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Russia and the New World Disorder
The Russian annexation of Crimea was one of the great strategic shocks of the past twenty-five years. For many in the West, Moscow's actions in early 2014 marked the end of illusions about cooperation, and the return to geopolitical and ideological confrontation. Russia, for so long a peripheral presence, had become the central actor in a new global drama. In this groundbreaking book, renowned scholar Bobo Lo analyzes the broader context of the crisis by examining the interplay between Russian foreign policy and an increasingly anarchic international environment. He argues that Moscow's approach to regional and global affairs reflects the tension between two very different worlds—the perceptual and the actual. The Kremlin highlights the decline of the West, a resurgent Russia, and the emergence of a new multipolar order. But this idealized view is contradicted by a world disorder that challenges core assumptions about the dominance of great powers and the utility of military might. Its lesson is that only those states that embrace change will prosper in the twenty-first century. A Russia able to redefine itself as a modern power would exert a critical influence in many areas of international politics. But a Russia that rests on an outdated sense of entitlement may end up instead as one of the principal casualties of global transformation.
336 pages, Hardcover
First published July 31, 2014
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January 27, 2025
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Хотя по многим позициям я с автором этой книги согласен, однако в книге присутствуют детали, которые могу говорить в пользу того, что автор просто использует превалирующую точку зрения на Западе в отношении России, которую он переписывает на свой лад.
The most existential fear is that of losing sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is a natural reaction to having been subject to repeated invasion: the Mongol onslaught in the thirteenth century, followed by three centuries of occupation (the “Mongol yoke”), Napoleon’s invasion in 1812, and Hitler’s devastating offensive in June 1941 and the ravaging of vast tracts of the western Soviet Union. At other times Russia has been attacked and occupied by Poles, Swedes, Turks, and Persians.
<...>
Although there were justified fears on these counts, for Putin and his associates— and many ordinary Russians— the real disaster was the transformation of the world’s second superpower into an impotent also-ran.
<...>
In foreign affairs the “new Russia” was reduced to the status of supplicant to the West— constantly scrabbling around for money, while being endlessly criticized and patronized. Mean-while, NATO expanded into areas that Moscow had controlled for decades.
Откуда англоязычные авторы берут весь этот бред? Не, ну правда, кто им всё это говорит? Такое чувство, что сами иностранцы это придумывают, а потом верят в то, что сами придумали. Если и есть какой-то страх, то это страх экспансии Китая, а не экспансии Польши или Прибалтийских стран (в сторону РФ). И как быть с тем фактом, что богатые русские покупают недвижимость в странах этого самого НАТО, если они его так бояться? В общем, бред какой-то.
Ну и конечно не обошлось без Сталина, которого якобы вся Россия носит на руках.
Many Russians credit him with establishing the Soviet Union as a global power and developed industrial society. They hold him up as the great leader who crushed Nazi Germany and saved the Motherland. And they view him as the ideal of the strong ruler, harsh certainly, but the only possible kind for a country that would otherwise descend into chaos and be picked off by foreign powers.
Хотя я и не отрицаю популярность Сталина в некоторых группах россиян, я бы не стал утверждать, что многие россияне считают его великим лидером. К примеру, на Северном Кавказе к Сталину совсем другое отношение. Да и в целом, в крупных городах его видят скорее как красного диктатора, а не как спасителя отечества. В России "слава" Сталина объясняется главным образом несправедливостью ельцинско-путинской власти, поэтому ещё в 90-ые годы люди любили говорить "Сталина на вас нет" имея в виду, что Сталин бы всех этих жуликов и воров поставил бы к стенке и расстрелял бы. Сталин умел создавать видимость «народного» не коррупционного лидера (в реальности Сталин жил очень и очень, т.е. он себе ни в чём не отказывал), но он был самым кровавым диктатором в истории России, погубивший больше всего русских. Тут есть одна проблема, которую многие иностранцы не могут понять: нынешняя Россия не способна или, вернее, не готова дать оценку своему коммунистическому прошлому. С одной стороны, россиянами манипулирует правящая элита, но с другой, сами россияне не знают где искать справедливость и управы на российский чиновнический аппарат который душит Россию. Вот поэтому некоторые граждане России и обращаются к таким радикалам как Сталин и Ленин (которые, как правильно отмечает книга «Номенклатура», и были создателями той политической системы, которая существует в России даже сегодня). Если построить в России полноценную и реальную демократию, тогда все эти сталины и ленины отправятся на помойку истории. В данном случаи можно вспомнить историю ФРГ, в которой до 70-ых годов был популярен Гитлер. Так что на поддержку Сталина не стоит смотреть как на реальную поддержку сталинского политического режима и отсутствие политической поддержки КПРФ это отлично показывает (КПРФ не были всегда такими клоунами, какими они стали сегодня).
