Bold and with a nice balance of personal and historical. Meticulously researched in a country where people disappearing without a trace is part of a horrifying government normal.
Highlights:
Back then, the criminal group that would come to be known as the Gulf Cartel dominated the state of Tamaulipas, and as a result had always had some sort of presence in town. But things had been relatively peaceful. The criminals never bothered regular working people, and in fact relied on their support to conduct business. In those days, Miriam would see them around, driving luxury trucks, throwing parties, eating opulent meals in the town's restaurants and then paying the tabs of diners to curry favor with the population. The locals had learned to coexist with the group's operators in San Fernando, and Miriam, like others, came to accept the symbiosis between them— each left the other to their own devices.
And then, all of a sudden, 2010 had happened and everything she thought she knew about San Fernando and her life there changed. A vicious breakup of the Gulf Cartel in Tamaulipas, a key smuggling route into the United States, led to the area being carved up by two main cartels, the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas.
The criminal organization that became the Gulf Cartel had run things in Tamaulipas for more than seventy years, first by smuggling alcohol, home goods, and electronics into the United States and then, in the 1990s, by trafficking massive quantities of cocaine, a move that took their earnings into the billions of dollars. As competition from rival traffickers stiffened, the leader of the cartel decided in 1998 to form a paramilitary wing within his organization to protect his inter-ests. That group, originally made up of Mexican Army Special Forces deserters, was known as the Zetas.
For more than a decade, the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas worked together, side by side like the fingers of a glove, smuggling cocaine into the United States and warring with rival cartels across the coun-try. But in 2010, as disagreements between the two groups mounted, the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas split, and the Zetas decided to go into business for themselves. The fight that ensued between the Gulf and the Zetas for control of the drug trade changed the way cartels operated in Mexico.
The Zetas, given their military background, were more studied in violence than their onetime Gulf bosses, and far more adept at logistics and planning. They began in 2010 to wage a war for territory and smuggling routes that staggered even the most hardened cartel killers.
The Zetas' bloodlust made the already grim violence that marked the government's War on Drugs seem quaint by comparison. The Zetas beheaded their victims or dissolved them in vats of acid; they forced captives to fight to the death for their own amusement, like a medieval death rite; and they killed innocents by the hundreds.
Then, the Zetas' brand of dehumanization caught on—and spread.
For all its exceptions, the drug economy often follows the laws of markets. It demands adaptation, flexibility. Once the Gulf had militarized by adding the Zetas to their ranks, other cartels in Mexico did, too. Competition between criminal groups got a lot deadlier after that. In 2011, the year after the Gulf and the Zetas split, Mexico registered nearly 28,000 murders, more than any other year since the government began collecting homicide data two decades before.
*****
As homicides skyrocketed and a fifth of the population abandoned San Fernando, Miriam held out. Sure, there were kidnappings, but only of the rich. Sure, people disappeared, but most were probably involved in organized crime somehow. The grisly murders? That was just the two warring cartels fighting it out. Denial allowed one to survive under the most abject circumstances, to avoid reckoning with the horrors of daily life and persevere in the face of them. The alternative was admitting that the life she had built for her family was gone; the alternative was fleeing or, in Miriam's case, fighting.
*****
Starting in the 1920s, after the United States outlawed the sale of alcohol, a group of contrabandists had managed to seize on the immense opportunity to grow rich by sneaking tequila and other liquors across the Rio Grande into Texas. But the smugglers flourished even after the Volstead Act was repealed. Having established a network, they began fencing anything they could find a market for, and on either side of the border— car parts, home electronics, tires, even cigarettes.
The organization, which would be retroactively named the Gulf Cartel by the government and media many decades later, was founded in the 193os by a former police officer named Juan Nepomuceno Guerra. Under Guerra, the roots of organized crime were only just beginning to sink themselves into the nation's foundation. Guerras network of smugglers was aided by his network of political connections, which assured the free and steady flow of merchandise. The government became partners in the smuggling enterprise, laying the groundwork for the integrated corruption and complicity to come and the patterns of crime and violence that would emerge in the following decades.
The United States would become a bold, unwitting partner in the growth of organized crime in Mexico, especially in Tamaulipas, first by banning alcohol, which helped lead Juan N. Guerra and his acolytes to create the organization, and later by banning narcotics, which prompted Guerras successor, Juan García Ábrego, to expand into smuggling cocaine. The expansion into drug smuggling would grow the revenue of the Gulf Cartel and other criminal organizations by billions of dollars, and would come at a cost of hundreds of thousands of lives across Mexico.
