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The Devil's Birthday: The Bridges to Arnhem 1944
ACE of The Devil's Birthday: The Bridges to Arnhem 1944
Arnhem was the heaviest Allied defeat of 1944 and was the subject of the famous film A Bridge Too Far. Casualties during the battle were appalling; the brave and enduring Dutch people suffered catastrophically in the aftermath and German morale was strengthened at a time of otherwise ebbing fortunes. This new revised edition besides being a superb history is, above all, a record of quite extraordinary courage. It is unlikely to be superseded as the standard work on a bold, gallant, yet doomed, undertaking.
Arnhem was the heaviest Allied defeat of 1944 and was the subject of the famous film A Bridge Too Far. Casualties during the battle were appalling; the brave and enduring Dutch people suffered catastrophically in the aftermath and German morale was strengthened at a time of otherwise ebbing fortunes. This new revised edition besides being a superb history is, above all, a record of quite extraordinary courage. It is unlikely to be superseded as the standard work on a bold, gallant, yet doomed, undertaking.
276 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1984
About the author
Geoffrey S. Powell
11 books5 followersThe author of a number of works on military history, Geoffrey Powell served in the British Army from his initial enlistment as a subaltern in 1939 until his retirement as a colonel in 1965.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
April 16, 2021
Those of us with more than a passing interest in the history of World War II think we know all about Operation Market Garden, the failed attempt by the Allies to end the war in 1944 by an airborne assault through Holland to capture bridges over the Maas and Rhine rivers, skirt the Siegfried Line and enter Germany. We've read the book or seen the movie of A Bridge Too Far, and know that it was the lack of intelligence about the SS divisions in the area, or the lack of radio communication that ruined the chances for success. This book puts those ideas to rights and more.
Geoffrey Powell commanded C company of 156 Parachute Battalion throughout Market Garden and won the Military Cross for his actions there, although you won't find this out by reading The Devil's Birthday. Nor will you find an apologia for what was one of the most vicious battles fought on the Western Front in World War II. What you will find is a clear headed exposition of the action throughout Market Garden, dispelling some myths and pointing to the real reasons the operation failed to achieve all its objectives.
What Powell makes clear is that the lack of time to properly plan such a complex operation cruelled its chances from the start. The Allies had built up a large airborne force, and were always on the lookout for ways to employ it - there had been quite a few operations planned after D-Day, all of which were cancelled as the advance of the Allies quickly overtook planned airborne objectives.
By September 1944 the Germans seemed to be not only on the run, but collapsing as a fighting force. Market Garden was planned to punch a hole in the collapsing lines, skirt around the top end of the Siegfried Line, cut off the Ruhr from Germany and voila, the war would be won. The planning of Market Garden took place in not much more than a week, with communications between Montgomery in France and Browning back in England not all that it could be. This led not only to some oversights in planning, but also a lack of time for the airborne command to push the USAAF and RAF to organise to land the troops closer to their objectives than what in fact occurred. The distance between the Dropping and Landing Zones and the bridges caused delays in capturing the bridge at Nijmegen, and led to the separation of forces at Arnhem, which doomed that part of the plan.
The lack of co-ordination between attack aircraft and the ground troops, due to lack of effective radio contact, and the Air Force's requirement that the attack aircraft couldn't be in the area of operations while troop-carrying or supply aircraft were in the area was a big problem.
The number of troops landed on the first day is an issue that Powell looks at closely and draws the conclusion that more could have been done to get more boots on the ground more quickly in the drop zones - the Air Forces should have been pushed to run more than one drop in a day, and there should have been more thought into which troops and supplies were dropped when - the decision by Browning to include his HQ battalion in the first drop is, to Powell, a wrong one.
The main part of the operation was the ground assault under the command of General Horrocks, and Powell gives us plenty of detail here, explaining the difficulties of running an army up one road, while also pointing out where that army was perhaps less than expeditious in its advance. He importantly points out that is was the tardiness of the advance of the flanking forces (12 Corps and 8 Corps), that led to the small German forces being able to continue to attack 30 Corps on the main road, and indeed cut that road on more than one occasion, delaying the whole operation significantly.
