generals. Among the more noteworthy and praiseworthy aspects of this book is the way that the author takes a great deal of text from Lincoln’s letters and telegrams and from the diaries of contemporaries, including the generals themselves, noting where variant accounts exist of a particular situation or interaction, and finding a great deal to praise in Lincoln’s humility as well as his natural strategic genius. For those authors who wish to understand the sorts of strains that the North was under and the mostly deft way in which Lincoln handled the situation, this book is an excellent and worthwhile examination of the difficult but ultimately successful relationship between Lincoln and his generals, once he found the right generals to put into place his grand strategic vision for Union victory.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
[2] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
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July 11, 2014
I had heard quite a bit about this book before reading it. I picked up an original 1952, red cover copy of this for probably just a couple of bucks at a thrift store. After reading this, I'm left feeling a bit disappointed in the book.
The author does so much speculating throughout the book, using terms like "probably", "most likely", "must have been", ect. Williams clearly holds Lincoln in the highest esteem in his book and in using these terms of speculation, always errors on the side of making Lincoln look his best. Williams presents Lincoln as the ultimate micro-manager (probably a term not used when this book was written) and as the supreme commander calling every little troop movement through out the war. If this is actually true, and I hesitate to believe it to the extreme Williams takes it, then Lincoln has to be blamed for appointing utter imbeciles such as McClellan, Hooker, and Rosecrans. Even Grant is not held in the esteem that most modern authors place on him and Sherman.
For those looking for a Civil War book on tactics and troop movement, this isn't it. There is just blip mentions of battles won and loss. Gettysburg gets about ONE page of detail in the book. Every battle is just mentioned as a win or loss with very little detail to the battle itself. This book is much more about the relationship between Lincoln and his generals. Tons of correspondence is laced throughout the book.
All in all, a bit disappointing for me in how the author approaches Lincoln and ultimately Grant and Sherman in the book. I'm a big fan of Lincoln, but I question how much of a role Lincoln really had in controlling these generals. According to Williams, Lincoln was the chess player while the generals were the pawns on the board.
The author does so much speculating throughout the book, using terms like "probably", "most likely", "must have been", ect. Williams clearly holds Lincoln in the highest esteem in his book and in using these terms of speculation, always errors on the side of making Lincoln look his best. Williams presents Lincoln as the ultimate micro-manager (probably a term not used when this book was written) and as the supreme commander calling every little troop movement through out the war. If this is actually true, and I hesitate to believe it to the extreme Williams takes it, then Lincoln has to be blamed for appointing utter imbeciles such as McClellan, Hooker, and Rosecrans. Even Grant is not held in the esteem that most modern authors place on him and Sherman.
For those looking for a Civil War book on tactics and troop movement, this isn't it. There is just blip mentions of battles won and loss. Gettysburg gets about ONE page of detail in the book. Every battle is just mentioned as a win or loss with very little detail to the battle itself. This book is much more about the relationship between Lincoln and his generals. Tons of correspondence is laced throughout the book.
All in all, a bit disappointing for me in how the author approaches Lincoln and ultimately Grant and Sherman in the book. I'm a big fan of Lincoln, but I question how much of a role Lincoln really had in controlling these generals. According to Williams, Lincoln was the chess player while the generals were the pawns on the board.
November 14, 2023
Absolutely Brilliant...I read the first Edition from 1952 . It really gives one a sense of the struggles and hardships encountered during the numerous battles. It mainly focused on the trial and Error of hiring and relieving various generals who either didn't want to fight or made excuses ( not enough personnel, poor conditions, Etc ) . Very well written , I highly recommend it.
June 18, 2019
T. Harry Williams (1909-1979) was an American historian who taught (often to overflow lectures) at Louisiana State University from 1941 to 1979, and who won both a National Book Award and the Pulitzer Prize for his 1969 biography of Louisiana governor Huey P. Long.
Williams’s Lincoln and His Generals is a fine study, carefully and wittily crafted for general readers with none of academic posturing—and of course, political correctness—that would be de rigueur for a professorial production seventy years later. Another reason why this work retains its freshness is that Williams made no comparisons between the Civil War and the Eisenhower era—nothing about, say, the Cold War, television, or Levittowns—so the reader remains focused in the Civil War past rather than also having to bridge the gap between his own time and the T. Harry Williams past.