However, Putin recognized that a compliant approach toward regime change in Kyiv could have critical consequences for his own popularity and credibility. He felt he needed to reaffirm that he was strong, that Russia was very much a great power, and that the West could not take liberties at its (and his) expense.
Опять же, я согласен с тем, что политическая потеря Украины могла выставить Путина в глазах россиян как слабого политика, т.е. Путин бы превратился в глазах россиян в Ельцина 2.0.
In this he acts on the presumption that Russians are well used to enduring great hardship and making huge sacrifices, but will never forgive weakness in those who rule them.
Но вот дальше опять идёт очень странная фраза. Откуда автор это решил? За три года войны я что-то не заметил, что россияне согласны терпеть лишения, лишь бы не показаться слабыми. Как раз всё обстоит в точности на оборот, ибо, чем дольше тянутся боевые действия, тем больше россиян за мир без предварительных условий даже в таких провластных социологических опросах какие сегодня только и проводятся в РФ. Так что тут автор полностью ошибается. Комфорт и финансовое благополучие у россиян стоят выше, чем имперские завоевания и даже "политическая слабость". Если автор имеет в виду Ельцина, при котором Россия была слабая, из-за чего народ его ненавидел, то тогда автор просто не понял, что определяющим были не уступки Ельцина НАТО, а бандитизм, нищета и всеобщая коррупция. Однако если принять эту точку зрения, тогда разрушится вся конструкция «России как империя», т.е. что Россия не может существовать, не проводя имперскую политику. Это утверждение ложное, но для многих западных аналитиков оно хоть и ложное, но очень удобное, ибо очень просто объясняет логику Путина. Но я повторю: это ложное утверждение. Путина интересует только одно - его власть над страной. Построение империи его не интересует вообще, ибо в противном случаи Украина была бы целиком в составе России, как это показал опыт подавления волнений во времена существования СССР, который как раз и был империей и действительно проводил имперскую политику. Так что не нужно льстить Путину и оскорблять само понятие империи.
So far, however, this discontent has been limited to domestic affairs. The Russian population has shown little interest in foreign policy, and has sup-ported the Kremlin in any case. It enthusiastically approved the annexation of Crimea, and has been highly receptive to Putin’s account of developments in eastern Ukraine and relations with the West. More generally it buys into the official narrative of a wronged Russia. A 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 73 percent of respondents believed that Russia deserved more respect from “other countries,” in other words the West. Subsequent Western sanctions have only strengthened such sentiments.
<...>
These are not game- changers— at least not yet— but buttress an already strong institutional and philosophical conservatism within the Putin elite.
Автор как будто не понимает, что в России, начиная с 1996 года, российская власть не спрашивает у народа, какую политику хочет видеть российский народ (конечно, полностью идти против мнения народа власть тоже не может, поэтому тут очень специфические отношения). А вот если спросить российский народ, что он на самом деле желает, то можно обнаружить что большинство желает построение сильной экономики, инвестиции в здравоохранение, инфраструктуру, науку, образование, а не инвестиции в "традиционные ценности" и антизападную риторику и экспансионизм. Россияне хотят путешествовать по миру, а не сидеть в окопах Донбасса. По мне, это очевидно, но почему таких простых вещей не понимает автор, мне не понятно. Хотя автор видит, как ведут себя очень богатые русские, которые скупают недвижимость в Майями.
Я остановился на теме русского национализма, ибо это стало последней каплей, после которой я посчитал, что такую мутатень я просто не могу дальше читать.
Official nationalism has acquired a more aggressive dimension that goes beyond the usual reiteration of Russia’s “rights” in the international system.
This raises the specter of territorial revisions on the basis of concepts such as Novorossiya (“New Russia”), and arrogates to Moscow the right to intervene forcibly on behalf of expatriate Russians, especially those living in the post-Soviet neighborhood. The ongoing Ukraine crisis has highlighted this new strain.