And what of the German forces? Much has been made in the past of the lack of intelligence about the SS Panzer Corps that were refitting in the area. However, as Powell points out, these forces were small in number, and in fact the number of troops and tanks in the area was about what the Allies had expected. What was less expected was the stiff resistance of the troops, not only because some of them were in the SS, but also because they were now fighting very close to home soil. The Germans were fortunate that the commanders in the area at the time, including Student and Bittrich, were seasoned, smart and effective. Having stated that, it is worth noting that the British forces in Oosterbeek held out for as long as they did partly because the forces opposing them were scratch units with not much tactical nous, so the German story was mixed. In fact Student himself called Market Garden a 'great success' for the Allies.
Powell's description of the fighting in the Oosterbeek pocket is harrowing to read, and no doubt accurate as he was there. As with many stories of war, the horrible waste of lives is the thing that sticks with the reader - more thought from the Allies, and perhaps less triumphalism might have stopped this operation before it began. In the end it was the "broad push" and not the "thunderbolt surprise" that got the Allies over the Rhine and into Germany. Powell has his doubts that, even if successful, Market Garden would have significantly shortened the War, and I tend to agree.
Powell ends this book with a discussion of the worth of airborne forces, and comes to the conclusion that their true worth is in operations on a smaller scale than that of Market Garden. He points out that in larger strategic operations such as Market Garden (or the invasion of Crete by the German airborne forces), even if the forces are successful their loss rate is horrendous. However, for smaller scale tactical operations there is great value in using such units. He points out that by this stage in the War the Allies had built up such a large airborne force the powers that be felt they had to do something with it to justify its formation.
Powell's last paragraph is worth quoting in full - "It is arguable that Eisenhower would have been better served in the autumn of 1944 by another half-dozen infantry or armoured divisions, backed by adequate logistic resources, than by First Allied Airborne Army. The airborne forces of the United States and Britain were expensive indeed in high quality men and in the special facilities needed to train them, in manufacturing capacity and in base area support, in scientific research and in military planners. Without any doubt, the two Allies had a need for smallish bodies of parachute or glider troops, of battalion or of regimental size. On the other hand it is not easy to justify the scarce resources which the Americans and the British devoted to their fine airborne, forces, and to the aircraft which flew them into battle."
This book may be the definitive account of operation Market Garden. It is definitely readable, interesting and comprehensive. Recommended.
Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/
Geoffrey Powell commanded C company of 156 Parachute Battalion throughout Market Garden and won the Military Cross for his actions there, although you won't find this out by reading The Devil's Birthday. Nor will you find an apologia for what was one of the most vicious battles fought on the Western Front in World War II. What you will find is a clear headed exposition of the action throughout Market Garden, dispelling some myths and pointing to the real reasons the operation failed to achieve all its objectives.
What Powell makes clear is that the lack of time to properly plan such a complex operation cruelled its chances from the start. The Allies had built up a large airborne force, and were always on the lookout for ways to employ it - there had been quite a few operations planned after D-Day, all of which were cancelled as the advance of the Allies quickly overtook planned airborne objectives.
By September 1944 the Germans seemed to be not only on the run, but collapsing as a fighting force. Market Garden was planned to punch a hole in the collapsing lines, skirt around the top end of the Siegfried Line, cut off the Ruhr from Germany and voila, the war would be won. The planning of Market Garden took place in not much more than a week, with communications between Montgomery in France and Browning back in England not all that it could be. This led not only to some oversights in planning, but also a lack of time for the airborne command to push the USAAF and RAF to organise to land the troops closer to their objectives than what in fact occurred. The distance between the Dropping and Landing Zones and the bridges caused delays in capturing the bridge at Nijmegen, and led to the separation of forces at Arnhem, which doomed that part of the plan.
The lack of co-ordination between attack aircraft and the ground troops, due to lack of effective radio contact, and the Air Force's requirement that the attack aircraft couldn't be in the area of operations while troop-carrying or supply aircraft were in the area was a big problem.
The number of troops landed on the first day is an issue that Powell looks at closely and draws the conclusion that more could have been done to get more boots on the ground more quickly in the drop zones - the Air Forces should have been pushed to run more than one drop in a day, and there should have been more thought into which troops and supplies were dropped when - the decision by Browning to include his HQ battalion in the first drop is, to Powell, a wrong one.
