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Stealing Horses to Great Applause: The Origins of the First World War Reconsidered
Stand-out theoretical and empirical explanation of the origins of the First World War by one of the great historians of international diplomacyStealing Horses to Great Applause presents arguably the finest considerations yet of the origins of the First World War. Breaking with accounts which focus on the actions of a single state or the final countdown to hostilities, Paul W. Schroeder describes the systemic crisis engulfing the Great Powers.They were more interested in colonial plunder overseas (stealing horses to great applause, in the old Spanish adage) than the traditional statecraft of European peace-making. Preserving the balance of power required preserving all the essential actors in it, including a tottering Austria-Hungary. This the British in particular failed to recognise. The Central Powers may have started the War but that does not mean they in any real sense caused it. In the end Schroeder recalls the verdict of Shakespeare's Romeo and All are punished.Stealing Horses to Great Applause includes appraisals of Niall Ferguson and A. J. P. Taylor, and an extensive unpublished final paper rethinking the First World War as "the last 18th-century war."With an introduction by Perry Anderson.
384 pages, Hardcover
Published February 18, 2025
About the author
Paul W. Schroeder
8 books8 followersA specialist in modern European and international diplomatic history, Paul W. Schroeder was professor emeritus of history at the University of Illinois. Initially ordained as a Lutheran pastor, Schroeder left the ministry in 1954 to attend graduate school, receiving his Ph.D in history from the University of Texas at Austin in 1958.
Among Schroeder's awards was a Fulbright (1956–57), a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship (1973), and designation as University of Illinois Jubilee Professor of Liberal Arts and Sciences (1992). He was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1983–84), a visiting research fellow at Merton College, Oxford (1984), and a visiting scholar at the Mershon Center for International Security at Ohio State University (1998).
Among Schroeder's awards was a Fulbright (1956–57), a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship (1973), and designation as University of Illinois Jubilee Professor of Liberal Arts and Sciences (1992). He was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1983–84), a visiting research fellow at Merton College, Oxford (1984), and a visiting scholar at the Mershon Center for International Security at Ohio State University (1998).
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January 11, 2026
This book reads as the best analysis leading the Great Powers unto the Great War as if it was a Monopoly’s game. Schroeder is the historian who knew the diplomatic game best: the rules, the players, the interests, the dynamics. Not only from 1870 until 1914, but from the beginning of the 18th century up until 1914. This book brings formidable insight into world history from the point of view of diplomatic history and “world systems”. But it has an important blind spot as well.
The book is a collection of essays from the author compiled by Perry Anderson, who admires the author’s contribution to the debate on the causes of the Great War. In my opinion, the first two chapters are the most insightful, after which the main argumentative lines are clear, and the marginal gains diminish. Still, for those interested in the role of the Balkans in great detail, there’s a chapter on the importance of the shift from Romania from Central powers to the Entente just before WWI which is a great zoom-in on the tumultuous region. And, of course, there’s the last chapter (which was an 100 page unpublished manuscript which was a book proposal that he never managed to write) drawing lines from the WWI debate to the 18th century and Napoleonic Wars.
Anderson summarizes the main points of Schroeder well in his introduction. From the Napoleonic Wars, in 1815, a new Concert of Europe emerged, which was balanced out by the main powers Russia and England on both sides of the spectrum. They dominated respectively by land and sea. In this Concert, the balance between five Great Powers and were defined by mutual restraint (why they did so, see below). Up until 1854, this all worked fine (even the revolution of 1848 did not alter the high diplomatic game). Then followed 15 years of intense struggle: Russia against Britain and France in the Crimea, Austria evicted from Italy by Piedmont and France, from Germany by Prussia, and France against Germany in 1870. Russia and England watched and could do nothing, as they were estranged from each other by the war in Crimea. They could no longer control political shifts in continental Europe, whose role was now taken over by Unified Germany. Bismarck saw it as its plight to maneuver European politics through this new international setting, which increasingly looked more like juggling interests. While doing so, he sought to consolidate the new power Germany had acquired, rather than expanding it further.
