البرغسونية

by Gilles Deleuze, أسامة الحاج (تعريب)

In this analysis of one major philosopher by another, Gilles Deleuze identifies three pivotal concepts - duration, memory, and élan vital - that are found throughout Bergson's writings and shows the relevance of Bergson's work to contemporary philosophical debates. He interprets and integrates these themes into a single philosophical program, arguing that Bergson's philosophical intentions are methodological. They are more than a polemic against the limitations of science and common sense, particularly in Bergson's elaboration of the explanatory powers of the notion of duration - thinking in terms of time rather than space.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Theory, France, Metaphysics, Sociology, 20th Century

138 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1966

About the author

Deleuze is a key figure in poststructuralist French philosophy. Considering himself an empiricist and a vitalist, his body of work, which rests upon concepts such as multiplicity, constructivism, difference and desire, stands at a substantial remove from the main traditions of 20th century Continental thought. His thought locates him as an influential figure in present-day considerations of society, creativity and subjectivity. Notably, within his metaphysics he favored a Spinozian concept of a plane of immanence with everything a mode of one substance, and thus on the same level of existence. He argued, then, that there is no good and evil, but rather only relationships which are beneficial or harmful to the particular individuals. This ethics influences his approach to society and politics, especially as he was so politically active in struggles for rights and freedoms. Later in his career he wrote some of the more infamous texts of the period, in particular, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. These texts are collaborative works with the radical psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, and they exhibit Deleuze’s social and political commitment.

Gilles Deleuze began his career with a number of idiosyncratic yet rigorous historical studies of figures outside of the Continental tradition in vogue at the time. His first book, Empirisism and Subjectivity, is a study of Hume, interpreted by Deleuze to be a radical subjectivist. Deleuze became known for writing about other philosophers with new insights and different readings, interested as he was in liberating philosophical history from the hegemony of one perspective. He wrote on Spinoza, Nietzche, Kant, Leibniz and others, including literary authors and works, cinema, and art. Deleuze claimed that he did not write “about” art, literature, or cinema, but, rather, undertook philosophical “encounters” that led him to new concepts. As a constructivist, he was adamant that philosophers are creators, and that each reading of philosophy, or each philosophical encounter, ought to inspire new concepts. Additionally, according to Deleuze and his concepts of difference, there is no identity, and in repetition, nothing is ever the same. Rather, there is only difference: copies are something new, everything is constantly changing, and reality is a becoming, not a being.

He often collaborated with philosophers and artists as Félix Guattari, Michel Foucault, Guy Hocquenghem, René Schérer, Carmelo Bene, François Châtelet, Olivier Revault d'Allonnes, Jean-François Lyotard, Georges Lapassade, Kateb Yacine and many others.

Reviews

[Kamakana · Rating 5 out of 5]

if you like this review i now have website: www.michaelkamakana.com

161117 this is a much much later later addition (5 years total): i have read a lot of philosophy since this first time, and it is not too much a surprise that i had first rejected it, as i was not then educated enough in various other philosophy- primarily phenomenonology, and now i am enthused to change the rating to five. i had the idea to search out the meaning/term of the 'virtual', but found myself reading the whole (short) book. what is the 'virtual' and how is it significant in deleuze? 'real but not actual, ideal but not abstract' quote from proust, is the motto of this term, in conceiving this, always in 'memory' and not 'matter'...

page 96 on gives some idea, though by now you have read some concepts such as 'duration' that are particularly deployed by bergson, 'intuition', 'multiplicity', 'possible' vs 'actual', but it is still a hard word to grasp. in deleuze the a) 'virtual' is contrasted with the b) 'possible', in that b) is actually imposed after the fact from the completed, projected backwards from the real, which is what it lacks, manifest only by adding it to the possible, whereas a) is completed, subsumed, identified with the 'actual' and through this 'diversified' on 'lines of flight', is essentially 'generative', and not just something less 'real', has its own being through which it propagates... i am in fact elaborating this term from much reading, not simply here, yet again, i must wrestle the meaning down: the possible must be 'realized' and in this there is resemblance, the a) virtual need not be realized but already 'real' in its way, yet to be 'actualized' and there is no necessary heritage, resemblance, limitations, how it works as potentials, not already there in the future, enabling the present, in the present... the present that always 'was' (now gone as soon as sensed) and the past that always 'is' (because it is always there as past...)...