The main part of the operation was the ground assault under the command of General Horrocks, and Powell gives us plenty of detail here, explaining the difficulties of running an army up one road, while also pointing out where that army was perhaps less than expeditious in its advance. He importantly points out that is was the tardiness of the advance of the flanking forces (12 Corps and 8 Corps), that led to the small German forces being able to continue to attack 30 Corps on the main road, and indeed cut that road on more than one occasion, delaying the whole operation significantly.
And what of the German forces? Much has been made in the past of the lack of intelligence about the SS Panzer Corps that were refitting in the area. However, as Powell points out, these forces were small in number, and in fact the number of troops and tanks in the area was about what the Allies had expected. What was less expected was the stiff resistance of the troops, not only because some of them were in the SS, but also because they were now fighting very close to home soil. The Germans were fortunate that the commanders in the area at the time, including Student and Bittrich, were seasoned, smart and effective. Having stated that, it is worth noting that the British forces in Oosterbeek held out for as long as they did partly because the forces opposing them were scratch units with not much tactical nous, so the German story was mixed. In fact Student himself called Market Garden a 'great success' for the Allies.
Powell's description of the fighting in the Oosterbeek pocket is harrowing to read, and no doubt accurate as he was there. As with many stories of war, the horrible waste of lives is the thing that sticks with the reader - more thought from the Allies, and perhaps less triumphalism might have stopped this operation before it began. In the end it was the "broad push" and not the "thunderbolt surprise" that got the Allies over the Rhine and into Germany. Powell has his doubts that, even if successful, Market Garden would have significantly shortened the War, and I tend to agree.
Powell ends this book with a discussion of the worth of airborne forces, and comes to the conclusion that their true worth is in operations on a smaller scale than that of Market Garden. He points out that in larger strategic operations such as Market Garden (or the invasion of Crete by the German airborne forces), even if the forces are successful their loss rate is horrendous. However, for smaller scale tactical operations there is great value in using such units. He points out that by this stage in the War the Allies had built up such a large airborne force the powers that be felt they had to do something with it to justify its formation.
Powell's last paragraph is worth quoting in full - "It is arguable that Eisenhower would have been better served in the autumn of 1944 by another half-dozen infantry or armoured divisions, backed by adequate logistic resources, than by First Allied Airborne Army. The airborne forces of the United States and Britain were expensive indeed in high quality men and in the special facilities needed to train them, in manufacturing capacity and in base area support, in scientific research and in military planners. Without any doubt, the two Allies had a need for smallish bodies of parachute or glider troops, of battalion or of regimental size. On the other hand it is not easy to justify the scarce resources which the Americans and the British devoted to their fine airborne, forces, and to the aircraft which flew them into battle."
This book may be the definitive account of operation Market Garden. It is definitely readable, interesting and comprehensive. Recommended.
Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/
February 5, 2019
Having watched A Bridge Too Far over Christmas I felt an urge to read more about Operation Market Garden.
Devils Birthday is written very much from a British perspective but does give credit to the American 82nd and 101st who often do not get the recognition they deserve.
The bravery of these men comes alive through these pages. I understand much more the logistical challenges for the Allies and as the author puts it what could go wrong went wrong. The author lends the book credibility as he was on the ground in Osterbeek during Operation Market Garden.
The book was published in 1984 when many of the top brass were still alive. Had this been published later I think the author would have been far more critical of Monty et al. Got the feeling he held back a bit out of loyalty.
In short, I learned a lot and now I want to dig into this subject a lot more.
Devils Birthday is written very much from a British perspective but does give credit to the American 82nd and 101st who often do not get the recognition they deserve.
The bravery of these men comes alive through these pages. I understand much more the logistical challenges for the Allies and as the author puts it what could go wrong went wrong. The author lends the book credibility as he was on the ground in Osterbeek during Operation Market Garden.
The book was published in 1984 when many of the top brass were still alive. Had this been published later I think the author would have been far more critical of Monty et al. Got the feeling he held back a bit out of loyalty.
In short, I learned a lot and now I want to dig into this subject a lot more.
September 2, 2016
Thought it was a great read. Fitting that it was the first book I finished in my new house on Arnhem St drinking coffee from my mug from the Airborne Museum in Oosterbeek.
April 18, 2026
This book is written by one of the men that fought at Arnhem/Oosterbeek during operation Market-Garden. However, he does not expose his 'being there' in detail but some mention is made of actions in which he was involved, without clearly revealing his full role and bravery.
