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The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane
This book deals largely with those aspects of the working of the R&AW of which the author had personal knowledge while serving in the organization for 26 years.
The book traverses through India’s contemporary history-importantly the 71 war; insurgency in the Northeast, Punjab and Kashmir; the Emergency; the war in Afghanistan and the intelligence imperatives and dispensation under Indira Gandhi, Morarji Desai, Rajiv Gandhi, VP Singh, Chandra Shekhar and Narasimha Rao. Written with the purpose that a knowledge of the role played by R&AW in those events would possibly enable a better understanding of its strengths and weaknesses, it painstakingly avoids over-statements, exaggerations and spins. The organization has been given credit where it is due. And it has been criticized where such criticism was warranted.
Known for his candor, the author provides rare insights into the functioning of R&AW. This book is objective in its commentary and assessment. A prolific writer like Raman waited for 13 years after he retired from R&AW in 1994 to come out with an insightful book.
In India, retired intelligence officers have written books on general aspects of intelligence and security. However, there has been a reluctance to write on the functioning of our intelligence agencies by its retired officers. Such reluctance was there even in other countries till the early 1960s. This has since disappeared. The public in general and the research scholars in particular have benefited from such writings. This book seeks to break the reluctance in India in public interest, so that the nation as a whole may benefit from a well-informed debate.
Kaoboys of the R&AW, first attempt by an insider, who belonged to the permanent cadre since inception of R&AW and was not merely a bird of passage, hopefully, would encourage others to share their experience and insights with the public and research scholars.
The book traverses through India’s contemporary history-importantly the 71 war; insurgency in the Northeast, Punjab and Kashmir; the Emergency; the war in Afghanistan and the intelligence imperatives and dispensation under Indira Gandhi, Morarji Desai, Rajiv Gandhi, VP Singh, Chandra Shekhar and Narasimha Rao. Written with the purpose that a knowledge of the role played by R&AW in those events would possibly enable a better understanding of its strengths and weaknesses, it painstakingly avoids over-statements, exaggerations and spins. The organization has been given credit where it is due. And it has been criticized where such criticism was warranted.
Known for his candor, the author provides rare insights into the functioning of R&AW. This book is objective in its commentary and assessment. A prolific writer like Raman waited for 13 years after he retired from R&AW in 1994 to come out with an insightful book.
In India, retired intelligence officers have written books on general aspects of intelligence and security. However, there has been a reluctance to write on the functioning of our intelligence agencies by its retired officers. Such reluctance was there even in other countries till the early 1960s. This has since disappeared. The public in general and the research scholars in particular have benefited from such writings. This book seeks to break the reluctance in India in public interest, so that the nation as a whole may benefit from a well-informed debate.
Kaoboys of the R&AW, first attempt by an insider, who belonged to the permanent cadre since inception of R&AW and was not merely a bird of passage, hopefully, would encourage others to share their experience and insights with the public and research scholars.
296 pages, Kindle Edition
First published July 1, 2007
107 people are currently reading
1393 people want to read
About the author
B. Raman
8 books23 followersBahukutumbi Raman(B. Raman) was an Additional Secretary of the Cabinet Secretariat of the Government of India and one-time head of the counter-terrorism division of India's external intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Until his death in 2013, he was the director of the Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai.
Having been one of the few surviving officers who were a witness to the creation of R&AW during 1968 by RN Kao, his analysis on Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and China have been an asset to the Intelligence community.
As a former intelligence official, B Raman regularly wrote about security, counter-terrorism and military issues regarding India and South Asia. He was a firm believer of Gandhi-Nehru rule, and had often proposed it as a solution to many of India's political uncertainties and socio-economic woes.
B Raman was also a contributor to the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG).
Having been one of the few surviving officers who were a witness to the creation of R&AW during 1968 by RN Kao, his analysis on Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and China have been an asset to the Intelligence community.
As a former intelligence official, B Raman regularly wrote about security, counter-terrorism and military issues regarding India and South Asia. He was a firm believer of Gandhi-Nehru rule, and had often proposed it as a solution to many of India's political uncertainties and socio-economic woes.
B Raman was also a contributor to the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG).
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 84 reviews
June 25, 2013
I can't say I did not develop a mild case of paranoia when I decided to write a review for this book. I say paranoia because when you read accounts of men like Mr. Raman one starts wondering where did they falter in their own lives. I mean, the man has done more for this country than I can ever imagine, he has earned friendships and loyalties which I can only fantasize about, etc. etc.
Sigh! Forgive me for digressing; On to the review of the book then.
What I liked:
1. The one big critique by my fellow reviewers, the disjointed writing. I liked it! Come on guys! The author was a field man involved in some serious cloak and dagger stuff, how did you think he would write? Like a field operative would of course!
I know, that isn't an excuse for the publishers to lean on for the piss poor editing. However, if you notice, the book is quite well indexed. Which tells me that the publishers for reasons we can only speculate about decided to leave Mr. Raman's writing be as he typed it originally.
Nothing endears to a reader of memoirs than the originality.
2. Mr. Raman is unapologetic about his admiration for Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi and to some measure for Chandrasekhar and P.V. Narasimha Rao. No two ways about it, he is quite frank about it. I liked that, not the loyalty part but about being honest and open about it. That takes guts to go on record about for an intelligence officer although he was retired at the time of writing it.
3. This is my first time reading material of such serious nature but although being a noob I could sense sincerity in the author when he recounted some of the work he had done as an intelligence officer.
4. The author is a very serious man but here and there he mentioned some stuff which made me laugh out loud. Like the time a lady got drunk and introduced to a big crowd about who he really was! I almost choked on the juice I was drinking laughing at that incident. There are a few more those but they are so very less in number that I would be stealing the publisher off his money if I wrote about those.
5. Unlike other writers, Mr. Raman has depended on absolutely no one to make this sell. None of the flashy forewords we see in other books. Just a page of very subdued praises, that's all.
What I did not like:
1. Just one actually. Somehow, one gets the impression that this book came out because it had to. I mean, there's absolutely minimal backing for this book and I am really disappointed as Mr. Raman deserved to have had his legacy read by many more.
2. There was very little about Mr. Kao. I was disappointed I couldn't read more about him.
On a side note, Mr. Raman passed away last week on June 16th 2013 (http://www.dnaindia.com/india/1848995...). May he rest in peace; thank you sir for your service to this country. We are indebted.
Sigh! Forgive me for digressing; On to the review of the book then.
What I liked:
1. The one big critique by my fellow reviewers, the disjointed writing. I liked it! Come on guys! The author was a field man involved in some serious cloak and dagger stuff, how did you think he would write? Like a field operative would of course!
I know, that isn't an excuse for the publishers to lean on for the piss poor editing. However, if you notice, the book is quite well indexed. Which tells me that the publishers for reasons we can only speculate about decided to leave Mr. Raman's writing be as he typed it originally.
Nothing endears to a reader of memoirs than the originality.
2. Mr. Raman is unapologetic about his admiration for Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi and to some measure for Chandrasekhar and P.V. Narasimha Rao. No two ways about it, he is quite frank about it. I liked that, not the loyalty part but about being honest and open about it. That takes guts to go on record about for an intelligence officer although he was retired at the time of writing it.
3. This is my first time reading material of such serious nature but although being a noob I could sense sincerity in the author when he recounted some of the work he had done as an intelligence officer.
4. The author is a very serious man but here and there he mentioned some stuff which made me laugh out loud. Like the time a lady got drunk and introduced to a big crowd about who he really was! I almost choked on the juice I was drinking laughing at that incident. There are a few more those but they are so very less in number that I would be stealing the publisher off his money if I wrote about those.
5. Unlike other writers, Mr. Raman has depended on absolutely no one to make this sell. None of the flashy forewords we see in other books. Just a page of very subdued praises, that's all.
What I did not like:
1. Just one actually. Somehow, one gets the impression that this book came out because it had to. I mean, there's absolutely minimal backing for this book and I am really disappointed as Mr. Raman deserved to have had his legacy read by many more.