evolutionism is an example, and this text refers to b's work Creative Evolution, where the changes, the adaptations, that lead through various states is not external, not given as possible but virtual. that is, it is 'internal' and 'virtual', so when the organism is stimulated it does not have a preset goal but reacts, adapts through the mechanism of natural selection, in this book illustrated by a great diagram showing the evolution of life, original divide between life and matter, the early schism between plant and animal, the branches into sort of animals that relies on instinct or intelligence, the human exteriorization of dominating matter (intellect) and understanding of life (intuition)... but we are looking this in one image as though it is already planned. in fact it is all virtual. and virtual never completely leaves us: we humans are the self-understanding of life and matter though we disregard the first in order to work with the other... i like to believe i now understand the virtual, but i am trying to create my own metaphors. one metaphor i read (Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy) as an example was the operation of a modern computer: that it has a graphic interface, desktop, windows, files, this is just 'surface effect' and nowhere 'actual', can be interacted with it in changes, actions, structure of this on the level of hardware/software, that it is indeed 'real' but not 'actual'... for in the moment it is 'actualized' the 'virtual' is no more...

this is a much later later review: now having read more deleuze, read more bergson through deleuze... i have to up the rating, as i understand him much better. this convinces me that i should not read philosophers 'cold', but only after some preliminary, introductory, secondary texts- as i am not studying phil, these other works that i do rank immediately high, are as if i am listening to a prof... as with husserl i am finding that if i cultivate the right accepting and patient and different style- he is not so difficult! go figure...

this is a much later review: i have now read more bergson, have now a better understanding of deleuze, have decided to read him again through the lens of other work, possibly revise the rating, but still must affirm how difficult such is. even now, when reading more on the differences between virtual possibilities and actual duration, and how time reality surpasses russell's mathematical logical assumptions, which seems only to deny reality of time...

211012 first review: this is probably what analytic philosophers hate: words, words, words, describing a complex metaphorical terrain with no clear familiar ordering of logic. i decided to write reviews for all the bergson even if i do not like it much, hence this review…

i have not really enjoyed what i have read of deleuze, so should not be surprised as this is more deleuze’s than bergson’s ideas. hard to follow, nowhere near as good as the man himself. but... occasional sharp insight convinces me having not read enough. i think i understand a bit on virtual, possible, actual, real, and this was interesting, but i would need a prof to tell me if i am right... there are so many books to read and so little time...

010220 more: Henri Bergson: Key Writings
Bergson’s Philosophy of Self-Overcoming: Thinking without Negativity or Time as Striving
Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life
Bergson: Thinking Beyond the Human Condition
more on Deleuze
Demystifying Deleuze: An Introductory Assemblage of Crucial Concepts
Deleuze, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty: The Logic and Pragmatics of Creation, Affective Life, and Perception
010220: Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction
Deleuze
Nietzsche and Philosophy
What Is Philosophy?
Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts
Bergsonism
Bergson-Deleuze Encounters: Transcendental Experience and the Thought of the Virtual
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy
Deleuze on Cinema

[Jonfaith · Rating 3 out of 5]

It seems to us that Duration essentially defines a virtual multiplicity (what differs in nature). Memory then appears as the coexistence of all degrees of difference in this multiplicity, in this virtuality.

I thoroughly enjoyed this survey, a treatment similar to those of Badiou when completing his annals of anti-philosophy. Deleuze parses the three chief principles of Bergson. I’m trusting the author here, not being overly familiar with Bergson. The possibility of Duration can only exist with the possibility of memory and a unified field of time. I’ve wrestled with that all morning but feel a relative (can’t avoid the pun) tension between perception and recollection a necessary dynamic.

[Bradley · Rating 4 out of 5]

Gilles Deleuze needs to stop fucking me in the mind-gina and get back to reality.