*****
In the years after the revolution, Mexico remained an authoritarian state - a centralized structure that answered to the president, who wielded enormous power. For most of the twentieth century, Mexico was ruled by one political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, whose seemingly contradictory name in fact summed up its greatest asset—that it could be both institutional and revolutionary at once, all things to all people, an amorphous ideology whose sole principle was political dominance.
A single party proved a remarkable way to control the politics of a nation. The party worked with business and union leaders, workers and capitalists, criminals and cops. With every leader at every level playing for the same team, there was no external opposition to contend with, or public political disputes to stifle. With that sort of power, criminals bowed to the state and served at its pleasure.
***
A decade of war during the Mexican Revolution had paved the way for government promises of social equality, wealth redistribution, and a break from the culture of strongman politics. A new political class was coming of age, civilian leaders who would begin to define the Mexican political architecture for decades to come.
Juan N. Guerra and his family used their fortune to plug themselves into that political architecture, paying off politicians and police in an arrangement that functioned more like a cooperative than a clandestine operation. With close financial and personal ties that ran all the way to Mexico City, the family did not hide on the margins of society, as most criminals were forced to do. They were embraced by it. The organization the Guerras began would consolidate and control smuggling in the state for the better part of a hundred years and would eventually become the Gulf Cartel.
Governors, state senators, and even cabinet-level ministers would find their way into Guerra's good graces, and he into theirs. His brother, Roberto, would serve briefly in the government itself, as a top administrator of state finances in Tamaulipas. Guerra's nephew would become the mayor of Matamoros.
By the summer of 1947, the year Juan N. Guerra killed Gloria Lan-deros, his family had a decisive hold on much of the smuggling through Tamaulipas and deep ties with the politicians and authorities meant to stop them. The family enjoyed the sort of impunity that came only when politicians were fully integrated onto the payroll and into the operation-not just handed envelopes of cash here and there.
Guerra had determined early on that simply paying off individuals was not enough-making them complicit in the enterprise assured their self-interest and allowed one's outfit to be a going concern. And since the politicians controlled the police, customs agents, and mili-tary, their buy-in meant the smuggling operation was as close to a state-owned enterprise as it could get.
***
Leadership was striking the right balance of violence to inflict on enemies— enough to scare off competition but not so drastic as to draw attention or to compromise the relationships you were paying money to maintain. Discipline was a must. If all went well, you were laundering huge sums of money and overseeing complex logistical chains that ran from South America to the United States.
Where Juan N. Guerra had forged a physical network to smuggle goods and a political one to protect his business, Juan García Ábrego would pioneer his own changes, realigning the Gulf Cartel to capitalize on shifts in regional politics and appetites. He would amplify the bribery, to the tune of millions of dollars a month, and make the cartel's primary business smuggling cocaine.
For decades, drugs from South America were routed through the Caribbean to Florida, then on to a constellation of cities across the United States. But when the U.S. government shut down the Caribbean route, it inadvertently opened up Mexico as a new front in the drug-smuggling business. García Ábrego smelled a once-in-a-generation opportunity that would alter the fate of his cartel, and of Mexico itself.
***
Criminal enterprises were harsh metaphors of corporate enter-prises, their language and actions more literal but in essence quite similar: Companies lobbied, criminals corrupted; companies created brands, cartels created reputations; companies staged hostile take-overs, and so, too, did cartels.
***
In 1994, the Mexican government signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which allowed for the open trade of goods between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Cross-border commerce flourished, spawning an ever-growing number of opportunities to smuggle drugs into the United States. The busiest border crossing in all of Mexico was the city of Nuevo Laredo, in Tamaulipas.
The same year NAFTA came into effect, there was an armed uprising in the south of Mexico by the Zapatistas, a group of poor-and poorly armed— indigenous villagers fed up with the indignity of corruption and the indifference of politicians. Though the movement was quickly crushed by the military, including the Special Forces group that would later form the Zetas, it was a hallmark of the nation's disaffection with politics and neoliberal globalization.
*****
There's a saying in Mexico, a choice, really, that criminals give those they wish to conscript: plata o plomo. The literal translation is "silver or lead": Take a payoff or catch a bullet. Those were the options the Letas gave to the politicians and police in their territories. Most went along with it; those who refused got the plomo.
***
Predatory acts against locals had not historically been a source of revenue for the cartels. Most drug traffickers enjoyed a certain amount of popularity among the common folk; they needed their support and hailed from their ranks. In a country deeply skeptical of its politicians and law enforcement, sticking it to the government was generally cheered.
But in the end, it was a numbers game: The Zetas had discovered a revenue stream that their Gulf bosses had not thought to exploit.
Kidnapping and extortion of locals were independent and complementary sources of income to international drug sales. In time, other criminal groups would find this new model hard to resist.
***
A name emerged for the missing, the unaccounted for; they were "the disappeared," as if their very presence was deleted. "Disappear" is a freighted verb in Latin America, a vocabulary shared by nations that have suffered its tragic distinction. It means not simply to vanish, but to be vanished: forcibly abducted and, often, never seen again. In the twentieth century, the authoritarian governments of Argentina and Chile tortured and disappeared thousands of supposed opposition members. Guatemala and El Salvador razed communities of accused sympathizers, both before and during their ultraviolent civil wars. Mexico had its own dark chapter in the sixties and seventies, when the PRi was responsible for the disappearance of some twelve hundred people. Historians have named this period of disappearances in the twentieth century the "dirty war."
But unlike Argentina, Chile, or Uruguay, Mexico never really tried to investigate these atrocities. While truth commissions and exhumations of mass graves sought to exorcise the sins of past regimes elsewhere in the region, government responsibility in Mexico stayed largely buried.
To disappear was a natural extension of the depraved war contin-uum, brutally efficient and practical. Without a body, there was no crime. But to disappear a person also inflicted perpetual torture on their families and loved ones, as it would be for Miriam Rodríguez.
For all the macabre scenes of murder compiled in the preceding era, the unending parade of horrors, at least families had had something to collect. To be disappeared robbed families of even the finality of death.
***
Branded by decades of association with the Gulf Cartel, the people of San Fernando suffered for this unwitting alliance. Fearful of Gulf members or sympathizers in their midst, the Zetas terrorized everyone in San Fernando.
Paramedics had stopped working in twenty-four-hour shifts— anyone shot or killed overnight would have to wait for sunrise to be treated or collected. Oxxos, the convenience stores that dot the map of Mex-ico, and which usually offer twenty-four-hour service, shut down by 5 P.M. in San Fernando. The sound of metal shutters clattering down prefaced the sunset as stores hustled to close in advance of nightfall. Families huddled indoors with the lights off, waiting for daybreak. Some bricked over their front doors and slipped in and out of their homes through side entrances. Trips after curfew, to the hospital or pharmacy, were calculated in the starkest terms—was the need life-threatening? Because the drive certainly was. The Zetas' paranoia became everyone else's, too.
***
"Tenian algo que ver." They had something to do with it. The victims were to blame. This was used as a justification for the violence waged against a neighbor, a stranger, even a friend—a way of living with the death and disappearances that suddenly became a part of everyone's life, a way to warrant inaction, cowardice, selfishness.
***
Miriam quickly discovered that the marines operated in an entirely different way from the police. They acted decisively, and lethally.
The marines slayed their enemies at a ratio of nearly thirty to one, and killed more enemies than they wounded, suggesting a tendency to finish off their rivals rather than leave them to fight another day. Staff at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico joked that it was only news when someone managed to survive a shootout with the marines.
*****
Torture in Mexico is as common as the reading of Miranda rights is in the United States, practically part and parcel of legal procedure. The United Nations has called it so widespread as to be "generalized." Authorities in Tamaulipas refer to it as "therapy." Miriam listened from another room, eager to hear what the boy had to say, while wincing every now and then with discomfort at the abuse.
*****
They dug holes in suspect locations, anywhere that might indicate disturbed earth-mountainsides with uneven grading, sections of darkened soil amid dry farmland, incongruous bald patches in grassy fields—hoping it might turn up the remains of their loved ones. To know a loved one had died was a horrible comfort.
***
"I never went to the authorities because they are the same people responsible for causing all the death in the first place."
***
The prosecutors nod, ignore the impulse to argue. They promise to make it right. To build a case. Why they hadn't in all the years prior is a mystery perhaps they themselves cannot answer. Why not do a good and proper job the first time around? Why catch only that which does not fall through the cracks? Why allow the cracks, sustain them? Because not everyone was going to do what Luis Héctor did. Not everyone was going to show up and present themselves and demand answers. And they were glad for that, because there were more cries than ears to listen, more need than capacity to respond. Stripped of expectations, most people accepted, even expected, that their cases, their desires, their justice, would fall to the subfloor. Had grown so used to it that it felt like the only way things could be.