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George Marshall: A Biography
A major historical biography of George C. Marshall—the general who ran the U.S. campaign during the Second World War, the Secretary of State who oversaw the successful rebuilding of post-war Europe, and the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize—and the first to offer a complete picture of his life
While Eisenhower Patton, Bradley, Montgomery, McArthur, Nimitz, and Leahy waged battles in Europe and the Pacific, one military leader actually ran World War II for America, overseeing personnel and logistics: Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from 1939 to 1945, George C. Marshall.
This interpretive biography of George C. Marshall follows his life from his childhood in Western Pennsylvania and his military training at the Virginia Military Institute to his role during and after World War II and his death in 1959 at the age of seventy-eight. It brings to light the virtuous historical role models who inspired him, including George Washington and Robert E. Lee, and his relationships with the Washington political establishment, military brass, and foreign leaders, from Harry Truman to Chiang Kai Shek. It explores Marshall’s successes and failures during World War II, and his contributions through two critical years of the emerging Cold War—including the transformative Marshall Plan, which saved Western Europe from Soviet domination, and the failed attempt to unite China’s nationalists and communists.
Based on breathtaking research and filled with rich detail, George Marshall is sure to be hailed as the definitive work on one of the most influential figures in American history.
While Eisenhower Patton, Bradley, Montgomery, McArthur, Nimitz, and Leahy waged battles in Europe and the Pacific, one military leader actually ran World War II for America, overseeing personnel and logistics: Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from 1939 to 1945, George C. Marshall.
This interpretive biography of George C. Marshall follows his life from his childhood in Western Pennsylvania and his military training at the Virginia Military Institute to his role during and after World War II and his death in 1959 at the age of seventy-eight. It brings to light the virtuous historical role models who inspired him, including George Washington and Robert E. Lee, and his relationships with the Washington political establishment, military brass, and foreign leaders, from Harry Truman to Chiang Kai Shek. It explores Marshall’s successes and failures during World War II, and his contributions through two critical years of the emerging Cold War—including the transformative Marshall Plan, which saved Western Europe from Soviet domination, and the failed attempt to unite China’s nationalists and communists.
Based on breathtaking research and filled with rich detail, George Marshall is sure to be hailed as the definitive work on one of the most influential figures in American history.
560 pages, Hardcover
First published October 21, 2014
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November 5, 2014
Forrest Pogue wrote a masterful four-volume biography of George Marshall. So, why write this book? Perhaps there is previously unknown material which sheds light on some aspect of the man. But no, that doesn't appear to be the case. Or maybe the authors are such great wordsmiths that the subject doesn't really matter, it's the writing that is worth the journey - think Edmund Morris. But no, the writing's pretty pedestrian. Maybe the authors have gone back to original documents, conducted their own interviews, traveled the same landscape to provide some original insight - think Robert Caro. But that would be another 'no'.
No, what we have here are two authors who have read other biographies of George Marshall and then shuffled some index cards. Just for example, they quote Pogue 18 times. Nevertheless, I understand that not everyone has the time or inclination to read a four-volume biography and a single-volume work can be important if it gets the general citizenry to read about a great man or a great time. But authors should try not to be execrable. This is when I quit:
The U.S. Army as a whole did not get the cream of the manpower crop. Sailors and marines, largely volunteers, were, by and large, better specimens of manhood than soldiers. Within the army, in turn, the quality of the infantry soldier, measured by physique, morale, and intellectual caliber, was inferior to that of men in other branches of the service. ... the skilled, and presumably smarter, plumbers, carpenters, electricians, and office clerks ended up in army desk jobs or other noncombat branches; the unskilled and, presumably, mentally inferior filled the infantry's ranks.
First, define manhood. Second, think back to when you were eighteen years-old. At that stage of your life were you a plumber? a carpenter? electrician? office clerk?* Hmmmm. Apparently you could go on to become a doctor, lawyer, engineer, pharmacist, teacher; you could grow up to be Al Effing Gore. But in the view of these authors, you would still be mentally inferior because you couldn't handle a coping saw.
I heartily recommend this book to the shallow, to those comfortable with stereotypes, people who call into radio talk shows to voice an opinion on a topic they know nothing about, and to those who copied other kids' homework.
Execrable.
_____________________________
*Bartleby, remember, was an office clerk. Imagine him as a marine, preferring not to.
No, what we have here are two authors who have read other biographies of George Marshall and then shuffled some index cards. Just for example, they quote Pogue 18 times. Nevertheless, I understand that not everyone has the time or inclination to read a four-volume biography and a single-volume work can be important if it gets the general citizenry to read about a great man or a great time. But authors should try not to be execrable. This is when I quit:
The U.S. Army as a whole did not get the cream of the manpower crop. Sailors and marines, largely volunteers, were, by and large, better specimens of manhood than soldiers. Within the army, in turn, the quality of the infantry soldier, measured by physique, morale, and intellectual caliber, was inferior to that of men in other branches of the service. ... the skilled, and presumably smarter, plumbers, carpenters, electricians, and office clerks ended up in army desk jobs or other noncombat branches; the unskilled and, presumably, mentally inferior filled the infantry's ranks.
First, define manhood. Second, think back to when you were eighteen years-old. At that stage of your life were you a plumber? a carpenter? electrician? office clerk?* Hmmmm. Apparently you could go on to become a doctor, lawyer, engineer, pharmacist, teacher; you could grow up to be Al Effing Gore. But in the view of these authors, you would still be mentally inferior because you couldn't handle a coping saw.
I heartily recommend this book to the shallow, to those comfortable with stereotypes, people who call into radio talk shows to voice an opinion on a topic they know nothing about, and to those who copied other kids' homework.
Execrable.
_____________________________
*Bartleby, remember, was an office clerk. Imagine him as a marine, preferring not to.
February 26, 2015
When one thinks of the great World War II generals the names George S. Patton, Omar Bradley, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Douglas Mac Arthur, and Bernard Montgomery seem to always enter the conversation. However, one of the most important military figures of the war never seems to be mentioned, that individual is George C. Marshall. The former Chief of Staff under Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary of State and Defense under Harry Truman had a tremendous impact during and after the war, and even has his name placed on one of the most important initiatives taken by the United States after 1945 to help rebuild Europe, the Marshall Plan. Marshall never did command troops on the battlefield but his impact on the military was substantial and his role has been the subject of a great deal of debate among historians. The latest effort is a new biography written by Debi and Irwin Unger with the assistance of Stanley Hirshson. The book, GEORGE MARSHALL is a comprehensive examination of Marshall’s career and a detailed analysis of Marshall’s role in history.
In the January 3, 1944 issue of Time magazine, Marshall’s photo adorns the cover as “man of the year.” The article that accompanied the photo stated that George C. Marshall was the closest person in the United States to being the “indispensable man” for the American war effort. One must ask the question, was this hyperbole justified? According to the Ungers the answer is a qualified no. After analyzing Marshall’s policies they conclude that his shortcomings outweigh his successes ranging from his poor judgment of the individuals he placed in command positions to his underestimating the number of troops necessary to fight the war, particularly in providing replacements for men killed or wounded in combat. In addition, they criticize Marshall for his approach to training and preparing American soldiers for combat which was painfully obvious during the North African campaign and other major operations during the war. The authors argue their case carefully supporting their views with the available documentation, though there is an over reliance on secondary sources.
Everyone who has written about Marshall and came in contact with him all agree that he epitomized the characteristics of a Virginia gentleman. He presented himself as aloof and honest, and though a rather humorless and direct person no one ever questioned his character. This persona remained with Marshall throughout his career and emerged during policy decisions, diplomatic negotiations, or his dealings with the divergent personalities that he had to work with. The narrative points out the importance of Marshall’s association with General John J. Pershing during World War I and the first major example of Marshall losing his temper over policy, and having the target of his tirade take him under their wing. The story follows Marshall’s career in the post-World I era and his association with men like Douglas Mac Arthur, Dwight Eisenhower and others who he would enter in his notebook as people to watch for in the future. The majority of the book deals with Marshall’s impact on American military planning. In the 1930s he worked to train National Guard units, but he also worked with the Civilian Conservation Corps which brought him to the attention of President Roosevelt. From this point on his career takes off. By 1938 he becomes Deputy Chief of Staff at the same time the situation in Europe continued to deteriorate. By 1939, after an overly honest conversation with Roosevelt about the state of US military preparedness, the president impressed with Marshall’s seriousness appointed him Chief of Staff.