Bismarck saw to do this by giving breathing space to the Great Powers in colonial matters: France could find compensation there, while he sought not to antagonize Britain. Schroeder writes of playing two games at the same time: one the rules of maintaining European power balance, the other “New Imperialism”, or the unchecked search for new territory. He also refers to this as “Weltpolitik”, and he summarizes this relentless search as the idea that the 20th century would belong to those states that managed to carve out a territory for themselves. Bismarck tried to outsource internal struggles of the Great Powers to imperialist adventures, playing out antagonism between France and England. But over time, the logic of the second game dominated over the former, and was brought back into the European continent.
But slowly, things were shifting on the European continent as well. It started out in the Congress of Berlin in 1878, were it became clear that the disputes between Russia and Austria were increasingly hard to settle. It was fixed by giving everybody a part of the territory at the expense of Turkey. Over the next years, Bismarck reforged relations with Austria, but used it to make Austria settle disputes with Italy and Russia (by forging triple alliances, which Austria reluctantly followed). But in 1890, Bismarck was dismissed and Germany took sides with Austria and refused to renew the Reinsurance treaty with Russia. This led Russia to sign a military alliance with France over 1891-4. What Bismarck thought would be a disaster and always sought to dismiss, was now unfolding: Germany being exposed to a two-front attack. It had to keep its remaining ally, Austria, close. Moreover, and importantly, it resulted in cautious diplomatic moves by the Germans and Austrians: Schroeder keeps highlighting that, because of their position, they showed restraint in expansive policies, in contrast with excessive Russian power grabs. Still, historians say it was the inherent German and Austrian autocratic structures which caused the war. Schroeder reacts: “Some steal horses to great applause, while others are hanged for looking over the fence.”
What made the balance of power tilt towards the Entente, however, was British reapproaching Russia and France rather than keeping the balance by withdrawing from these continental powerplays. Its main interest for doing so was the Empire. While Bismarck thought to outplay the imperial competition of these powers to Germany’s success, now took a turn: the combined imperial might of France and Russia was overwhelming for the British Empire to control, so it sought not to antagonize them and settle imperial disputes with them. Importantly, Britain joined the Entente not because of its anti-German stance (which it definitely had, but which was not overdetermining), but because of its imperial interests in light of Russia-Franco Entente. From 1890 on, it became clear to Britain that in European matters, it mainly had to appease to Russian and French wishes.
The problem soon became clear: these interests were opposed to the weakest chain in the Concert of Europe: Austria-Hungary. In the Balkan, the most tumultuous region of conflict in Europe, Russia clashed with Austria-Hungary. All powers were already starting to realise that Austria-Hungary would dissolve eventually, and were already looking at how to divide the spoils. Especially in the diplomatic games, the Great Powers increasingly sought to settle disputes by making Austria-Hungary give up its interests. Britain simply didn’t care enough. If it would have, things could have turned out differently. While Britain did take Germany seriously, and repeatedly engaged in diplomatic problem solving with them up until 1914, they simply did not think about the Austrians, which proved their most fatal miscalculation.
And so a clear division emerged in European politics. The system of New Imperialism was run by the Entente, and the Central Powers were simply not in the same league. Germany especially, as a new industrial power, was not necessarily “encircled” by the Entente powers in Europe (main conquests were happening in the Balkans, where it was not endangered) but it was “circled out” by imperial powers outside Europe. The combined realization that diplomatic politics were not in their favour, in which Austria-Hungary’s position as Great Power was increasingly endangered, while Germany was circled out and only had one ally left, led them to decide to attack in the hope to swing things around. Austria-Hungary specifically, Schroeder summarizes: “committed suicide out of fear of the hangman [the international system]” (182). In another passage, he wrote: “All saw existing trends … in similar fashion, and concluded that the game was approaching a turning point in the near future. Three powers, seeing victory ahead, favoured a ‘peaceful’ continuation of the ‘status quo’. Two others sensed impending defeat and determined to change it.” (p. 88)
And so the Vienna system collapsed, while it had largely withered the storms of industrialisation, modernization, mass politicisations in socialism, nationalism, and liberalism for a 100 years. It had started in 1815 after all the powers had agreed that the 18th century had caused too much bloodshed. They realised mostly because Napoleon’s insatiable taste for power had caused the most generalized period of war. Trying to navigate his games, even joining him as a satellite, would not defend you from his army. And thus, by practice, the European powers all eventually realised that they first needed to get Napoleon out, after which they had to install mutual restraint in European matters, which worked pretty well for a while. The international commitments reigned over national interests. Instead of labelling this conservative league of diplomatic internationalism “backward”, he labelled it “the first modern peace”, while its descent into WWI was the “last 18th century war”.