<...>
The government has from time to time tolerated ultra-nationalist violence, particularly when perpetrated against “people of Caucasian nationality” —Chechens, Ingush, Dagestanis, and others.
Прежде чем рассуждать на тему русского национализма неплохо ознакомится с этим самым русским национализмом, к примеру, прочитав книгу «Кровь и почва русской истории». Путин проводит самую антирусскую политику, какую только можно проводить. Более антирусскую политику проводили только Советы, ибо именно на костях русских людей и был воздвигнут этот исполин на глиняных ногах под названием СССР (см. книгу «Кровь и почва русской истории»). Первый с кем Путин начал бороться были как раз русские националисты, лидеры которых прошли через репрессии и тюрьму. Думаю, это объяснялось тем, что Путин увидел в Оранжевой революции, что именно националисты и стали тем ледоколом, которым сломали режим.
Although I agree with the author of this book on many points, there are details in the book that might suggest that the author is simply using the prevailing viewpoint in the West regarding Russia, which he is rewriting to his own liking.
The most existential fear is that of losing sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is a natural reaction to having been subject to repeated invasion: the Mongol onslaught in the thirteenth century, followed by three centuries of occupation (the “Mongol yoke”), Napoleon’s invasion in 1812, and Hitler’s devastating offensive in June 1941 and the ravaging of vast tracts of the western Soviet Union. At other times Russia has been attacked and occupied by Poles, Swedes, Turks, and Persians.
<...>
Although there were justified fears on these counts, for Putin and his associates— and many ordinary Russians— the real disaster was the transformation of the world’s second superpower into an impotent also-ran.
<...>
In foreign affairs the “new Russia” was reduced to the status of supplicant to the West— constantly scrabbling around for money, while being endlessly criticized and patronized. Mean-while, NATO expanded into areas that Moscow had controlled for decades.
Where do English-speaking authors get all this nonsense from? No, really, who tells them all this? It feels like the foreigners themselves are making it up and then believing what they made up. If there is any fear, it is the fear of China's expansion, not the expansion of Poland or the Baltic states (towards Russia). And what about the fact that rich Russians buy real estate in the countries of this very NATO if they are so afraid of it? In general, it's nonsense.
And of course, it did not do without Stalin, whom, allegedly all Russia carries on its hands.
Many Russians credit him with establishing the Soviet Union as a global power and developed industrial society. They hold him up as the great leader who crushed Nazi Germany and saved the Motherland. And they view him as the ideal of the strong ruler, harsh certainly, but the only possible kind for a country that would otherwise descend into chaos and be picked off by foreign powers.
While I do not deny Stalin's popularity among some groups of Russians, I would not say that many Russians consider him a great leader. For example, in the North Caucasus, Stalin is viewed quite differently. And in general, in large cities, he is seen more as a red dictator than as the savior of the fatherland. In Russia, Stalin's “fame” is mainly due to the injustice of the Yeltsin-Putin government, so back in the 90s, people liked to say “Stalin is not on you!”, meaning that Stalin would have put all those crooks and thieves against the wall and shot them. Stalin was able to create the appearance of a “popular” non-corrupt leader, but he was the bloodiest dictator in the history of Russia, who killed the most Russians. There is one problem that many foreigners cannot understand: today's Russia is not able or, rather, not ready to evaluate its communist past. On the one hand, Russians are manipulated by the ruling elite, on the other hand, Russians themselves do not know where to look for justice and control of the Russian bureaucratic apparatus that strangles Russia. That is why some Russian citizens turn to such radicals as Stalin and Lenin (who, as the book “Nomenklatura” correctly points out, were the creators of the political system that exists in Russia even today). If we build a full-fledged and real democracy in Russia, then all these Stalinists and Lenins will go to the dustbin of history. In this case, we can recall the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, in which Hitler was popular until the 70s. So support for Stalin should not be looked at as real support for the Stalinist political regime and the lack of political support for the CPRF shows this perfectly (the CPRF were not always the clowns they have become today).
However, Putin recognized that a compliant approach toward regime change in Kyiv could have critical consequences for his own popularity and credibility. He felt he needed to reaffirm that he was strong, that Russia was very much a great power, and that the West could not take liberties at its (and his) expense.
