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Denkbewegungen: Tagebücher 1930-1932, 1936-1937
Bisher unbekannte Texte des großen Philosophen, neu entdeckte Tagebücher bzw. Manuskripte, in denen Wittgenstein philosophische Gedankengänge neben Reflexionen persönlichen Charakters und kulturgeschichtliche Überlegungen eintrug, werden mit dieser Edition vom Innsbrucker Brenner-Archiv erstmals der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht, wobei durch eine neue Transkriptionsmethode alle für Wittgenstein so typischen Textveränderungen, seine Varianten und Korrekturen, und damit der Denk- und Arbeitsprozeß des Philosophen sichtbar gemacht werden. Die in ihrer Thematik breitgefächerten Notizen und Gedanken bestechen durch sprachliche Schönheit und Tiefe des Denkens bei gleichzeitiger Kürze der Formulierung.
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
157 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1997
About the author
Ludwig Wittgenstein
287 books3,050 followersLudwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (Ph.D., Trinity College, Cambridge University, 1929) was an Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.
Described by Bertrand Russell as "the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating", he helped inspire two of the twentieth century's principal philosophical movements: the Vienna Circle and Oxford ordinary language philosophy. According to an end of the century poll, professional philosophers in Canada and the U.S. rank both his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations among the top five most important books in twentieth-century philosophy, the latter standing out as "...the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations". Wittgenstein's influence has been felt in nearly every field of the humanities and social sciences, yet there are widely diverging interpretations of his thought.
Described by Bertrand Russell as "the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating", he helped inspire two of the twentieth century's principal philosophical movements: the Vienna Circle and Oxford ordinary language philosophy. According to an end of the century poll, professional philosophers in Canada and the U.S. rank both his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations among the top five most important books in twentieth-century philosophy, the latter standing out as "...the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations". Wittgenstein's influence has been felt in nearly every field of the humanities and social sciences, yet there are widely diverging interpretations of his thought.
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Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
March 5, 2023
Wittgenstein was a strange man for sure, but our treatment of him may be stranger. We treat him as a sage and his writing, even things like this — his diaries — as if they contain something valuable and profound if we just look and think about them hard enough. He’s downright vexing.
Why do we care about Wittgenstein’s life, and especially about his reflections on his own life?
There is Wittgenstein, the relatively dry philosopher of logic and the less dry but still abstract philosopher of language and mind. And then there’s a Wittgenstein who sits behind his enigmatic remarks on ethics and religion as unsayable but more important than anything that is sayable. His life, as he says, is what shows his ethics.
The book contains diaries from two periods during the 1930s, so during the formative years of the Blue and Brown Books and including time spent at Wittgenstein’s Norway retreat. We don’t find a lot of straightforward philosophical analyses and discussions in the diaries. They are truly self-reflections.
As Ray Monk emphasizes in his Introduction, the self-reflections orbit around Wittgenstein’s intense compulsion to be “good.” “Good,” in Monk’s interpretation, derives from Wittgenstein’s reading of Otto Weininger — the obligation to seek out, develop, and activate genius.
Thus for Wittgenstein, whose genius is his philosophical work, philosophy is itself a moral requirement, with the highest standards of performance. He consistently chastises himself for laziness, fogginess, . . . whatever failings keep him from his best work.
But he also chastises himself consistently for the person he is outside of his “cleverness.” He asks how he would be judged by others if not for his cleverness at philosophy, and he finds himself full of vanity and cowardice.
The two — his philosophical work and his standing outside of his philosophical work — cannot be kept separate. The same moral requirements stand over each and find each lacking. He says, “I am for example a petty, lying rogue & yet can talk about the grandest things.
And while I am doing that, I seem to myself perfectly detached from my pettiness. Yet I am not.”
We also find two threads that do not show explicitly in his philosophical writings — his intense relationship to Christianity, and to the New Testament in particular, and his relationship with Marguerite Respinger.
His remarks on the New Testament blend an examination of what is meant by and required for a good life, and on what it means to bring yourself into the proper relationship with Christianity. He was reading and thinking extensively about Kierkegaard’s writings during these times, and we find Wittgensteinian echoes of Kierkegaard’s equally intense reflections on the nature of faith and on the enigmas and paradoxes of Christianity.
It may be no coincidence that Kierkegaard’s work catches Wittgenstein’s interest also at the time that he is coming to terms with his relationship with Marguerite. He says that he is in love with her, but there is an attraction/repulsion overlaying whatever relationship they will ever have. It’s clearly never to become a conventional marriage.
The circumstances are certainly different from Kierkegaard’s relationship with Regine Olsen, but the impossibility of conventional marriage is common between them. And of course, Kierkegaard’s own writing, particularly Either/Or (not explicitly referred to here) on the ethical and what he calls the “exception" appear inspired by the complexities of his relationship with Regine.