[Toon Van der Coelden · Rating 4 out of 5]

Right! In alle eerlijkheid, alleen God Deleuze weet waar dit werk in zijn fijnste details over gaat. Maar goed, eerst een kleine schets van wat ik denk dat Deleuze zijn bedoeling was:
Waar Nietzsche et la Philosophie de oorsprong van de filosofie als conceptkritiek bij Nietzsche legt en La philosophie critique de Kant toont wat deze kritiek juist niet zou moeten zijn (of alleszins waar er voorbij Kant gegaan zou moeten worden), legt Le Bergsonisme vooral een reeks concepten op tafel. Met het conceptueel kader van Bergson in de hand begint Deleuze hier de trage opbouw van zijn oneindig complex metafysisch systeem. Het wijst op de voorzienigheid van een genie dat een werk waaraan Deleuze in de jaren '50 begonnen is, zo essentieel zou worden voor zijn hoofdwerk een goede 30 jaar later. Elke zin, elk concept lijkt opzet voor zijn latere filosofie te zijn. Termen als '(coexistence) virtuelle', 'multiplicité' en natuurlijk 'différenciation' vinden hier hun ingang in de metafysica van Deleuze zonder dat Deleuze reeds al te expliciet maakt wat die termen voor hem zelf (zullen) betekenen. Le Bergsonisme blijft immers nog steeds, wel ja..., een werk over Bergson. Het is deze dubbelheid, Bergson-Deleuze, het gevoel dat Deleuze's eigen filosofie van achter de hoek meegluurt, wat dit werkje soms zo frustrerend en tegelijk hemels aantrekkelijk maakt.

Van wat er van Deleuze's schets van Bergson zijn filosofie al dan niet klopt, kan ik jammer genoeg niet al te veel zeggen. Bergson zelf is voor mij onbekend terrein en zoals ik al zei, is het niet altijd duidelijk waar Bergson eindigt en Deleuze begint (vandaar waarschijnlijk ook Le Bergsonisme of Nietzsche et la philosophie). In het eerste hoofdstuk lijkt Deleuze vooral weer de weg van Nietzsche et la philosophie op te gaan met ietwat heldere passages over conceptuele kritiek. Waar Nietzsche de vraag "qui?" (in tegenstelling tot "qu'est-ce que") aan het concept stelde, vraagt Bergson zich vooral af wat het statuut is van concepten binnen de filosofische vraagstelling. In lijn met de typische attitude van Deleuze is het niet zozeer het filosofische antwoord maar de vraag die er toe doet. Niet het concept als alles verklarend samenraapsel van identieke zaken of als idee of predikaat maar als creatieve kracht en spel. Ooit al thuisgezeten en je plotseling, à la Parmenides, afgevraagd: ''waarom is er iets en niet niets?", breek je kop er niet langer over because it's all bollocks voor Bergson. 'Zijn' en 'niet-zijn' verschillen niet zozeer in kwantiteit (in een verschil in hoeveelheid substantie of in graad) maar zijn kwalitatief verschillend van aard en kunnen niet zomaar met en door elkaar gebruikt worden. Het is met dit soort fijngevoeligheid voor kwalitatieve verschillen en juiste/foute vraagstellingen dat Bergson zijn theorie van de herinnering (het verleden en heden als ontologisch van compleet andere aard) en de befaamde élan vital, die de inspiratie zal vormen voor Deleuze's zelf-organisatie van het organisme, uiteenzet.

Het is ook op dit punt (ongeveer halverwege de tekst) dat Deleuze mij geleidelijk aan begint te verliezen. Deleuze's conceptuele jongleerskills hebben misschien geen limieten maar ik ben al blij als ik er twee in mijn hersenpan kan vastzetten. Eens ik wat meer van zijn latere werken heb gelezen (God Deleuze weet hoe lang dat nog mag duren), kom ik nog wel eens op deze tekst terug. Vooral is Le Bergsonisme dus het zoveelste werkje in een reeks geniale monografieën dat de stukken moet klaarzetten voor het conceptueel schaakspel dat Différence et Répétition zal worden. Of zo voelt het toch aan. Dat Deleuze nog van lopers koninginnen en van hokjes vijfhoeken zal maken, daar twijfel ik niet aan.