Again, I agree that the political loss of Ukraine could have made Putin look like a weak politician in the eyes of Russians, i.e. Putin would have turned into Yeltsin 2.0 in the eyes of Russians.
In this he acts on the presumption that Russians are well used to enduring great hardship and making huge sacrifices, but will never forgive weakness in those who rule them.
But here comes a very strange phrase again. Where did the author get this idea from? In three years of war, I have not noticed that Russians agree to endure hardship as long as they do not appear weak. Everything is exactly the opposite, because the longer the hostilities last, the more Russians are in favor of peace without preconditions, even in such pro-government sociological polls as are only conducted in Russia today. So the author is completely wrong here. Russians value comfort and financial well-being above imperial conquests and even “political weakness”. If the author means Yeltsin, under whom Russia was weak, because of which the people hated him, then the author simply did not realize that the determining factor was not Yeltsin's concessions to NATO, but banditry, poverty and general corruption. However, if one accepts this point of view, then the whole construct of “Russia as an empire” is destroyed, i.e. that Russia cannot exist without pursuing an imperial policy. This statement is false, but for many Western analysts, although it is false it is very convenient because it explains Putin's logic in a very simple way. But I repeat: it is a false statement. Putin is only interested in one thing - his power over the country. He is not interested in empire building at all, because otherwise Ukraine would be entirely part of Russia, as the experience of suppressing unrest during the existence of the USSR, which was an empire and really pursued an imperial policy, has shown. So there is no need to flatter Putin and insult the very concept of empire.
So far, however, this discontent has been limited to domestic affairs. The Russian population has shown little interest in foreign policy, and has sup-ported the Kremlin in any case. It enthusiastically approved the annexation of Crimea, and has been highly receptive to Putin’s account of developments in eastern Ukraine and relations with the West. More generally it buys into the official narrative of a wronged Russia. A 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 73 percent of respondents believed that Russia deserved more respect from “other countries,” in other words the West. Subsequent Western sanctions have only strengthened such sentiments.
<...>
These are not game- changers— at least not yet— but buttress an already strong institutional and philosophical conservatism within the Putin elite.
It is as if the author does not realize that in Russia, since 1996, the Russian authorities have not asked the people what kind of policy the Russian people want to see (of course, the authorities cannot go completely against the opinion of the people either, so there is a very specific relationship here). But if you ask the Russian people what they really want, you will find that most of them want to build a strong economy, invest in health care, infrastructure, science, and education, and not invest in “traditional values” and anti-Western rhetoric and expansionism. Russians want to travel the world, not sit in the trenches of Donbass. To me, this is obvious, but why such simple things the author does not understand, I do not understand. The author also sees how very rich Russians who buy real estate in Miami behave.
I stopped on the topic of Russian nationalism, for it was the last straw, after which I considered that such rubbish I simply cannot read further.
Official nationalism has acquired a more aggressive dimension that goes beyond the usual reiteration of Russia’s “rights” in the international system.
This raises the specter of territorial revisions on the basis of concepts such as Novorossiya (“New Russia”), and arrogates to Moscow the right to intervene forcibly on behalf of expatriate Russians, especially those living in the post-Soviet neighborhood. The ongoing Ukraine crisis has highlighted this new strain.
<...>
The government has from time to time tolerated ultra-nationalist violence, particularly when perpetrated against “people of Caucasian nationality” —Chechens, Ingush, Dagestanis, and others.
Before discussing Russian nationalism it is sound to familiarize yourself with this very Russian nationalism, for example, by reading the book “The Blood and Soil of Russian History”. Putin is pursuing the most anti-Russian policy that can be pursued. Only the Soviets pursued a more anti-Russian policy, for it was on the bones of the Russian people that this giant on clay feet called the USSR was erected (you can read more in detail in the book “The Blood and Soil of Russian History”). The first people Putin started to fight were Russian nationalists, whose leaders had gone through repression and prison. I think it was because Putin saw in the Orange Revolution that the nationalists were the icebreaker that broke the regime.
Хотя по многим позициям я с автором этой книги согласен, однако в книге присутствуют детали, которые могу говорить в пользу того, что автор просто использует превалирующую точку зрения на Западе в отношении России, которую он переписывает на свой лад.