2. There was very little about Mr. Kao. I was disappointed I couldn't read more about him.
On a side note, Mr. Raman passed away last week on June 16th 2013 (http://www.dnaindia.com/india/1848995...). May he rest in peace; thank you sir for your service to this country. We are indebted.
March 19, 2016
On rare occasions, guardian-shadows are allowed voices to speak. An instructive read that goes beyond *just a thrilling bunch of stories*, it is also tribute to those who strive endlessly to preserve our freedom.
March 2, 2019
B Raman's 'The Kaoboys of R&AW' was on my long list of to-be-reads for sometime. The hype over the book and the author himself did have their influence on me. Finally, ended up reading the Kindle version. If I can summarize Raman's book, I say its a 'too clever by half' attempt!
Why do I say that? And its not to suggest that Raman's book is thrash or not to be read at all. It has its importance, there are facts revealed which were unknown hitherto and new perspectives on our polity, intelligence apparatus and incidents.
It is the unbridled sanctimonious importance that he grants himself and constant attempts to blame everyone else is one of my pain points. The other agony I had to experience throughout the work is his fawning obsequiousness of the Gandhi Family. He almost grants the entire bouquets of goods that happened to India and the Intelligence community to Indira and Rajiv Gandhi and the anything bad to everyone else! I mean if this was how a intelligence officer was enamored by a political family, what is the guarantee that it has not affected his sensibilities and decision making abilities?
Fathom this: He credits Indira Gandhi for her role in the successful intelligence operations during 1971 war and many quoted incidents later. However, no such words of praise are directed towards VP Singh or Chandrashekar for their support to the intelligence agencies during the Khalistani movement or in Kashmir. All success after Indira credited only to the intelligence officers (while they duly deserve) while every success earlier has been lavishly credited by the author to Indira and her son. Even after his retirement, there are instances he quotes where successful diplomatic maneuvers were credited to PVN Rao and Manmohan Singh. However, there are no words of praise for AB Vajpayee for his role in Pokhran-II tests or other successful diplomatic victories.
His hatred towards 'Hindutva' emerges several times in the book. Maybe this ensured his dislike for Vajpayee and Hindu organizations. Worst and most unexpected of a intelligence officer is like mainstream media, he squarely blames the rise of Islamic terrorism in India to the demolition of Babri Masjid! He hints that if the Babri Masjid wasn't brought down, Islamic terrorism would have spared India altogether. Blimey!!!
As I read through his analysis of post Babri incidents, a sense of despondency crept inside. If this is how our ace intelligence officers analyse issues in a partisan manner, would it be any different today? The threats have increased. Ways to target India have grown manifold. But have our intelligence officers and their apparatus upgraded themselves? Or do they still believe that making notes regularly is good enough to thwart terrorist attacks?
The creation of R&AW, its working, role and position of sleuths in IB and R&AW, their role in diplomacy, successful missions are highlights of Raman's work. Few amusing incidents (Eg. Drunken wife of a Indian diplomat who revealed his true identity as an officer of R&AW) and his style of narration makes it a easy and pleasant read.
I have always loved to read about the working of Intelligence agencies and their role in real. I would rate Peter Wrights 'Spycatcher' and Maj. Gen. VK Singhs 'India's External Intelligence: Secrets of R&AW' higher than Raman's work in terms of aim of the book and earnestness of the author. If you are seriously interested in reading on intelligence agencies, missing 'Kaoboys of R&AW' is no major loss.
Eagerly waiting to read Yuri Modin's 'My Five Cambridge Friends'. Alas, the Indian versions are too costly hence waiting for the low cost edition to be out sometime. Also wondering is Allen Dulles 'Craft of Intelligence' is still relevant in modern times. Dont want to read about the survival capacity of a Dodo :-) If anyone has the above info on these two works, please do let me know.
Why do I say that? And its not to suggest that Raman's book is thrash or not to be read at all. It has its importance, there are facts revealed which were unknown hitherto and new perspectives on our polity, intelligence apparatus and incidents.
It is the unbridled sanctimonious importance that he grants himself and constant attempts to blame everyone else is one of my pain points. The other agony I had to experience throughout the work is his fawning obsequiousness of the Gandhi Family. He almost grants the entire bouquets of goods that happened to India and the Intelligence community to Indira and Rajiv Gandhi and the anything bad to everyone else! I mean if this was how a intelligence officer was enamored by a political family, what is the guarantee that it has not affected his sensibilities and decision making abilities?
Fathom this: He credits Indira Gandhi for her role in the successful intelligence operations during 1971 war and many quoted incidents later. However, no such words of praise are directed towards VP Singh or Chandrashekar for their support to the intelligence agencies during the Khalistani movement or in Kashmir. All success after Indira credited only to the intelligence officers (while they duly deserve) while every success earlier has been lavishly credited by the author to Indira and her son. Even after his retirement, there are instances he quotes where successful diplomatic maneuvers were credited to PVN Rao and Manmohan Singh. However, there are no words of praise for AB Vajpayee for his role in Pokhran-II tests or other successful diplomatic victories.
His hatred towards 'Hindutva' emerges several times in the book. Maybe this ensured his dislike for Vajpayee and Hindu organizations. Worst and most unexpected of a intelligence officer is like mainstream media, he squarely blames the rise of Islamic terrorism in India to the demolition of Babri Masjid! He hints that if the Babri Masjid wasn't brought down, Islamic terrorism would have spared India altogether. Blimey!!!
As I read through his analysis of post Babri incidents, a sense of despondency crept inside. If this is how our ace intelligence officers analyse issues in a partisan manner, would it be any different today? The threats have increased. Ways to target India have grown manifold. But have our intelligence officers and their apparatus upgraded themselves? Or do they still believe that making notes regularly is good enough to thwart terrorist attacks?
The creation of R&AW, its working, role and position of sleuths in IB and R&AW, their role in diplomacy, successful missions are highlights of Raman's work. Few amusing incidents (Eg. Drunken wife of a Indian diplomat who revealed his true identity as an officer of R&AW) and his style of narration makes it a easy and pleasant read.
I have always loved to read about the working of Intelligence agencies and their role in real. I would rate Peter Wrights 'Spycatcher' and Maj. Gen. VK Singhs 'India's External Intelligence: Secrets of R&AW' higher than Raman's work in terms of aim of the book and earnestness of the author. If you are seriously interested in reading on intelligence agencies, missing 'Kaoboys of R&AW' is no major loss.
Eagerly waiting to read Yuri Modin's 'My Five Cambridge Friends'. Alas, the Indian versions are too costly hence waiting for the low cost edition to be out sometime. Also wondering is Allen Dulles 'Craft of Intelligence' is still relevant in modern times. Dont want to read about the survival capacity of a Dodo :-) If anyone has the above info on these two works, please do let me know.
June 16, 2012
An average book... maybe because it describes an average secret service but that is not the only reason. The narrative is discontinuous, most events described are trivial.
I had always imagined RAW to be very good, because no one knew anything about it. As a secret service it may have been better that way. But having known a few things more about it after this book, am not sure whether I should have read the book in the first place.
I had always imagined RAW to be very good, because no one knew anything about it. As a secret service it may have been better that way. But having known a few things more about it after this book, am not sure whether I should have read the book in the first place.
May 3, 2019
The book is a reminisce of B Raman's tenure in R&AW. Divided into chapters it covers a wide ground such as the 1971 Indo-Pak war and the subsequent creation of Bangladesh, terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir , political leaders like Indira, Rajiv , Chandrashekhar and V P Singh alongwith events like the bofors scandal and Indira Gandhi's assasination. Raman hasn't named anyone directly and has described the ascent and decline of R&AW alongwith stinging criticism of certain individuals.
February 28, 2020
It is a great book if you are interested in knowing insights into R&AW. The author has used simple language and not too many jargons so it is easy to understand who does not live the world of police, military, and Spy. The flow could have been improved as sometimes he jumps from one topic to another.