The author’s integrate the major events in Europe and the Far East up to and including the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but they do not mine any new ground. As the book analyzes the major components of Marshall’s career, the authors have a habit of presenting the negative, then produce some positives, and finally concluding their analysis with the mistakes that Marshall supposedly made. A number of examples come to mind. Roosevelt haters for years have tried to blame the president for the events of December 7, 1941 and the authors examine Marshall’s culpability for how unprepared the US was for the attack. The Ungers examine numerous investigations of the attack on Pearl Harbor and seem disappointed that more of the blame did not fall on Marshall. They seem to conclude as they comment on his appearance at a Congressional hearing that “Marshall’s demeanor may also reveal a degree of self-doubt-indeed pangs of conscience-at his own imperfect performance in the events leading to Pearl Harbor.” The Congressional investigation criticized Marshall and Admiral Harold Stark for “insufficient vigilance in overseeing their subordinates in Hawaii……[and] deplored Marshall’s failure on the morning of the attack to send a warning to Short on a priority basis.” (367)
It is painfully obvious based on the author’s narrative that the United States was totally unprepared for war. They credit Marshall for doing his best to lobby Congress to expand the American military and institute a draft and then extend it. In 1942 Roosevelt wanted to strike at North Africa, but Marshall believed that the American needs in the Pacific and plans to assist the British in Iceland and Northern Ireland would create man power shortages if the strike in North Africa went forward. The authors criticize Marshall for not presenting his case forcefully enough to Roosevelt which would cause manpower issues later on in the war. In planning for the war Marshall argued that a force of 8,000,000 men and 90 divisions would be sufficient to win the war. Throughout the war there were constant worries that certain strategic decisions would not be successful for lack of manpower. The author’s point to the cross channel invasion of France, having enough troops to take on the Japanese once the Germans were defeated, and the landing at Sicily to make their case. They do praise Marshall for trying to reform the military command structure by always placing one general in charge in each war theater, be it D-Day, Torch, or other operations. They also praise Marshall for trying to reform the training of American troops, but at the same time they criticize him for the lack of morale of American soldiers and their supposed lack of commitment to defeat the enemy. Marshall would partly agree with the authors conclusions as he admitted that the soldiers sent to North Africa “were only partly trained and badly trained.” (168)
As mentioned before, Marshall maintained a list of men he though would be invaluable in leading American troops during the war. The authors have difficulty with some of his choices and argue that he was a poor judge of character in others. “On the one hand we note the names of fighting generals George S. Patton, Robert Eichelberger, Courtney Hodges, J. Lawton Collins, and Lucian Truscott,” and administrators like Dwight Eisenhower and Brehon Somervell, but on the other hand we find the likes of Lloyd Fredendall and Mark Clark, which provoked a respected military correspondent like Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times to have written “the greatest American military problem was leadership, the army he concluded, had thus far failed to produce a fraction of the adequate officer leadership needed.” (208)
Many of the criticisms that the authors offer have some basis, but their critique goes a bit too far by suggesting that Marshall was indirectly responsible for the death of his step son, Allen at Anzio as he had placed him in range of peril because he facilitated his transfer to North Africa after he completed Armored Force School at Fort Knox. The most effective historical writing is one of balance and objectivity, but at times the Ungers become too polemical as they try to downgrade Marshall’s reputation. Granted Marshall had never led troops in combat, but as a logistician, administrator, and diplomat he deserves to be praised. Marshall’s ability to deal with British generals and their egos was very important to the allied effort. His ability to work with Winston Churchill and argue against the English Prime Minister’s goals of a Mediterranean strategy and movement in the Balkans as part of retaining the British Empire merits commendation. His ability to navigate American politics and strong personalities was also a key to victory.
Once the authors have completed their discussion of the war they turn to Marshall’s role as Secretary of State. They correctly point out that it took Marshall some time to realize that Stalin could not be trusted and had designs on Eastern Europe. They are also correct in pointing out that the European Recovery Program that bears his name was not developed by the Secretary of State but by a talented staff that included the likes of George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, Dean Acheson, Dean Rusk, and Robert Lovett. Marshall’s importance was lobbying Congress to gain funding for the program. The authors also give Marshall credit for trying to work out a rapprochement between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists after the war, a task that was almost impossible. The authors describe the heated debate over the creation of the state of Israel that Marshall vehemently opposed based on the national security needs of the United States and dismissed the political and humanitarian calculations of Clark Clifford and President Truman. A position the authors feel that when looked upon from today’s perspective was quite accurate. Finally, the authors give Marshall a significant amount of credit for the creation of NATO.
If Marshall’s term as Secretary of State is deemed successful by the authors his one year stint as Secretary of Defense is seen as flawed. The main criticism of Marshall deals with Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War. After taking the reader through the North Korean attack on South Korea and the successful Inchon landing the authors describe in detail the dilemma of how far to pursue North Korean troops. The question was should United Nations forces cross the 38th parallel into the north and how close should American bombing come to the Yalu River that bordered on Communist China. According to the authors when the Communist Chinese troops entered the war it was not totally the fault of MacArthur because of the unclear orders that Marshall gave. According to the authors Marshall’s orders were “tentative and ambiguous,” thus confusing the American commander.(464) The limits on what the President allowed were very clear and when General Matthew Ridgeway, who replaced MacArthur as American commander was asked “why the chiefs did not give MacArthur categorical directions the general responded “what good would that do? He wouldn’t obey the orders.” (467) It appears the authors can never pass on an opportunity of presenting Marshall in a negative light.
Overall, the book is well written and covers all the major components of the Second World War. It does less with Marshall’s role as Secretary of State and Defense, but if one is looking for a different approach to Marshall’s career this book can meet your needs as long as you realize that there are segments that are not very balanced. Even in the book’s last paragraph they feel the need to make one last negative comment, “all told, the performance of George Marshall in many of his roles was less than awe-inspiring.” (490)
In the January 3, 1944 issue of Time magazine, Marshall’s photo adorns the cover as “man of the year.” The article that accompanied the photo stated that George C. Marshall was the closest person in the United States to being the “indispensable man” for the American war effort. One must ask the question, was this hyperbole justified? According to the Ungers the answer is a qualified no. After analyzing Marshall’s policies they conclude that his shortcomings outweigh his successes ranging from his poor judgment of the individuals he placed in command positions to his underestimating the number of troops necessary to fight the war, particularly in providing replacements for men killed or wounded in combat. In addition, they criticize Marshall for his approach to training and preparing American soldiers for combat which was painfully obvious during the North African campaign and other major operations during the war. The authors argue their case carefully supporting their views with the available documentation, though there is an over reliance on secondary sources.
Everyone who has written about Marshall and came in contact with him all agree that he epitomized the characteristics of a Virginia gentleman. He presented himself as aloof and honest, and though a rather humorless and direct person no one ever questioned his character. This persona remained with Marshall throughout his career and emerged during policy decisions, diplomatic negotiations, or his dealings with the divergent personalities that he had to work with. The narrative points out the importance of Marshall’s association with General John J. Pershing during World War I and the first major example of Marshall losing his temper over policy, and having the target of his tirade take him under their wing. The story follows Marshall’s career in the post-World I era and his association with men like Douglas Mac Arthur, Dwight Eisenhower and others who he would enter in his notebook as people to watch for in the future. The majority of the book deals with Marshall’s impact on American military planning. In the 1930s he worked to train National Guard units, but he also worked with the Civilian Conservation Corps which brought him to the attention of President Roosevelt. From this point on his career takes off. By 1938 he becomes Deputy Chief of Staff at the same time the situation in Europe continued to deteriorate. By 1939, after an overly honest conversation with Roosevelt about the state of US military preparedness, the president impressed with Marshall’s seriousness appointed him Chief of Staff.
The author’s integrate the major events in Europe and the Far East up to and including the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but they do not mine any new ground. As the book analyzes the major components of Marshall’s career, the authors have a habit of presenting the negative, then produce some positives, and finally concluding their analysis with the mistakes that Marshall supposedly made. A number of examples come to mind. Roosevelt haters for years have tried to blame the president for the events of December 7, 1941 and the authors examine Marshall’s culpability for how unprepared the US was for the attack. The Ungers examine numerous investigations of the attack on Pearl Harbor and seem disappointed that more of the blame did not fall on Marshall. They seem to conclude as they comment on his appearance at a Congressional hearing that “Marshall’s demeanor may also reveal a degree of self-doubt-indeed pangs of conscience-at his own imperfect performance in the events leading to Pearl Harbor.” The Congressional investigation criticized Marshall and Admiral Harold Stark for “insufficient vigilance in overseeing their subordinates in Hawaii……[and] deplored Marshall’s failure on the morning of the attack to send a warning to Short on a priority basis.” (367)
It is painfully obvious based on the author’s narrative that the United States was totally unprepared for war. They credit Marshall for doing his best to lobby Congress to expand the American military and institute a draft and then extend it. In 1942 Roosevelt wanted to strike at North Africa, but Marshall believed that the American needs in the Pacific and plans to assist the British in Iceland and Northern Ireland would create man power shortages if the strike in North Africa went forward. The authors criticize Marshall for not presenting his case forcefully enough to Roosevelt which would cause manpower issues later on in the war. In planning for the war Marshall argued that a force of 8,000,000 men and 90 divisions would be sufficient to win the war. Throughout the war there were constant worries that certain strategic decisions would not be successful for lack of manpower. The author’s point to the cross channel invasion of France, having enough troops to take on the Japanese once the Germans were defeated, and the landing at Sicily to make their case. They do praise Marshall for trying to reform the military command structure by always placing one general in charge in each war theater, be it D-Day, Torch, or other operations. They also praise Marshall for trying to reform the training of American troops, but at the same time they criticize him for the lack of morale of American soldiers and their supposed lack of commitment to defeat the enemy. Marshall would partly agree with the authors conclusions as he admitted that the soldiers sent to North Africa “were only partly trained and badly trained.” (168)
As mentioned before, Marshall maintained a list of men he though would be invaluable in leading American troops during the war. The authors have difficulty with some of his choices and argue that he was a poor judge of character in others. “On the one hand we note the names of fighting generals George S. Patton, Robert Eichelberger, Courtney Hodges, J. Lawton Collins, and Lucian Truscott,” and administrators like Dwight Eisenhower and Brehon Somervell, but on the other hand we find the likes of Lloyd Fredendall and Mark Clark, which provoked a respected military correspondent like Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times to have written “the greatest American military problem was leadership, the army he concluded, had thus far failed to produce a fraction of the adequate officer leadership needed.” (208)
Many of the criticisms that the authors offer have some basis, but their critique goes a bit too far by suggesting that Marshall was indirectly responsible for the death of his step son, Allen at Anzio as he had placed him in range of peril because he facilitated his transfer to North Africa after he completed Armored Force School at Fort Knox. The most effective historical writing is one of balance and objectivity, but at times the Ungers become too polemical as they try to downgrade Marshall’s reputation. Granted Marshall had never led troops in combat, but as a logistician, administrator, and diplomat he deserves to be praised. Marshall’s ability to deal with British generals and their egos was very important to the allied effort. His ability to work with Winston Churchill and argue against the English Prime Minister’s goals of a Mediterranean strategy and movement in the Balkans as part of retaining the British Empire merits commendation. His ability to navigate American politics and strong personalities was also a key to victory.