The most existential fear is that of losing sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is a natural reaction to having been subject to repeated invasion: the Mongol onslaught in the thirteenth century, followed by three centuries of occupation (the “Mongol yoke”), Napoleon’s invasion in 1812, and Hitler’s devastating offensive in June 1941 and the ravaging of vast tracts of the western Soviet Union. At other times Russia has been attacked and occupied by Poles, Swedes, Turks, and Persians.
<...>
Although there were justified fears on these counts, for Putin and his associates— and many ordinary Russians— the real disaster was the transformation of the world’s second superpower into an impotent also-ran.
<...>
In foreign affairs the “new Russia” was reduced to the status of supplicant to the West— constantly scrabbling around for money, while being endlessly criticized and patronized. Mean-while, NATO expanded into areas that Moscow had controlled for decades.
Откуда англоязычные авторы берут весь этот бред? Не, ну правда, кто им всё это говорит? Такое чувство, что сами иностранцы это придумывают, а потом верят в то, что сами придумали. Если и есть какой-то страх, то это страх экспансии Китая, а не экспансии Польши или Прибалтийских стран (в сторону РФ). И как быть с тем фактом, что богатые русские покупают недвижимость в странах этого самого НАТО, если они его так бояться? В общем, бред какой-то.
Ну и конечно не обошлось без Сталина, которого якобы вся Россия носит на руках.
Many Russians credit him with establishing the Soviet Union as a global power and developed industrial society. They hold him up as the great leader who crushed Nazi Germany and saved the Motherland. And they view him as the ideal of the strong ruler, harsh certainly, but the only possible kind for a country that would otherwise descend into chaos and be picked off by foreign powers.
Хотя я и не отрицаю популярность Сталина в некоторых группах россиян, я бы не стал утверждать, что многие россияне считают его великим лидером. К примеру, на Северном Кавказе к Сталину совсем другое отношение. Да и в целом, в крупных городах его видят скорее как красного диктатора, а не как спасителя отечества. В России "слава" Сталина объясняется главным образом несправедливостью ельцинско-путинской власти, поэтому ещё в 90-ые годы люди любили говорить "Сталина на вас нет" имея в виду, что Сталин бы всех этих жуликов и воров поставил бы к стенке и расстрелял бы. Сталин умел создавать видимость «народного» не коррупционного лидера (в реальности Сталин жил очень и очень, т.е. он себе ни в чём не отказывал), но он был самым кровавым диктатором в истории России, погубивший больше всего русских. Тут есть одна проблема, которую многие иностранцы не могут понять: нынешняя Россия не способна или, вернее, не готова дать оценку своему коммунистическому прошлому. С одной стороны, россиянами манипулирует правящая элита, но с другой, сами россияне не знают где искать справедливость и управы на российский чиновнический аппарат который душит Россию. Вот поэтому некоторые граждане России и обращаются к таким радикалам как Сталин и Ленин (которые, как правильно отмечает книга «Номенклатура», и были создателями той политической системы, которая существует в России даже сегодня). Если построить в России полноценную и реальную демократию, тогда все эти сталины и ленины отправятся на помойку истории. В данном случаи можно вспомнить историю ФРГ, в которой до 70-ых годов был популярен Гитлер. Так что на поддержку Сталина не стоит смотреть как на реальную поддержку сталинского политического режима и отсутствие политической поддержки КПРФ это отлично показывает (КПРФ не были всегда такими клоунами, какими они стали сегодня).
However, Putin recognized that a compliant approach toward regime change in Kyiv could have critical consequences for his own popularity and credibility. He felt he needed to reaffirm that he was strong, that Russia was very much a great power, and that the West could not take liberties at its (and his) expense.
Опять же, я согласен с тем, что политическая потеря Украины могла выставить Путина в глазах россиян как слабого политика, т.е. Путин бы превратился в глазах россиян в Ельцина 2.0.
In this he acts on the presumption that Russians are well used to enduring great hardship and making huge sacrifices, but will never forgive weakness in those who rule them.
