Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?

by Russ Shafer-Landau

Since September 11, 2001, many people in the United States have been more inclined to use the language of good and evil, and to be more comfortable with the idea that certain moral standards are objective (true independently of what anyone happens to think of them). Some people, especially those who are not religious, are not sure how to substantiate this view. Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? provides a basis for exploring these doubts and ultimately defends the objectivity of ethics. Engaging and accessible, it is the first introduction to meta-ethics written especially for students and general readers with no philosophical background. Focusing on the issues at the foundation of morality, it poses such questions How can we know what is right and wrong? Does ethical objectivity require God? Why should I be moral? Where do moral standards come from? What is a moral value, and how can it exist in a scientific world? Do cultural diversity and persistent moral disagreement
support moral skepticism?
Writing in a clear and lively style and employing many examples to illustrate theoretical arguments, Russ Shafer-Landau identifies the many weaknesses in contemporary moral skepticism and devotes considerable attention to presenting, and critiquing, the most difficult objections to his view. Also included in the book are a helpful summary of all the major arguments covered, as well as a glossary of key philosophical terms. Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? is ideal for a variety of philosophy courses and compelling reading for anyone interested in ethics.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Unfinished

150 pages, Paperback

First published October 2, 2003

Reviews

[Harry · Rating 1 out of 5]

Poor argument, curricular, founded in biased self-evident nonsense.

[Bay Long · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very good short introduction of metaethics. It is centred around the debate between moral objectivism and nihilism, subjectivism, and relativism, and defends the former. I find the discussion of the divine command theory and the last few chapters a bit hasty.

[Paul · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a good little (150 pages) introduction to moral realism; of the non-naturalist stripe.

Since the book is so short, and of an introductory nature, the arguments in the chapters are somewhat weak. Shafer-Landau's weakest chapter is his argument for why morality doesn't need God in any way. His best is his chapter against a moral skepticism towards moral realism.

Perhaps Shafer-landau feels justified in being dogmatic at points, and in offering less than convincing arguments against his interlocutors, because he defends the subjects in the book in greater length, and in a much more detailed and rigorous fashion in his Moral Realism: A Defense. Shafer-Landau wets the appetite in Whatever Happened to Good and Evil, though. For example, he offers a sneak peak at his novel approach to justifying moral beliefs by appeal to reliabilism (though he'll need to add proper function here, but then he may not be able to avoid theism). He also offers another sneak peak into his view that one's moral principles necessarily motivate, and beliefs alone are insufficient to motivate (desires, or other subjective states, must be included), so morality cannot be objective, by denying the premise that one's morality necessarily motivates him to action.

His argument against ethics and God is to ask a question. He asks, "Why think morals need a lawgiver when you don't think any of the other 'laws' in the universe, e.g., gravity, need a lawgiver." However, and quite apart from the various responses and moves theists can make here, I'm not sure I wouldn't say that his question involves another argument for God's existence. Many theists think precisely what Shafer-Landau thinks is just obviously absurd, i.e., that law other than ethical ones do not require a lawgiver. For example, one might read what John Foster says in his Divine Lawmaker as a counter to the assumption Shafer-Landau takes as an obvious defeater.

Those familiar with the basics the subject(s) of Shafer-Landau's book should skip this book and read his other book (listed above). Those new to this discussion would profit from reading the book under review.

[Ethan]

Read half of this for university, decided to finish it. It's fine as an introductory piece I guess, but it is generally middling, indecisive, unconvincing in its main aim to argue for an objective ethics. Yet, simultaneously, it is also poor at presenting scepticism of ethics, whether to believe or no.

A general load of argument-chopping, mostly in summary, glossed, but nothing grabbing or too interesting. I'd skip it and just read the actual articles and books from which the rehearsed arguments are drawn.

[James · Rating 2 out of 5]

The author gives convincing rebuttals to a number of arguments against moral objectivism. However, arguments for moral objectivism are never made. The problems with this book can be summed up by looking to the final chapter "Why be moral?" An argument is supported by the coherent position of "I don't think so".