Once the authors have completed their discussion of the war they turn to Marshall’s role as Secretary of State. They correctly point out that it took Marshall some time to realize that Stalin could not be trusted and had designs on Eastern Europe. They are also correct in pointing out that the European Recovery Program that bears his name was not developed by the Secretary of State but by a talented staff that included the likes of George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, Dean Acheson, Dean Rusk, and Robert Lovett. Marshall’s importance was lobbying Congress to gain funding for the program. The authors also give Marshall credit for trying to work out a rapprochement between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists after the war, a task that was almost impossible. The authors describe the heated debate over the creation of the state of Israel that Marshall vehemently opposed based on the national security needs of the United States and dismissed the political and humanitarian calculations of Clark Clifford and President Truman. A position the authors feel that when looked upon from today’s perspective was quite accurate. Finally, the authors give Marshall a significant amount of credit for the creation of NATO.
If Marshall’s term as Secretary of State is deemed successful by the authors his one year stint as Secretary of Defense is seen as flawed. The main criticism of Marshall deals with Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War. After taking the reader through the North Korean attack on South Korea and the successful Inchon landing the authors describe in detail the dilemma of how far to pursue North Korean troops. The question was should United Nations forces cross the 38th parallel into the north and how close should American bombing come to the Yalu River that bordered on Communist China. According to the authors when the Communist Chinese troops entered the war it was not totally the fault of MacArthur because of the unclear orders that Marshall gave. According to the authors Marshall’s orders were “tentative and ambiguous,” thus confusing the American commander.(464) The limits on what the President allowed were very clear and when General Matthew Ridgeway, who replaced MacArthur as American commander was asked “why the chiefs did not give MacArthur categorical directions the general responded “what good would that do? He wouldn’t obey the orders.” (467) It appears the authors can never pass on an opportunity of presenting Marshall in a negative light.
Overall, the book is well written and covers all the major components of the Second World War. It does less with Marshall’s role as Secretary of State and Defense, but if one is looking for a different approach to Marshall’s career this book can meet your needs as long as you realize that there are segments that are not very balanced. Even in the book’s last paragraph they feel the need to make one last negative comment, “all told, the performance of George Marshall in many of his roles was less than awe-inspiring.” (490)
November 12, 2014
Winston Churchill called George Marshall the organizer of victory in World War II. President Harry Truman said George Marshall made the greatest contribution to the country over the preceding thirty years. Yet we rarely hear or read much about him. “George Marshall: A Biography” was begun some years ago by the historian Stanly Hirshson. After his death in 2003, Debi and Irwin Unger took up the project. The book is based mainly on previously published sources and says relatively little about Marshall’s personal life and the book breaks no new ground. Marshall presented a difficult problem for biographers. Marshall did not write his memories nor did he leave a trail of revealing letters or diaries.
George Marshall was a descendant of Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall. George Marshall was born in Pennsylvania in 1880. He graduated from the Virginia Military Institute. He was posted to the Philippines, and then when reassigned to the States he worked at the Infantry and Calvary School at Fort Leavenworth Kansas. In World War I Marshall served as an aid to General John Pershing, planning battles and trying with Pershing to make the case for universal military training. George Marshall was Army Chief of Staff during World War II, transforming a week military to the world’s strongest. The Unger’s reveal how he turned what was an Army of 200,000 ill-trained, ill equipped men in 1939 into one of 8.5 million six years later. It was a huge bureaucratic task and it was done while identifying and elevating men like Eisenhower, Patton, Clark and Bradley through the ranks, dealing with Congress and the British, and not least, strategizing about how to defeat the Japanese and Nazi simultaneously. The authors write that Marshall’s management process was to identify talented men in the War Department and empower them. In other words he was an excellent delegator. Marshall appointed Eisenhower to preside over the Allies and to command D-Day. Marshall was Secretary of State (1947-1949) and fought to sway the acceptance of the Marshall Plan and fought with Congress to enact it. Marshall promoted and encouraged the careers at State of George Kennan and Dean Acheson. Marshall acted brilliantly as Secretary of State and Ambassador to China. He was Secretary of Defense in 1950 and retired to private life in 1951. Marshall won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953 the same year Churchill won it for Literature.
The book is not a balanced account. The unexceptional portrait that emerges from the pages of the book consistently under rates or misrepresent Marshall’s motives and the challenges he had to overcome. The Unger strike a revisionist view of Marshall. The Unger’s persistently seem to be looking for any negative flaw in Marshall and if they could not find one, they overlooked or misrepresented Marshal’s motivation and actions to undermine him. Marshall’s integrity outweighed even his military, strategic and diplomatic skill but the authors overlooked this. Forrest C. Pogue’s biography in 1963 and Ed Cray’s “General of the Army” 1990 remain the standard account of Marshall.
What I look for in a biography is a balanced, unbiased reporting of the facts; I except the author to have done due diligence in researching for documentation and to gather and verify information from more than one source before reporting it as a fact in the book. I cannot recommend this book unless one already has studied World War Two and the post war period and has a firm understanding of the history of the period and the role Marshall played. I read this as an audio book downloaded from Audible. Johnny Heller narrated the book.
George Marshall was a descendant of Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall. George Marshall was born in Pennsylvania in 1880. He graduated from the Virginia Military Institute. He was posted to the Philippines, and then when reassigned to the States he worked at the Infantry and Calvary School at Fort Leavenworth Kansas. In World War I Marshall served as an aid to General John Pershing, planning battles and trying with Pershing to make the case for universal military training. George Marshall was Army Chief of Staff during World War II, transforming a week military to the world’s strongest. The Unger’s reveal how he turned what was an Army of 200,000 ill-trained, ill equipped men in 1939 into one of 8.5 million six years later. It was a huge bureaucratic task and it was done while identifying and elevating men like Eisenhower, Patton, Clark and Bradley through the ranks, dealing with Congress and the British, and not least, strategizing about how to defeat the Japanese and Nazi simultaneously. The authors write that Marshall’s management process was to identify talented men in the War Department and empower them. In other words he was an excellent delegator. Marshall appointed Eisenhower to preside over the Allies and to command D-Day. Marshall was Secretary of State (1947-1949) and fought to sway the acceptance of the Marshall Plan and fought with Congress to enact it. Marshall promoted and encouraged the careers at State of George Kennan and Dean Acheson. Marshall acted brilliantly as Secretary of State and Ambassador to China. He was Secretary of Defense in 1950 and retired to private life in 1951. Marshall won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953 the same year Churchill won it for Literature.
The book is not a balanced account. The unexceptional portrait that emerges from the pages of the book consistently under rates or misrepresent Marshall’s motives and the challenges he had to overcome. The Unger strike a revisionist view of Marshall. The Unger’s persistently seem to be looking for any negative flaw in Marshall and if they could not find one, they overlooked or misrepresented Marshal’s motivation and actions to undermine him. Marshall’s integrity outweighed even his military, strategic and diplomatic skill but the authors overlooked this. Forrest C. Pogue’s biography in 1963 and Ed Cray’s “General of the Army” 1990 remain the standard account of Marshall.
What I look for in a biography is a balanced, unbiased reporting of the facts; I except the author to have done due diligence in researching for documentation and to gather and verify information from more than one source before reporting it as a fact in the book. I cannot recommend this book unless one already has studied World War Two and the post war period and has a firm understanding of the history of the period and the role Marshall played. I read this as an audio book downloaded from Audible. Johnny Heller narrated the book.