This is the main message of his last chapter and it is quite interesting. More than saying that 18th century “warmaking” was switched with “peacemaking” because of modernizing tendencies (a common argument, saying that that very peace making effort was also, ultimately, smashed by those “left behinders” that did not become more liberal and modern), he says that the periods of war-mongering was more defined in the international area of power politics, combined with a new push for “New Imperialism”. I’m in favour of this argument, but still I am also open for the nuance that indeed the more “autocratic” regimes (especially Russia, who Schroeder refers to a lot for reckless behaviour) could have been indeed more prone for violence.
But by the time I was starting the last chapter, I had been exposed to too much diplomatic history as if I were watching a sports commentator analysing a game of Monopoly. Schroeder, despite being a historian to admire because of his unique combination of empirical knowledge while being able to make large theoretical arguments about the system as a whole and the methodology of historians, is still a conservative. For him, social movements or class struggle do not come into his analysis at all, and if so, they do so only in a violent form. This is most apparent in his characterisation of Napoleonic France, which is, for some external reason, just insatiable looking for power. He does not consider at all that the political revolution and the violent (literal) beheading of the ancient regime scared the aristocracy of European to its bones. The international scene was inherently anti-French, and Napoleon opted for the flight forward to eradicate these threats. Still, the diplomatic framework is extremely tight with Schroeder, and now has to be complemented with other great work on 1) the economic imperatives of “New Imperialism” of all European powers and 2) the domestic social contexts driving the state-practices of diplomatic balancing.
The book is a collection of essays from the author compiled by Perry Anderson, who admires the author’s contribution to the debate on the causes of the Great War. In my opinion, the first two chapters are the most insightful, after which the main argumentative lines are clear, and the marginal gains diminish. Still, for those interested in the role of the Balkans in great detail, there’s a chapter on the importance of the shift from Romania from Central powers to the Entente just before WWI which is a great zoom-in on the tumultuous region. And, of course, there’s the last chapter (which was an 100 page unpublished manuscript which was a book proposal that he never managed to write) drawing lines from the WWI debate to the 18th century and Napoleonic Wars.
Anderson summarizes the main points of Schroeder well in his introduction. From the Napoleonic Wars, in 1815, a new Concert of Europe emerged, which was balanced out by the main powers Russia and England on both sides of the spectrum. They dominated respectively by land and sea. In this Concert, the balance between five Great Powers and were defined by mutual restraint (why they did so, see below). Up until 1854, this all worked fine (even the revolution of 1848 did not alter the high diplomatic game). Then followed 15 years of intense struggle: Russia against Britain and France in the Crimea, Austria evicted from Italy by Piedmont and France, from Germany by Prussia, and France against Germany in 1870. Russia and England watched and could do nothing, as they were estranged from each other by the war in Crimea. They could no longer control political shifts in continental Europe, whose role was now taken over by Unified Germany. Bismarck saw it as its plight to maneuver European politics through this new international setting, which increasingly looked more like juggling interests. While doing so, he sought to consolidate the new power Germany had acquired, rather than expanding it further.
Bismarck saw to do this by giving breathing space to the Great Powers in colonial matters: France could find compensation there, while he sought not to antagonize Britain. Schroeder writes of playing two games at the same time: one the rules of maintaining European power balance, the other “New Imperialism”, or the unchecked search for new territory. He also refers to this as “Weltpolitik”, and he summarizes this relentless search as the idea that the 20th century would belong to those states that managed to carve out a territory for themselves. Bismarck tried to outsource internal struggles of the Great Powers to imperialist adventures, playing out antagonism between France and England. But over time, the logic of the second game dominated over the former, and was brought back into the European continent.