[Saad Din · Rating 5 out of 5]

A brilliant take on morality

[Soyorin · Rating 3 out of 5]

7/10. Read it for class (right after finishing Ayn Rand’s book on morality—another ethical objectivist, though her arguments didn’t persuade me much. Rand’s framework feels less like a universal moral philosophy and more like an ideological defense of rational self-interest and laissez-faire capitalism).
One of my lingering questions was how ethical objectivism differs from ethical relativism. If objectivists also admit morality isn’t eternal (as discussed in Chapter 16), doesn’t that mean morality changes over time? The key split lies in what grounds moral truth. Ethical objectivists claim moral statements are true or false based on objective facts—whether about human nature, human flourishing, or universal moral laws—that exist independently of personal opinions or cultural norms. Relativists, on the other hand, argue morality is rooted in personal belief (subjective relativism) or cultural convention (cultural relativism). In their view, there’s no universal right or wrong beyond what individuals or societies happen to decide.
Now, even if objectivists concede morality isn’t “eternal” in a divine or unchanging sense, the “changes” they recognize are still tied to objective human realities. For example, if human needs and ways of living evolve, then moral principles may shift to reflect what objectively supports human flourishing in new contexts. Ancient norms emphasizing tribal loyalty made sense in small, survival-based communities, whereas modern norms of global cooperation align with today’s interconnected world. The shift, objectivists would argue, isn’t arbitrary—it’s grounded in facts about what enables humans to thrive.
Relativists, however, see moral change as purely belief-based: slavery was “moral” in ancient Rome because Romans endorsed it, and “immoral” now because we reject it. For them, there’s no deeper standard by which one view can be judged better than the other. So while both frameworks allow morality to change over time, objectivism grounds that change in facts about human life, whereas relativism grounds it in subjective or collective opinion.
That said, while I appreciated many of the book’s points, it often fell into logical missteps. One paragraph (P16) illustrates this well:
“If we rejectthe possibility of objective morality, then we must say that our own basic commitments are never wrong (unless, of course, they are always wrong, as the error theorist maintains). We, or our society, are morally infallible at least with regard to what we hold most dear.”
The problems here are multiple. First, it assumes rejecting objective morality leaves only two options: either our commitments are never wrong, or all moral claims are false (the error theory). But this ignores other views—such as relativism—that reject objective morality while still allowing that moral beliefs can be wrong relative to cultural norms or personal standards.
Second, the claim that “we or our society are morally infallible regarding our most cherished morals” simply doesn’t follow. Even without objective morality, judgments can be “wrong” by internal criteria. A society that preaches equality while practicing discrimination contradicts its own principles. Wrongness, in this sense, can be evaluated by coherence within a framework rather than by appeal to objective truth.
Finally, this is a classic hasty generalization. Rejecting objectivism does not entail that moral commitments are never wrong. Non-objective theories (like subjectivism and relativism) still allow for moral error, judged by standards internal to a person or culture. By skipping over these alternatives, the book oversimplifies the issue and misrepresents what rejecting objectivism actually means.

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is broadly persuasive when it's rebutting relativist and nihilist critiques of ethical realism but it is less persuasive in its attempts to put forward a positive case for realism.

One of his points is that most popular criticisms of moral realism are capable of being dealt with through analogies to realism about the external world, i.e. "people have strong disagreements about the contents of morality, therefore morality is subjective" is not persuasive because people also have strong disagreements about the material world and that doesn't prove that the existence of tables depends on your belief in them. Similarly, the question "where do moral rules come from" has parallels in questions like "where do the rules of physics or logic come from." The fact that there isn't an obvious or satisfactory answer doesn't prove those rules don't exist.

The positive case for ethical realism is weaker though and mostly comes down to the intuitive plausibility of moral realism. Essentially, it is intuitively plausible that killing children is wrong regardless of what people think about it. However there is also a lot of intuitive plausibility behind the idea that ethics is just a pro-social evolutionary adaptation. So overall that argument ends up being a bit of a wash.

Some of the most interesting points are a little tangential to the main topic. For instance he has a discussion of ethical humility (and relatedly ethical tolerance) which is quite good. Lots of relatives/nihilists view the idea that there is something objectively right or wrong as inherently intolerant or arrogant. But he points out that if you believe either that ethics is all made up, or that it's down to individuals to choose how to make it up, then ethical mistakes aren't really possible. If ethics is whatever you believe it is, then no matter what you believe you can't be mistaken. And if ethical mistakes aren't possible then there isn't really any reason for caution, humility, or tolerance. You are right, 100% of the time. Full steam ahead for whatever project happens to catch your fancy. Of course the question of which ethical view is most compatible with humility doesn't prove which one is right, but those sorts of discussions are interesting to have.

Overall, solid book. Will definitely consider checking out his more academic ones.

[IWB · Rating 4 out of 5]

Metaethics is that branch of philosophy that concerns ethical theories and their convergence with issues in epistemology, ontology, semantics, and psychology.

This book by Shafer-Landau is an introduction aimed at the beginner. As such, a good understanding of the book requires no previous philosophical training from the reader. There are few technical notions that occur in the book, but those that do are highlighted, contextually explained, and further explicated in the helpful glossary at the end of the book. Additionally, Shafer-Landau includes an appendix in which the arguments of each section are presented synoptically in a conventional premise to conclusion form, with a summary of the problems associated with the argument in question.

This book, while an introduction, is not a typical survey consisting of a presentation of the central topics, with arguments pro and con; rather, Shafer-Landau uses this introduction as a means to argue for the objectivity of morals. This is but one among many important issues in contemporary metaethics (although, it certainly is one of the most important). In so doing, he makes no excuses for the insertion of his own philosophical view on the subject; indeed, his project is to make a case for a non-naturalized account of moral realism. Throughout the book, he makes a case for moral objectivity, all the while considering various counter-arguments and objections to moral objectivism. For this reason, the reader is given an excellent analysis of metaethical concepts, but also that sense of 'seeing' philosophy being done before your eyes.

While Shafer-Landau uses this introduction to make an argument for his own philosophical views, it is uncharitable to accuse him of being opinionated or biased. He argues for his claims; that is, he provides good reasons for the claims he makes and he thinks they are persuasive reasons. This is what you do when you think you have the right answer (or something that approximates a right answer), or at least a plausibly better answer than your predecessors and peers. It is not opinionated to present an argument for something that you take to be the case. As such, this book is refreshing in that it avoids the often sterile, inauthentic approach of many who present each position 'objectively' with for and against arguments. Instead, Shafer-Landau thinks he has a good case for a certain view, so he presents a good argument for that view. All the while, the reader enjoys the benefits of being informed by a very competent and fair-minded philosopher. People have this wrong-headed idea that you cannot both argue for a particular view and introduce readers to the general topic of which your view concerns.

Shafer-Landau takes great pains to walk the reader through the various arguments and objections of each section, and then summarizes what has been achieved and how it relates to preceding sections. His explanations are clear, the arguments precise and succinct, and the analysis is chock full of interesting and important problems for and against moral objectivism. Having said all that, let's not forget that this is an introduction. As such, the arguments are as precise as one can hope for in an introduction. I think he could have said a bit more, for instance, about why moral objectivity can be invoked without having to invoke God. I think his argument is just fine, but some Christian theists can be truculent on this point, and they'll scramble for every bit of Quinn, Mavrodes, Alston, and Bob Adams they can find to keep God in the picture. But herein lies one major weakness in Shafer-Landau's account. He presents the theist as having to hold to a "law-maker" framework. This is easily dispatched with the typical Euthyphro Dilemma counter-argument. But he does nothing to show that the theist who grounds ethics in God's nature, rather than in God's will, is at all affected by the "law-maker" account. See Adams "Finite and Infinite Goods", Alston, "What Euthyphro Should Have Said" as starters.

The only reason I don't give this book 5 stars is that, insofar as this book is a development for, and defense of, a certain metaethical stance, the content is a bit limited in breadth. But I suppose you can't have it both ways. Either way, Shafer-Landau does little to engage the views of other contemporary metaethical theorists. Instead, the few references he does make to other philosophers are typically historical figures, Hume for instance. One definite downside to this book is that no further reading list is provided of supplementary and related materials. So, if you want to read more metaethics, you'll have to get a reading list from somewhere else, 'cuz it ain't here.

Substantively, this book covers a lot of good information that will most certainly disabuse the reader of vague conceptions, fallacious arguments, and incomplete notions about a number of issues. A careful reading of this book will give the reader a strong sense of how to argue about various issues concerning moral objectivism. the reader will be able to coherently speak about what it means to say that there is right and wrong, good and bad in the world, and that such qualities are independent of our own thoughts and values.

I recommend this book for anyone with an interest in ethics, especially those who want a metaphysical account ethics, anyone who wants to understand the various claims surrounding the objectivity of morals, and those who think that morality cannot be objective apart from God as its foundation.

[Grant Petik · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great, short overview of Moral Realism and Meta-Ethics, or the idea that “There is an objective set of moral principles that exist regardless of what we happen to think of them”. In an era of Egoism and Subjectivism, this book does well to solidify confidence in the belief that morality doesn’t and can’t stem just from what we want it to be. While we may not be able to authoritatively say what it entails, that doesn’t mean it isn’t real and more foundational than we may give it credit for.

If you are new to and interested in ethics, meta-ethics, and philosophical exercises in general— this book makes for a great jumping in point!

[Dave Darb · Rating 3 out of 5]

The basic premise of this book is that some moral views are better than others, despite the sincerity of the individuals, cultures, and societies that endorse them. This type of philosophy asks: can ethical claims be true? What makes them true? Where do they come from?

[Aaron Shafovaloff · Rating 3 out of 5]

Had surprisingly glib dismissal of divine command theory and lacked fair response to the Euthyphro dilemma.

[Morris Yen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well written introductory book to metaethics. However, it would be better if it is more compact or to include more advanced (i.e. not so intuitive) arguments.

[Jake · Rating 1 out of 5]

Unconvincing.

[ina.who · Rating 4 out of 5]

Simple, but *Objectively* *Good*

[David Gross · Rating 3 out of 5]

It’s Halloween. Wanna hear something scary? There may be absolutely no objective standard of moral right and wrong. Good and evil might be entirely subjective, or merely a social convention, or might even (shudder) be entirely meaningless and only trick-or-treating in the costume of meaningful concepts.

The status of moral statements, like the idea of free will, is under a philosophical cloud. Most everyone believes in their heart of hearts that they have free will, but when you look up close at the philosophical arguments for and against it, it looks wildly implausible. Similarly, when people argue about moral values, they almost always are arguing against a background assumption that some values are just plain right — not conventionally right, not mere opinions or exhortations, but facts. But this too looks very implausible on close examination.

In Whatever Happened to Good and Evil Russ Shafer-Landau tries to rescue moral objectivism (the idea that certain moral judgements are indeed objectively correct or incorrect, always and everywhere, and independently of who utters them or what culture they come from) from a variety of forms of moral skepticism: nihilism (the idea that moral judgements are meaningless or refer to nothing at all), moral relativism (the idea that moral rules are social conventions, like the rules of grammar or of baseball), and moral subjectivism (the idea that moral judgements are personal evaluations, like disgust or erotic attraction, and are only true or false to the extent that they are sincere or insincere).

Shafer-Landau does this in a peculiar way. Rather than trying to make an affirmative case for moral objectivism, he instead tries to demolish the case for the following two propositions:

1. Some form of moral skepticism has been logically proven.
2. Any form of moral objectivism can be logically disproven.

This form of logical argument, though, at best only demonstrates that moral objectivism remains logically possible — it doesn’t actually make a case for it being true. (Though Shafer-Landau has written a larger book, Moral Realism: A Defence, that may make this case: I don’t know.)

So in part one, he describes a number of arguments for moral skepticism and shows that they each have weaknesses that make them unable to successfully win the day. And in part two, he looks at various take-downs of moral objectivism and shows that they don’t succeed in leaving moral objectivism without a logical escape route.

He does a pretty good job in part two, though I’m not convinced that he has successfully attacked the best versions of the best of such arguments. Part one, though, is a complete mess. Many of his arguments there mostly reduce to “this argument for moral skepticism must be incorrect because it leads to conclusions that are incompatible with moral objectivism” — in other words, assuming what he means to prove.

Moral objectivism is reassuring, intuitive, and allows ordinary moral discourse to have a point. I often find myself wishing it were true. I’m pretty sure, though, that it’s incorrect, and after reading this careful defense from a convinced believer, I’m more sure than before.

[K · Rating 3 out of 5]

Shafer-Landau offers a brief defence of a non-naturalist form of moral realism. The book is divided into three parts. In the first part Shafer-Landau discusses some very broad forms of moral skepticism (subjectivism, relativism, nihilism (non-cognitivism/error theory)) and concludes that they face insurmountable difficulties. In his view, these positions can't account for moral progress and moral disagreement, and they cannot provide a solid ground for tolerance. Is Shafer-Landau begging the question? I think he is.

The second part is much better. Here, Shafer-Landau offers positive arguments for moral realism. One of the more interesting ones is his argument regarding epistemic facts. According to him, epistemic facts (those that tell you what you ought to do when you're aiming towards truth) are normative and fall outside the domain of empirical investigation (a.k.a. science). Moral facts are similar to epistemic facts and we can make sense of both. This entails that scientific discourse does not provide a complete and respectable ontology ,and, consequently, naturalism is false.

The third part consists of a short discussion on the possibility of moral knowledge. As many of you will have already guessed, Shafer-Landau thinks that moral knowledge is very much within our capacities and is entirely a-priori (similar to mathematical knowledge).

Is the book good? It's not bad. It's a very opinionated introductory text on metaethical questions. It is humorous, easy to read, and covers most of the very basic ground. It's also great if you want your naive relativist friend to shut up. However, it is not recommended if a) you're looking for an introduction that's more balanced and b) you have a fair understanding of the topic.

[Jessica · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a short and sweet summary of meta ethics and an argument for the status of moral claims being objective. It's not a very complex text but it's introductory, so that is to be expected. Shafer-Landau is very good at elucidating ethical issues. He helpfully diagrams the major arguments for and against moral skepticism, which is helpful to understand where things go wrong - because for an argument to be wrong either the premises must be incorrect or the logic must be invalid. I also enjoyed the few pages appealing to philosophical knowledge being real. That's comforting, as a philosophy student and life-long philosopher.

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very introductory but the chapters are very short and will be a great textbook for my intro class.

[vishy]

read this for my philosophy seminar - seems like a good introduction into metaethics!