[Niousha mokhtari · Rating 2 out of 5]

ترجمه افتضاح و حیف که مترجم بسیار خوش سلیقه است و خرابکار در این سلیقه ی خوبش!

[Jacob Hurley · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an early Deleuze book, back from his days of grounded & thorough research on obscure but respectable philosophers, yet this supposed 'study' of Bergson is already quite independently Deleuzean philosophy in its own right. His main project is to try and make sense of the relationship between Bergson's famous concepts . . . . he begins by stridently declaring that Bergson's philosophic method (usually understood as a logical series of arguments against the Neo-Kantian perspective) is in fact a primarily linguistic and eisegetic response to basic philosophical dilemmas such as the mind-body problem. Bergson's solutions, he claims, always follow a confounding path that perpetually leads to a deflation of space and a centrality of duration, a method that produces a time-centric philosophy that dispenses the centrality of scientific and mathematical partitionings. By this method, then, Bergson arrived at the mystic nature of time, the ontological split between memory and present experience, and his organic/morphological revision of Darwin's theory of evolution.

However, when Bergson's distinctions are taken not as corrections of standard philosophic frameworks (as Bergson sought to do in rejecting, eg, the materialist-idealist divide) but rather as synthetic creations within the basic Hegelian mode of the 19th century, Deleuze feels that Bergsonism produces bizarre paradoxes. Matter and Memory, for example, simultaneously argues for a pure monism of spirit (in that the psychological distinctions of the mind are partitions of a united manifold) and for a fundamental gap between past and present (in that the mind necessarily functions on the duplicities within that manifold); likewise, Bergson writes variously on time that its passage is relativist and variable based on experience, but also that its special nature must derive from an external and independent unity of substance. Deleuze, then, attempts to make sense of Bergson's own solution to these paradoxes between monism and multiplicity, namely, Bergson's sense of a unity of spirit that is partitioned variously by the Soul, a perennially relevant process that is as true of an individual's experience of the world and mind as of the organic evolution of life as a whole. This is essentially a variation upon the Platonic theory of the Good, but where Bergson differs (or at least may seem to) is in totally subjectivist and 'living' nature of ontological and philosophical distinctions ... as opposed to classical idealist philosophy, where distinctions are drawn 'negatively' to ascertain noumena, Bergsonism then (allegedly) draws its distinctions in a positive way: just as the mind separates one object from another to create positive concepts, so too does Bergson's philosophy creatively and actively partition logical arguments for the sake of creative, organic solutions.

This, of course, is perhaps true or untrue of Bergson's philosophy proper; it is absolutely true, however, of Deleuze, who managed to attribute a nigh identical attitude to Spinoza on the higher-order levels. Indeed, just like with everything and everyone Deleuze wrote about, it turns out that Bergson was simultaneously a machine and an indeterminably living being who theorized schizophrenically about DIFFERENCE and REPETITION. What's interesting about this method of 'philosophical criticism', as it were, is that it is simultaneously so radically transformative and yet never quite logically objectionable, at least not on any petty levels. Bergson here is made practically to transform into a late Heideggerian lingusitic-processor, and then into a Deleuzean machine ... depending on yr creed you may find this a genuine study or else a sophistical challenge to be overcome (or both!), but definitely a worthy study for anyone interested in Bergson or Deleuze; do not be fooled by its shortness of length, for its density and scope of argumentation seem to me to be equal to any of the great tomes of the philosophers.

[Tohid hadinejad · Rating 4 out of 5]

این کتاب از مهم ترین کتاب های فلسفی قرن بیستم است. در کتاب دلوز تلاش کرده تا بنیان های فلسفی برگسون را توضح دهد. هرچند مطالعه کتاب با زبان اصلی یعنی زبان فرانسوی بهترین راه مواجهه با این کتاب است ولی برای عزیزانی که با این زبان آشنایی ندارند خواندن این کتاب در کنار کتاب انگلیسی می تواند در فهم این کتاب ثقیل و بدفهم کمک کند.