December 29, 2014
Although I enjoyed the information, I believe the book is unfairly critical of General Marshall. As a frequent reader of historical works, I have learned how easy it is to use the perspective of history to second-guess and criticize the lives of others in the past. I feel that the authors of this work went beyond historical accuracy to create a work that tears down much of General Marshall's hard-won and well-earned reputation as a great American patriot and servant of the people. I do not recommend this book to the honest reader. Rather, see the pivotal work done years earlier on General Marshall by biographer Forrest Pogue.
October 25, 2014
George Marshall by Irwin & Debi Unger (Harper, October 2014, 560 pages, $35.00/18.99) is a contemporary re-appraisal of George Marshall's life and career. Despite the fact that throughout his long military service, Marshall was always recognized for his character and ability, this biography seems to go out of its way to find fault with the man and his achievements. Whether the issue is the impossibility of any human achieving to the level Marshall's acclaim suggests or a need to find fault with a general widely thought to be one of America's finest military examples, the Ungers seem to go out of their way to fault Marshall for not always getting it right. Never recognized for his brilliance in speech nor given the opportunity to command men in battle, George Marshall still managed to rise to the highest levels of the military and to serve as Army Chief of Staff under Roosevelt and both Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense in the Truman administration. A person of seemingly modest ambition, he was named Time Magazine's Man of the Year twice and won the Nobel Peace Prize. He was promoted to General of the Army, the highest possible rank in the U.S. Army. Despite his recognition, the Ungers are always careful to explore how Marshall falls short of absolute icon status when fully examined. How could he not?
Marshall was born in1880 in Uniontown, PA, the son of a local businessman, but he early identified with the Virginia gentry from which his mother was descended. He attended Virginia Military Institute, where his career was acceptable, but not notable, perhaps spurred on by a denigrating remark made by his older brother. He was commissioned in the regular Army, and like so many of his age cohort serving in the peacetime Army, found promotion to be slow and rewards meager. Generally speaking, he was recognized for his organizational ability, his attention to detail, and his encouragement of his subordinates to take the initiative. He gained a reputation as an effective organizer and administrator, a role he functioned in throughout his career, never having the opportunity to command troops in battle, the usual path to top positions in the Army. Unlike his, perhaps, greatest rival, General Douglas MacArthur he neither came from a distinguished military background, nor gained recognition through his skill at commanding men or as a strategist. Marshall was a consummate bureaucrat, always keeping the spotlight on others as he rose through the ranks. Whenever the opportunity arose for him to take a command post, his superior officers much preferred to keep him in staff positions where his judgment and knowledge were seen as being indispensable. After impressing General John J. Pershing with his directness and honesty, Marshall often had the support of Pershing as he rose through the ranks after World War I. As Pershing's personal aide, Marshall came to know the people and the levers of power in Washington. After Franklin D. Roosevelt became President, his rise in the Army ranks became swifter. While not highly articulate or learned, Marshall was persuasive in both the counsels of the mighty and before Congressional hearings....The remainder of my review appears on my blog. Please read it there and then order the book through my Amazon portal. Thanks.
Marshall was born in1880 in Uniontown, PA, the son of a local businessman, but he early identified with the Virginia gentry from which his mother was descended. He attended Virginia Military Institute, where his career was acceptable, but not notable, perhaps spurred on by a denigrating remark made by his older brother. He was commissioned in the regular Army, and like so many of his age cohort serving in the peacetime Army, found promotion to be slow and rewards meager. Generally speaking, he was recognized for his organizational ability, his attention to detail, and his encouragement of his subordinates to take the initiative. He gained a reputation as an effective organizer and administrator, a role he functioned in throughout his career, never having the opportunity to command troops in battle, the usual path to top positions in the Army. Unlike his, perhaps, greatest rival, General Douglas MacArthur he neither came from a distinguished military background, nor gained recognition through his skill at commanding men or as a strategist. Marshall was a consummate bureaucrat, always keeping the spotlight on others as he rose through the ranks. Whenever the opportunity arose for him to take a command post, his superior officers much preferred to keep him in staff positions where his judgment and knowledge were seen as being indispensable. After impressing General John J. Pershing with his directness and honesty, Marshall often had the support of Pershing as he rose through the ranks after World War I. As Pershing's personal aide, Marshall came to know the people and the levers of power in Washington. After Franklin D. Roosevelt became President, his rise in the Army ranks became swifter. While not highly articulate or learned, Marshall was persuasive in both the counsels of the mighty and before Congressional hearings....The remainder of my review appears on my blog. Please read it there and then order the book through my Amazon portal. Thanks.
August 22, 2017
This was a factual book revealing a serious, somber, industrious man who evolved into a major role in history.
The book was informative but, for me, was not an exciting read - just steady and interesting. From the book that is what George Marshall was and he seemed to have conformed to many of the Boy Scout standards (not friendly, kind?, cheerful?,)and his manner doing this made him the favorite in some ways of General Pershing and Presidents FDR and Truman.
The authors really explained to some extent how he operated, delegation and support, and that he had often failed to have made the best decisions.
That as a military man he served in so many civilian positions afterward, at a not young age, he was certainly trusted and patriotic. From other films and reports I have seen on Marshall I wonder if the Ungers missed something.
I notice that like Dwight Eisenhower he never served in combat or led soldiers in the field. And both declined to take political positions through their military careers. (The Eisenhower part gleamed from other readings - not this book).
Also I learned that he enabled others to make and get passed into law the European Recovery Program which is commonly referred to as the “Marshall Plan” and which likely somewhat succeeded to get necessary support both in the States and Europe due to the fastening for the Marshall name to it.
This was a book worth reading and I am pleased that I did but it gets only three stars from me. I started this book before vacation and read it through a GOOD vacation so it took me eight weeks to finish and maybe it was my inertia that failed rather than the authors work.
September 3, 2022
A biography of one of the most important men in the 20th century. And I had never heard of him until I saw someone I admire reading this book. Missed this section in History class. Never holding a command in the army, George Marshall expanded it from 275,000 soldiers to more than 8 million during WWII.
This one took me a while to read. About 4 years. Kept putting it down and coming back to it. Finally, finished reading it this Summer.
From being part of founding NATO, to creating the European Recovery Plan after WWII, to receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, Marshall kept a low profile and led through the most challenging times in WWII.
All of that did not keep him from failures and he always had some critics, mischaracterizing his actions on communicating information during the Pearl Harbor attack. Through it all, he maintained a sense of duty and honor which was refreshing to see.