Williams’s Lincoln and His Generals is a fine study, carefully and wittily crafted for general readers with none of academic posturing—and of course, political correctness—that would be de rigueur for a professorial production seventy years later. Another reason why this work retains its freshness is that Williams made no comparisons between the Civil War and the Eisenhower era—nothing about, say, the Cold War, television, or Levittowns—so the reader remains focused in the Civil War past rather than also having to bridge the gap between his own time and the T. Harry Williams past.
April 30, 2019
It is a very good book, in a topic I'm not terribly interested in - the Civil War. Lincoln and His Generals is more of a biography of Lincoln and his Generals than it is a history book. The bios are limited to the war, but it reads more like a biography, so that it is not simply facts and dates, but has some personal interest. It is also interesting for ideas of leadership. For instance, the best generals were those who could adapt. General Lee was a general of the past, Ulysses S. Grant was a modern general. Some of these observations can serve anyone in leadership.
July 8, 2008
For anyone wanting to understand Lincoln and the military strategy of the Civil War, this is the place to strt. It is a classic that I constantly refer to when teaching the Civil War
February 3, 2019
Good discussion of the development of modern command structure
December 3, 2024
This book is 70 years old and holds up well. It's readable and insightful, and the author sticks to his topic without being redundant. I know it's gone through numerous editions, and I read an early one, which shows that this book has staying power. It's a worthy addition to anyone's Civil War bookshelf.
The book looks at how Lincoln dealt with the many (and mostly incompetent) top generals as he waged the Civil War. And I say Lincoln waged it because that's one of the claims made strongly in this book and backed up with a lot of source material. Lincoln was heavily involved in the war, obviously in its start that he tried to avoid, but then in defining its purpose and working on its tactics. He knew that the point of the war was to defeat the South's army -- and while that seems obvious, it wasn't how most of the generals he employed understood it to be. They looked at the keys as defending Northern turf and then taking Southern turf. They thought they needed to be an occupying army. But that was totally wrong. They needed to stop the South's ability to fight and its will to keep fighting.
Over and over, Lincoln excoriated his generals for spending their efforts on maneuvers and defensive gestures, when what they needed to do was find the enemy and fight it. The North had superior resources in every way -- men, food, weapons -- but the North's generals repeatedly backed away from confrontations because they felt they didn't have the edge. They wanted guaranteed victories with minimal bloodshed, whereas Lincoln knew the price would be steep. The book chronicles time after time when McClellan and others dithered in the field, unwilling to go into battle unless they got more troops, horses, supplies, etc. On several of those occasions, a strong effort might have ended the war much earlier.
Lincoln's patience with McClellan especially is astonishing. Here's Lincoln in the most high-stress job imaginable, and he's writing kind and keep-up-the-spirit letters to a whiny general who keeps promising to fight the enemy, but never does. Lincoln is insulted by his generals over and over, usually through the means of them criticizing the other generals he is backing, and he just lets it go. Astonishing. This guy who was probably always the smartest man in the room, is willing to pretend to be a country bumpkin and let everyone else have the glory ... if only they will do something brave that earns them glory. It's a lesson for today's leaders (I'm looking at you, Republican Party) who do nothing but criticize, complain and hate.
The book also provides interesting insight on how good and no-good communications were at the time. The telegraph existed, and it seems some of the generals spent most of their time writing telegraph messages and letters to Lincoln. But yet, there were many times when he didn't know what was going on and had to read rumors in the newspapers. And there were times when one general didn't know what the other was doing, sometimes due to intentional keeping of secrets, and sometimes because communications just weren't what they would be in the mid-20th century. And yet, Lincoln (and, to some extent, Halleck who was his chief-of-staff) eventually developed a war machine that got the right people to the right positions with the right resources. And, as the author says, it was the first modern military campaign in history.
Good stuff. A concise look at one vital aspect of the Civil War and Lincoln's legacy.
The book looks at how Lincoln dealt with the many (and mostly incompetent) top generals as he waged the Civil War. And I say Lincoln waged it because that's one of the claims made strongly in this book and backed up with a lot of source material. Lincoln was heavily involved in the war, obviously in its start that he tried to avoid, but then in defining its purpose and working on its tactics. He knew that the point of the war was to defeat the South's army -- and while that seems obvious, it wasn't how most of the generals he employed understood it to be. They looked at the keys as defending Northern turf and then taking Southern turf. They thought they needed to be an occupying army. But that was totally wrong. They needed to stop the South's ability to fight and its will to keep fighting.