But slowly, things were shifting on the European continent as well. It started out in the Congress of Berlin in 1878, were it became clear that the disputes between Russia and Austria were increasingly hard to settle. It was fixed by giving everybody a part of the territory at the expense of Turkey. Over the next years, Bismarck reforged relations with Austria, but used it to make Austria settle disputes with Italy and Russia (by forging triple alliances, which Austria reluctantly followed). But in 1890, Bismarck was dismissed and Germany took sides with Austria and refused to renew the Reinsurance treaty with Russia. This led Russia to sign a military alliance with France over 1891-4. What Bismarck thought would be a disaster and always sought to dismiss, was now unfolding: Germany being exposed to a two-front attack. It had to keep its remaining ally, Austria, close. Moreover, and importantly, it resulted in cautious diplomatic moves by the Germans and Austrians: Schroeder keeps highlighting that, because of their position, they showed restraint in expansive policies, in contrast with excessive Russian power grabs. Still, historians say it was the inherent German and Austrian autocratic structures which caused the war. Schroeder reacts: “Some steal horses to great applause, while others are hanged for looking over the fence.”
What made the balance of power tilt towards the Entente, however, was British reapproaching Russia and France rather than keeping the balance by withdrawing from these continental powerplays. Its main interest for doing so was the Empire. While Bismarck thought to outplay the imperial competition of these powers to Germany’s success, now took a turn: the combined imperial might of France and Russia was overwhelming for the British Empire to control, so it sought not to antagonize them and settle imperial disputes with them. Importantly, Britain joined the Entente not because of its anti-German stance (which it definitely had, but which was not overdetermining), but because of its imperial interests in light of Russia-Franco Entente. From 1890 on, it became clear to Britain that in European matters, it mainly had to appease to Russian and French wishes.
The problem soon became clear: these interests were opposed to the weakest chain in the Concert of Europe: Austria-Hungary. In the Balkan, the most tumultuous region of conflict in Europe, Russia clashed with Austria-Hungary. All powers were already starting to realise that Austria-Hungary would dissolve eventually, and were already looking at how to divide the spoils. Especially in the diplomatic games, the Great Powers increasingly sought to settle disputes by making Austria-Hungary give up its interests. Britain simply didn’t care enough. If it would have, things could have turned out differently. While Britain did take Germany seriously, and repeatedly engaged in diplomatic problem solving with them up until 1914, they simply did not think about the Austrians, which proved their most fatal miscalculation.
And so a clear division emerged in European politics. The system of New Imperialism was run by the Entente, and the Central Powers were simply not in the same league. Germany especially, as a new industrial power, was not necessarily “encircled” by the Entente powers in Europe (main conquests were happening in the Balkans, where it was not endangered) but it was “circled out” by imperial powers outside Europe. The combined realization that diplomatic politics were not in their favour, in which Austria-Hungary’s position as Great Power was increasingly endangered, while Germany was circled out and only had one ally left, led them to decide to attack in the hope to swing things around. Austria-Hungary specifically, Schroeder summarizes: “committed suicide out of fear of the hangman [the international system]” (182). In another passage, he wrote: “All saw existing trends … in similar fashion, and concluded that the game was approaching a turning point in the near future. Three powers, seeing victory ahead, favoured a ‘peaceful’ continuation of the ‘status quo’. Two others sensed impending defeat and determined to change it.” (p. 88)
And so the Vienna system collapsed, while it had largely withered the storms of industrialisation, modernization, mass politicisations in socialism, nationalism, and liberalism for a 100 years. It had started in 1815 after all the powers had agreed that the 18th century had caused too much bloodshed. They realised mostly because Napoleon’s insatiable taste for power had caused the most generalized period of war. Trying to navigate his games, even joining him as a satellite, would not defend you from his army. And thus, by practice, the European powers all eventually realised that they first needed to get Napoleon out, after which they had to install mutual restraint in European matters, which worked pretty well for a while. The international commitments reigned over national interests. Instead of labelling this conservative league of diplomatic internationalism “backward”, he labelled it “the first modern peace”, while its descent into WWI was the “last 18th century war”.