First Sentence:
George Calett Marshall was born on the last day of 1880 between two worlds. -1
“I had always the sense that I was in the presence of a man who was altogether my superior… In his tremendous control over himself, and in his tremendous determination. When he came to the conclusion that something should be done, he said it with such a firmness and with such a lucidity that you just agreed with him. You know he was right.” -6
What he lacked in intellectual achievement he made up in strength of character, however acquired. -13
“You are a rather unusual army officer, aren’t you?” Katherine exclaimed when he refused the drink. Marshall asked her how many officers she had known. The ice was broken. -61
As post commandant he sought to help his men and their families cope with current hardships. He encouraged military families to plant vegetable gardens and build chicken coops and hog pens to supplement their diets. He ordered the base mass sergeant to prepare large extra servings of the lunchmeal to be sold to enlisted men for $.10 to take home after duty to their hungry wives and children. -64
Whether by plan or by ingrained trait, the general would never allow FDR to get too close personally. He did not allow the president to call him “George”; he refused to laugh at his jokes. Fearing to fall under FDR’s famous spell, he would never accept invitations to Hyde Park, the president’s Hudson Valley home. In those last peacetime months Marshall did not even respect the president loved by so many. Not until after Pearl Harbor, he later admitted, did he grow to admire his boss. -90
FDR’s pro-navy bias was transparent. In 1956 Marshall recalled that at one point during the war he had to ask FDR to stop speaking of the navy as “we” and the army as “they.” -97
Churchill, a fierce anticommunist, on learning of the German attack in June, is reported by his private secretary to have observed: “If Hitler invaded hell I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.” -104
Fortunately Marshall was now widely seen as a man whose views were not tainted by political ambition or partisanship. With his awesome dignity and patent sincerity, his command of ideas and facts, his lack of offensive ego, and his political neutrality, his goals could only be considered honest and disinterested. -108
Wedemeyer believed that the almost 9 million men would yield 250 combat infant divisions. Instead, by war’s end there were only 90 to fight the Axis. In fact, the number of actual available ground combat troops in 1941–45 will be fewer than in 1917–18, though the army in World War I was only half the total size as in the later war. -114
In two hellish hours the planes with the rising S
sun emblem on their wings sank four US battleships and crippled four others; destroyed a small armada of lesser vessels; demolished 188 planes, and damaged another 155. The Japanese attack killed 2,345 American servicemen and wounded 1,274 others. -123
The men gathered at the White House that late November day were confronted with the same dilemma as Abraham Lincoln as he grappled with the crisis of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor in April 1861, and they reached the same conclusion as the great emancipator: Let the enemy fire the first shot. -126
Is it conceivable that Marshall would connive with FDR and his chief advisers to endanger the Navy and the Army air Corps on Oahu? The answer again is no. It is preposterous to believe that a man who had built his career, and indeed his life, on his reputation for personal integrity, and for whom the army was everything, would have lent himself to such a project. -127
Human communications and perceptions are always imperfect, and it is easy to assign blame after the fact. -128
It was not easy in the months after Pearl Harbor to explain to average mid continent citizens why the country’s war effort was centered on Germany and Italy when it was Japan that had perfidiously attack the United States. -139
In the end Italy as a cobelligerent contributed relatively little to the Allied cause. Still, the downfall of the dictator, Adolf Hitler‘s close partner, bolstered Allied morale at a time of uncertainty and continued doubt. -279
It was while he was standing on the Tourette of his tank near the Alban hills south of Rome to survey the terrain ahead that a sniper’s bullet ended his life. Whether or not Marshall made the emotional association suggested here, stoicism and respect for patriotic duty we’re intrinsic parts of a soldier’s values – perhaps Marshall’s in particular – and it can be assumed that they served him as comfort on this tragic occasion. -286
And so Marshall once more failed to win a combat command. He would never lead men in battle; he would remain a desk officer, a military manager, and a top administrator to the end of his army career. -295
To preserve his health and energy Marshall maintained limited hours. He arrived early but also left early, believing that no effective work was ever done much past 3 o’clock. -297
The night before [before D—Day], he was at the Soviet Embassy to receive a decoration, the Order of Suvorov. He escaped to Quarters No. 1 soon after the ceremony and simply went to bed. As he later explained his composure, “Well, there was nothing I could do about it anymore. It was much better to get a good night’s sleep and be ready for whatever the morning might bring.” -311
When Marshall asked Brooke to approve Ike’s broad-front strategy, he refused. This is the sanitized bare-bones written record of events. But the reality was more vivid. The meeting on the first, Harry Hopkins was right, produced “one of the most violent disagreements and disputes of the war.” -332
Especially crippling was the shortage of petroleum to the point where Japanese refiners were experimenting with gasoline made from potatoes. -349
Both outspoken, both autodidact historians, they would forge a strong bond that would soon transform American foreign policy. Truman would come to believe Marshall “the greatest man of World War II.” -356
There still remained the major issue of creating a democratic coalition government. This was to be solved by the Political Consultative Conference that convened in Chungking in January to draft a new frame of government for China. To retain his independence of action in a politically sensitive area, Marshall refused to participate in its deliberations, so he offered to serve as an intermediary between the two sides. -374
Truman began calling the ERP the Marshall Plan. The name was frankly expedient. Truman was running for president in his own right, and his ratings with the public were low. He sought to avoid too close a personal connection with the scheme. As the President told his friends: “Can you imagine [the bill’s] chances of passing in an election year in a Republican Congress if it is named for Truman and not Marshall?” -410
British and many American policymakers feared that supporting the Jews would propel the Arabs of the Middle East into the arms of the Soviets. -419
To him, as to the pro-Arab officers of the State Department, the Palestine issue ultimately boiled down to expediency: The United States must choose what was best for the United States; the rest was irrelevant. -422
One of Marshall‘s contributions to the diplomacy of the early Cold War was his role in launching the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO). Linking the United States and ultimately 28 European countries including Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and several lesser powers, in a treaty of mutual defense and military cooperation, it would be a cornerstone of American foreign policy for more than 60 years and, with modifications, it still is today. -446
He would turn down a second Truman offer of the presidency of the Red Cross, but accepted the assignment as chairman of the American Battle Monuments Commission, a post previously held by his revered mentor General Pershing, who had died in 1948. -479
And yet, he conceded, large armies were not the way to achieve a peaceful world. Rather, “the most important single factor will be a spiritual regeneration to develop goodwill and understanding among nations.” -482
Truman visited, and Eisenhower came three times. On one of Ike’s visits he was accompanied by the aged Winston Churchill, who stood at the doorway of his room with tears in his eyes while Marshall lay under the covers on his hospital bed. -485
All told, the performance of George Marshall in many of his roles was less than awe-inspiring. He had to, the far right excepted, the paeans were incessant, the applause unrelieved. The discrepancy may well have originated in Americans’ yearning for a platonic ideal of a triumphant military leader above politics, deceit, and selfish ambition – in a word, a George Washington – which they located in a fallible man of sterling character but unremarkable powers. Only a very few keen observers saw beyond the conventional wisdom. In effect, the Olympian persona that Marshall himself created protected him, though imperfectly, from criticism, both in his prime and in his future historical reputation. -490
Last Sentence:
But whatever the reality, his life and work left a deep imprint of American life and the world during the mid-20th-century year of crisis and trial. -490
This one took me a while to read. About 4 years. Kept putting it down and coming back to it. Finally, finished reading it this Summer.
From being part of founding NATO, to creating the European Recovery Plan after WWII, to receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, Marshall kept a low profile and led through the most challenging times in WWII.
All of that did not keep him from failures and he always had some critics, mischaracterizing his actions on communicating information during the Pearl Harbor attack. Through it all, he maintained a sense of duty and honor which was refreshing to see.
First Sentence:
George Calett Marshall was born on the last day of 1880 between two worlds. -1
“I had always the sense that I was in the presence of a man who was altogether my superior… In his tremendous control over himself, and in his tremendous determination. When he came to the conclusion that something should be done, he said it with such a firmness and with such a lucidity that you just agreed with him. You know he was right.” -6
What he lacked in intellectual achievement he made up in strength of character, however acquired. -13
“You are a rather unusual army officer, aren’t you?” Katherine exclaimed when he refused the drink. Marshall asked her how many officers she had known. The ice was broken. -61
As post commandant he sought to help his men and their families cope with current hardships. He encouraged military families to plant vegetable gardens and build chicken coops and hog pens to supplement their diets. He ordered the base mass sergeant to prepare large extra servings of the lunchmeal to be sold to enlisted men for $.10 to take home after duty to their hungry wives and children. -64
Whether by plan or by ingrained trait, the general would never allow FDR to get too close personally. He did not allow the president to call him “George”; he refused to laugh at his jokes. Fearing to fall under FDR’s famous spell, he would never accept invitations to Hyde Park, the president’s Hudson Valley home. In those last peacetime months Marshall did not even respect the president loved by so many. Not until after Pearl Harbor, he later admitted, did he grow to admire his boss. -90
FDR’s pro-navy bias was transparent. In 1956 Marshall recalled that at one point during the war he had to ask FDR to stop speaking of the navy as “we” and the army as “they.” -97
Churchill, a fierce anticommunist, on learning of the German attack in June, is reported by his private secretary to have observed: “If Hitler invaded hell I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.” -104
Fortunately Marshall was now widely seen as a man whose views were not tainted by political ambition or partisanship. With his awesome dignity and patent sincerity, his command of ideas and facts, his lack of offensive ego, and his political neutrality, his goals could only be considered honest and disinterested. -108
Wedemeyer believed that the almost 9 million men would yield 250 combat infant divisions. Instead, by war’s end there were only 90 to fight the Axis. In fact, the number of actual available ground combat troops in 1941–45 will be fewer than in 1917–18, though the army in World War I was only half the total size as in the later war. -114
In two hellish hours the planes with the rising S
sun emblem on their wings sank four US battleships and crippled four others; destroyed a small armada of lesser vessels; demolished 188 planes, and damaged another 155. The Japanese attack killed 2,345 American servicemen and wounded 1,274 others. -123
The men gathered at the White House that late November day were confronted with the same dilemma as Abraham Lincoln as he grappled with the crisis of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor in April 1861, and they reached the same conclusion as the great emancipator: Let the enemy fire the first shot. -126