Over and over, Lincoln excoriated his generals for spending their efforts on maneuvers and defensive gestures, when what they needed to do was find the enemy and fight it. The North had superior resources in every way -- men, food, weapons -- but the North's generals repeatedly backed away from confrontations because they felt they didn't have the edge. They wanted guaranteed victories with minimal bloodshed, whereas Lincoln knew the price would be steep. The book chronicles time after time when McClellan and others dithered in the field, unwilling to go into battle unless they got more troops, horses, supplies, etc. On several of those occasions, a strong effort might have ended the war much earlier.
Lincoln's patience with McClellan especially is astonishing. Here's Lincoln in the most high-stress job imaginable, and he's writing kind and keep-up-the-spirit letters to a whiny general who keeps promising to fight the enemy, but never does. Lincoln is insulted by his generals over and over, usually through the means of them criticizing the other generals he is backing, and he just lets it go. Astonishing. This guy who was probably always the smartest man in the room, is willing to pretend to be a country bumpkin and let everyone else have the glory ... if only they will do something brave that earns them glory. It's a lesson for today's leaders (I'm looking at you, Republican Party) who do nothing but criticize, complain and hate.
The book also provides interesting insight on how good and no-good communications were at the time. The telegraph existed, and it seems some of the generals spent most of their time writing telegraph messages and letters to Lincoln. But yet, there were many times when he didn't know what was going on and had to read rumors in the newspapers. And there were times when one general didn't know what the other was doing, sometimes due to intentional keeping of secrets, and sometimes because communications just weren't what they would be in the mid-20th century. And yet, Lincoln (and, to some extent, Halleck who was his chief-of-staff) eventually developed a war machine that got the right people to the right positions with the right resources. And, as the author says, it was the first modern military campaign in history.
Good stuff. A concise look at one vital aspect of the Civil War and Lincoln's legacy.
January 30, 2025
I always go into Civil War books published before the 1960s with a guarded approach. The last vestiges of the Lost Cause were still infecting the popular scholarship of the war, influenced by the Southern writers of early 20th century. Thankfully by the middle of the 20th century, that narrative was beginning the long road towards it’s necessary correction.
This book was published in 1952. This was a really, really great book.
Focusing on President Lincoln and his relationships (working and personal) with the highest command of the Union Army (hardly anyone below army command is given a mention in this book), this book continues to hold up as a solid work on the study of Union senior command during the Civil War. Lots of focus on the Lincoln/McClellan (ugh McClellan) and Lincoln/Grant relationships, but the other generals in between are given their due as well. I would have liked to see more on Hooker and Meade, but given Hooker’s short tenure as commander of the Army of the Potomac, and Meade’s eventual overshadowing by Grant it’s understandable. I was happy to see that this book does not demean Grant as a butcher (quite the opposite actually) or a drunk as scholarship during this time was rife with.
The real crux of Williams’ argument is that Lincoln was a solid military tactician and strategist, and that often he was better than his senior generals in these regards. Williams makes a solid argument here and is able to back it up with strong research. There are times when Lincoln comes off as a military genius (quite debatable) but the argument that he was making better strategic decisions than his military advisors lands, due to Williams strong research.
I also appreciated that Williams stuck to the topic. Major battles warrant only brief mentions, none more than a few sentences. This book is about Lincoln and his senior command and not the battles. This kept the narrative flowing and the book on topic. I appreciated that.
This book was published in 1952. This was a really, really great book.
Focusing on President Lincoln and his relationships (working and personal) with the highest command of the Union Army (hardly anyone below army command is given a mention in this book), this book continues to hold up as a solid work on the study of Union senior command during the Civil War. Lots of focus on the Lincoln/McClellan (ugh McClellan) and Lincoln/Grant relationships, but the other generals in between are given their due as well. I would have liked to see more on Hooker and Meade, but given Hooker’s short tenure as commander of the Army of the Potomac, and Meade’s eventual overshadowing by Grant it’s understandable. I was happy to see that this book does not demean Grant as a butcher (quite the opposite actually) or a drunk as scholarship during this time was rife with.
The real crux of Williams’ argument is that Lincoln was a solid military tactician and strategist, and that often he was better than his senior generals in these regards. Williams makes a solid argument here and is able to back it up with strong research. There are times when Lincoln comes off as a military genius (quite debatable) but the argument that he was making better strategic decisions than his military advisors lands, due to Williams strong research.
I also appreciated that Williams stuck to the topic. Major battles warrant only brief mentions, none more than a few sentences. This book is about Lincoln and his senior command and not the battles. This kept the narrative flowing and the book on topic. I appreciated that.