So why is any of this interesting? Well, I don’t think it is to anyone who isn’t a student of Wittgenstein. Otherwise, these are the reflections of a strange man unable to come to terms with himself and his environment.
But, as I hinted above, there is with Wittgenstein this kind of gap, the “unsayable” which he believes to be of the utmost importance. We want to know what’s in that gap.
Some philosophers disdain Wittgenstein as a kind of charlatan, that his “followers” see so much that isn’t actually there, so much profundity in something that is shallow but clever. I imagine that some of this has to do with his “followers" in fact making much more of what Wittgenstein said than what Wittgenstein himself actually thought. If so, it’s actually remarkable that someone has a gift for saying things that make people think.
At the worst, I sometimes imagine Wittgenstein to be a kind of cargo cult. But then there may be a lot to be gained by examining this particular cargo.
Why do we care about Wittgenstein’s life, and especially about his reflections on his own life?
There is Wittgenstein, the relatively dry philosopher of logic and the less dry but still abstract philosopher of language and mind. And then there’s a Wittgenstein who sits behind his enigmatic remarks on ethics and religion as unsayable but more important than anything that is sayable. His life, as he says, is what shows his ethics.
The book contains diaries from two periods during the 1930s, so during the formative years of the Blue and Brown Books and including time spent at Wittgenstein’s Norway retreat. We don’t find a lot of straightforward philosophical analyses and discussions in the diaries. They are truly self-reflections.
As Ray Monk emphasizes in his Introduction, the self-reflections orbit around Wittgenstein’s intense compulsion to be “good.” “Good,” in Monk’s interpretation, derives from Wittgenstein’s reading of Otto Weininger — the obligation to seek out, develop, and activate genius.
Thus for Wittgenstein, whose genius is his philosophical work, philosophy is itself a moral requirement, with the highest standards of performance. He consistently chastises himself for laziness, fogginess, . . . whatever failings keep him from his best work.
But he also chastises himself consistently for the person he is outside of his “cleverness.” He asks how he would be judged by others if not for his cleverness at philosophy, and he finds himself full of vanity and cowardice.
The two — his philosophical work and his standing outside of his philosophical work — cannot be kept separate. The same moral requirements stand over each and find each lacking. He says, “I am for example a petty, lying rogue & yet can talk about the grandest things.
And while I am doing that, I seem to myself perfectly detached from my pettiness. Yet I am not.”
We also find two threads that do not show explicitly in his philosophical writings — his intense relationship to Christianity, and to the New Testament in particular, and his relationship with Marguerite Respinger.
His remarks on the New Testament blend an examination of what is meant by and required for a good life, and on what it means to bring yourself into the proper relationship with Christianity. He was reading and thinking extensively about Kierkegaard’s writings during these times, and we find Wittgensteinian echoes of Kierkegaard’s equally intense reflections on the nature of faith and on the enigmas and paradoxes of Christianity.
It may be no coincidence that Kierkegaard’s work catches Wittgenstein’s interest also at the time that he is coming to terms with his relationship with Marguerite. He says that he is in love with her, but there is an attraction/repulsion overlaying whatever relationship they will ever have. It’s clearly never to become a conventional marriage.
The circumstances are certainly different from Kierkegaard’s relationship with Regine Olsen, but the impossibility of conventional marriage is common between them. And of course, Kierkegaard’s own writing, particularly Either/Or (not explicitly referred to here) on the ethical and what he calls the “exception" appear inspired by the complexities of his relationship with Regine.
So why is any of this interesting? Well, I don’t think it is to anyone who isn’t a student of Wittgenstein. Otherwise, these are the reflections of a strange man unable to come to terms with himself and his environment.
But, as I hinted above, there is with Wittgenstein this kind of gap, the “unsayable” which he believes to be of the utmost importance. We want to know what’s in that gap.
Some philosophers disdain Wittgenstein as a kind of charlatan, that his “followers” see so much that isn’t actually there, so much profundity in something that is shallow but clever. I imagine that some of this has to do with his “followers" in fact making much more of what Wittgenstein said than what Wittgenstein himself actually thought. If so, it’s actually remarkable that someone has a gift for saying things that make people think.
At the worst, I sometimes imagine Wittgenstein to be a kind of cargo cult. But then there may be a lot to be gained by examining this particular cargo.
May 30, 2026
War Wittgenstein ein Spitzbube? Und wenn ja, bin ich ein Schelm? Oder darf man diese Frage nicht stellen, wenn man diesen Tagebucheintrag liest: Beim Lehren der Philosophie kann man oft sagen: „Spitzbuben selbst, die uns zu Schelmen machen!“ (6.5.1930)
An anderer Stelle nennt er sich einen kleinlichen, lügnerischen Wicht. (12.10.31) Was ist davon zu halten? Oder, tiefer gefragt, lohnt es sich überhaupt, darüber nachzudenken?
