Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?

by James B. Wood

In this provocative history, James B. Wood challenges the received wisdom that Japan's defeat in the Pacific was historically inevitable. He argues instead that it was only when the Japanese military prematurely abandoned its original sound strategic plan―to secure the resources Japan needed and establish a viable defensible perimeter for the Empire―that the Allies were able to regain the initiative and lock Japanese forces into a war of attrition they were not prepared to fight. The book persuasively shows how the Japanese army and navy had both the opportunity and the capability to have fought a different and more successful war in the Pacific that could have influenced the course and outcome of World War II. It is therefore a study both of Japanese defeat and of what was needed to achieve a potential Japanese victory, or at the very least, to avoid total ruin.

Wood's argument does not depend on signal individual historical events or dramatic accidents. Instead it examines how familiar events could have become more complicated or problematic under different, but nevertheless historically possible, conditions due to changes in the complex interaction of strategic and operational factors over time. Wood concludes that fighting a different war was well within the capacities of imperial Japan. He underscores the fact that the enormous task of achieving total military victory over Japan would have been even more difficult, perhaps too difficult, if the Japanese had waged a different war and the Allies had not fought as skillfully as they did. If Japan had traveled that alternate military road, the outcome of the Pacific War could have differed significantly from that we know so well―and, perhaps a little too complacently, accept.

Genres: History, Military History, Military Fiction

152 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2007

Reviews

[Jack · Rating 3 out of 5]

Was defeat inevitable? Short answer, yes. Wood argues that while Japan’s initial successes were due to aggressive tactics and clearly defined goals, a combination of strategic overreach (Midway), resource limitations (no convoy system to battle US submarine campaign), and failure to adapt to changing circumstances (the rigorous Japanese naval pilot training program produced a few hundred pilots a year, versus the US producing literally thousands) sealed their fate. While different decisions by the Japanese leadership could have definitely prolonged the war, the only way it could have ended differently would have to be lack of American will to continue. With the inevitable manufacture of an atomic bomb, this was highly unlikely. 3.5 stars.

[Lee · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a good one. The author shied away from speaking about specific tactical decisions (that is, particular battles), but stuck to military strategy.

The Japanese needed to delay, delay, delay in any war with the USA, and hope for war-weariness or a German victory in Europe for them to be able to negotiate a favorable peace. This book outlines some ways that the Japanese could have forced some of that delay on the American offensives that took place beginning in November 1943.

[Lloyd · Rating 4 out of 5]

This author uses an alternative history analysis of Japan’s military strategy during World War II to make the case that Japan’s defeat by the allies was not inevitable. He points out how Japan could have made better use of Army infantry soldiers in the Pacific area (as opposed to their usage in China), early adoption of convoy tactics by their merchant marines, focusing their submarines against allied merchant marines (as opposed to focusing on military naval ships) and most of all going over to the defensive as soon as they acquired the resource rich countries in Indochina and Malayia. Instead, the Japanese got “victory fever” from their early and quick success and pushed their offensive farther into Midway, the Solomons and New Guinea. Those offensives were ultimately unsuccessful, and they cost the Japanese dearly in military losses; plus, the time needed to put consolidation of their initial gains behind schedule. Losing their focus on hardening the defense of their initial gains in resource rich areas made those areas vulnerable to the eventual allied counter offensives. However, even if the Japanese had followed in real time all the author’s hindsight strategies, the author concedes that it likely would have only delayed eventual defeat by about one year. At that point, Japan’s only hope was that the allies would have been suffering from war fatigue and their own losses in blood and treasure that they may have accepted a peace far short of the unconditional surrender that did occur. Such a defeat would not have been as catastrophic as the actual defeat, but defeat would still have ensued. The author makes logical and well-reasoned arguments for his counterfactual strategies, but he ignores the Japanese mindset. Their military was taught to adhere to the Bushido code of the warrior class. That code stressed offensive actions and a willingness to fight even hopeless causes to a honorable death. Digging in defensively after achieving such dramatic offensive victories would have been a hard sell to the Japanese military leaders in 1942 and 1943.

[James Rooney · Rating 5 out of 5]

This short work is chock-full of insightful suggestions and ideas. Wood starts off by arguing that the traditional idea of inevitable American victory due to industrial superiority is misleading.

Japan made many serious mistakes throughout the war, but perhaps the most serious was her failure to remain concentrated and her decision to disperse her assets across the Pacific, allowing them to be defeated in detail by the American offensives.

Had the Japanese been more cautious and less reckless they might have prolonged their resistance for a lot longer than they in fact did.

The best part of the work for me was the author's condemnation that Japan never waged a war against Allied shipping with submarines, even though the impressive results that could be obtained from so doing were in front of their eyes in the Atlantic, and even though the Germans strongly recommended that they do so.

This is a colossal failure of Japanese strategy, and one that is frequently overlooked because you cannot see what isn't there. But especially at the outset of the war, e.g. during Watchtower, the Japanese might have crippled American logistics with vigorous submarine warfare.

But they didn't even try. So much the better for the United States and so much the worse for them.

While this is the most interesting aspect of the work it is far from the only one, this is a must read for Japan's strategic failure.

[Brian · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good, compact, consice history that says what needs to be said and no more.

[Dan Ust · Rating 3 out of 5]

Makes a good case, though it needs more polish to read well.