January 24, 2019
Raman is quite unapologetic about his admiration for the Gandhis, and credits them for what India's intelligence agencies are today. He also laments that these agencies were unable to protect both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, to whom they owed a lot for their existence. The only major point of dissent that I have with the author is regarding the Ayodhya issue. He argues that Muslims in India have not taken to widespread violence until their sentiments were hurt due to Babri-Masjid demolition, and squarely blames the Hindu community for hurting Muslim sentiments, which is quite erroneous and historically untrue. Also, I expected something in detail about R&AW's liaison with the Mossad, but it only gets a mention.
December 3, 2021
Most contemporary Indian history I know comes from coffee table conversations between my parents and aunty-uncles. Naturally noticeable was the partisan bent in which way the interpretation of actions and events go. A personal history blending into an institutional history from a person belonging to possibly the most secretive arm of our government feels strangely similar to sitting around listening to an uncle talk.
It does feel unvarnished, with numerous instances talked about where RAW could have done better, and where the Indian Government itself could do better in terms of facilitating intelligence. The bullet point analysis at the end corroborates the alleged razor sharp skills of the author in the same, and while there would have been more hope of transparency at the time the book was written, in our present central consolidation of power, it is less likely to come to pass.
There is a regrettable amount of stepping on each other's toes when it comes to the question of National defense, rather than the seamless cooperation that we would wish for.
There is some amount of idolisation of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, from an intelligence policy perspective, but to be honest, I think they might deserve it. Considering the bias is tough when the full picture isn't out. Maybe a full picture is a mirage, and we should try and get to our opinions. What I took away most, other than all the interesting contemporary history, is that we need more such books to make up our own minds.
It does feel unvarnished, with numerous instances talked about where RAW could have done better, and where the Indian Government itself could do better in terms of facilitating intelligence. The bullet point analysis at the end corroborates the alleged razor sharp skills of the author in the same, and while there would have been more hope of transparency at the time the book was written, in our present central consolidation of power, it is less likely to come to pass.
There is a regrettable amount of stepping on each other's toes when it comes to the question of National defense, rather than the seamless cooperation that we would wish for.
There is some amount of idolisation of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, from an intelligence policy perspective, but to be honest, I think they might deserve it. Considering the bias is tough when the full picture isn't out. Maybe a full picture is a mirage, and we should try and get to our opinions. What I took away most, other than all the interesting contemporary history, is that we need more such books to make up our own minds.
January 12, 2026
A decent read, but the narrative feels overly centred on Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi.
The book tends to credit the Gandhis for most successes while shifting responsibility for failures elsewhere, making it feel somewhat one-sided.
The book tends to credit the Gandhis for most successes while shifting responsibility for failures elsewhere, making it feel somewhat one-sided.
November 4, 2019
All my expectations of RAW being a premier intelligence unit were diminished after reading this book.
As writer aptly put forward that for every attack there were multiple instances where the attack was subverted with the efforts of RAW. However, he failed to explain or brought even a single such instance to the notice of readers.
Most of the times, RAW woke up after something bad has happened, be it the assasination of our two former prime ministers, insurgency in Punjab, 93 bomb blasts or emergence of LTTE faction in India. Infact the only sucessful campaign of RAW in 1971 war for liberation of Bangladesh seemed like personal initiative taken by Mrs Indira Gandhi and there also, military intelligence on more than one occasion proved to be more accurate than RAW's.
And like any other typical government service, most of its agents exploited the agency and were corrupt to the core. And the worst of all was the failure of our leaders to keep these corrupt officials in check.
Most of the time for its inefficiency, the writer kept on blaming IB, politicians and other governmental agencies.
In the end it was a good read, but don't expect RAW to be in the league of MOSSAD , KGB or CIA.
As writer aptly put forward that for every attack there were multiple instances where the attack was subverted with the efforts of RAW. However, he failed to explain or brought even a single such instance to the notice of readers.
Most of the times, RAW woke up after something bad has happened, be it the assasination of our two former prime ministers, insurgency in Punjab, 93 bomb blasts or emergence of LTTE faction in India. Infact the only sucessful campaign of RAW in 1971 war for liberation of Bangladesh seemed like personal initiative taken by Mrs Indira Gandhi and there also, military intelligence on more than one occasion proved to be more accurate than RAW's.
And like any other typical government service, most of its agents exploited the agency and were corrupt to the core. And the worst of all was the failure of our leaders to keep these corrupt officials in check.
Most of the time for its inefficiency, the writer kept on blaming IB, politicians and other governmental agencies.
In the end it was a good read, but don't expect RAW to be in the league of MOSSAD , KGB or CIA.
April 13, 2024
The genius of a man and his foresight.
An excellent read, especially for those who keep a keen interest in international relations and its dynamic interplay with a nation’s security obligations.
An excellent read, especially for those who keep a keen interest in international relations and its dynamic interplay with a nation’s security obligations.
April 10, 2025
Interesting in parts but self aggrandising and light on details likely due to security concerns kills the narrative . There is too much blind loyalty of the Gandhi family which sadly was the bane of Indian politics for too long , which somewhat killed what could have been a fascinating series of exploits . The true efforts of the RAW in the Bangladesh freedom struggle or the undercover work in Pakistan are not even touched on in any operational detail , rather we are left with a dry tale of inter department rivalries and petty complaints about PMs who followed the Gandhis . Very disappointing.
November 7, 2016
“Every country gets the intelligence agencies it deserves…..R&AW is intelligence agency we deserve and not the agency that we need as one of the two rising powers in Asia.”
If you are expecting account of covert and clandestine operations of R&AW spies while liberating struggle of Bangladesh and then after, ‘The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane’ would disappoint you. This book does not narrate operations of R&AW on the line of operations of MOSSAD narrated by popular books on intelligence agencies. Rather, while praising role of R&AW in many occasions, this book equally revels serious operational problems in R&AW, its weaknesses, lack of cooperation between Indian security agencies and ego clashes at top most level in bureaucracy. B Raman narrated rare firsthand account of world of R&AW. Full of stories, this book it oasis for those who are interested in working of India’s external intelligence agency, it’s founding and functioning. Author honestly portrayed pictures of R&AW chiefs including founding Chief Rameshwar Nath Kao and other officers. Functioning of agency under different Prime Minister provides valuable inputs while evaluating performance of various Prime Ministers in terms of dealing with external and internal security problems. Events like Bangladesh war, Khalistan movement and terrorism in Panjab, assassination of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, inception of terrorism in J&K, Bofors scam, Demolition of Babari Masjid etc are described from intelligence point of view and are highly informative. Irony and dilemmas of intelligence agencies of world, Role of ISI, CIA and intelligence agencies of other countries in context of India, their liasoning network and their functioning are narrated, though not so lucidly, which provides glimpse in this secret world. However, some time book looks unorganized and author seems to wandering like spy, in toto, book provide good overall picture. B Raman does not forget to mention Late Shakti Bhatt, daughter of famous Gujarati writer Kanti Bhatt who died at young age of 26 due to brief illness, on whose insistence he agreed to write this book. Plenty of anecdotes, honest narrative and more than any other thing, subject of book itself makes this book highly readable.
If you are expecting account of covert and clandestine operations of R&AW spies while liberating struggle of Bangladesh and then after, ‘The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane’ would disappoint you. This book does not narrate operations of R&AW on the line of operations of MOSSAD narrated by popular books on intelligence agencies. Rather, while praising role of R&AW in many occasions, this book equally revels serious operational problems in R&AW, its weaknesses, lack of cooperation between Indian security agencies and ego clashes at top most level in bureaucracy. B Raman narrated rare firsthand account of world of R&AW. Full of stories, this book it oasis for those who are interested in working of India’s external intelligence agency, it’s founding and functioning. Author honestly portrayed pictures of R&AW chiefs including founding Chief Rameshwar Nath Kao and other officers. Functioning of agency under different Prime Minister provides valuable inputs while evaluating performance of various Prime Ministers in terms of dealing with external and internal security problems. Events like Bangladesh war, Khalistan movement and terrorism in Panjab, assassination of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, inception of terrorism in J&K, Bofors scam, Demolition of Babari Masjid etc are described from intelligence point of view and are highly informative. Irony and dilemmas of intelligence agencies of world, Role of ISI, CIA and intelligence agencies of other countries in context of India, their liasoning network and their functioning are narrated, though not so lucidly, which provides glimpse in this secret world. However, some time book looks unorganized and author seems to wandering like spy, in toto, book provide good overall picture. B Raman does not forget to mention Late Shakti Bhatt, daughter of famous Gujarati writer Kanti Bhatt who died at young age of 26 due to brief illness, on whose insistence he agreed to write this book. Plenty of anecdotes, honest narrative and more than any other thing, subject of book itself makes this book highly readable.