Diese Tagebücher galten lange als verloren, wurden wiederentdeckt und 1997 veröffentlicht. Ich habe sie Anfang der 2000er gekauft, ins Bücherregal gestellt und dann vergessen.
Und um es gleich zu sagen, ein ganz großer Verlust wäre es nicht gewesen, sie wären nicht wiedergefunden worden. Vieles ist mehr oder weniger bekannt, vieles völlig belanglos, vieles irgendwie interessant, ohne aber ohne das Bild von Wittgenstein zu ändern, und vieles macht ihn als Person eher noch undurchsichtiger.
So wird in diesen Tagebüchern Marguerite Respinger öfter erwähnt als jede andere Person, aber welches Verhältnis er zu ihr hatte, bleibt völlig unklar. Dass er sie liebe behauptet er, dass sie ihn habe heiraten wollen. Aber alle Bemerkungen sind oberflächlich.
Dagegen, und das hat mich einigermaßen schockiert, drückt er seine Abneigung gegenüber Ramsey sehr direkt aus: “Ramseys Geist war mir zuwider... [] Er hatte einen häßlichen Geist. Aber keine häßliche Seele.“ (27.4.30) Gut zu wissen, oder vielleicht eher doch nicht?
Wittgenstein war bekanntlich sehr an Musik interessiert und hatte wohl auch Ahnung von Musik. Und natürlich ist es dann erfrischend, wenn er anlässlich einer schlechten Kritik über Bruckner schreibt: „Ich denke dann immer: haben diese Großen [auch Brahms und Wagner] so unerhört viel gelitten, daß heute ein Arschgesicht kommt & seine Meinung über sie abgibt.“ (30.4.30)
Andererseits sagt er selbst dies über Mahler: „Maler [sic!] scheint mir gerade in diesen Momenten (wenn die Anderen am stärksten ergreifen) besonders unerträglich & ich möchte dann immer sagen: aber das hast du ja nur von den Anderen gehört, das gehört ja nicht (wirklich) Dir.“ (In den Anmerkungen wird eine andere Bemerkung zitiert, wonach Mahler eine Reihe seltener Talente hatte, um diese schlechte Musik zu machen.) War also Wittgenstein selbst ein Arschgesicht? Oder hatte er einfach ein besseres Musikverständnis.
Philosophisch geben diese Tagebücher nicht besonders viel her. Mit wenigen Ausnahmen.
Diese Bemerkung führt allerdings nur dazu, dass nun jeder die Stellen, die er nicht versteht oder mit der sie nicht einverstanden ist, für Kitsch erklären kann.
Schön finde ich dies:
Gefallen hat mir auch die Bemerkung, nach der jemand, der vom Protestantismus zum Katholizismus übertritt, ein geistiges Monstrum ist, während der entgegengesetzte Übertritt von einer abgründigen Dummheit zeugt. (25.2.31)
Viele seiner Bemerkungen sind nicht eben genial.
Das billig zu nennen, zeugt natürlich wieder von Größe.
Hier ein paar zur Auswahl:
Luther war kein Protestant.
Wir sind in unserer Haut gefangen.
Echte Bescheidenheit ist eine religiöse Angelegenheit.
Lesen betäubt meine Seele.
„Weiß ist auch eine Art von Schwarz.“
Okay, die letzte Bemerkung kommt mir unbillig vor. Aber dafür enthält sie das Mysterium der Wittgensteinschen Anführungsstriche.
Und schließlich enthalten diese Tagebücher jede Menge, nun, religiösen Kitsch. Ein Beispiel dafür soll genügen:
Zur Edition: Die Herausgeberin (Ilse Sommavilla) hat sich entschieden, die Tagebücher in der sehr eigenen Orthographie Wittgensteins zu belassen. Das macht das Lesen schwierig, ist aber beinahe der größte Gewinn dieses Buches.
Ich habe das Buch sehr gerne gelesen, würde es aber nur Menschen empfehlen, die ein großes Interesse an Wittgenstein haben und dessen Hauptwerke kennen.
An anderer Stelle nennt er sich einen kleinlichen, lügnerischen Wicht. (12.10.31) Was ist davon zu halten? Oder, tiefer gefragt, lohnt es sich überhaupt, darüber nachzudenken?
Diese Tagebücher galten lange als verloren, wurden wiederentdeckt und 1997 veröffentlicht. Ich habe sie Anfang der 2000er gekauft, ins Bücherregal gestellt und dann vergessen.