Is it conceivable that Marshall would connive with FDR and his chief advisers to endanger the Navy and the Army air Corps on Oahu? The answer again is no. It is preposterous to believe that a man who had built his career, and indeed his life, on his reputation for personal integrity, and for whom the army was everything, would have lent himself to such a project. -127
Human communications and perceptions are always imperfect, and it is easy to assign blame after the fact. -128
It was not easy in the months after Pearl Harbor to explain to average mid continent citizens why the country’s war effort was centered on Germany and Italy when it was Japan that had perfidiously attack the United States. -139
In the end Italy as a cobelligerent contributed relatively little to the Allied cause. Still, the downfall of the dictator, Adolf Hitler‘s close partner, bolstered Allied morale at a time of uncertainty and continued doubt. -279
It was while he was standing on the Tourette of his tank near the Alban hills south of Rome to survey the terrain ahead that a sniper’s bullet ended his life. Whether or not Marshall made the emotional association suggested here, stoicism and respect for patriotic duty we’re intrinsic parts of a soldier’s values – perhaps Marshall’s in particular – and it can be assumed that they served him as comfort on this tragic occasion. -286
And so Marshall once more failed to win a combat command. He would never lead men in battle; he would remain a desk officer, a military manager, and a top administrator to the end of his army career. -295
To preserve his health and energy Marshall maintained limited hours. He arrived early but also left early, believing that no effective work was ever done much past 3 o’clock. -297
The night before [before D—Day], he was at the Soviet Embassy to receive a decoration, the Order of Suvorov. He escaped to Quarters No. 1 soon after the ceremony and simply went to bed. As he later explained his composure, “Well, there was nothing I could do about it anymore. It was much better to get a good night’s sleep and be ready for whatever the morning might bring.” -311
When Marshall asked Brooke to approve Ike’s broad-front strategy, he refused. This is the sanitized bare-bones written record of events. But the reality was more vivid. The meeting on the first, Harry Hopkins was right, produced “one of the most violent disagreements and disputes of the war.” -332
Especially crippling was the shortage of petroleum to the point where Japanese refiners were experimenting with gasoline made from potatoes. -349
Both outspoken, both autodidact historians, they would forge a strong bond that would soon transform American foreign policy. Truman would come to believe Marshall “the greatest man of World War II.” -356
There still remained the major issue of creating a democratic coalition government. This was to be solved by the Political Consultative Conference that convened in Chungking in January to draft a new frame of government for China. To retain his independence of action in a politically sensitive area, Marshall refused to participate in its deliberations, so he offered to serve as an intermediary between the two sides. -374
Truman began calling the ERP the Marshall Plan. The name was frankly expedient. Truman was running for president in his own right, and his ratings with the public were low. He sought to avoid too close a personal connection with the scheme. As the President told his friends: “Can you imagine [the bill’s] chances of passing in an election year in a Republican Congress if it is named for Truman and not Marshall?” -410
British and many American policymakers feared that supporting the Jews would propel the Arabs of the Middle East into the arms of the Soviets. -419
To him, as to the pro-Arab officers of the State Department, the Palestine issue ultimately boiled down to expediency: The United States must choose what was best for the United States; the rest was irrelevant. -422
One of Marshall‘s contributions to the diplomacy of the early Cold War was his role in launching the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO). Linking the United States and ultimately 28 European countries including Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and several lesser powers, in a treaty of mutual defense and military cooperation, it would be a cornerstone of American foreign policy for more than 60 years and, with modifications, it still is today. -446
He would turn down a second Truman offer of the presidency of the Red Cross, but accepted the assignment as chairman of the American Battle Monuments Commission, a post previously held by his revered mentor General Pershing, who had died in 1948. -479
And yet, he conceded, large armies were not the way to achieve a peaceful world. Rather, “the most important single factor will be a spiritual regeneration to develop goodwill and understanding among nations.” -482
Truman visited, and Eisenhower came three times. On one of Ike’s visits he was accompanied by the aged Winston Churchill, who stood at the doorway of his room with tears in his eyes while Marshall lay under the covers on his hospital bed. -485
All told, the performance of George Marshall in many of his roles was less than awe-inspiring. He had to, the far right excepted, the paeans were incessant, the applause unrelieved. The discrepancy may well have originated in Americans’ yearning for a platonic ideal of a triumphant military leader above politics, deceit, and selfish ambition – in a word, a George Washington – which they located in a fallible man of sterling character but unremarkable powers. Only a very few keen observers saw beyond the conventional wisdom. In effect, the Olympian persona that Marshall himself created protected him, though imperfectly, from criticism, both in his prime and in his future historical reputation. -490
Last Sentence:
But whatever the reality, his life and work left a deep imprint of American life and the world during the mid-20th-century year of crisis and trial. -490
January 21, 2017
I appreciate it very much when the author provides good criticism of one of our national icons. A good many have been whitewashed to the point they have lost their humanity. No one will accuse Debi Unger of being soft on Marshall. The entire book is a constant harangue against Marshall without recognizing the delicate balancing act Marshall was forced to walk because of his civilian masters. I offer this not being a big fan of Marshall. He had a very poor work ethic, delegated far too much, and too high an opinion of himself--but these are personal characteristics and have nothing to do with his body of work which was immense and praiseworthy. There were many issues to find fault with--the poor training of US infantry, poor command choices, the Sherman!, the list goes on, but when you have the responsibility for so much it is going to be easy to pick it apart.
Unger does expend too much ink on WW2 basic history. If one is willing to read a biography on Marshall, then the writer should assume that the time-worn stories can be dispensed with. The reader will know the basic flow of the war. The time should have been devoted to the inner working of Marshall and some explanation as to the decisions he made. I have not read other biographies on Marshall, but will do so, if only to gain a more balanced viewpoint.
Unger does expend too much ink on WW2 basic history. If one is willing to read a biography on Marshall, then the writer should assume that the time-worn stories can be dispensed with. The reader will know the basic flow of the war. The time should have been devoted to the inner working of Marshall and some explanation as to the decisions he made. I have not read other biographies on Marshall, but will do so, if only to gain a more balanced viewpoint.
May 2, 2015
It's not often that you find biographers that hold their subject in such low regard. Also disappointed with the quality of the writing. Given to loose grammar, and frequent reversions to slang. How many serious biographies use the word "hooey" to dismiss, without much in the way of analysis, a position held by the subject of the book? Often challenged the subject's beliefs by posing a series of questions - pedantic and tedious. Final analysis - the quality of the writing did not do justice to the subject of this book.
July 10, 2021
This was another of my Daedalus books. In reading the Bruno mystery series that takes place in France, I learned things about The Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe after WW2 that I didn't know. The Marshall Plan sounded like a really good idea and something I would like to think is American---help the people that you just defeated in war get back on their feet. The generation of WW2 has been idealized as a time in our history when Americans looked good and did the right thing. Since we have struggled in this century to do the right thing even at home, I wanted to read some US history about a time when things were hard but somehow Americans were better and we knew the ending was good so I took on this book.
It was written in this century first by a man who died in 2003 and then finished by a couple in 2014. It is comprehensive in that we go through Marshall's entire life with the focus of his WW2 years and immediately after the war. Marshall was the Chief of Staff of the US Army during WW2 and thus a member of the Joint Chiefs. His personality and integrity seem to stand unchallenged as a good and respectable man. I am uncertain if the Ungers decided that in this century we want the unvarnished truth and nobody is a real hero. Unlike Ron Chernow's books on Hamilton and Grant, this one seems to not turn the subject into a guy who is kind of above the rest of us. Chernow came to really like his subjects and I don't get much warm and fuzzy for Marshall from the Ungers. Of course apparently Marshall was not a warm and fuzzy guy anyway. They quote William S. White from the NY Times saying of Marshall "The net impression is of a man to whom duty and honor are as real as the oak trees that stand with such sure strength about him here, a hard just man with an inner life which, surely, few have ever really known." The Ungers say of this "All told White's description was as frank and accurate a portrayal of the essential Marshall as any in his lifetime."
Marshall is given credit for being the master planner of the Allied forces in WW2 and managing the Coalition of Allies that led to victory. Yet the Ungers here quote William White as saying "In none of his remarks was there any "war drama". "The war to him was, rather an enterprise almost inhumanly complex and exasperating, primarily an enterprise of so many million tons of ammunitions, so many hundreds of miles of inertly resisting terrain, so many temperamental subordinate commanders to cajole."
We find that unlike all the Hollywood versions of The War, none of it went smoothly and all along there was the chance that success would be elusive. They say of the American troops: "Nor was the army he helped to create composed of highly skilled, well trained troops, capable of taking on the veteran German enemy, though by 1944 that enemy was in the last stages of its strength. Admittedly young American men were not ready to become soldiers. Neither the nation's peacetime values, nor its individualistic, democratic culture, were equal to the brutal demands of mid-20th century military engagement. Marshall understood this and sought to improve their morale and their understanding of the stakes. But his efforts were insufficient. Nor was Marshall directly in charge of the training process. Yet however explicable the failure to turn American youths into warriors, the chief of staff cannot be acclaimed, without serious qualifiers as the "organizer of victory." A good thing most of the WW2 vets are dead or they might question these 21st century scholars questioning their military prowess since after all it was the last real war that the Americans actually won!
I also wondered since this book was written in this century there is a lot about the problems in Congress and with politics where there are the same battles between the right and left that we are seeing today. Has this always been true or are we looking at history through current lenses and tinting it to our way of thinking? Of course it is true that FDR and Truman had detractors and weren't perfect but as with George W. Bush, the march of time does color things more positively.
They even want to take away his credit for The Marshall Plan. "It was probably the most important policy achievement during his months in office. He had not conceived it; he was not its parent. Its naming had been virtually fortuitous." It was originally called the Truman Plan but in an election year they renamed it for the highly respected General whom people of the time gave credit for winning the war.
We, the children of those WW2 vets, raised in the days after victory by parents who had lived through a Depression and a World War prefer to see it as the generation who made the world safe for democracy and it lasted for a little while.