What the author does is look at certain key elements of the operation and analyzing what went wrong and why. Lack of time to prepare the operation is something that comes through at many instances. It may not come as a surprise that an operation of this scale can't be planned in just a few days. Yes, there were previous operations plans that contained a framework to start from, but an operation of this size and complexity requires more. It becomes clear that communications were the problem at many times. And this not only points back to the lack of working radios as it goes far deeper than this. The lack of reliable communications between the boots on the ground and the supporting air forces is one of the factors that could have been solved if preparation time had been better. But also the contact between the transporting air units, and their escorts, and the ground support units could have been worked out better. Now it often happened that air support was lacking because transport planes and their escorts were in the air. Why? Why, considering the area involved, were support aircraft not allowed to be in the air when Dakota's, etc. were flying around?
Yes, the radios were a specific issue, but this could have been solved by including more, but heavier radiosets, in the airlifts. Why could the reporters contact London and could the airbornes only with some luck and chewing gum reach nearby units? Another issue was the spread of the airlifts over several days. Men on the ground were important, so why fly in support units and such in the first lift? The British units needed rifles and numbers to get to the bridge fast in order to conquer them by surprise. And why was a complete upper echelon HQ flown in taking up precious space of combat men and equipment? On top of this the HQ was inadequately trained to function properly. It should have stayed in England or maybe behind the Allied lines in Belgium. On the ground in The Netherlands it was useless and added an extra command layer in a situation that was already messy.
The book, despite its age, does point out many interesting points that are worth exploring some more and indicates which lessons can be learned from the operation. One can also wonder why Monty's involvement, once the tanks started rolling, was in a way lacking. The corps on the flanks of XXX Corps had a stiff fight on their hands, something that is not always made clear, but could he have intervened and made adjustments to keep XXX Corps moving down the road despite the German resistance?
Talking about the Germans. The varying reports of Germans in the Reichswald, or maybe not, were a real nuisance for the Allies. Intelligence was available that indicated a heavier German presence in the area than had first been estimated, but between 'Comet' and 'Market-Garden' this was somehow lost and not taken into consideration. The Dutch resistance had a large amount of information, but the Allies (mainly the British) did not make good use of this. American forces at Eindhoven en Nijmegen were far more willing to use it, for example the Dutch telephone lines which were secretly operated by reliable operators. This could have solved the communications issues, not completely of course, but every bit of help was needed. It could have played an important role at times.
Market-Garden will remain a topic to look into for many years to come. Opinions will differ on the how, what and why, which makes this an ongoing discussions for many years to come.
Still a very good book despite its age.
What the author does is look at certain key elements of the operation and analyzing what went wrong and why. Lack of time to prepare the operation is something that comes through at many instances. It may not come as a surprise that an operation of this scale can't be planned in just a few days. Yes, there were previous operations plans that contained a framework to start from, but an operation of this size and complexity requires more. It becomes clear that communications were the problem at many times. And this not only points back to the lack of working radios as it goes far deeper than this. The lack of reliable communications between the boots on the ground and the supporting air forces is one of the factors that could have been solved if preparation time had been better. But also the contact between the transporting air units, and their escorts, and the ground support units could have been worked out better. Now it often happened that air support was lacking because transport planes and their escorts were in the air. Why? Why, considering the area involved, were support aircraft not allowed to be in the air when Dakota's, etc. were flying around?
Yes, the radios were a specific issue, but this could have been solved by including more, but heavier radiosets, in the airlifts. Why could the reporters contact London and could the airbornes only with some luck and chewing gum reach nearby units? Another issue was the spread of the airlifts over several days. Men on the ground were important, so why fly in support units and such in the first lift? The British units needed rifles and numbers to get to the bridge fast in order to conquer them by surprise. And why was a complete upper echelon HQ flown in taking up precious space of combat men and equipment? On top of this the HQ was inadequately trained to function properly. It should have stayed in England or maybe behind the Allied lines in Belgium. On the ground in The Netherlands it was useless and added an extra command layer in a situation that was already messy.
