It's well-written, I'll give it that. You can take what he writes with a pinch of salt. The life of a translator in the middle of war is dull, brutal and everything in-between. This book will be of interest to those who don't know anything about a translator on a war-plane (and Fritz's former superiors).
Interesting Passages:
86-89-91-93-94 of 228
I began to liken it to the notion of a hypothetically very rich, very not white country, let’s call it Audi Sarabia, invading a hypothetically very proud, relatively dysfunctional, very white country, let’s call it Texasstan. You would have then a country that felt they were morally upright, who, on the premise of rooting out terrorists and extremist ideologues, invaded a formerly independent state with a long and storied history of rejecting invaders and upholding their millennia-old way of life. This formerly independent state would have a working constitution, a (semi-) functioning government, and while maybe not everyone who lived under that government agreed with its policies, well, you can’t please everyone.
Now, on invasion, the Audis would say that the government was corrupt (what government isn’t), draconian (a little hypocritical, that, but okay), and guilty of harboring and supporting international threats (people, they mean people). The rest of the world would say, “Well, okay, yeah, those are all true statements, so I guess you have a point,” and would stand idly by while the Audis went in and subverted an established, legitimate government, in order to stand up a puppet state that would blindly support them in their mission. The Audis would set up shop in the major cities and begin the process of looking for their enemies.
But then, who, exactly, are their enemies? Supporters of the old government, that one’s easy. Rebels against the new government, also easy (the Audis prefer rebel to insurgent in this analogy—has to do with that whole submission to Islam thing). Oh, and anyone that members of the new government say is bad, regardless of any proof supporting these claims, and regardless of the fact that it seems strangely convenient that most of the people being named happen to be political opponents, or guys that the members of the new government feel have wronged them (some of them fellow members).
Over the next five to ten years, the Audis continue to build up their presence, continue to raid homes at night, kidnap people, drop bombs indiscriminately, all the while maintaining that these actions are justifiable and for the greater good. Meanwhile, the Texans, who have had their own culture longer than the Audis have had a nation, replete with their own laws and customs, are told that they should be ashamed of this culture, that it’s barbaric and outdated, and that while they don’t necessarily need to convert to the Audis’ religion (this isn’t the Crusades; proselytization is actually illegal under the rules governing the Audis’ military members), they should probably think about joining the rest of the world in modernity.
At some point during all this, a number of Texans find themselves wondering whether the old government—which, admittedly, had its problems—wasn’t preferable. They were violent, yes, but at least they were predictable in their violence. And they didn’t have giant flying bogeymen that went around blowing up weddings or bombing funerals or just generally making violence an everyday part of life. If, then, a number of these Texans begin to feel that they have no choice but to try and fight against the Audis, would that be so unreasonable? And if, once they do start fighting back, their culture and long-standing way of life mean that they fight hard, even fight dirty, wouldn’t this too make some sense?
I spent too many hours and too many words developing this brilliant analogy of mine. It was ham-fisted....If I had tried this shit on a U-boat, I probably would have gotten punched, or at the very least told in no uncertain terms to shut the fuck up.
-------------
It was interesting, the idea that almost ten years after 9/11 we had finally killed our country’s biggest bogeyman, and it was very interesting that we had invaded Pakistan to do it. But I wasn’t, like, happy about it.
-------------
“Dude, we should be celebrating!”
“Why? What will that get you? He [OBL] was an incredible human. He changed the world.”
No more smile. Some redness though.
“Fritz, shut the fuck up.”
“Get out of this room.”
“Wha—”
“Leave!”
-----------
Well-armed Talibs. All around them were Hi-Luxes (Toyota pickup trucks that are seemingly indestructible and therefore the preferred mode of transportation of insurgents worldwide), machine guns, RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades)—you name it, these guys had it.
They also had something no one had ever seen the Taliban with before.
A volleyball net.
There they were, a bunch of Talibs in their man-jammies, surrounded by a metric fuck-ton of serious weapons.
Playing volleyball.
--------
Kalima, or at least the guy who wanted to talk to him, was emblematic of so much of what I was hearing on mission after mission. These men, these Taliban, these guys sitting in the mountains, were bored and tired, but mostly bored. This is difficult to explain in that, while it’s easy for me to tell you this, it’s difficult for us humans to admit that the malevolent can be filled with the mundane. We want our evil to stay evil.
102 of 228
For so many Afghans, a bad day consists of their house getting blown up along with the fifteenth family member they’ve had killed because of this war. It’s not hard to understand why they might want to get back at us for that shit. Or maybe their bad day is when, after having been promised a well, a few foolhardy fuckwits decide to shoot at the Americans in broad daylight, and the Americans decide that everyone in that village can get fucked, the well is off. That’s if we don’t decide to just bomb them, citing “increased Taliban presence.”