[Pedro · Rating 5 out of 5]

li o primeiro capitulo

[Sophia]

Memory is the key to the magic of the present.

[Zack Bachmann · Rating 3 out of 5]

Probably good but still clueless

[T · Rating 4 out of 5]

What Deleuze “lacks” as a reader, he makes up for in creativity. This book isn’t exactly “about” Bergson, it’s more a Kantian “as if” of Bergson, pushing Bergson to conclusions he didn’t come to in order to push the project forward. In this book you find a mixture of Deleuze’s early arguments about Difference combined with haphazard summaries of Bergson. At times these are rich, brilliant, beautiful. Other times Deleuze seems to lose track of what he was trying to say. Above all, probably my least favorite in this book is the shared assumptions about Hegelian dialectic as a sort of cartoon vision of “negation” and what he calls, in a footnote, “false” movement. I find rather that Deleuze in every sense continues Hegel’s Logic, developing its counter tendencies, its hidden potentials, and a more dynamic attention to life and the new biology’s approaches to it. He likewise shares the sort of Hegelian love for “metaphysic” and science in combination, as well as Hegel’s mystical foundations for modern science. Overall, I recommend this book as anything except an introduction to Bergson, it is far more an introduction to one of the most creators thinkers of French intellectual history.

[Tom · Rating 4 out of 5]

For such a small book this one was tough, made my head hurt trying to conceive of time as qualitative duration as opposed to quantitative difference in temporal degrees. I am a literally a cone, please actualise me pleaseee helppp the virtual is too scary.

[Luke · Rating 5 out of 5]

Deleuze is influenced most by Bergson and his paradigm of science. Although it’s not very well known, especially in the US. Bergson will be more methodologically influential on philosophy than Schopenhauer or Hegel. His paradigm of rebalancing science with metaphysics is yet to be truly pioneered, despite Deleuze’s great efforts. To anyone paying attention the next improvement of western philosophy/psychology/science surely is, and probably has been Bergson.

Schopenhauer may have built a frame work for Darwin to study evolution, Einstein to study the relativity of spacetime, and maybe for Freud to study the sublimation of the will. That said, Schopenhauer studied things in a purely dualist framework. He wasn’t influenced enough by the east despite introducing a more serious study of the east in modern philosophy. Schopenhauer fell into the same pseudo understanding of the east that Hegel before him and even Nietzsche at times after him fell. Schopenhauer viewed it pessimistically for sure, but more to the point he viewed it through the stabilization of identity or permanence, he objectified externality through a misunderstanding of materialization, and he paradoxically left the same room for social Darwinism that Nietzsche left.

Hegel allows for the kind of capitalist deconstruction of reality. This thinking is a big influence on Deleuze and carries philosophy again forward, into the critique of economy as metaphysical superstructure. Hegel leads to Bergson in many ways especially with the use of the Ancient Greek Titaness Mnemosyne and the definition of the quantum. Connecting memory to the rationalization of meta narrative and the real is where Bergson continues from.

Bergson rebalances all of western metaphysics and science by recognizing the temporal Platonic paradigm as a rather human paradigm. He recognizes the secularization of time and space that is built into human thought. It takes an untangling of temporality as Nietzsche understood, but instead of stopping with difference and repetition, like Deleuze, or stopping at Plato, like Nietzsche and Deleuze, Bergson goes a step further into the monism of affirmation.

Bergson removes materialism, performability and finalism, not just teleology, identity and projection. This is the genius of Bergson that Baudrillard and Deleuze still can’t fully improve upon. Time, defined well before (“Galileo” or Newtonian science as Baudrillard hints at) is the misperception of space through a misunderstanding of quality and quantity. Baudrillard follows Bergsonism with the void and disappearance, but again doesn’t fully grasp the paradigm in its monism. Space cannot be projected onto time.

Time is not spatial, it is a dual property of the monism of presence. Deleuze is right to question Bergson in his own improved secularization of time and space. But not because it is wrong, because it is confusing!