This is the main message of his last chapter and it is quite interesting. More than saying that 18th century “warmaking” was switched with “peacemaking” because of modernizing tendencies (a common argument, saying that that very peace making effort was also, ultimately, smashed by those “left behinders” that did not become more liberal and modern), he says that the periods of war-mongering was more defined in the international area of power politics, combined with a new push for “New Imperialism”. I’m in favour of this argument, but still I am also open for the nuance that indeed the more “autocratic” regimes (especially Russia, who Schroeder refers to a lot for reckless behaviour) could have been indeed more prone for violence.
But by the time I was starting the last chapter, I had been exposed to too much diplomatic history as if I were watching a sports commentator analysing a game of Monopoly. Schroeder, despite being a historian to admire because of his unique combination of empirical knowledge while being able to make large theoretical arguments about the system as a whole and the methodology of historians, is still a conservative. For him, social movements or class struggle do not come into his analysis at all, and if so, they do so only in a violent form. This is most apparent in his characterisation of Napoleonic France, which is, for some external reason, just insatiable looking for power. He does not consider at all that the political revolution and the violent (literal) beheading of the ancient regime scared the aristocracy of European to its bones. The international scene was inherently anti-French, and Napoleon opted for the flight forward to eradicate these threats. Still, the diplomatic framework is extremely tight with Schroeder, and now has to be complemented with other great work on 1) the economic imperatives of “New Imperialism” of all European powers and 2) the domestic social contexts driving the state-practices of diplomatic balancing.
July 3, 2026
I have been getting into Schroeder this year and always find him worth engaging with. That being said, as a kind of postmortem collection of his previously less well known works this has a repetitive and uneven quality which isnt anyone's fault but does make it kind of a slog to go through. It is still worth going through however, even if the final and best chapter is undermined by a shocking admission he likes Thomas Friedman (!) of all people.
June 18, 2026
“A Spanish proverb says: ‘Some men steal horses to great applause, while others are hanged for looking over the fence’”—which could be taken as an accurate summary of the differential effects, “not incidental, accidental, or unintended, but regular, structural, and intentional,” of the imperialist game as it was practiced by 1914. Example? “In 1904–10 Japan stole horses to great applause. Austria-Hungary was hanged despite attempting the help the owner save his horses and repair his fence. It is hard to conceive a better illustration of a perverse international incentives structure.
-Perry Anderson, Introduction
"Assume ex hypothesi that, as argued here, in order for tolerable peace and stability to prevail in international politics, the individual states participating in it and pursuing their individual substantive goals must simultaneously also act as members of a civil association working to maintain the practice, and that this requires members, especially the great powers, to have shared formal and informal understandings on acceptable rules, norms, and practices, a general agreement on what limits have to be observed and joint responsibilities fulfilled, and the ways to do this."
-Chapter 6
“If you want to understand the politics that ultimately helps make wars occur and international systems break down, study World War I. If you want to understand better how a durable system of general relative peace and order can emerge, survive, and solve major problems for a considerable time, examine the Vienna System.”
-Perry Anderson, Introduction
"Assume ex hypothesi that, as argued here, in order for tolerable peace and stability to prevail in international politics, the individual states participating in it and pursuing their individual substantive goals must simultaneously also act as members of a civil association working to maintain the practice, and that this requires members, especially the great powers, to have shared formal and informal understandings on acceptable rules, norms, and practices, a general agreement on what limits have to be observed and joint responsibilities fulfilled, and the ways to do this."
-Chapter 6
“If you want to understand the politics that ultimately helps make wars occur and international systems break down, study World War I. If you want to understand better how a durable system of general relative peace and order can emerge, survive, and solve major problems for a considerable time, examine the Vienna System.”
Read
July 30, 2025not sure what to make of this. It is a refreshingly revisionist book. But there are certain subtexts I did not feel comfortable with. Since this is almost solely about diplomatic history, it also means that there is a lot of ground that is not covered here and which has quite some bearing on the questions asked. Still, fascinating and readable
August 13, 2026
Be wise as serpents and harmless as doves. Satan - root cause of hell in politics is the "dragon" (the dragon symbolizes Satan in the government), where the "serpent" refers to Satan in the church. Satan wanted the 2nd German Reich imperialism to result in WWI. The previous 1st German Reich is another time period when Germany rose to power (Holy Roman Empire misnomer, Frankish power resulted in a German speaking Europe ruled until 1806). Satan planned Hitler's Third Reich to result in WWII. People are priceless, so we are supposed to help people break free of the satanic influence such as the dragon in government. Having said so, consider current politics.
Wake up Germany! Wake up Russia! Wake up Britain! Wake up France! Wake up USA and everyone! German policy is akin to bestial nature - more like a ravenous leopard than a human (Leopard tank proves the German Leopard symbol). Germany acts on Satan's will to initiate WWIII in 1993 by forming the European Union 4th German Reich. German leadership of European Union is an expression of unrestrained imperialist Satanic influenced Germans. Likewise, Russia moves as a ravenous bear commanded to devour flesh (Russian bear symbol). Say Russia needs to take desperate action against Germany for the power struggle rooted in German repetitive satanic mobilization; the concept reveals there is no Russian root cause for WWIII, Russia wants survival. So, Russia invades Ukraine as a defensive move against the German statement which Russia knew beforehand, on the tip of the German tongue all along: the announcement, Germany is going to build the "strongest conventional army in Europe (14 May 2025, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz)." Clear as day! Germans do not know they are aligning themselves with Satan to build the WWIII climate. The 4th German Reich was born 01 November 1993. As it happened to my great grandfather in World War II, if the US military gives me a gun and instructs me to use it against The Reich, I have no choice but to blast all the Germans & German sympathizers. Satan is the root cause. The German souls are priceless.
There is no solution to the war itself because the 4th German Reich is prophesized. Germany will use her military. You can still let Jesus lead you to help whatever Old World (& whatever New World) people will listen before war broadens. Support efforts ***in-person locally*** to help people understand how to do Jesus will instead of their own will. Help efforts ***in-person locally*** for baptisms by water immersion "in the name of Jesus Christ." People need to understand more about receiving the gift of the Holy Ghost (spirit of Jesus Christ Himself in the bodily temple of a person). Help spread understanding that Jesus is the one on the throne. See Acts 2:38. See Colossians 2:9. See the book of Acts. Let Jesus lead now, let Jesus lead as the war broadens with Germany at the center again! Pick today to declare war on Satan!
Wake up Germany! Wake up Russia! Wake up Britain! Wake up France! Wake up USA and everyone! German policy is akin to bestial nature - more like a ravenous leopard than a human (Leopard tank proves the German Leopard symbol). Germany acts on Satan's will to initiate WWIII in 1993 by forming the European Union 4th German Reich. German leadership of European Union is an expression of unrestrained imperialist Satanic influenced Germans. Likewise, Russia moves as a ravenous bear commanded to devour flesh (Russian bear symbol). Say Russia needs to take desperate action against Germany for the power struggle rooted in German repetitive satanic mobilization; the concept reveals there is no Russian root cause for WWIII, Russia wants survival. So, Russia invades Ukraine as a defensive move against the German statement which Russia knew beforehand, on the tip of the German tongue all along: the announcement, Germany is going to build the "strongest conventional army in Europe (14 May 2025, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz)." Clear as day! Germans do not know they are aligning themselves with Satan to build the WWIII climate. The 4th German Reich was born 01 November 1993. As it happened to my great grandfather in World War II, if the US military gives me a gun and instructs me to use it against The Reich, I have no choice but to blast all the Germans & German sympathizers. Satan is the root cause. The German souls are priceless.
There is no solution to the war itself because the 4th German Reich is prophesized. Germany will use her military. You can still let Jesus lead you to help whatever Old World (& whatever New World) people will listen before war broadens. Support efforts ***in-person locally*** to help people understand how to do Jesus will instead of their own will. Help efforts ***in-person locally*** for baptisms by water immersion "in the name of Jesus Christ." People need to understand more about receiving the gift of the Holy Ghost (spirit of Jesus Christ Himself in the bodily temple of a person). Help spread understanding that Jesus is the one on the throne. See Acts 2:38. See Colossians 2:9. See the book of Acts. Let Jesus lead now, let Jesus lead as the war broadens with Germany at the center again! Pick today to declare war on Satan!
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