It was written in this century first by a man who died in 2003 and then finished by a couple in 2014. It is comprehensive in that we go through Marshall's entire life with the focus of his WW2 years and immediately after the war. Marshall was the Chief of Staff of the US Army during WW2 and thus a member of the Joint Chiefs. His personality and integrity seem to stand unchallenged as a good and respectable man. I am uncertain if the Ungers decided that in this century we want the unvarnished truth and nobody is a real hero. Unlike Ron Chernow's books on Hamilton and Grant, this one seems to not turn the subject into a guy who is kind of above the rest of us. Chernow came to really like his subjects and I don't get much warm and fuzzy for Marshall from the Ungers. Of course apparently Marshall was not a warm and fuzzy guy anyway. They quote William S. White from the NY Times saying of Marshall "The net impression is of a man to whom duty and honor are as real as the oak trees that stand with such sure strength about him here, a hard just man with an inner life which, surely, few have ever really known." The Ungers say of this "All told White's description was as frank and accurate a portrayal of the essential Marshall as any in his lifetime."
Marshall is given credit for being the master planner of the Allied forces in WW2 and managing the Coalition of Allies that led to victory. Yet the Ungers here quote William White as saying "In none of his remarks was there any "war drama". "The war to him was, rather an enterprise almost inhumanly complex and exasperating, primarily an enterprise of so many million tons of ammunitions, so many hundreds of miles of inertly resisting terrain, so many temperamental subordinate commanders to cajole."
We find that unlike all the Hollywood versions of The War, none of it went smoothly and all along there was the chance that success would be elusive. They say of the American troops: "Nor was the army he helped to create composed of highly skilled, well trained troops, capable of taking on the veteran German enemy, though by 1944 that enemy was in the last stages of its strength. Admittedly young American men were not ready to become soldiers. Neither the nation's peacetime values, nor its individualistic, democratic culture, were equal to the brutal demands of mid-20th century military engagement. Marshall understood this and sought to improve their morale and their understanding of the stakes. But his efforts were insufficient. Nor was Marshall directly in charge of the training process. Yet however explicable the failure to turn American youths into warriors, the chief of staff cannot be acclaimed, without serious qualifiers as the "organizer of victory." A good thing most of the WW2 vets are dead or they might question these 21st century scholars questioning their military prowess since after all it was the last real war that the Americans actually won!
I also wondered since this book was written in this century there is a lot about the problems in Congress and with politics where there are the same battles between the right and left that we are seeing today. Has this always been true or are we looking at history through current lenses and tinting it to our way of thinking? Of course it is true that FDR and Truman had detractors and weren't perfect but as with George W. Bush, the march of time does color things more positively.
They even want to take away his credit for The Marshall Plan. "It was probably the most important policy achievement during his months in office. He had not conceived it; he was not its parent. Its naming had been virtually fortuitous." It was originally called the Truman Plan but in an election year they renamed it for the highly respected General whom people of the time gave credit for winning the war.
We, the children of those WW2 vets, raised in the days after victory by parents who had lived through a Depression and a World War prefer to see it as the generation who made the world safe for democracy and it lasted for a little while.
August 26, 2023
A Man for His Time and for the Ages
George Marshall is rightly perceived as an American hero - he was the architect of America's role in WWII and its aftermath. Although a latecomer to the war, the U.S. had to fight on two fronts and manage the internecine bickering over strategy and imperial ambitions with their allied counterparts (read Churchill) who had one eye on the post-fighting global power structure (and England's role in it).
A skilled military strategist and diplomat, a manager in modern warfare requirements of training and logistics; he was the consumate backroom operator who created the fighting force but he himself was not a warrior - he was not a combat general. History tends to romanticize the war but the authors do a wonderful job of describing the administrative headaches and turf wars that complicated Marshall's job. They also note that while the General was vocal and active in the planning phases, he left the battlefield decisions to the men on the front lines.
At the outset of the Second World War the U.S. army totaled only 200,000 but grew to 8.5 million by war’s end. The logistical challenges in growing and training such a force, not to mention the necessary build up in weaponry and supplies, were monumental. General Marshall planned and executed on this massive task.
In today's climate of instant gratification and self-interest, it is refreshing to read of a public servant who, while appearing to lack some social skills, was motivated by old fashioned virtues such as honor, integrity and public service. That said, the authors adopt a clear eyed view of Marshall's accomplishments and failures. They note that the Marshall Plan, perhaps recognized as his signature accomplishment, was not really his creation but rather was Truman's baby, although it would never have seen the light of day with the Presidents name on it. Likewise, Marshall's innate caution during his tenure as Secretary of State possibly led to decisions that exacerbated Cold War tensions.
In summary (and with the benefit of hindsight), they contend that Marshall fell well short of perfection in many of his most important decisions; but his reputation was protected by his sterling character and rectitude, pure motivation and lack of political ambition. He was a man of his times and for the ages.
George Marshall is rightly perceived as an American hero - he was the architect of America's role in WWII and its aftermath. Although a latecomer to the war, the U.S. had to fight on two fronts and manage the internecine bickering over strategy and imperial ambitions with their allied counterparts (read Churchill) who had one eye on the post-fighting global power structure (and England's role in it).
A skilled military strategist and diplomat, a manager in modern warfare requirements of training and logistics; he was the consumate backroom operator who created the fighting force but he himself was not a warrior - he was not a combat general. History tends to romanticize the war but the authors do a wonderful job of describing the administrative headaches and turf wars that complicated Marshall's job. They also note that while the General was vocal and active in the planning phases, he left the battlefield decisions to the men on the front lines.
At the outset of the Second World War the U.S. army totaled only 200,000 but grew to 8.5 million by war’s end. The logistical challenges in growing and training such a force, not to mention the necessary build up in weaponry and supplies, were monumental. General Marshall planned and executed on this massive task.
In today's climate of instant gratification and self-interest, it is refreshing to read of a public servant who, while appearing to lack some social skills, was motivated by old fashioned virtues such as honor, integrity and public service. That said, the authors adopt a clear eyed view of Marshall's accomplishments and failures. They note that the Marshall Plan, perhaps recognized as his signature accomplishment, was not really his creation but rather was Truman's baby, although it would never have seen the light of day with the Presidents name on it. Likewise, Marshall's innate caution during his tenure as Secretary of State possibly led to decisions that exacerbated Cold War tensions.
In summary (and with the benefit of hindsight), they contend that Marshall fell well short of perfection in many of his most important decisions; but his reputation was protected by his sterling character and rectitude, pure motivation and lack of political ambition. He was a man of his times and for the ages.
November 25, 2017
So far, this book is written like a high school book report. There's no cadence or rhythm to the writing, and no even remotely salient points until the breakout of the Second World War. The authors spend half a page on the death of Marshall's first wife and another page on the meeting, courtship and marriage of his second. They spend 2 pages on his time in the First World War. And even once you get to WW2, it's just the same information you'd expect in any general history of the war; there's no insight or personal facts that could bring this biography or its subject to life. Roosevelt is played off as a tone deaf politician, with no real understanding of the military, trying desperately to march the US to its doom in the early years of the war, but Marshall doesn't come off as much better, seemingly at odds with everyone in some sort of passive aggressive form of what the authors describe as chivalry or moral uprightness or southern stoicism or something equally dumb. The authors also continuously re-use the same quotes and phrases, often only a few pages later on, leading to a feeling that a lot of the final manuscript was cobbled together. I'm dreading reading the rest of this book.
"To what extent does Marshall’s role in the shortcomings of American fighting men in North Africa and in later theaters affect our estimate of his career? He was not a combat general; he never led troops in the battlefield against an enemy force. He once described his role as “pick[ing] the right man for the job and back[ing] him up with every resource at our disposal.” One historian has described him as “the epitome of the modern military manager,” whose “energy was devoted to training and logistics.” He had other important functions as well—as a skilled military diplomat and as a strategist, for example. But it is clear that much of his reputation rests on his achievements in creating an army out of virtually nothing and teaching it how to fight. And here, at his presumed forte, he proved at best mediocre."
"To what extent does Marshall’s role in the shortcomings of American fighting men in North Africa and in later theaters affect our estimate of his career? He was not a combat general; he never led troops in the battlefield against an enemy force. He once described his role as “pick[ing] the right man for the job and back[ing] him up with every resource at our disposal.” One historian has described him as “the epitome of the modern military manager,” whose “energy was devoted to training and logistics.” He had other important functions as well—as a skilled military diplomat and as a strategist, for example. But it is clear that much of his reputation rests on his achievements in creating an army out of virtually nothing and teaching it how to fight. And here, at his presumed forte, he proved at best mediocre."
January 29, 2017
Being very interested in WWII and the early cold war, I found this an engaging review of a man who was at the heart of those events. The author takes a very balanced approach in her review of his life. While he had a few seminal achievements (preparing the US for war, organizing the effort and selling the Marshall Plan to a skeptical public), the picture comes through of a very imperfect man. Marshall made many misjudgments throughout his career, regarding people and war and political strategy. But those can be forgotten in his achievements. Also, I think the author is a little too harsh on him regrading China. His was but a finger in a dike in the changes that were taking place there in the 30s and 40s.