The scientific improvement of Bergson is the complete communicability with Riemann space and Einstein’s relativity. When Bergson’s paradigm can adequately explain physical phenomena, polyvocally describe the internal nature of evolution, and predict psychological behavior neuroscientifically, it will be a working theory.

His paradigm may be already understood by a select few who we don’t hear much about…hopefully not just exploited by those who have the mathematical means and ends to maintain human behaviors. Bottom line is that Bergson comes across as conflating science with metaphysics. But only his method is actually capable of saving science from its attachment to dualism, reductionism, and most importantly its anthropocentric definitions of life and life’s material objects.

“The past would never be constituted if it did not coexist with the present whose past it is. The past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two elements which coexist: One is the present, which does not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through which all presents pass. It is in this sense that there is a pure past, a kind of "past in general": The past does not follow the present, but on the contrary, is presupposed by it as the pure condition without which it would not pass. In other words, each present goes back to itself as past. The only equivalent thesis is Plato's notion of Reminiscence. The reminiscence also affirms a pure being of the past, a being in itself of the past, an ontological Memory that is capable of serving as the foundation for the unfolding of time. Yet again, a Platonic inspiration makes itself profoundly felt in Bergson.”

[Alexander · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's arguable that if the work of Henri Bergson remains spoken about today, it's due in no small part to the incredible efforts of Gilles Deleuze, whose philosophy of creation has never ceased to draw on the thought of his venerable predecessor. Indeed so strong has been the influence of the one on the other that Deleuze's own work has been characterized by many as a kind of Bergsonian metaphysics restated in terms other than those of Bergson. It's in this light then, that one ought to consider the Bergson presented here: a Bergson filtered (but not at all 'distorted') through the lens of Deleuzian concerns, drawing out the pivotal themes which would come to define not only Deleuze's own prodigious philosophy, but the very reception of Bergson himself in the wake of Deleuze's bold re(appropriation).

Although billed as an exploration of Bergson's 'three fundamental concepts' - duration, memory and élan vital - in truth, these notions serve more as gateways for the study of a second triad of ideas - each of which will more properly find its full extension in Deleuze's own mature metaphysics - but are here given a full hearing in the Bergsonian milieu from which they stem. Thus, for duration stands the study of 'multiplicities'; for memory, the study of the 'virtual coexistence of times' (past and present); for élan vital, the 'actualization of the virtual'. While careful to source each of his readings in the work of Bergson himself, it's the particular weight or significance given to the latter theme of each pair that makes the reading of Bergson here distinctly Deleuzian, and, as per most of Deleuze's readings, distinctly original.

At the heart of the book's thematic narrative also lies that most contested of Bergsonian doctrines: the method of intuition. Often dismissed a fuzzy and imprecise concept or feeling, Deleuze here reclaims it not only as the organizing thread of the entire Bergsonian edifice, but as 'one of the most fully developed methods in philosophy' par excellence. Proceeding by 'applying the test of the true and the false to problems themselves', intuition in Bergson/Deleuze is nothing but the rooting out of badly posed problems, malformed questions and muddled distinctions. Given that from the beginning to the end of his career, Deleuze considered philosophy itself to be the art of posing and pursuing well-formed questions (by means of concepts...), not simply this or that philosophical thesis is given voice here, but so too is the very breadth of philosophy put at stake.

Indeed, had the book consisted of nothing other than accenting Bergson's own rethinking of philosophical principles - including and especially the critique of concepts like 'possibility', 'generality', and 'the negative' that lie at its heart - Bergsonism would have earned its price of admission multiple times over. But of course, you get all that and a nice study of Bergson's other ideas to go along with it too. So while it's true that Bergsonism is a relatively slim and breezy study - perhaps too slim and breezy, given the depth of its concerns - there's no accusing it superficiality. And although I wouldn't recommend this book for newcomers to Bergson - it moves too quick for that, I think - there's reward aplenty for those looking to get a better handle on one of the twentieth century's most intriguing and controversial thinkers.