The book, despite its age, does point out many interesting points that are worth exploring some more and indicates which lessons can be learned from the operation. One can also wonder why Monty's involvement, once the tanks started rolling, was in a way lacking. The corps on the flanks of XXX Corps had a stiff fight on their hands, something that is not always made clear, but could he have intervened and made adjustments to keep XXX Corps moving down the road despite the German resistance?
Talking about the Germans. The varying reports of Germans in the Reichswald, or maybe not, were a real nuisance for the Allies. Intelligence was available that indicated a heavier German presence in the area than had first been estimated, but between 'Comet' and 'Market-Garden' this was somehow lost and not taken into consideration. The Dutch resistance had a large amount of information, but the Allies (mainly the British) did not make good use of this. American forces at Eindhoven en Nijmegen were far more willing to use it, for example the Dutch telephone lines which were secretly operated by reliable operators. This could have solved the communications issues, not completely of course, but every bit of help was needed. It could have played an important role at times.
Market-Garden will remain a topic to look into for many years to come. Opinions will differ on the how, what and why, which makes this an ongoing discussions for many years to come.
Still a very good book despite its age.
August 20, 2018
Geoffrey Powell has written a first rate military history of the Allied Offensive in 1944 to bring World War II to a rapid conclusion by seizing the bridges over the key rivers in Holland that would allow the Allied Forces to then invade Germany and drive directly toward Berlin. Known as Operation Market Garden, the plan called for the use of the three Allied Airborne Divisions, the British First Airborne Division, and the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, to seize the vital bridges that would then be the highway for the 30th Corp. under General Horrocks, to cross the Rhein and start the invasion of Germany. Geoffrey Powell examines in a concise, strategic and insightful manner, all of the key personalities and their reasoned decisions for wanting to have this campaign. Yes, it turned out to be a disaster for a number of reasons that should and could have been predicted, and anticipated, but because of the burning desire of Montgomery and the British government to end the end the war as quickly as possible, and save as many British troops from continued losses, facts were overlooked or discarded. Many of us will remember the very successful movie, "A Bridge to Far" that came out about this campaign, and how costly it was for the Airborne Divisions. Faulty intelligence or disregarded intelligence reports failed to prepare the British First Airborne Division for the fact they were jumping into zones around Arnhem that were already infested by the 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions that were being refitted in the area. As events proved, heroism and dauntless courage is no match for armored forces with tanks and heavy equipment. This is a insightful, informative and very provocative military history, with lessons that are valid and should be considered and remembered by any military or political leader making a decision to send combat troops into action without well thought out plans and contingencies that can help make the outcome a success. One of the most interesting aspects of the book is the very poignant and focused revelations that Geoffrey Powell presents about the bravery of the Dutch population around Arnhem and the other cities that were being "liberated" by the Allies in this Market Garden operation. The bravery of the Dutch and their courage in helping wounded Allied soldiers, knowing that German reprisals would be instant execution, is truly remarkable. It's a chapter in WWII that very few people are aware of because it's so often not discussed or written about. Operation Market Garden has always been a controversial campaign with numerous histories and studies written, and strong opinions on all sides about whether or not it should have even taken place. The Devil's Birthday is a book that answers these questions in a very thoughtful, precise, and insightful manner, and is well worth reading. I strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in military history and all of its complexities. Geoffrey Powell is a superb author and fine writer.
May 2, 2020
The Devil's Birthday is an excellent account of Operation Market Garden, written by one who fought in Arnhem. Powell provides a history of the whole battle, though focuses more on the airborne rather than the actions of XXX corps - though these still get covered, rare for a British book, there is proper recognition of the efforts of the US 101st and 82nd airborne divisions (the latter called the 83rd on the back cover!) during the battle, and the key role they played.
Powell hits home on the tragedy of the battle in his concluding chapters, yes the British 1st airborne division suffered terribly in the fighting at the bridge, and wider Arnhem battle front, but the real tragedy is that even if the plan had been successful and bridgehead had been created across the Rhine, the war would not have ended by Christmas. It is this litany of assumptions on which the operation that is launched (easy to point to in hindsight, some not so easy at the time) that is the real tragedy. Morale had not collapsed in the German army, they were still able to galvanise men to populate the fighting divisions, and whilst perhaps not of the calibre of 1940, were sufficient to give a significant bloody nose to the western allies. And if this is the case, the battle should not have been tried, as Lathbury identified, to make it worth while, all the bridges were needed, not 90%, and Geoffrey Powell builds on this to argue that without a collapse of the German army in the west it was not worth it, instead creating a narrow and difficult salient into enemy territory, and untold suffering for the people of Holland, who bravely continued their protest action against the Germans for the rest of the war.
