Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) is, by far, the most celebrated military theorist, whose prestige has reached new heights. However, this book argues that his reputation has been largely inflated because of the notorious difficulties of understanding his major book, On War (1832). Many of Clausewitz's interpreters, struggling to make sense of his work, have not admitted - to themselves no less than to their readers - that they did not quite figure it out. Hence, ‘the emperor's new clothes.' Returning to the subject in an updated and expanded form after 35 years, the pre-eminent Clausewitz scholar Azar Gat lays out Clausewitz's real intellectual background and the actual development of his ideas on war and its conduct. The Clausewitz Myth makes sense of Clausewitz's train of thought, removing the veils of mystification and idolization surrounding it to clearly explain what the man and his work were about. Thereby the real Clausewitz, with both his significant contributions and his major errors in the field of military theory, replaces the current interpreters' myth of ‘Clausewitz the absolute.' An indispensable book for every student of war, military theory, and strategy.
A fascinating and challenging read. In essence, Gat argues that Clausewitz experienced a crisis in his thinking in 1827, when he realised that his central belief, that war was inherently absolute, did not accord with the reality that most wars were in fact limited. This led him to the conclusion that war is the continuation of politics by other means, with political objectives therefore constraining war’s natural absolute violence. As Gat observes, this understanding was in fact commonplace since antiquity and it was only the extreme violence of the Napoleonic wars that had obscured it. Beyond this, Gat argues that many of Clausewitz’s arguments are flawed, especially his assumption that the defence is the stronger form of action.
The book is very readable, despite its exploration of intellectual trends and of Clausewitz’s personal intellectual journey. The points are made clearly and convincingly, and supported by straightforward end notes.
No doubt many will disagree with Gat’s arguments and conclusions. But the central point is that we should treat Clausewitz, like any other author, as a fallible human being, whose thought develops over time and which has flaws as well as flashes of deep insight. In particular, exploring Clausewitz in the context of his own times, rather than extracting him into some sort of floating timelessness, offers greater chance of understanding what he actually thought. For me, the deeper awareness of the development and weaknesses in Clausewitz’s thought merely increases its value. This is no divinely inspired text, to be taken on trust, but the work of a reflective and experienced professional.
In short, this is a hugely important and valuable contribution by Gat. Recommended to anyone seeking to draw learning from Clausewitz.
I do not claim to be a Clausewitz follower, so I will preface my review by saying I found Gat's arguments convincing, but I don't feel I have the expertise (nor time) to check if they're right.
Having said that, the theory the author lays out makes a lot of sense and seems to provide great explanatory power for why Clausewitz's On War became a classic and is difficult to understand. That is, Clausewitz changed his conception of war, started rewriting the book, but died before he had a chance to completely rewrite his book. There is also the fact that he picked up the idea of a Hegelian dialectic around the end of his life that he started to implement in the book to resolve his change of mind (but again, he didn't finish rewriting all of On War.)
Gat's explanation of Clausewitz's times and the new records of Clausewitz's evolving thoughts because of new Clausewitz material all seem to back up his interpretation.
Gat is a clear and lucid writer, and so I recommend the book for any that have an interest in Clausewitz or simply have enjoyed Gat's other works. At the very least, it will equip you with a new understanding and appreciation for the history of war theory around Clausewitz's lifetime.
A main problem with Gat’s book, which is a mystery to the reader, is how so many excellent scientists from renowned universities all over the world over a long period of time could have made such fundamental mistakes? Which, cf. Gat, they must have done. They have simply been blinded by the complicated structure of Clausewitz’s main work, Gat believes. Gat also claims, in an attempt to discredit the war theorist, that Clausewitz did not invent the theses on the relationship between politics and war. Most Clausewitz experts probably know this, but “no man is an island”, and of course Clausewitz stands on the shoulders of previous thinkers who have dealt with war and its theory. However, he has done it concisely and convincingly, like few before him, and for that alone he should be credited. It is simply bordering on scientific dishonesty not to discuss in his book the extensive analyses available from other sources that the nature of war, the relationship between defense and offense, the origin and development over time of Clausewitz’s theory of war, and the many other problems that Gat cites have never been thoroughly addressed by Clausewitz’s supporters. Gat neglects and makes the lack of research in these areas the main reason why Clausewitz, in his opinion, has been misunderstood and misinterpreted over the past 200 years.