[George · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great little entry in Deleuze's project of reading the history of philosophy, arriving here at a French philosopher not that far away from his own period. Deleuze seems maybe more faithful to Bergson's project, has to stretch it less to make it fit his own, than some of his other subjects. Chapter 5 offers what is most clearly an exposition of Deleuze's own philosophy of difference in a Bergsonian language, while chapters 1 to 4 run through the problem of intuition, multiplicity, and duration in order to set up that exposition. There are lots of interesting little moments, like a paragraph in chapter 4 in which Deleuze squeezes in an exposition and critique of Einstein's theory of relativity (something that Bergson devoted quite a bit more time to and has not quite been appreciated for – as Deleuze points out in chapter 5, Bergson wasn't trying to correct Einstein or offer a philosopher's takedown of science, but rather he was trying to give Einstein the metaphysics that his system required in order to function) and a section in chapter 5 where Deleuze talks about evolution and speciation as one biological example of the process of actualisation (specifically, convergent evolution seems to teach something about the specific virtual status of the problems that animal and vegetable forms incarnate and solve, always and repeatedly on their own terms). This biological slant is a key but subtle insight of the whole book and links it nicely to chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition. Deleuze really seems to be trying to grapple with the tremendous metaphysical consequences of molecular biology coming into existence as a discipline; it's more than a metaphorical aid to his philosophical exposition here (unlike, some might say, his use of calculus elsewhere). I recommend as a companion piece the more accessible but still substantial essay by Deleuze collected in Desert Islands called "Bergson's Concept of Difference," and also this book seems like it works even better if you've actually read Matter and Memory or Creative Evolution beforehand rather than after.

[Alexander Smith · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a great read to pick up if you have just read some of Bergson. It puts some perspective on why what he was saying was monumental, and it further situates Deleuze's work in a more earnest way than a lot of other books Deleuze wrote about other philosophers.

Deleuze offers a lot of books in ways that births monstrosities of the philosophers he interprets, but here, I would not say that's exactly the case. Here it seems that Deleuze offers a particular interpretation of Bergson that simply disagrees with Bergson by taking advantage of an ambiguity in Bergsonian thought. Specifically, Deleuze points out that Bergsons' later works are not so quick to avoid differences in degree for differences in kind, and he offers a particular solution to this issue by schematizing Bergson in a particular way. While I like Deleuze's interpretation, and the work that this book offers in explaining Deleuze's own philosophy to his mentor, one who studies Bergson might easily say that Deleuze has stretched Bergson's intentions and assumptions for a personal need to explain an ambiguity in Deleuze's use of Bergson's work.

So, in total, I think this book is a great bridge between Deleuze and Bergson which enables me to connect aspects of Bergsonian duration to Deleuze in a way that is more well developed. This is not a through introduction to Bergson. This is a particularly personal interpretation for Deleuze's personal exposition.

[Andrew]

I used to read a lot of Deleuze, but I hadn't in years, and I'm reminded of everything that attracted me about him-- his ability to needle your thoughts, provoke you out of an intellectual slumber-- as well as what repulsed me, namely his blunt and willing obscurantism. I'm afraid I haven't read enough of Bergson, and what I did read was ages ago, to make a serious judgment on Deleuze's analysis, but I think I should perhaps read a bit more of both writers again.

[Shulamith Farhi · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting reflections on memory and virtuality. I'm planning to follow up on the discussions of story-telling and paramnesia.

***

Take two. Adding two stars. A lifechanging book. Sure it's vitalist and affirmationist, but it's witty, fun and offers a useful recipe for making sure one's evolution continues to be creative. Especially good for helping nerds get out of their heads and into their bodies.

[Steven Peck · Rating 4 out of 5]

I had hoped that reading one French philosopher's take on another French philosopher would cancel out the obscurity, but it appears to have compounded it. I knew more about Bergson before reading this. I jest. This was an important work that helped me understand both Bergson and Deleuze a little better. Especially in regards to the virtual/Actual vs. potential/real.

[Sara-Maria · Rating 4 out of 5]

bergson say what?