Interestingly the author concludes that the strategic parachute force developed by the allies during the war was not in fact justified by the resources spent, and the results achieved - whilst not denying the undoubted gallantry demonstrated by those who fought in the divisions. Airborne victories were more tactical than strategic, and when being used as a strategic force, in Market Garden, they were unsuccessful.
This is an excellent account of the battle, well recommended to any with even a passing interest in the war in Western Europe in 1944.
Powell hits home on the tragedy of the battle in his concluding chapters, yes the British 1st airborne division suffered terribly in the fighting at the bridge, and wider Arnhem battle front, but the real tragedy is that even if the plan had been successful and bridgehead had been created across the Rhine, the war would not have ended by Christmas. It is this litany of assumptions on which the operation that is launched (easy to point to in hindsight, some not so easy at the time) that is the real tragedy. Morale had not collapsed in the German army, they were still able to galvanise men to populate the fighting divisions, and whilst perhaps not of the calibre of 1940, were sufficient to give a significant bloody nose to the western allies. And if this is the case, the battle should not have been tried, as Lathbury identified, to make it worth while, all the bridges were needed, not 90%, and Geoffrey Powell builds on this to argue that without a collapse of the German army in the west it was not worth it, instead creating a narrow and difficult salient into enemy territory, and untold suffering for the people of Holland, who bravely continued their protest action against the Germans for the rest of the war.
Interestingly the author concludes that the strategic parachute force developed by the allies during the war was not in fact justified by the resources spent, and the results achieved - whilst not denying the undoubted gallantry demonstrated by those who fought in the divisions. Airborne victories were more tactical than strategic, and when being used as a strategic force, in Market Garden, they were unsuccessful.
This is an excellent account of the battle, well recommended to any with even a passing interest in the war in Western Europe in 1944.
November 16, 2021
Absorbing & Informative
This account of Market Garden was recommended to me and I recommend it to you. Thoroughly researched and well written it is possibly the best account of the operation I have read.
This account of Market Garden was recommended to me and I recommend it to you. Thoroughly researched and well written it is possibly the best account of the operation I have read.
October 27, 2023
Good read delves right into the nitty gritty of the operation and tells of mistakes and what went right
October 16, 2016
I thought this would just be another Market-Garden book but I enjoyed it more than I'd expected. To begin with, it's told from a British perspective and as such it gets into the details of the British forces much better than accounts I've read to date. The author is candid and critical. I thought he was a bit "easy" on Monty, but he focused his criticisms on Monty's subordinates and their dubious choices. It should also be noted that the author participated in the battle as a company commander.
He's also quite complementary of the Americans, excepting Brereton, whom as he rightfully notes were much more experienced in airborne ops at the time. For example, he notes how extensively and successfully the Americans used local citizens as guides and assets while the British were distrustful or ignored the locals to their own determent.
An excellent account of the operation and a must-read for anyone interested in the topic.
He's also quite complementary of the Americans, excepting Brereton, whom as he rightfully notes were much more experienced in airborne ops at the time. For example, he notes how extensively and successfully the Americans used local citizens as guides and assets while the British were distrustful or ignored the locals to their own determent.
An excellent account of the operation and a must-read for anyone interested in the topic.
April 24, 2008
Powell was a veteran of the battle.
This book is enjoyable but is relatively amateurish in its writing style. Not too different to A Bridge Too Far, just not as detailed.
Again full of the many inaccuracies of similar books.
This book is enjoyable but is relatively amateurish in its writing style. Not too different to A Bridge Too Far, just not as detailed.
Again full of the many inaccuracies of similar books.
October 18, 2016
Nice written and very nice detailed book about operation Market-Garden, a "must-read" for anyone interested in this disastrous campaign.
Te author besides of being a veteran of the operation himself was an historian who talked with officers in the aftermath.
Te author besides of being a veteran of the operation himself was an historian who talked with officers in the aftermath.
May 28, 2012
An excellent book on Operation Market Garden. The author does an excellent job of showing us the players and understand their choices and mistakes.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews