This is the latest book that I have read by Antonio Damasio. The previous two books that I have read focused on feelings and the body. From his research in neurology he has come to the tentative conclusion that these two things figure prominently in the phenomenon of consciousness.
After giving the direction of his research into consciousness and the importance of biological regulation and value in chapters one and two in part one, he goes on to examining different components to consciousness. Part two investigates the roles of maps and images in the brain and the contribution of the body, emotions and feelings, and memory. Part three discusses the different types of self, working up to self-consciousness and what brain components go into producing these states. Part four explores the contributions consciousness gives to the life of the mind. Damasio also includes an appendix on brain structures and functioning.
One thing that surprised me was the way Damasio sees emotions as basic and feelings piggybacking on top of them. I was under the impression before reading the book that feelings were primary and emotions were secondary as in coming after feelings.
I have a number of reflections on some specific pieces of text. Kindle locations are given in brackets [].
[279] “. . . only after minds developed language and lived to tell did it about become widely known that minds did exist.” This lends support to my notion that we do not think in language. The reason I feel it supports this is because it indicates that minds came first and only later did language come along to translate our thoughts and communicate them to others.
[287] “A mind unwitnessed by a self protagonist is still a mind. However, given that the self is our only natural means to know the mind, we are entirely dependent on the self’s presence, capabilities, and limits.” In conjunction with the previous quote is Damasio saying that it takes language to be aware of a self.
[1199] “. . . images are based on changes that occur in the body and brain during the physical interaction with the body.” This is the conclusion to his description of how the brain uses images to think whether conscious or not. I take this to lend support to my above notion about language and thought, if he is saying that the brains way of thinking is through images and not language. Whether he would agree with me or not, I am not sure.
[1798] “Some of those regions are involved in language, others in movement, others in manipulations that constitute reasoning.” Does this also mean that language is different than thought.
[2263] “. . . the [cell] ensembles would hold know-how, that is, dispositions, for eventual reconstruction of explicit representations when they become needed.” (italics in original) This reminds me of image and text compression in computers. [2310] He continues shortly after this to say: “Dispositions are not words; they are abstract records of potentialities.” At least at the level of dispositions language is not involved, again supporting my ideas on language and thought.
[2460] “Unfortunately, taking consciousness as mere mind is a common use of the term—a misuse, I think.” While I would agree more or less with him here, there maybe no sacrosanct definition of consciousness, but the user of the word should be clear on the definition he or she chooses to use for it.
[2521] Summarizing about the correlations between brain and mind, he says: “These important results can be parsimoniously interpreted in the context of the abundant evidence that mind processes operate nonconsciously (as reviewed in this chapter and in chapter 11).” The key for me is “nonconsciously.” If mind processes are truly nonconscious than thought cannot be done in language, or at least this is my own conclusion.
[2676] “Core consciousness does not require language and must have proceeded language, obviously in nonhuman species but also in humans. In effect, language would likely not have evolved in individuals devoid of core consciousness. Why would they need it? On the contrary, at the highest grades on the scale, autobiographical consciousness relies extensively on language.” Never mind what he counts as “core” consciousness, the “autobiographical” kind is only found in humans and language seems to be required. My point in bringing this up is two. One it fits in with my notion that language is a sense, a sense that senses self-consciousness or conscious thought. And again, I believe it lends support to my notion that we do not think in language.
[2883] Summarizing, he says: “All the [conscious] knowledge is readily present. It is not arrived at by reasoned inference or interpretation. To begin with, it is not verbal either.” (my italics) More support that we do not think in language.
[2919] “These sorts of [time and space] images can be converted into mathematical descriptions as well as musical compositions and executions. Mathematician and composers excel at this sort of image-making.” If so, this shows that at the very least not all thought is of a verbal nature. As an aside, it is said at least of some composers, such as Bach, that their musical compositions are mathematical. This could be part of the explanation for this.
[3156] “Michael Gazzaniga has advanced the notion of ‘interpreter’ as a way of explaining the generation of consciousness. Moreover, he has related it, quite sensibly, to the machinery of the left hemisphere and to the language processes therein. I like his idea very much (in fact, there is a distinct ring of truth to it), but I believe it applies fully only to the level of the autobiographical self and not quite to that of the core self.” See above [2676] for comment.
[4195] “I believe that the conclusions on the merits of un-consciousness [that they have reasoning capabilities] are correct, but our notion of what goes on beneath the glassy surface of consciousness is much enriched when we factor emotion and feeling into the unconscious processes.” This shows if reasoning goes on under the conscious roof, than emotions and feelings are an intricate component of thought itself. This along with other research leads me belief this is the case.
[4273] In a section entitled “The Feeling of Conscious Will” he says: “Someone who share{s} this view is Dan Wegner, who describes conscious will as ‘the somatic marker of personal authorship, an emotion that authenticates the action’s owner as the self. With the feeling of doing an act, we get a conscious sensation of will attached to the action.’” Although neither Wegner or Damasio would necessarily agree with me that free will is indeed an emotion or feeling, I think their work can support such a notion.
[4824] “The problem, some will say the mystery, has to do with how a phenomenon [consciousness] that is regarded as nonphysical—the mind—can exert its influence on the very physical nervous system that moves us to action.” I ask why it cannot be physical. Vision is physical with light impinging on our eyes and processed in the brain, and light is composed of photons. Light seemingly nonphysical is actually physical, so why not mind. Not a knock out drag out argument, but seemingly in support that mind is a physical process.
I know I have commented a lot on my idea that we do not think in language. But, the things I kept reading in the book kept reminding of it throughout. I cannot say that Damasio would be in total agreement with me on this. I think—probably not.
I am on board with Damasio’s major premise. This is that consciousness, including human self-consciousness, arises from brain functioning. He fully admits that he has not proven this in a surefire way. He does amass enough evidence from his and others’ research to make it a reasonable assumption, but he realizes there is more research that needs to be done in order to make it a scientific certainty.*
I enjoyed the book, but became slightly bored with Damasio’s discussion of brain contents (brain stem, amygdala, nuclei, and such things). Although, these things are important in understanding how the brain works. I have to say I am more of a materialist and it consequences than him. Seeing how he is primarily a scientist, and I am concerned with philosophy of mind, this is understandable from my perspective. I will also say that I learned many new things by reading this book (brain structure, better understanding of emotions and feelings, images and mappings, and more).
If you are interested in the brain, especially consciousness, I would highly recommend this book. I will practically guarantee that you will gain from reading this book. For those that need a bit more on basic brain structure and functioning there is a decent appendix covering these things as I already mention, which may come in handy for those not so conversant on these things.
* Scientific certainty is not a final certainty. All theories and findings in science are provisional to some degree or other. However, some things in science are certain to a very high degree, and I think this is what Damasio is ultimately after.