April 5, 2009
I was always curious to read about India's spy agency - and its worthiness. This book is first hand description of how RAW works, its history and procedures, and justifications for failures. The paragraphs are repetitive at a times and opinions are more inclined towards cynicism. Perhaps just impressions of a retired spy.
If you are expecting a story similar to what ex-spies from Mossad, CIA or MI6 have written - then this book is not even close. The book does not discuss details of the covert operation and/or specifics. It glosses over key information elements of so called "spy agency" of India.
Good read if you can relate to the events described in the book and are interested in feeble spy operations of countries like India.
If you are expecting a story similar to what ex-spies from Mossad, CIA or MI6 have written - then this book is not even close. The book does not discuss details of the covert operation and/or specifics. It glosses over key information elements of so called "spy agency" of India.
Good read if you can relate to the events described in the book and are interested in feeble spy operations of countries like India.
October 30, 2017
Great account of how the agency works by an ex official at highest levels.
It discusses about the agency's successes, failures, lack of man management, attitude of permissiveness which led to rise of moles, functioning under different governments. It is fascinating to know the developments behind the monumental incidents that shaped geopolitical scenarios which include bangladesh bifurcation, kanishka plane bombing, twin PM assassinations, kargil war, naga/mizo conflicts among others.
The book could've been better edited but that doesn't hamper reading. I finished in one go, real page turner!
It discusses about the agency's successes, failures, lack of man management, attitude of permissiveness which led to rise of moles, functioning under different governments. It is fascinating to know the developments behind the monumental incidents that shaped geopolitical scenarios which include bangladesh bifurcation, kanishka plane bombing, twin PM assassinations, kargil war, naga/mizo conflicts among others.
The book could've been better edited but that doesn't hamper reading. I finished in one go, real page turner!
July 20, 2019
Author is not sure who coined the term ‘Kaoboys’, but among the three persons he mentions, T.N. Kaul seems the most likely. The book covers a wide gamut of events under seven PMs. His adulation for Indira and Rajiv Gandhi are matched only by his veneration for the first five RAW chiefs. This often results in hard-to-digest claims and conjectures. Author claims for RAW a major share of the credit for the creation of Bangladesh, the biggest coup being the tip-off from a mole in Gen Yahya Khan’s office about a pre-emptive strike by the Pakistani air force on December 3. RAW immediately alerted the IAF and informed Indira Gandhi. Thanks to the warning, the strike failed, he writes. Modern armies do not depend on moles to warn them of enemy attacks; they have other means, like air defence radars etc. In ’71, preparations for war had begun in April itself. Significantly, Mrs Gandhi was in Calcutta on December 3 when the war began.
Read between the lines, and the book has interesting inferences: for instance, the government paid a commission of $6 million to an Iranian middleman to get a soft loan of $250 million from the Shah of Iran. How then can the government treat commissions paid in deals like Bofors as crimes? Again, based on RAW-IB inputs, all Sikhs entering Delhi during Asiad 1982 were stopped and searched. The humiliation drove many into the arms of Khalistani terrorists. The situation rapidly deteriorated. Who took the decision to ban the entry of Sikhs? Besides, if most PMs were better informed than RAW or IB, as he writes, it’s a sad reflection on the agencies.
To be fair, Author has listed the failures of RAW along with its successes. In ’69, RAW and IB assessed that 2,100 Naga hostiles had gone to Yunnan for training. Sam Manekshaw and Maj Gen M.N. Batra, the director of military intelligence—told the joint intelligence committee that the number was around 450, which later proved correct. Among the other lapses are the failure to prevent Mujibur Rehman’s assassination in ’75; not sharing with IB the information received from MI-5 that could have prevented the arms drop in Purulia; ignoring warnings from IB about unusual activity in Pakistan’s Northern Areas which led to the Kargil fiasco; and giving Rajiv Gandhi incorrect advice in the Bofors cover-up.
Author acknowledges the culpability of the intelligence agencies in the Indira-Rajiv assassinations. After Operation Bluestar, R.N. Kao, then senior advisor, decided that no Sikhs would be deployed for the PM’s close proximity security. When she expressed her misgivings, the orders were cancelled. Had Kao stood his ground, the tragedy could have been averted. In ’91, intelligence agencies knew Rajiv was under threat from Khalistani terrorists and the LTTE. Yet nothing was done, on grounds that the SPG Act did not cover an ex-PM’s security. After the assassination, RAW’s monitoring division was able to track down the conspirators by intercepting and decoding LTTE communications. Had its earlier monitoring been as systematic, Rajiv would have been alive today.
Author’s reluctance to give names, even of well-known personalities like Quattrocchi, is baffling. His book reveals the indiscipline, nepotism and corruption in RAW. Trade unionism led to a strike in 1980 when police had to rescue officers ‘gheraoed’ by the strikers. Nepotism was so common that the agency was facetiously called the Relatives & Associates Wing. RAW officers posted abroad lived in style and were the only ones who could afford a Mercedes. "How do they manage to find the money," asked Narasimha Rao, then foreign minister. Author makes a strong case for parliamentary oversight. He says major debacles like Kargil and Rabinder Singh’s escape could have been pre-empted by a suitable monitoring mechanism for RAW, on the pattern of the CIA and Mossad. He blames the political establishment for its apathy to intelligence issues. Coming from an insider, the advice should be taken seriously.
Read between the lines, and the book has interesting inferences: for instance, the government paid a commission of $6 million to an Iranian middleman to get a soft loan of $250 million from the Shah of Iran. How then can the government treat commissions paid in deals like Bofors as crimes? Again, based on RAW-IB inputs, all Sikhs entering Delhi during Asiad 1982 were stopped and searched. The humiliation drove many into the arms of Khalistani terrorists. The situation rapidly deteriorated. Who took the decision to ban the entry of Sikhs? Besides, if most PMs were better informed than RAW or IB, as he writes, it’s a sad reflection on the agencies.
To be fair, Author has listed the failures of RAW along with its successes. In ’69, RAW and IB assessed that 2,100 Naga hostiles had gone to Yunnan for training. Sam Manekshaw and Maj Gen M.N. Batra, the director of military intelligence—told the joint intelligence committee that the number was around 450, which later proved correct. Among the other lapses are the failure to prevent Mujibur Rehman’s assassination in ’75; not sharing with IB the information received from MI-5 that could have prevented the arms drop in Purulia; ignoring warnings from IB about unusual activity in Pakistan’s Northern Areas which led to the Kargil fiasco; and giving Rajiv Gandhi incorrect advice in the Bofors cover-up.
Author acknowledges the culpability of the intelligence agencies in the Indira-Rajiv assassinations. After Operation Bluestar, R.N. Kao, then senior advisor, decided that no Sikhs would be deployed for the PM’s close proximity security. When she expressed her misgivings, the orders were cancelled. Had Kao stood his ground, the tragedy could have been averted. In ’91, intelligence agencies knew Rajiv was under threat from Khalistani terrorists and the LTTE. Yet nothing was done, on grounds that the SPG Act did not cover an ex-PM’s security. After the assassination, RAW’s monitoring division was able to track down the conspirators by intercepting and decoding LTTE communications. Had its earlier monitoring been as systematic, Rajiv would have been alive today.
Author’s reluctance to give names, even of well-known personalities like Quattrocchi, is baffling. His book reveals the indiscipline, nepotism and corruption in RAW. Trade unionism led to a strike in 1980 when police had to rescue officers ‘gheraoed’ by the strikers. Nepotism was so common that the agency was facetiously called the Relatives & Associates Wing. RAW officers posted abroad lived in style and were the only ones who could afford a Mercedes. "How do they manage to find the money," asked Narasimha Rao, then foreign minister. Author makes a strong case for parliamentary oversight. He says major debacles like Kargil and Rabinder Singh’s escape could have been pre-empted by a suitable monitoring mechanism for RAW, on the pattern of the CIA and Mossad. He blames the political establishment for its apathy to intelligence issues. Coming from an insider, the advice should be taken seriously.
June 30, 2016
B. Raman has written extensively on Indian security matters for a while now, as well as being a guest on numerous TV debates on the subject. At the time of picking this book, I had no idea that Raman worked for R&AW. I went in to buy this book expecting an account of some of RAW's missions abroad, on the lines of the numerous accounts that exist of MOSSAD and the CIA. There are few such accounts mentioned in the book. Instead, the book provides a broad overview of the history of RAW's role in Indian policy and shaping relationships with its neighbours, as well as providing extensive details of the thinking of various prime ministers, from Indira Gandhi who helped birth RAW from IB, all the way to the government of Narasimha Rao. In terms of analyzing the relationship between RAW, the government, and other agencies, I found this book to be an eye-opener in understanding the frequent conflicts that arise between them. Raman also consistently puts forward his views on various policies and problems that have plagued RAW through the decades, without which the book would merely be a loose collection of anecdotes. The book is littered with incomplete anecdotes, however, not to mention curiously bad editing and grammar for someone who possessed a BA in journalism. The other major drawback is the lack of a larger context provided to many of the events and episodes highlighted through the book. Raman writes purely as an analyst, and never once tries to portray the humanity of the spies involved, or the people affected by the actions of RAW or other intelligence agencies. If this is what you're looking for, this is not the book for the job.
Each chapter covers either issues and threats that RAW dealt with, or analyzes the relationships between RAW and the prime minister/government of the day. Raman starts with analyzing the role of RAW in the 1971 war which saw Bangladesh break off from Pakistan. Under the guidance of it's first director, RN Kao, RAW was reprotedly successful in organizing a PSYWAR (psychological warfare) campaign to highlight atrocities in Bangladesh. This was crucial in garnering diplomatic support for India's actions in Bangladesh, much to the consternation of the US and Pakistan. Also highlighted is the carrying out of "covert actions" in northern Burma during this war, which played a role in curbing the activities of the Mizo National Front (MNF) under Laldenga. Raman highlights the role played by RAW in setting the stage for negotiations that ultimately brought an end to insurgency by the MNF. This was an insurgency that saw sufficient violence and bloodshed from all sides involved, and Raman stays mum on all of it. Raman highlights the role played by the ISI and China in supporting these insurgencies through providing arms and training, and the non-cooperation of the Burmese Army. These claims are hard to verify for me, based as they are on classified information. But this is true of much of what is said in the book.
Raman moves on to talk about the Khalistani movement, which along with the portions dealing with terrorism, forms a considerable chunk of the book. Again, the role of the ISI aside, supported as it was from Zia ul Haq in its policies, Raman fumes at the turned gaze of the CIA, MI6 and Canadian intelligence agencies while Khalistani militants brazenly moved across borders to organize support for their movement. I haven't read any other account of the Khalistani movement, but Raman insists that the mushrooming of support for the movement was an instance of a successful PSYWAR campaign by ISI to highlight atrocities against Sikhs in India. It's hard for me to believe that any intelligence agency would have the power to foment such an organized movement single handedly without any help from other sources of disgruntlement amongst the Sikh population. To that end, Raman insists that the lack of help provided to Sikhs abroad on the same lines that Israel provides to Jews also helped build up support for Khalistan. But again, this seems far-fetched.
The ouster of Indira Gandhi in 1977 would see a dip in funding for RAW under Morarji Desai's government. Desai, rightly or wrongly, viewed RAW as a political tool used by Indira Gandhi against her enemies. Raman provides a blanket denial of these allegations, but rarely addresses them head on or clear the air about them. Nonetheless, Desai's distrust saw many of RAW's capabilities blunted as manpower had to be fired or re-assigned, and missions scaled back. But interestingly, Raman points out to the rot that had already set in to RAW. Nepotistic appointments, lavish lifestyles led by RAW officers abroad, reports of RAW agents harassing Indians abroad dulled the post 1971 sheen of the organization. But Raman says that though the RAW chiefs appointed by every successive governments were remarkably upright individuals, they seemed to turn a blind eye, or were outright ineffective, in dealing with these matters.
Through each of these chapters, Raman brings out the intricacies and counter-intuitive nature of intelligence work. The fact that CIA helped provide RAW with training and equipment in its founding days, while supporting the ISI in its actions against India, seems bizarre. These are the few nuggets that are great takeaways from the book. Often, it seems that when we thinking about American involvement in an issue, different arms of the country have their own agendas. There are instances of CIA chiefs helping the Indian cause while the State Department was hostile. Or the unwritten rules about spying, like the idea that liaison officers of an agency aren't supposed to spy on the countries they're posted in, or that host countries aren't supposed to ill-treat spies discovered in the embassy of a friendly nation (which ISI and IB reportedly never follow). These are the places of the book where the macabre world of spycraft are written for all to see.
Raman goes into considerable detail about the days and weeks leading up to the asssassination of Indira Gandhi. Pointing to the lack of coordination between the RAW, IB and Delhi Police, Raman sketches a depressing picture of the state of information sharing between agencies. The fact that intelligence agency failures are highlighted, and successes kept classified, creates an incentive for intelligence agencies to over-hype or exaggerate perceived threats, lest they be held accountable for a failure. Conflicting reports on threats to a VIP are commonplace, as is the issue of common sources being used by multiple agencies which means information provided by different agencies is rarely independent, or that turf wars between agencies remain a blight. Throw in a sense of competition between agencies to be the first to report a threat, and it's a miracle that any VIP stays alive!
From Desai's lack of support of the RAW, through Rajiv Gandhi's continuation of Indira's patronage of the institution, down to Rao and Singh's grudging appreciation of its work, the RAW suffered from many flaws which could have been addressed by the prime ministers of the day. Aside from those mentioned earlier, rivalry with other agencies, a lack of oversight of the agency by the parliament (compared to the practice in the US and most democracies elsewhere), troubles in preventing major attacks and issues with gathering certain kinds of human intelligence continue to plague the agency. Counter-intelligence remains a concern as there have been numerous instances of moles penetrating the PMO and RAW itself. Nepotism in recruitments still continue, thanks to its exemption from recruiting through the UPSC.
Raman bemoans the fact that successes from an agency can never be publicized while failures can, which contributes to an impression of ineptitude about the capabilities of the RAW and IB. But it's also clear that the Indian government's refusal to declassify reports from way back when also contribute hugely to our lack of awareness of past successes of the RAW. Raman claims that the RAW's archives contain plenty of material for any future historian, but whether such a historian would be allowed to freely write remains unclear. Perhaps political parties fear the confirmation of allegations of RAW and IB's complicity in spying on the opposition coming to light. Or perhaps that the archives are woefully incomplete and disorganized. Either way, the RAW remains an organization that is shrouded in perhaps a little too much secrecy as Raman points out, and this need for excess secrecy continues to be its undoing even today.
Each chapter covers either issues and threats that RAW dealt with, or analyzes the relationships between RAW and the prime minister/government of the day. Raman starts with analyzing the role of RAW in the 1971 war which saw Bangladesh break off from Pakistan. Under the guidance of it's first director, RN Kao, RAW was reprotedly successful in organizing a PSYWAR (psychological warfare) campaign to highlight atrocities in Bangladesh. This was crucial in garnering diplomatic support for India's actions in Bangladesh, much to the consternation of the US and Pakistan. Also highlighted is the carrying out of "covert actions" in northern Burma during this war, which played a role in curbing the activities of the Mizo National Front (MNF) under Laldenga. Raman highlights the role played by RAW in setting the stage for negotiations that ultimately brought an end to insurgency by the MNF. This was an insurgency that saw sufficient violence and bloodshed from all sides involved, and Raman stays mum on all of it. Raman highlights the role played by the ISI and China in supporting these insurgencies through providing arms and training, and the non-cooperation of the Burmese Army. These claims are hard to verify for me, based as they are on classified information. But this is true of much of what is said in the book.
Raman moves on to talk about the Khalistani movement, which along with the portions dealing with terrorism, forms a considerable chunk of the book. Again, the role of the ISI aside, supported as it was from Zia ul Haq in its policies, Raman fumes at the turned gaze of the CIA, MI6 and Canadian intelligence agencies while Khalistani militants brazenly moved across borders to organize support for their movement. I haven't read any other account of the Khalistani movement, but Raman insists that the mushrooming of support for the movement was an instance of a successful PSYWAR campaign by ISI to highlight atrocities against Sikhs in India. It's hard for me to believe that any intelligence agency would have the power to foment such an organized movement single handedly without any help from other sources of disgruntlement amongst the Sikh population. To that end, Raman insists that the lack of help provided to Sikhs abroad on the same lines that Israel provides to Jews also helped build up support for Khalistan. But again, this seems far-fetched.
The ouster of Indira Gandhi in 1977 would see a dip in funding for RAW under Morarji Desai's government. Desai, rightly or wrongly, viewed RAW as a political tool used by Indira Gandhi against her enemies. Raman provides a blanket denial of these allegations, but rarely addresses them head on or clear the air about them. Nonetheless, Desai's distrust saw many of RAW's capabilities blunted as manpower had to be fired or re-assigned, and missions scaled back. But interestingly, Raman points out to the rot that had already set in to RAW. Nepotistic appointments, lavish lifestyles led by RAW officers abroad, reports of RAW agents harassing Indians abroad dulled the post 1971 sheen of the organization. But Raman says that though the RAW chiefs appointed by every successive governments were remarkably upright individuals, they seemed to turn a blind eye, or were outright ineffective, in dealing with these matters.
Through each of these chapters, Raman brings out the intricacies and counter-intuitive nature of intelligence work. The fact that CIA helped provide RAW with training and equipment in its founding days, while supporting the ISI in its actions against India, seems bizarre. These are the few nuggets that are great takeaways from the book. Often, it seems that when we thinking about American involvement in an issue, different arms of the country have their own agendas. There are instances of CIA chiefs helping the Indian cause while the State Department was hostile. Or the unwritten rules about spying, like the idea that liaison officers of an agency aren't supposed to spy on the countries they're posted in, or that host countries aren't supposed to ill-treat spies discovered in the embassy of a friendly nation (which ISI and IB reportedly never follow). These are the places of the book where the macabre world of spycraft are written for all to see.
Raman goes into considerable detail about the days and weeks leading up to the asssassination of Indira Gandhi. Pointing to the lack of coordination between the RAW, IB and Delhi Police, Raman sketches a depressing picture of the state of information sharing between agencies. The fact that intelligence agency failures are highlighted, and successes kept classified, creates an incentive for intelligence agencies to over-hype or exaggerate perceived threats, lest they be held accountable for a failure. Conflicting reports on threats to a VIP are commonplace, as is the issue of common sources being used by multiple agencies which means information provided by different agencies is rarely independent, or that turf wars between agencies remain a blight. Throw in a sense of competition between agencies to be the first to report a threat, and it's a miracle that any VIP stays alive!
From Desai's lack of support of the RAW, through Rajiv Gandhi's continuation of Indira's patronage of the institution, down to Rao and Singh's grudging appreciation of its work, the RAW suffered from many flaws which could have been addressed by the prime ministers of the day. Aside from those mentioned earlier, rivalry with other agencies, a lack of oversight of the agency by the parliament (compared to the practice in the US and most democracies elsewhere), troubles in preventing major attacks and issues with gathering certain kinds of human intelligence continue to plague the agency. Counter-intelligence remains a concern as there have been numerous instances of moles penetrating the PMO and RAW itself. Nepotism in recruitments still continue, thanks to its exemption from recruiting through the UPSC.
Raman bemoans the fact that successes from an agency can never be publicized while failures can, which contributes to an impression of ineptitude about the capabilities of the RAW and IB. But it's also clear that the Indian government's refusal to declassify reports from way back when also contribute hugely to our lack of awareness of past successes of the RAW. Raman claims that the RAW's archives contain plenty of material for any future historian, but whether such a historian would be allowed to freely write remains unclear. Perhaps political parties fear the confirmation of allegations of RAW and IB's complicity in spying on the opposition coming to light. Or perhaps that the archives are woefully incomplete and disorganized. Either way, the RAW remains an organization that is shrouded in perhaps a little too much secrecy as Raman points out, and this need for excess secrecy continues to be its undoing even today.
August 10, 2017
Interestingly, the book’s title is derived from the last name of Rameshwar Nath Kao - a charismatic spymaster and R&AW’s first chief and the officers who worked under him– who later came to be known as the ‘Kaoboys’.
The book can be broadly divided into two parts – the Kao era and the post Kao era.
B Raman the author (who was one of the original Kaoboys) keeps the book true to its tagline ‘down memory lane’ thus not claiming it to be objective account but a subjective version of the R&AW from his (an insider’s) perspective.
The book doesn’t delve into the details of specific missions or the names of specific agents involved but more into the genesis of R&AW as India’s premier external intelligence agency and its involvement in key incidents that shaped India since R&AW’s formation in 1968 namely - 1971 war, militancy in the North East, the Emergency, the Khalistan movement and assassinations of Indira & Rajiv.
The books goes into fair bit of detail about how Rameshwar Nath Kao played a key role in developing R&AW into an organization trusted and respected by the ruling class, partly because of his closeness to Indira Gandhi. Raman does a good job in highlighting R&AW’s organizational failures like losing the trust India gained in Bangladesh following the ‘71 war, the unprofessionalism of some of the officers posted in Europe/US and how their carelessness lead to many instances of R&AW being infiltrated by agents of foreign intelligence agencies and double agents. Raman is quite scathing towards the bureaucracy (especially IFS and MEA officials posted abroad) and the jealousy and lack of coordination that exists between the R&AW and IB.
The best part of the book is the surprising lack of jingoism and how it de-glamorizes the role of a spy. It is more of taking fake assignments (many a times known to the host countries), developing & maintaining relationships with key contacts in various organizations/countries, collecting information as accurate as possible and providing them to the government at the right time. It is much less of planned assassinations, police chases in the enemy country etc.
Though Raman tries to be as objective as possible, there is a significant pro Indira/Rajiv slant in his appreciations and criticisms. He is ruthless in relatively minor misgivings of the governments of Morarji Desai, VP Singh and Chandrashekar, while casually grazes over the horrendous episodes of emergency and the Bofors scandal. The chapter titled ‘Bofors and R&AW’ ends up patronizing Rajiv Gandhi at the end. He brushes over the definite role Kao’s R&AW would have played during the emergency.
Finally the book seems to be hastily edited as phrases and bits of information repeat at multiple places in the book. The individual chapters sometimes feel like more of a haphazard collection of thoughts than a coherent narrative.
But Raman more than makes up for the minor negative with interesting and funny anecdotes from his stay as R&AW’s agent in Paris and Geneva.
Overall, an interesting book, though feels like a drag in bits.
The book can be broadly divided into two parts – the Kao era and the post Kao era.
B Raman the author (who was one of the original Kaoboys) keeps the book true to its tagline ‘down memory lane’ thus not claiming it to be objective account but a subjective version of the R&AW from his (an insider’s) perspective.
The book doesn’t delve into the details of specific missions or the names of specific agents involved but more into the genesis of R&AW as India’s premier external intelligence agency and its involvement in key incidents that shaped India since R&AW’s formation in 1968 namely - 1971 war, militancy in the North East, the Emergency, the Khalistan movement and assassinations of Indira & Rajiv.
