Lyndon Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam

by Larry Berman

Lyndon Johnson's war focuses on the repercussions from President Johnson's failure to address the fundamental incompatibility between his political objectives at home and his military objectives in Vietnam.

Genres: History

254 pages, Hardcover

First published April 1, 1989

About the author

Larry Berman (PhD, Princeton) is Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Davis, and founding Dean of the Georgia State Honors College.

His books include Zumwalt: The Life and Times of Admiral Elmo Russell "Bud" Zumwalt Jr. (2012), Perfect Spy: The incredible Double Life of Pham Xuan An (2007), No Peace, No Honor (2001), Lyndon Johnson War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (1989), and Planning A Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (1982). Berman is currently researching for his next book, A Slow Walk with Death: The Lingering Effects of Agent Orange.

Reviews

[Brett C · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is the follow-up to Larry Berman's first Vietnam-LBJ narrative, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam

This narrative demonstrated the numerous errors in judgement by LBJ, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Commander, US Military Assistant Command Vietnam (MACV) General William Westmoreland, and other significant figures (Secretary of State, Dean Rusk; National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy; Chairman of the JCS, General Earle Wheeler).

The full-blown launching of combat operations in July 1965 slowly slipped into a stalemate. Berman did an outstanding job of explaining conflicting demands and judgments: McNamara's want for troop stabilization and Vietnamization-pacification, General Westmoreland's ever demand for troop strength increase, the bombing campaign of Operation Rolling Thunder, and looming pressure of the JCS "getting results" for LBJ and Congress.

The U.S. objective in Vietnam was the independence of South Vietnam, its freedom from attack, and a stable democratic government in the South. By denying the communists a military victory, the United States believed it could create conditions under which negotiations would be viable, but Hanoi saw Vietnam as a single country that had been split artificially by neo-colonialist intervention. The revolutionary Viet Cong believed it had an obligation to free South Vietnam from foreign intervention, while the United States believed the Vietnam War was a case of one country trying to conquer another country, covered by our treaty guarantee. LBJ's policy was slowly slipping in the war into a stalemate. Yet even as the president became evident, he refused to abandon his no-win policy. President Johnson would soon learn, as Hanoi's leaders well understood, that a stalemate would undermine a democracy faster than a communist regime. A free press, the legitimacy of political opposition, and an attentive citizenry forced Johnson to exaggerate rates of progress and lights at the ends of tunnels, in order to keep the war going, operating under restraints imposed by the president, the military commanders recognized that Vietnam could be a long war. Hanoi could accept the conditions of a stalemate longer than the United States. Stalemate was tantamount to victory for Hanoi. (pg 25)

By October 1966 into early 1967, it was clear the war was leading a slippery slope to stalemate. Intelligence reports, conflicting field reports of casualties, and the pressures of fluctuating Viet Cong & North Vietnamese Army troop strength & offensive operations consistently clouded the positive outlook of winning the war.

The July 1965 decision to Americanize the war had apparently eroded whatever incentives the South Vietnamese people may have held to help themselves. Opponents of escalation believed that the additional forces being requested by Westmoreland would not solve pacification problems; nor would they slow the horse carrying U.S. public opinion towards rejecting the war. Additional forces were not needed for military security and could not control the rate of attrition. No one could show what 200,000 more American troops would accomplish beyond increasing the enemy's weekly losses by 400 a week. pg 37

The year 1967 showed increase in troop strength & further escalation of combat gave the deception of making progress through General Westmoreland's "war of attrition" and search-and-destroy ground doctrine.

The surprise Tet Offensive of January 1968 proved otherwise: a tactical military defeat for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces but was the turning point for LBJ and the American people. By March 1968, the Gallup poll reported that 49 per cent of the American population believed that the United States was wrong to have gotten involved militarily in Vietnam. (pg 202)

Lyndon Johnson chose to Americanize the war in July 1965; he chose to accept General Westmoreland's attrition strategy; he chose not to mobilize his country for war; he chose and encouraged others to paint optimistic scenarios for the American public; he chose to hide the anticipated enemy buildup prior to Tet, because in an election year he had hoped for a military miracle—perhaps Westmoreland could turn the tide when the enemy began its final desperate assault.

It was left to Clark Clifford as Secretary of Defense to convince Johnson that Vietnam had become a sinkhole. The irony was that Secretary McNamara had been banished from the administration for the same advice. George Ball had been listened to but not heard. Johnson's decision to remove himself from the [Presidential reelection] race presented the ultimate recognition that the Vietnam War had become interwoven with his personality and his presidency. "I shall not accept" was the president's admission that Vietnam had become against his every desire Lyndon Johnson's War.

Larry Berman's two narratives about the Vietnam War under the LBJ administration are superb. They're to the point, well-written, well-researched, and worth the read. In both books, I learned a great deal. I would highly recommend both books. Thanks!

[Liz · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting read looking at the dialogue between Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War. It was interesting to note how Johnson perceived this war during his presidency, and after everything realized how much of a mistake it was. For an academic read it was certainly engaging.

[Billy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Larry Berman argued in 1989s Lyndon Johnson’s War that LBJ personally kept the war going, because he feared the political backlash at home if he abandoned the cause.

[Reza Amiri Praramadhan · Rating 4 out of 5]

The lesson learned from the book is clear: never, I repeat, never try to focus on two issues on the same time, especially in nation-ruling-scale. Lyndon B. Johnson, tried with his Gun-and-Butter Policy which put the commitment on Vietnam War and Great Society on same time. If only he focused on only one project at a time, he would be remembered in a different light. However, fate is a cruel mistress.

[Tom Nolan]

paperback 6x9