Но вот дальше опять идёт очень странная фраза. Откуда автор это решил? За три года войны я что-то не заметил, что россияне согласны терпеть лишения, лишь бы не показаться слабыми. Как раз всё обстоит в точности на оборот, ибо, чем дольше тянутся боевые действия, тем больше россиян за мир без предварительных условий даже в таких провластных социологических опросах какие сегодня только и проводятся в РФ. Так что тут автор полностью ошибается. Комфорт и финансовое благополучие у россиян стоят выше, чем имперские завоевания и даже "политическая слабость". Если автор имеет в виду Ельцина, при котором Россия была слабая, из-за чего народ его ненавидел, то тогда автор просто не понял, что определяющим были не уступки Ельцина НАТО, а бандитизм, нищета и всеобщая коррупция. Однако если принять эту точку зрения, тогда разрушится вся конструкция «России как империя», т.е. что Россия не может существовать, не проводя имперскую политику. Это утверждение ложное, но для многих западных аналитиков оно хоть и ложное, но очень удобное, ибо очень просто объясняет логику Путина. Но я повторю: это ложное утверждение. Путина интересует только одно - его власть над страной. Построение империи его не интересует вообще, ибо в противном случаи Украина была бы целиком в составе России, как это показал опыт подавления волнений во времена существования СССР, который как раз и был империей и действительно проводил имперскую политику. Так что не нужно льстить Путину и оскорблять само понятие империи.
So far, however, this discontent has been limited to domestic affairs. The Russian population has shown little interest in foreign policy, and has sup-ported the Kremlin in any case. It enthusiastically approved the annexation of Crimea, and has been highly receptive to Putin’s account of developments in eastern Ukraine and relations with the West. More generally it buys into the official narrative of a wronged Russia. A 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 73 percent of respondents believed that Russia deserved more respect from “other countries,” in other words the West. Subsequent Western sanctions have only strengthened such sentiments.
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These are not game- changers— at least not yet— but buttress an already strong institutional and philosophical conservatism within the Putin elite.
Автор как будто не понимает, что в России, начиная с 1996 года, российская власть не спрашивает у народа, какую политику хочет видеть российский народ (конечно, полностью идти против мнения народа власть тоже не может, поэтому тут очень специфические отношения). А вот если спросить российский народ, что он на самом деле желает, то можно обнаружить что большинство желает построение сильной экономики, инвестиции в здравоохранение, инфраструктуру, науку, образование, а не инвестиции в "традиционные ценности" и антизападную риторику и экспансионизм. Россияне хотят путешествовать по миру, а не сидеть в окопах Донбасса. По мне, это очевидно, но почему таких простых вещей не понимает автор, мне не понятно. Хотя автор видит, как ведут себя очень богатые русские, которые скупают недвижимость в Майями.
Я остановился на теме русского национализма, ибо это стало последней каплей, после которой я посчитал, что такую мутатень я просто не могу дальше читать.
Official nationalism has acquired a more aggressive dimension that goes beyond the usual reiteration of Russia’s “rights” in the international system.
This raises the specter of territorial revisions on the basis of concepts such as Novorossiya (“New Russia”), and arrogates to Moscow the right to intervene forcibly on behalf of expatriate Russians, especially those living in the post-Soviet neighborhood. The ongoing Ukraine crisis has highlighted this new strain.
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The government has from time to time tolerated ultra-nationalist violence, particularly when perpetrated against “people of Caucasian nationality” —Chechens, Ingush, Dagestanis, and others.
Прежде чем рассуждать на тему русского национализма неплохо ознакомится с этим самым русским национализмом, к примеру, прочитав книгу «Кровь и почва русской истории». Путин проводит самую антирусскую политику, какую только можно проводить. Более антирусскую политику проводили только Советы, ибо именно на костях русских людей и был воздвигнут этот исполин на глиняных ногах под названием СССР (см. книгу «Кровь и почва русской истории»). Первый с кем Путин начал бороться были как раз русские националисты, лидеры которых прошли через репрессии и тюрьму. Думаю, это объяснялось тем, что Путин увидел в Оранжевой революции, что именно националисты и стали тем ледоколом, которым сломали режим.
Although I agree with the author of this book on many points, there are details in the book that might suggest that the author is simply using the prevailing viewpoint in the West regarding Russia, which he is rewriting to his own liking.
The most existential fear is that of losing sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is a natural reaction to having been subject to repeated invasion: the Mongol onslaught in the thirteenth century, followed by three centuries of occupation (the “Mongol yoke”), Napoleon’s invasion in 1812, and Hitler’s devastating offensive in June 1941 and the ravaging of vast tracts of the western Soviet Union. At other times Russia has been attacked and occupied by Poles, Swedes, Turks, and Persians.