The books goes into fair bit of detail about how Rameshwar Nath Kao played a key role in developing R&AW into an organization trusted and respected by the ruling class, partly because of his closeness to Indira Gandhi. Raman does a good job in highlighting R&AW’s organizational failures like losing the trust India gained in Bangladesh following the ‘71 war, the unprofessionalism of some of the officers posted in Europe/US and how their carelessness lead to many instances of R&AW being infiltrated by agents of foreign intelligence agencies and double agents. Raman is quite scathing towards the bureaucracy (especially IFS and MEA officials posted abroad) and the jealousy and lack of coordination that exists between the R&AW and IB.
The best part of the book is the surprising lack of jingoism and how it de-glamorizes the role of a spy. It is more of taking fake assignments (many a times known to the host countries), developing & maintaining relationships with key contacts in various organizations/countries, collecting information as accurate as possible and providing them to the government at the right time. It is much less of planned assassinations, police chases in the enemy country etc.
Though Raman tries to be as objective as possible, there is a significant pro Indira/Rajiv slant in his appreciations and criticisms. He is ruthless in relatively minor misgivings of the governments of Morarji Desai, VP Singh and Chandrashekar, while casually grazes over the horrendous episodes of emergency and the Bofors scandal. The chapter titled ‘Bofors and R&AW’ ends up patronizing Rajiv Gandhi at the end. He brushes over the definite role Kao’s R&AW would have played during the emergency.
Finally the book seems to be hastily edited as phrases and bits of information repeat at multiple places in the book. The individual chapters sometimes feel like more of a haphazard collection of thoughts than a coherent narrative.
But Raman more than makes up for the minor negative with interesting and funny anecdotes from his stay as R&AW’s agent in Paris and Geneva.
Overall, an interesting book, though feels like a drag in bits.
October 31, 2021
A rare and first-hand view into the workings of the most secretive government agency Research & Analysis Wing, India's external intelligence agency.
The book written by a retired R&AW officer B Raman who spent more than 3 decades working for the agency right from its inception in 1968, provides a detailed insight into the workings of R&AW and its work and relations with the Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of External Affairs and other foreign intelligence agencies. The book derives its name from its first chief R.N. Kao and the officers under him who were the cause of its success and came to be known as "Kao boys of R&AW".
The book is in chronological order of the author's service in R&AW and the most outstanding thing about the book is how objectively it is written and by that, I mean the author has rightly praised but has also criticised various people right from the chief of Kao to various Prime Ministers during his tenure. The author never shies away from calling a spade a spade.
"Raman displayed an unwavering commitment to his work. This, along with his vast knowledge and the ability to recall details of events even after the passage of decades made him a near-ideal intelligence officer."
While reading this book one is held in awe of the numerous people who have done so much for the country with little to no recognition and the general public being totally ignorant about it. Perhaps one of the occupational traits of working for an intelligence agency. Along with it, there are multiple incidents that illustrate the dilemma faced by intelligence officers while dealing with reports indicating a likely threat. If the information proves to be incorrect, they are accused of frivolous reporting without proper verification. If the information proves to be correct, but had not been reported on time since the verification process was incomplete, they are accused of tardy reporting.
All major security incidents have been covered by the author since R&AW inception. Some of the major intelligence breaches mentioned by the author like the one in the Prime Minister Office shed new light on the world of counterintelligence and India's lack of credible counterintelligence.
In the final chapter Raman looks at his time in R&AW and tries to answer questions that one may have about its past and future. The book is recommended for anyone interested in the world of Intelligence and their working especially that of R&AW.
The book written by a retired R&AW officer B Raman who spent more than 3 decades working for the agency right from its inception in 1968, provides a detailed insight into the workings of R&AW and its work and relations with the Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of External Affairs and other foreign intelligence agencies. The book derives its name from its first chief R.N. Kao and the officers under him who were the cause of its success and came to be known as "Kao boys of R&AW".
The book is in chronological order of the author's service in R&AW and the most outstanding thing about the book is how objectively it is written and by that, I mean the author has rightly praised but has also criticised various people right from the chief of Kao to various Prime Ministers during his tenure. The author never shies away from calling a spade a spade.
"Raman displayed an unwavering commitment to his work. This, along with his vast knowledge and the ability to recall details of events even after the passage of decades made him a near-ideal intelligence officer."
While reading this book one is held in awe of the numerous people who have done so much for the country with little to no recognition and the general public being totally ignorant about it. Perhaps one of the occupational traits of working for an intelligence agency. Along with it, there are multiple incidents that illustrate the dilemma faced by intelligence officers while dealing with reports indicating a likely threat. If the information proves to be incorrect, they are accused of frivolous reporting without proper verification. If the information proves to be correct, but had not been reported on time since the verification process was incomplete, they are accused of tardy reporting.
All major security incidents have been covered by the author since R&AW inception. Some of the major intelligence breaches mentioned by the author like the one in the Prime Minister Office shed new light on the world of counterintelligence and India's lack of credible counterintelligence.
In the final chapter Raman looks at his time in R&AW and tries to answer questions that one may have about its past and future. The book is recommended for anyone interested in the world of Intelligence and their working especially that of R&AW.
September 26, 2019
An excellent memoir direct from the horse's mouth. As one of the founders of RAW, B Raman gives a detailed account of how intelligence agencies work and the limitations or bureaucratic roadblocks they face. His frustration with the bureaucracy and internal fightings with IB and MEA are clearly visible in his account. But at times you get a feeling that he is going overboard in his praise for Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, and attributes almost everything good that happened in those 4 decades to both of them. He also very smartly sidesteps the Bofors issue by claiming he doesn't have any knowledge regarding it which is difficult to digest. Although he has given several little anecdotes, which are times humorous as well, but once you finish the book you are left with the feeling that he could have mentioned some more of RAWs missions which are not known to public. Also, I feel he has failed to give credit to deserving people in a couple of cases such as Operation Black Thunder, where Ajit Doval's name is mentioned nowhere and almost all the credit is given to RAW, kPS Gill and the army, and the role of Rakesh Maria in the Bombay blasts case also finds no mention. B Raman remained a bachelor and dedicated his entire life to national security, even post retirement. One wonders how many sacrifices does a person make while working in such agencies, by living their complete life in anonymity for the nation's cause and expecting nothing in return. Four stars to the book, Five Stars to the man.
October 8, 2024
An illustrative look at how India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) conducted external intelligence operations from its inception in 1968 (when it was forked off of the Intelligence Bureau). Raman covers the following events and the role RAW played in them:
- The Mizo and Naga insurgencies in India's Northeast (as well as Chinese involvement)
- The Bangladeshi Liberation War
- The inception of the Sikh separatist (Khalistan) movement and its support from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
- The Sri Lankan Civil War
- The assassinations of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi
- The 1992/93 Bombay bomb blasts
He also goes into the operational deficiencies in RAW and the various controversies it found itself embroiled in. I found him to be candid in his analyses of weaknesses and strengths. He has a conversational "uncle" tone throughout the book which I enjoyed, but may put off the more academically-inclined reader. Quite a few stories are redundant as he jumps back and forth between chronologically linear events.
Big takeway from this book (might be outdated): RAW is not subject to parliamentary inquiry or oversight, which other nations (such as the CIA in the US) have.
His sage advice (that probably still rings true even as Pakistan flounders and fragments under the weight of its chickens coming home to roost): "One should never trust the Americans in matters concerning Pakistan. The Americans will never act against Pakistan for anything it does to India."
Short-medium book, finished in about a week of sporadic reading.
- The Mizo and Naga insurgencies in India's Northeast (as well as Chinese involvement)
- The Bangladeshi Liberation War
- The inception of the Sikh separatist (Khalistan) movement and its support from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
- The Sri Lankan Civil War
- The assassinations of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi
- The 1992/93 Bombay bomb blasts
He also goes into the operational deficiencies in RAW and the various controversies it found itself embroiled in. I found him to be candid in his analyses of weaknesses and strengths. He has a conversational "uncle" tone throughout the book which I enjoyed, but may put off the more academically-inclined reader. Quite a few stories are redundant as he jumps back and forth between chronologically linear events.