-----------
The Taliban had forced our hand. They were responsible for harboring the people who had planned and carried out 9/11. They routinely infringed on human rights, and while maybe we did too, at least we accomplished something when we did it. What were they building? What were they giving the world? Fucking nothing. Killing them, ridding them and their ilk from the face of the Earth was the only way to ensure that no more JTACs got shot, no more girls got acid thrown on their faces, and this war could finally end. The only logical conclusion was that I should, in fact, be mad at the Taliban. Maybe they weren’t completely and utterly evil, but that sure as shit didn’t mean they didn’t need to die.
176-177-179-182 of 228
According to my official Air Force records, I do not have, and in fact have never had, PTSD. Formally receiving this diagnosis would have required an official admission that what I did and saw and heard was in fact traumatic and that it wasn’t normal, which would only have served to justify my reasons for not wanting to go back. You can see why the powers that be wouldn’t want to admit this. And while this diagnosis wasn’t true when the Air Force made it, it might be now. Time doesn’t heal all wounds—some simply can’t be treated—but eventually your mind can bring the edges together, and while the scar is ugly and imprecise, the gaping hole has, finally, closed. These days I can listen to Pashto without breaking out in a cold sweat, get on a plane without thinking about the guns that ought to be attached to it, and talk about war without wanting to curl up in a ball and die. This, then, is understood as meaning that my PTSD has been cured (never mind that curing something that was never supposed to have existed creates some mild metaphysical stickiness).
In the time since I wasn’t diagnosed, the military has embraced a different terminology to attempt to describe the turmoil that I and so many others experienced: moral injury. The idea of moral injury has been around since at least the 1980s, though the explicit term was coined by Jonathan Shay in the nineties, when his work with Vietnam veterans led to his writing Achilles in Vietnam. Today, Syracuse University’s Moral Injury Project not only defines moral injury but attempts to explain why and when it happens:
Moral injury is the damage done to one’s conscience or moral compass when that person perpetrates, witnesses, or fails to prevent acts that transgress one’s own moral beliefs, values, or ethical codes of conduct.
This is a good definition; it is thorough while simultaneously casting a wide enough net to embrace the myriad reasons any warfighter could suffer such an injury. Being a DSO allowed for perpetration, witnessing, and failure. Certainly, my moral code was violated. But I don’t think moral injury fully encompasses just what happened. It’s not that I, along with almost every other Pashto DSO, wasn’t morally injured. We were. But it’s not entirely accurate to say that there was “damage done to [my] conscience or moral compass.” It’s more like, along with the many men I killed, my consciousness was blown the fuck up.
With the exception of spies mythical and real, most warfighters throughout history have not been tasked with killing people they know. Even in our modern wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the majority of killing is done by complete strangers.............The most famous of these warriors are drone operators. These men and women face issues that I can’t begin to understand, as the cognitive dissonance that they experience is so strange as to be something out of science fiction. If anything, it seems that their injury is arguably worsened by the moral contradiction of being so far away from the “threat.” These are people who wake up every morning and drive to work like any other commuter. Except, their work is hunting people. They do this work for twelve hours (or more), and at the
end of their shift they head home. Just like any other commuter. Maybe their significant other calls them and asks them to stop and pick up some milk on the way, which they obligingly do, maybe grabbing a candy bar or a six-pack at the same time. And then they sit down to dinner with their loved ones, the memory of the missile they fired five hours earlier destroying a man still playing in their head.
Often, the man that was destroyed by that missile was a target that this drone operator had been following for days or weeks. This work is done to establish what is known as a pattern of life (POL), aka the shit someone does on a regular basis. POL is supposed to help determine whether the things someone is doing or the people someone is meeting are happenstance or more purposeful. Did that guy go talk to a known bomb-maker who also happens to be a tailor just once, like someone who was trying out different tailors might do? Or did that guy go see his “tailor” two or three times a week for a month, all while wearing the same ill-fitting clothing? In the course of this work—sometimes as a side effect, sometimes completely on purpose—one begins to develop an idea of who that target is.
In a New York Times article exploring the effects of this work, of the damage done to the men and women who perform this function, an unnamed drone operator says that his injuries resulted from “cognitive combat intimacy,” a term so apt that I wish his name were published, if only so he could get the credit he deserves for such an accurate neologism. The day in, day out watching of targets, learning about their lives, their habits, their likes and dislikes, results in a strong sense of familiarity, and sometimes, even closeness (a friend of mine who did this sort of work once told me that he and his team could always identify one particular target based on the highly specific porn searches said target made on various devices that he used, which while comical, is indeed also quite intimate). And then, after you’ve come to know so much about this person, in fact because you’ve come to know so much about this person, you kill them.
The work I did was not this in-depth, and nowhere near as detailed (I didn’t hear of any porn searches, though I did learn about a few sexual preferences), and so it could be said, in relation to others like these drone operators, that I didn’t know much about the men I was listening to, not really. The sense of closeness I had with the men I listened to was not a cognitive process, but an emotional one.
----------
U.S. (and many European) fighters are so well equipped, so technologically advanced, so well armored as to be mythical. SEALs, Green Berets, and other special operators are trained to continue moving after they’ve been shot. (I’ve helped them with this training. The rules were that when we, the “bad guys,” got shot, we went down. If they, the “good guys,” got shot, they were supposed to keep advancing until they neutralized us and completed their mission. All of this was done with simulation rounds, but there’s still impact, and the guns we were using were real; they really were getting shot.) The purpose of this training is to impart a psychology of undefeatability. It is singularly terrifying to shoot multiple bullets into what is supposed to be a human and then watch that (alleged) human continue to push forward as if nothing happened to them. Yes, somewhere in the back of your mind you know that they are wearing a bulletproof vest and other pieces of body armor and that these are the things keeping them alive, but that knowledge doesn’t make the six-foot-tall, two-hundred-and-fifty-pound creature coming at you any less intimidating. To kill such a being is to kill a god. I could now see why a Talib might feel entitled to inflate his kill count.
In addition to this sort of allegorical accounting, I wondered if, in a way, they weren’t actually right about how many of us they were successfully killing. At the very least, a lot of us were dying. And I couldn’t help but think, if a warfighter dies because of a war, does it matter if they died on the battlefield? Does it matter if their death is “self-inflicted”? All those men and women who made it out of Afghanistan, only to commit suicide once they were home, are they not casualties of war? Didn’t the Taliban kill them?
Equally disheartening was my newfound understanding of why the Taliban seemed to ignore, somehow discount, our kills. On the missions where I knew we had killed dozens of them, they routinely refused to acknowledge all of the deaths. Some of this was attributable to their haphazard organization; they didn’t exactly have rosters of who was fighting in a given battle, or dog tags to identify unrecognizable corpses. Our jokes about them being immortal had stopped being funny, because now I couldn’t help but wonder if they actually were. They were suffering thousands of casualties per year, which I always heard about, but not once had I been told that the Taliban was growing weaker, getting smaller. It was like we were playing whack-an-Afghan, and every time we managed to hit one, another popped up one wadi over. How many times had we rolled up the same guy, interrogated him, probably tortured him, eventually released him, only to wind up hunting him down again weeks or months or years later? They were constantly replacing themselves, either literally or figuratively, and we had fallen for the trap of thinking of them as interchangeable, thereby placing them beyond the constraints of ordinary humanity, allowing them to become the superhumans they claimed they were. So, while I knew they were dying, I no longer believed they were dead.
106 of 228
OF MY THREE AIR MEDALS, two of them deal with flights from my first deployment. The one that chronologically covers the first half of the deployment says that my “superb airmanship and courage were instrumental to the successful execution of twenty combat missions totaling 191.5 flight hours supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Constantly operating under the threat of man portable air defense systems and anti-aircraft artillery, Airman Fritz provided real time imminent threat warning, situational awareness and non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to coalition Special Operations Forces executing critical close air support, armed reconnaissance, infiltration and exfiltration missions. Additionally, Airman Fritz passed twelve imminent threat warnings during missions that included short notice launches in support of troops in contact. Additionally, Airman Fritz was able to warn ground forces of possible mine and ambush locations, ensuring the safe return of ground Special Operations Forces. Airman Fritz and his crew’s efforts also contributed to the elimination of twenty insurgents and detention of twelve enemy fighters including two high value targets.”
The other medal, which chronologically covers the second half of that deployment, says much of the same boilerplate shit about threat warning and types of missions. But it also says that over the course of “131 flight hours” I “passed eight imminent threat warnings” and that I “was able to provide warning to ground forces of a machine gun ambush and insurgents tracking coalition force movements.” Apparently, I further “contributed to the detention of seven enemy fighters including two high value targets.”
182 of 228
You may have noticed, or maybe not, how slippery I have been with the verb to kill:
“I killed.”
“We killed.”
“I helped kill.”
This is no grammatical slip, an inability to keep track of who did what. These variations are there because there was, and is, an argument to be made about my role in any killing, as that’s not how gunships, or Whiskeys, or DSOs work. No single individual is held responsible for the people that our planes kill. It’s a crew effort.
(…..) According to my official records I have in fact killed 123 people. The actual wording is “123 insurgents EKIA” (EKIA = enemy killed in action, so not quite people, but definitely killed). These records don’t say that I was part of a crew that killed these people, or that I supported other people who did the killing, just that I killed those 123 humans. I can’t know, and will never know, if all of these kills belong to me. I do know, and will always know, that I belong to all of them.
215 of 228
I went to the community college near my base to take some pre-reqs, transferred to a university soon thereafter, got my degree, and applied to medical school.
Being a physician was never going to unkill those 123 men. Nothing will.
There is no atonement, because I did nothing wrong; I am no sinner.
And there is no absolution, because I did nothing right; I am the worst sinner.