I was struck by his role as a Switzerland of sorts within the government. Everyone trusted his judgments and the respect he commanded allowed him to advocate for some critical programs at key times. The book might have been subtitled The Lobbyist because that is where he truly excelled in convincing Congress and our allies on various key points even if his initial judgments in some of those areas were not entirely correct.
I also did not appreciate what it was like to be in the military from 1900-1940. Other than WWI, the military was not held in high esteem nor was it a fast track to anything. The posts where he served up until getting back to Washington were backwaters at best.
Lastly, the interpersonal dynamic sticks with me as a leader. He worked very well with some but could never sort out the Pacific theater entirely with the admirals and MacArthur, nominally his inferior. He had the chance to make hard choices and overall I found his decisiveness lacking at many points.
I was struck by his role as a Switzerland of sorts within the government. Everyone trusted his judgments and the respect he commanded allowed him to advocate for some critical programs at key times. The book might have been subtitled The Lobbyist because that is where he truly excelled in convincing Congress and our allies on various key points even if his initial judgments in some of those areas were not entirely correct.
I also did not appreciate what it was like to be in the military from 1900-1940. Other than WWI, the military was not held in high esteem nor was it a fast track to anything. The posts where he served up until getting back to Washington were backwaters at best.
Lastly, the interpersonal dynamic sticks with me as a leader. He worked very well with some but could never sort out the Pacific theater entirely with the admirals and MacArthur, nominally his inferior. He had the chance to make hard choices and overall I found his decisiveness lacking at many points.
January 23, 2024
I enjoyed this unfiltered biography of General Marshall, that I picked up at the Truman Library Gift Shop. With the vision of a historical viewpoint, the authors have given an unvarnished view of the great administrator of WW II. His attributes were discipline, loyalty and dedication to the job. There were certainly efforts he made at various points in his significant career that failed or were not fully successful. However, he remains one of the primary forces behind America's success in the war and the subsequent rebuilding of Europe.
Notable Quote: (Pages 161-2) General Marshall's Management Theory: ...the Department is filled with able men who analyze their problems well but feel compelled always to bring them to me for final solution. I must have assistants who will solve their own problems and tell me later what they have done."
Notable Quote: (Pages 161-2) General Marshall's Management Theory: ...the Department is filled with able men who analyze their problems well but feel compelled always to bring them to me for final solution. I must have assistants who will solve their own problems and tell me later what they have done."
October 27, 2020
The Ungers have written a readable and informative biography of a very consequential figure in 20th century history. Their style, however, comes across as overly opinionated and often strangely unforgiving of its subject. The title should probably be something a tad more descriptive than simply "A Biography"; it's more like an analysis of someone they thing is an overrated failure. Still, Marshall's accomplishments and devotion to duty do manage to shine through the dark clouds the authors have surrounded him with. While a third author is listed, he actually died in 2003, a decade+ before this book was released; it's unclear how much of a contribution he actually made prior to his passing. I do have to wonder what he thinks of the work the Ungers have put together...
January 16, 2024
My appreciation of the thorough research and global context of GEN Marshall’s thoughts and decisions may outweigh the view I hold of those who plucked him from amongst his peers to move him through the ranks. I learned quite a bit from this one, and enjoyed the history. GEN Marshall’s career impacts are underwhelming: an infantry officer that didn’t command troops in either WWI or WWII … a SecState that didn’t lead critical foreign policies of the time (Israel-Palestine notably) … a civilian SecDef that ordered contradictory orders to the theater commander … and is most notably known for the Marshall Plan which he did not give birth to (named after him by the President for partisan/electoral expediency). A true patriot and dedicated civil servant, but there may have been others that could have been more appropriate for the gigs.
April 3, 2018
Marshall - Very shallow book, written with obvious bias and omission, rare praise or positive commentary for Marshall’s many achievements, very disappointing in the shallow treatment of one of America’s greatest soldier. The account of Marshall limiting the WWII Army to 90 divisions is pathetically false.
Marshall - Very shallow, written with obvious bias and omission, rare praise or positive commentary for Marshall’s many achievements, disappointing in the shallow treatment of one of America’s greatest soldiers and statesmen. The account of Marshall limiting the WWII Army to 90 divisions is pathetically shallow and false.
Marshall - Very shallow, written with obvious bias and omission, rare praise or positive commentary for Marshall’s many achievements, disappointing in the shallow treatment of one of America’s greatest soldiers and statesmen. The account of Marshall limiting the WWII Army to 90 divisions is pathetically shallow and false.
March 7, 2019
A biography on a man with amazing personal integrity but flawed judgement, his favoriting a cross-Chanel attack in 1942 : Operation Sledgehammer being the most egregious, thankfully Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Alan Brooke had a better strategic grasp.
Author does a good job at looking at Marshall objectively, while not necessarily agreeing with all the authors conclusions he puts the evidence out there.
His 2nd Wife’s first husband was an attorney shot by a disgruntled client, that particular anecdote resonated with me, Marshall seemed to be a good father to his step-children.
Author does a good job at looking at Marshall objectively, while not necessarily agreeing with all the authors conclusions he puts the evidence out there.
His 2nd Wife’s first husband was an attorney shot by a disgruntled client, that particular anecdote resonated with me, Marshall seemed to be a good father to his step-children.
October 29, 2021
Don’t make this the first or only book you read about George Marshall. The authors seek to provide criticisms that they feel weren’t properly noted in previous biographies. There may be valid criticisms such as infantry training, infantry replacement strategies and managing MacArthur. However, some criticisms are petty such as his work hours (he started his day early and tried to end by mid afternoon) as well as the idea that he was vain and carefully crafted an image of himself. In general, most of his accomplishments are accompanied by a ‘yes, but’.
Overall, there are much better biographies of George Marshall.
Overall, there are much better biographies of George Marshall.
February 24, 2022
The general was a private man, that few if any really managed to understand fully. These authors certainly have not succeeded in cracking the code and accordingly fails in providing a convincing portrait. Instead they seem to have settled for providing a series of examples of 'maybe he was not as great leader anyhow' and fill the pages with superficially recounting a series of well known controversies from Pearl Harbour over American-British collaboration to MacAhrtur and in doing so ploughing well known lines of arguments without providing any new insight.
So speedily onto Pogue in the hope that the enigma and the man is more convincingly portraied.
So speedily onto Pogue in the hope that the enigma and the man is more convincingly portraied.
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July 13, 2023this was a wonderful researched book on one of the most important men of the 20th century. my primary and only quarrel is that the authors seems to go out of their way to criticize Marshall for many decisions he had to make. as being a historian allows for 20 20 hindsight, their criticism is misdirected many times. Making decision in war time and during the Cold War was difficult as new ground was being breached ..Given the circumstances Marshall was the best man for these times. Not every decision was right but I suspect none of us would have done better. a good book but written with a definite bias.
June 17, 2017
I enjoyed this biography of General Marshall... A long but always interesting read of one of the major personalities of last century's war for the dominion of the world. This book was particularly interesting for its portrayal of a man of universally admired character: no one who worked with or under him was ever in doubt of his convictions.
I knew nothing of General Marshall before taking up this book... Reading it has been well worth the trouble.
I knew nothing of General Marshall before taking up this book... Reading it has been well worth the trouble.
November 12, 2021
A biography ought to have three things. The first and foremost is accuracy. The biographer cannot carry the subject to where they did not actually live, It should not use conjecture. The Ungers are accurate. Next a biography needs to provide new material in the research realm. I see no new research here. Finally, the overall treatment should give you an idea about the inner drive of a person. I have no idea why Marshall was driven to do what he did. It is a decent biography.
September 26, 2022
The book was a history of WW2 & the early Cold War as much as a Marshall bio. Thus, it could be much shorter and still cover the subject adequately. On what was about Marshall, a well balanced biography. It illustrates bus strengths and weaknesses. It was a little dry and boring at times. It seemed to me that the book spent most of it's time on WW2 and gave short shrift to the SECSTATE and SECDEF times.
December 14, 2019
This is the first biography of Marshall I've read. I think it is sad that the author's acknowledge Marshall's integrity and amazingly steady temperament, but then goes on to count against him all the things other people gave Marshall credit for which he himself didn't as if that was a character flaw on his part.
September 1, 2018
Great book about one of the greatest Soldiers whomever lived. He never led troops in combat was a genius organizer and administrator. Not without his faults as the author pointed out, this book is a great overview of this remarkable man. Great read.
March 13, 2019
This is a fair and reasonably detailed account of Marshall's life and the extraordinary times he lived in. The author particularly excels in explaining the context in which Marshall's most important decisions took place.
September 17, 2019
Biography of early years is good but after that is bad. Was interested in learning about General Marshall and this was a mistake choosing this book. Not much real insight and lots of quotes regarding what other historians think of Marshall... with no information supporting it.
December 30, 2017
An honest look at General Marshall's life & career. He had strengths & weaknesses like most of us deserves high praise for his contributions to hasten the end of WW II.
September 24, 2018
Readable and interesting background on Marshall, WWII, and the Marshall Plan.
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