Big takeway from this book (might be outdated): RAW is not subject to parliamentary inquiry or oversight, which other nations (such as the CIA in the US) have.
His sage advice (that probably still rings true even as Pakistan flounders and fragments under the weight of its chickens coming home to roost): "One should never trust the Americans in matters concerning Pakistan. The Americans will never act against Pakistan for anything it does to India."
Short-medium book, finished in about a week of sporadic reading.
October 30, 2025
A really interesting insider account about India’s external intelligence agency. While the name used to make my think it will be about the man RN Kao and his smartness on some intelligence missions, the book is more about R&AW as the organisation, its history and how it failed from time to time. Due to obvious security issues, there is no coverage about proactive measures taken to defend the country successfully by R&AW but only its failures and reactive investigations have been spoken about. But for someone like me who enjoys the intelligence stories and as Indians we see CIA more in TV shows and web series but don’t see enough stories of R&AW, this book is a great insight into their world.
I read some other reviews which felt the author was biased to Congress leaders. Well, he spent his entire career under them so is it too difficult to blame him for that? His world view was formed by the leaders of that time and frankly, India’s political ecosystem from 1990 onwards till the book came out in 2007 was quite haphazard. Infact, had the author written this book closer to 2012, I would have loved to read his take on the MMS Govt’s handling of internal and external security.
For someone who’s interested in this space, a definitely must read book.
I read some other reviews which felt the author was biased to Congress leaders. Well, he spent his entire career under them so is it too difficult to blame him for that? His world view was formed by the leaders of that time and frankly, India’s political ecosystem from 1990 onwards till the book came out in 2007 was quite haphazard. Infact, had the author written this book closer to 2012, I would have loved to read his take on the MMS Govt’s handling of internal and external security.
For someone who’s interested in this space, a definitely must read book.
December 19, 2025
In the preface to the book, the author mentions that on reading the first chapter, his publisher was very happy about his writing style. I feel that always nothing more than a over flattering assesment.
The content matter of this book is something that is so juicy and interesting that the final product is somewhat of a disappointment. The writing style is too long winded and repetitive that it reads like a bureaucratic government note rather than an interesting insight into the inner workings of India's foreign intelligence agency. The book can work well as a cure for insomniacs.
The descriptions and anecdotes mentioned are very dry and since he does not mention names in several instances, there is no point of those anecdotes anyway.
To his credit the author does not shy away from criticising various people and organisations and also bestows praise where he felt it's needed. He also gives his insight on how to improve the working of such agencies, although with the flair and elan of a writer of a tax law textbook.
Overall interesting subject, but poorly written.
The content matter of this book is something that is so juicy and interesting that the final product is somewhat of a disappointment. The writing style is too long winded and repetitive that it reads like a bureaucratic government note rather than an interesting insight into the inner workings of India's foreign intelligence agency. The book can work well as a cure for insomniacs.
The descriptions and anecdotes mentioned are very dry and since he does not mention names in several instances, there is no point of those anecdotes anyway.
To his credit the author does not shy away from criticising various people and organisations and also bestows praise where he felt it's needed. He also gives his insight on how to improve the working of such agencies, although with the flair and elan of a writer of a tax law textbook.
Overall interesting subject, but poorly written.
December 29, 2017
The book is a detailed account of RAW and how it operates. Going into various working and functionings of the organisation the author has tried to walk the reader through the 1970s,80s and early 90s of how RAW operated under several PM and how it changes bumper to bumper.
Interesting inside information is available with pace and fast changing story landscape. What is however missing is probably the James Bond scene you expect out of this book. Book is a very interesting read and many of the incidents like the assassination of Rajiv and Indira Gandhi and the Khalistan Movement are covered in detail. OPerational challenges and details which might not be available otherwise are up for grabs.
Interesting inside information is available with pace and fast changing story landscape. What is however missing is probably the James Bond scene you expect out of this book. Book is a very interesting read and many of the incidents like the assassination of Rajiv and Indira Gandhi and the Khalistan Movement are covered in detail. OPerational challenges and details which might not be available otherwise are up for grabs.
September 10, 2020
This book is really good.
A must read for anyone interested in the functioning of the investigative agencies.
It talks about the inception of RAW, India's premier secret service agency and how it helped in the creation of Bangladesh and what challenges it has had to face in its existence ever since 1968 when it was established under Kao.
Raman describes all the incidents in a very good manner. I liked his way of describing all the aspects - both inside and outside that have impacted RAW's functioning over the years.
It also talks about the tussle with IB and describes the relations with the parties in power.
It also talks about the positives and the negatives of RAW in equal measure.
It's definitely recommended.
A must read for anyone interested in the functioning of the investigative agencies.
It talks about the inception of RAW, India's premier secret service agency and how it helped in the creation of Bangladesh and what challenges it has had to face in its existence ever since 1968 when it was established under Kao.
Raman describes all the incidents in a very good manner. I liked his way of describing all the aspects - both inside and outside that have impacted RAW's functioning over the years.
It also talks about the tussle with IB and describes the relations with the parties in power.
It also talks about the positives and the negatives of RAW in equal measure.
It's definitely recommended.
May 6, 2017
A great insight into the premiere intelligence gathering agency of the nation, The R&AW, it's formative years and a look at the events that shaped the nation during its formative years post the Independence. A lot of the events have been covered nicely by the author that took place during the author's tenure at the R&AW. At times though it felt like flipping through a history text book. But I must complement the author in bringing out the gruelling truth about the history of the terrorism as we currently know.
Overall, it's a nice read if you're enthusiastic about knowing about the shaping of the nation post independence till the early 2000 when the author retired from his office.
Overall, it's a nice read if you're enthusiastic about knowing about the shaping of the nation post independence till the early 2000 when the author retired from his office.
August 30, 2018
This book is good. I just have finished reading 30% and have questions to ask. Questions I will write later, but about this book- This book gives very good idea about when and How R&AW was started, what challenges this organisation faced and overcame. Who all (if not everybody) contributed to maintain inernal peace and thwart external threats against India. Though at times I felt as if, while writing and sharing his experience, author was lost in multiple thoughts; as if certain things he felt like sharing with readers but was too cautious perhaps? So he just drew outline.
Because of that this book raises so many questions, and because of this one will read more. Dig more.
Questions like:
No mention of Mr. Ajit Doval in Chapter 'The Khalistani Terrorism'. Why?
Because of that this book raises so many questions, and because of this one will read more. Dig more.
Questions like:
No mention of Mr. Ajit Doval in Chapter 'The Khalistani Terrorism'. Why?
January 3, 2021
There is very little that is written about Indian Intelligence Agencies . This is a good book from that perspective. It covers an important era of post independence era. The style of writing is not very well organized . Also a lot of time is spent on personalities than on situations & operations.
It is also interesting how Author is ready to write off big blunders by political personalities he likes through acts of omission.
Never the less, given how little is written about Indian Intelligence Agencies, and how little has been written by people who are part of intelligence setup, this is a must read.
It is also interesting how Author is ready to write off big blunders by political personalities he likes through acts of omission.
Never the less, given how little is written about Indian Intelligence Agencies, and how little has been written by people who are part of intelligence setup, this is a must read.
August 30, 2019
Having a good analysis on RAW, it can be a good source of primary information about the intelligence institutions. To many repetition are sometimes too much boring. One thing makes me suspicious that RAW never took any steps against Pakistan where ISI continually taking major steps against India. This claims made the book very weak. Anyway, good to know RAW and its legendary head Kao. Respect to such man.
April 21, 2020
Obviously written by an ex-serviceman, so the flow of words is not like a typical novel but it is a good one to gather knowledge about our intelligence agencies. I have read many books regarding these topics so I did not find many information new in this but surely if you'll be reading it for the first time then it is a great read.
You'll know about the mistakes of the institute and the success stories and many more. Worth your time!!
You'll know about the mistakes of the institute and the success stories and many more. Worth your time!!
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