[Frank Spencer · Rating 3 out of 5]

Deleuze, Lacan, and writers of that category are really hard for me to understand.

[in8 · Rating 4 out of 5]

thougts so far: http://www.5cense.com/16/485.htm

[Bernardo Moreira · Rating 4 out of 5]

Li esse livro logo após terminar o Ensaio dos Dados Imediatos da Consciência de Bergson.
Deleuze apresenta um comentário (se é que essa brilhante análise pode ser reduzida a um mero comentário) que articula diferentes momentos da obra de Bergson para pensar a filosofia da diferença. Com capítulos "temáticos" (mas que tratam todos as mesmas questões sob óticas diferentes), Deleuze busca encontrar na obra de Bergson uma filosofia da diferença que contraponha a contradição, a identidade, o negativo. E sucede, é claro.
O melhor momento do livro é a discussão sobre o monismo e o dualismo em Bergson, articulando os temas da multiplicidade qualitativa, da duração, da diferença, do tempo, do uno, da extensão e da matéria. A conclusão de Deleuze é interessantíssima, observando diferentes aspectos nos escritos de Bergson que sustentam monismos, dualismos e pluralismos que não entram em contradição. A pergunta se orienta para diferenças de grau e diferenças de natureza, distenções e contrações. "... há tão somente um tempo (monismo), embora haja uma infinidade de fluxos atuais (pluralismo generalizado) que participam necessariamente do mesmo todo virtual (pluralismo restrito)."
"... não só as multiplicidades virtuais implicam um só tempo, como a duração, como multiplicidade virtual, é esse único e mesmo Tempo."
O que fica com mais força para mim é: partindo virtual ao atual em sua diferenciação e diferençação podemos contrapor o paradigma da gênese, do germe, do possível ao real (post-festum); aqui encontramos uma fundamentação teórica para podermos falar do encontro e da contingência, como em Althusser no materialismo aleatório.

[Milo Galiano · Rating 3 out of 5]

Me ha servido muchísimo para aclarar enormes problemas que tenía con Bergson, pero sobre todo con los términos de virtualidad y actualidad. Este libro, sin embargo, atraviesa muchos temas, todos ellos (sospecho que) con una intención de salvar a Bergson después de casi medio siglo en el que nadie tuvo en cuenta su pensamiento por la irrupción einsteiniana en la academia.

Encuentro muchos puntos importantísimos, como son los juegos con los binomios bergsonianos, la influencia platónica que encontramos en Bergson y, por supuesto, la configuración de la Duración a través de los mecanismos de Diferenciación propios de la naturaleza. Todo ello me parece muy interesante y, a grandes rasgos, podría decir que comulgo con muchos de estos planteamientos, pero no he podido parar de pensar que Deleuze se encuentra atravesadísimo por una lectura un poco extraña de Kant, de la que él mismo reniega pocos años más tarde, que encontramos en «La filosofía crítica de Kant». Sin embargo, ese libro no me lo he leído aún, así que esto es mera suposición hueca.

[Ermina · Rating 2 out of 5]

Nakon male pauze, vratila sam se knjigama. Nažalost, trenutno čitam ne toliko zanimljivo štivo i Bergsonova filozofija mi nije pomogla. Ima ovdje zanimljivih teza, ali, ili Delez piše dosadnjikavo (što nije čudo) ili je prijevod loš, ili me ova vrsta literature ne fascinira onoliko koliko očekujem, čim je se prihvatim.

[Chant · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bergson through the lens of Deleuze. Not bad! I'm actually surprised that I enjoyed this book as much as I did!

[Søren K. Dick · Rating 4 out of 5]

Intuition is key

[Gustavo Morales · Rating 5 out of 5]

Nadie me engañó con este libro

[Juane Pizarro]

Entendí dos capítulos y medio, los siguientes dos capítulos y medio fueron sufrimiento incomprensible 👍

[Matei Borangic · Rating 5 out of 5]

Amazing companion to Bergson's philosphy. It very well summarizes the whole book + Bergson through the last paragraph of the book.