August 5, 2024
It’s a classic book for the Lincoln admirer, but it feels dated because it’s too worshipful. The author believed that Lincoln was a master strategist who was more responsible for the Union victory than any of his generals and there he’s wrong. Lincoln was an excellent strategist but not without growing pains and without his share of mistakes. These are explained away, diminished, or attributed to others. The relationship with Grant is presented in an antagonistic manner in order to lionize Lincoln when instead Lincoln had a lot of trust in Grant, and the two collaborated towards a common goal.
Lincoln couldn’t have won without U.S.Grant who was responsible for the most significant strategic victories for the Union. By the time he won the Vicksburg campaign he had matured as a commander and the level of popularity he enjoyed was self earned and independent of parties. In the effort to lionize Lincoln too little credit is given to Grant, and Sherman. This is just the most obvious objection, but the same thing applies to everyone else. Not enough is said about Halleck and Stanton either. Overall the book is too one sided for my taste.
Lincoln couldn’t have won without U.S.Grant who was responsible for the most significant strategic victories for the Union. By the time he won the Vicksburg campaign he had matured as a commander and the level of popularity he enjoyed was self earned and independent of parties. In the effort to lionize Lincoln too little credit is given to Grant, and Sherman. This is just the most obvious objection, but the same thing applies to everyone else. Not enough is said about Halleck and Stanton either. Overall the book is too one sided for my taste.
December 2, 2024
This book sat on my shelf for a long time before I got around to finally reading it. I'm glad I gave it a chance. This is not in any sense a biography of Lincoln (or any of his generals), but we do learn quite a bit about Lincoln's intelligence, his character and his dedication to winning the war. As Williams points out numerous times, Lincoln understood better than his generals that the main goal should be defeating enemy armies, not occupying cities. Perhaps a bit outdated, but still provocative and worth reading.
October 4, 2025
3.5/5 - accomplished what it sets out to do in that it discusses Lincoln as military strategist, the only issue being that in doing so the book has us spend 10x more time with mclellan and other incompetents than with the true heroes of the war like Sherman, Grant, and Thomas.
Contains one of my favorite sentences I have ever read. This written in reference to an inept general complaining about needing reinforcements:
“Rosecrans was developing into a first rate epistolatory controversialist”
Contains one of my favorite sentences I have ever read. This written in reference to an inept general complaining about needing reinforcements:
“Rosecrans was developing into a first rate epistolatory controversialist”
July 8, 2023
A well researched book even though it is before the opening of the Freedom of Information Act. As a history reader I knew many of the gripes about the "political" Generals that the Federal forces put up with in the early years of the Civil War. It just showed what Lincoln suffered with in those years. Good information for Civil War Buffs.
November 6, 2019
Lincoln really had a hard time finding good generals to help the North win the Civil War!
August 17, 2022
Great narrative. Holds up overtime.
December 4, 2023
Really enjoyed reading about Lincoln’s interactions with his generals
December 23, 2023
Just the right amount of the politics of the time and military history. Easy read. I have an even greater appreciation for what this man means to our country.
January 24, 2024
An insightful and well-written history of Lincoln’s trouble finding a fighting man to lead his armies.
May 23, 2024
Informative
OK recap covered by many other books. Good presentation of Lincoln's role in the military and his interactions with staff.
OK recap covered by many other books. Good presentation of Lincoln's role in the military and his interactions with staff.
March 19, 2014
I really enjoyed this book! Mr. Williams gives an insightful glance into the relationships between President Lincoln and his generals during the Civil War. The focus of the book is mainly on the generals that most frustrated the Commander In Chief, those with cases of 'the slows' or those that constantly asked for supplies and reinforcements and yet could never entirely be ready to engage the Confederates. Lincoln takes a paternal tone with some of the younger generals, and was patient beyond belief with all the egotism and jockeying for position among the commanders. The tone of the book is that of a lecture, but Mr. Williams uses language that any layperson could understand in describing the strategy employed by the president and his generals, with military jargon explained. Any historian or Civil War buff should have a copy of this book
July 29, 2013
My brother-in-law lent this book to me....we both are Civil War/Lincoln readers. This is an excellent read but only for those truly interested in the subject and the strategy that went into the Civil War battles. I learned so much from reading this book and the author was able to capture a side of Lincoln readers rarely see..... that of a brilliant war strategist and manager of military men with a variety of personality quirks and degrees of competence of leading men on the battlefield. I am very picky about non fiction and this one satisfied me immensely.
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