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440 pages, Hardcover
Published December 19, 2023
'In mathematics, you do not understand things (John von Neumann). You just get used to them.'
As to Wittgenstein, he did not even try to explain. Explaining was not his business, as he insisted. But he did his best to describe mathematical reasoning. He stressed time and again that a proof must be “übersehbar” (meaning perspicuous, or surveyable, or to be taken in with one glance—Cartesian, to use Ian Hacking’s term). The proof of Pythagoras at the start of this chapter would have given him satisfaction.
Unfortunately, only a few theorems can be reached by such proofs. Usually, the best one can hope for is a series of moves, one following the other, and each one perspicuous. The famous mathematician Paul Erdős, one of the most prolific mathematicians of the last century, claimed that God (in his words, “the Supreme Fascist”) kept these proofs locked away in a book. The highest accolade a mathematical demonstration can earn is therefore: “It is from the book.”
What happens when we experience proof? Neurobiologists have scanned mathematicians’ brains, and duly found that some bits of lobes light up, and others not. It does not explain why understanding proof provides pleasure. Can evolutionary biology provide the key? So far it has not. Mathematical hedonism remains mysterious. It is well-known that mathematical discovery precedes proof—often by ages. Insight relies on induction and analogy.