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Although there were justified fears on these counts, for Putin and his associates— and many ordinary Russians— the real disaster was the transformation of the world’s second superpower into an impotent also-ran.
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In foreign affairs the “new Russia” was reduced to the status of supplicant to the West— constantly scrabbling around for money, while being endlessly criticized and patronized. Mean-while, NATO expanded into areas that Moscow had controlled for decades.
Where do English-speaking authors get all this nonsense from? No, really, who tells them all this? It feels like the foreigners themselves are making it up and then believing what they made up. If there is any fear, it is the fear of China's expansion, not the expansion of Poland or the Baltic states (towards Russia). And what about the fact that rich Russians buy real estate in the countries of this very NATO if they are so afraid of it? In general, it's nonsense.
And of course, it did not do without Stalin, whom, allegedly all Russia carries on its hands.
Many Russians credit him with establishing the Soviet Union as a global power and developed industrial society. They hold him up as the great leader who crushed Nazi Germany and saved the Motherland. And they view him as the ideal of the strong ruler, harsh certainly, but the only possible kind for a country that would otherwise descend into chaos and be picked off by foreign powers.
While I do not deny Stalin's popularity among some groups of Russians, I would not say that many Russians consider him a great leader. For example, in the North Caucasus, Stalin is viewed quite differently. And in general, in large cities, he is seen more as a red dictator than as the savior of the fatherland. In Russia, Stalin's “fame” is mainly due to the injustice of the Yeltsin-Putin government, so back in the 90s, people liked to say “Stalin is not on you!”, meaning that Stalin would have put all those crooks and thieves against the wall and shot them. Stalin was able to create the appearance of a “popular” non-corrupt leader, but he was the bloodiest dictator in the history of Russia, who killed the most Russians. There is one problem that many foreigners cannot understand: today's Russia is not able or, rather, not ready to evaluate its communist past. On the one hand, Russians are manipulated by the ruling elite, on the other hand, Russians themselves do not know where to look for justice and control of the Russian bureaucratic apparatus that strangles Russia. That is why some Russian citizens turn to such radicals as Stalin and Lenin (who, as the book “Nomenklatura” correctly points out, were the creators of the political system that exists in Russia even today). If we build a full-fledged and real democracy in Russia, then all these Stalinists and Lenins will go to the dustbin of history. In this case, we can recall the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, in which Hitler was popular until the 70s. So support for Stalin should not be looked at as real support for the Stalinist political regime and the lack of political support for the CPRF shows this perfectly (the CPRF were not always the clowns they have become today).
However, Putin recognized that a compliant approach toward regime change in Kyiv could have critical consequences for his own popularity and credibility. He felt he needed to reaffirm that he was strong, that Russia was very much a great power, and that the West could not take liberties at its (and his) expense.
Again, I agree that the political loss of Ukraine could have made Putin look like a weak politician in the eyes of Russians, i.e. Putin would have turned into Yeltsin 2.0 in the eyes of Russians.
In this he acts on the presumption that Russians are well used to enduring great hardship and making huge sacrifices, but will never forgive weakness in those who rule them.
But here comes a very strange phrase again. Where did the author get this idea from? In three years of war, I have not noticed that Russians agree to endure hardship as long as they do not appear weak. Everything is exactly the opposite, because the longer the hostilities last, the more Russians are in favor of peace without preconditions, even in such pro-government sociological polls as are only conducted in Russia today. So the author is completely wrong here. Russians value comfort and financial well-being above imperial conquests and even “political weakness”. If the author means Yeltsin, under whom Russia was weak, because of which the people hated him, then the author simply did not realize that the determining factor was not Yeltsin's concessions to NATO, but banditry, poverty and general corruption. However, if one accepts this point of view, then the whole construct of “Russia as an empire” is destroyed, i.e. that Russia cannot exist without pursuing an imperial policy. This statement is false, but for many Western analysts, although it is false it is very convenient because it explains Putin's logic in a very simple way. But I repeat: it is a false statement. Putin is only interested in one thing - his power over the country. He is not interested in empire building at all, because otherwise Ukraine would be entirely part of Russia, as the experience of suppressing unrest during the existence of the USSR, which was an empire and really pursued an imperial policy, has shown. So there is no need to flatter Putin and insult the very concept of empire.
So far, however, this discontent has been limited to domestic affairs. The Russian population has shown little interest in foreign policy, and has sup-ported the Kremlin in any case. It enthusiastically approved the annexation of Crimea, and has been highly receptive to Putin’s account of developments in eastern Ukraine and relations with the West. More generally it buys into the official narrative of a wronged Russia. A 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 73 percent of respondents believed that Russia deserved more respect from “other countries,” in other words the West. Subsequent Western sanctions have only strengthened such sentiments.
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These are not game- changers— at least not yet— but buttress an already strong institutional and philosophical conservatism within the Putin elite.
It is as if the author does not realize that in Russia, since 1996, the Russian authorities have not asked the people what kind of policy the Russian people want to see (of course, the authorities cannot go completely against the opinion of the people either, so there is a very specific relationship here). But if you ask the Russian people what they really want, you will find that most of them want to build a strong economy, invest in health care, infrastructure, science, and education, and not invest in “traditional values” and anti-Western rhetoric and expansionism. Russians want to travel the world, not sit in the trenches of Donbass. To me, this is obvious, but why such simple things the author does not understand, I do not understand. The author also sees how very rich Russians who buy real estate in Miami behave.
I stopped on the topic of Russian nationalism, for it was the last straw, after which I considered that such rubbish I simply cannot read further.
Official nationalism has acquired a more aggressive dimension that goes beyond the usual reiteration of Russia’s “rights” in the international system.
This raises the specter of territorial revisions on the basis of concepts such as Novorossiya (“New Russia”), and arrogates to Moscow the right to intervene forcibly on behalf of expatriate Russians, especially those living in the post-Soviet neighborhood. The ongoing Ukraine crisis has highlighted this new strain.
<...>
The government has from time to time tolerated ultra-nationalist violence, particularly when perpetrated against “people of Caucasian nationality” —Chechens, Ingush, Dagestanis, and others.
Before discussing Russian nationalism it is sound to familiarize yourself with this very Russian nationalism, for example, by reading the book “The Blood and Soil of Russian History”. Putin is pursuing the most anti-Russian policy that can be pursued. Only the Soviets pursued a more anti-Russian policy, for it was on the bones of the Russian people that this giant on clay feet called the USSR was erected (you can read more in detail in the book “The Blood and Soil of Russian History”). The first people Putin started to fight were Russian nationalists, whose leaders had gone through repression and prison. I think it was because Putin saw in the Orange Revolution that the nationalists were the icebreaker that broke the regime.
January 16, 2022
A great book that perfectly captures Russia's complex relationships with other countries. It provides a clearer picture of what Russia wants or, rather, doesn't want. I wish I could have read the book when it appeared, because reading it now feels like some chapters are waiting to be added.
September 30, 2015
This book reads very well but could use some insight from IR theory, to put his historical and cultural analysis into a stronger framework. Lo obviously knows a lot about Russia; I'm just not sure how well his conclusions will hold up over time. I vote for his strong authoritarian model prediction, esp. given the Syrian intervention underway today and Putin's performance at the UN this week. Anyone interested in Russia and interpreting events must read this book, whatever its flaws.
March 24, 2018
Bobo Lo has written an outstanding analytical work that is a sharp take on the drivers of Russian foreign policy. A necessary corrective to the prevailing view that President Putin's Russia has gone from success to success, Russia and the New World Disorder distinguishes between tactical moves and long term strategic trends that are not promising for a Russia that cannot readily adapt to a rapidly changing world. He successfully outlines Moscow's imperial pretensions and inability to acknowledge that the 21st century will be driven by more than great power politics and military might. The conclusion laying out four possibilities for the future was thought provoking.
October 20, 2021
Great book on Russian foreign policy in the contemporary world. Some of the more forward-looking chapters are a bit dated now, but that doesn't take away from the validity of his overall insights and conclusions.
November 18, 2017
systematic but not at all convincing.
May 21, 2023
Good:
a. Could have a quick view of Russia and its foreign policy
Bad:
a. the author is very ambitious to cover as much as he could, as a result, introduction turns vague
a. Could have a quick view of Russia and its foreign policy
Bad:
a. the author is very ambitious to cover as much as he could, as a result, introduction turns vague
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