Osprey's examination of French infantry tactics during the Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815). For over 20 years France was the dominating, controlling and conquering power of the western world, a result not only of Napoleon's inspired leadership, but of the efforts of almost an entire generation of Frenchmen under arms. The French Revolution heralded both social change and a seismic shift in how armies were organized, trained and deployed.
This book provides an analysis of the preparation of French troops from manual regulations to the training ground, studying the changing quality of command and control within the army, which initially ensured that the French infantry were virtually unstoppable. Paddy Griffith not only explores the role of the French infantry at the apex of their powers and their actions in key battles, but also provides a detailed explanation of their eventual decline leading to defeat at Waterloo, providing a critical overview of French Napoleonic infantry tactics.
Paddy Griffith was a senior lecturer in war studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst for 16 years. He is the author of numerous articles and books on the history of warfare, including Battle Tactics of the Western Front, 1916-18 and The Art of War of Revolutionary France, 1789-1802.
The trouble is I'm not entirely sure we really know what actually occurred. Paddy Griffith is a brilliant analyst and I hope he is correct in his summing up - which is all he could do in this volume
The book covers many points of French infantry tactics. The chief draw back is its failure to address the question whether the growth of the French Imperial Guard by its selection of veterans for the Old and Middle Guard inhibited the development of line or light infantry units. The author observes the decline in those units necessitated the growth of French artillery to compensate for the degeneration of the non-Imperial Guard foot. The question is fundamental to the survival of Napoleon's empire. If the army had not installed numerous veterans into the Guard, could the infantry have performed better in 1813? Or was the only way to revive the infantry after 1809 to pursue a peace policy for several years to train the conscripts to the standard of 1805? It is well and pertinently illustrated. If one has never encountered the topic before this book provides an excellent introduction.
I’ve started reading about the Napoleonic wars so read this to give me an insight into the military tactics of the time. Why did all the soldiers just walk slowly together in a long line seemingly making themselves an easy target for the enemy? Having read the book I wouldn’t describe myself as an expert by any means, it’s obviously far more complicated subject that I would have imagined but this book was a great starting point and has given me a good grounding for my future studies and I would recommend it to anyone who has an interest in the subject
A good work for those who know something of the era but want to go much deeper. That being said, the author seems perhaps too focused on the "column vs. line" debate, in that he sees the French as relying on columns too much and despite evidence to the contrary.