Und um es gleich zu sagen, ein ganz großer Verlust wäre es nicht gewesen, sie wären nicht wiedergefunden worden. Vieles ist mehr oder weniger bekannt, vieles völlig belanglos, vieles irgendwie interessant, ohne aber ohne das Bild von Wittgenstein zu ändern, und vieles macht ihn als Person eher noch undurchsichtiger.
So wird in diesen Tagebüchern Marguerite Respinger öfter erwähnt als jede andere Person, aber welches Verhältnis er zu ihr hatte, bleibt völlig unklar. Dass er sie liebe behauptet er, dass sie ihn habe heiraten wollen. Aber alle Bemerkungen sind oberflächlich.
Dagegen, und das hat mich einigermaßen schockiert, drückt er seine Abneigung gegenüber Ramsey sehr direkt aus: “Ramseys Geist war mir zuwider... [] Er hatte einen häßlichen Geist. Aber keine häßliche Seele.“ (27.4.30) Gut zu wissen, oder vielleicht eher doch nicht?
Wittgenstein war bekanntlich sehr an Musik interessiert und hatte wohl auch Ahnung von Musik. Und natürlich ist es dann erfrischend, wenn er anlässlich einer schlechten Kritik über Bruckner schreibt: „Ich denke dann immer: haben diese Großen [auch Brahms und Wagner] so unerhört viel gelitten, daß heute ein Arschgesicht kommt & seine Meinung über sie abgibt.“ (30.4.30)
Andererseits sagt er selbst dies über Mahler: „Maler [sic!] scheint mir gerade in diesen Momenten (wenn die Anderen am stärksten ergreifen) besonders unerträglich & ich möchte dann immer sagen: aber das hast du ja nur von den Anderen gehört, das gehört ja nicht (wirklich) Dir.“ (In den Anmerkungen wird eine andere Bemerkung zitiert, wonach Mahler eine Reihe seltener Talente hatte, um diese schlechte Musik zu machen.) War also Wittgenstein selbst ein Arschgesicht? Oder hatte er einfach ein besseres Musikverständnis.
Philosophisch geben diese Tagebücher nicht besonders viel her. Mit wenigen Ausnahmen.
Mein Buch, die log.phil. Abhandlung enthält neben gutem & echtem auch Kitsch d.h. Stellen mit denen ich Lücken ausgefüllt habe und sozusagen in meinem eigenen Stil. Wie viel von dem Buch solche Stellen sind weiß ich nicht & es ist schwer es jetzt gerecht zu schätzen. (16.5.30)
Diese Bemerkung führt allerdings nur dazu, dass nun jeder die Stellen, die er nicht versteht oder mit der sie nicht einverstanden ist, für Kitsch erklären kann.
Schön finde ich dies:
Ich höre im Geist schon die Nachwelt über mich reden, statt mich selbst zu hören, der, da er mich kennt, frage ich, ein viel undankbareres Publikum ist. (15.11.31)
Gefallen hat mir auch die Bemerkung, nach der jemand, der vom Protestantismus zum Katholizismus übertritt, ein geistiges Monstrum ist, während der entgegengesetzte Übertritt von einer abgründigen Dummheit zeugt. (25.2.31)
Viele seiner Bemerkungen sind nicht eben genial.
Selbsterkenntnis & Dummheit ist eins. (Das sind billige Bemerkungen.) (12.10.31)
Das billig zu nennen, zeugt natürlich wieder von Größe.
Hier ein paar zur Auswahl:
Luther war kein Protestant.
Wir sind in unserer Haut gefangen.
Echte Bescheidenheit ist eine religiöse Angelegenheit.
Lesen betäubt meine Seele.
„Weiß ist auch eine Art von Schwarz.“
Okay, die letzte Bemerkung kommt mir unbillig vor. Aber dafür enthält sie das Mysterium der Wittgensteinschen Anführungsstriche.
Und schließlich enthalten diese Tagebücher jede Menge, nun, religiösen Kitsch. Ein Beispiel dafür soll genügen:
Ich habe heute die Sonne vor meinem Fenster gesehen in dem Augenblick, als sie anfing, hinter dem westlichen Berg aufzugehen. Gott sei Dank. Aber ich glaube nun, zu meiner Schande, daß mir dieses Wort nicht genug vom Herzen gekommen ist. Denn ich war wohl froh, als ich die Sonne nun wirklich erblickte, aber meine Freude war doch zu wenig tief, zu lustig, nicht wahrhaft religiös. Oh, wäre ich doch tiefer! (18.3.37)
Zur Edition: Die Herausgeberin (Ilse Sommavilla) hat sich entschieden, die Tagebücher in der sehr eigenen Orthographie Wittgensteins zu belassen. Das macht das Lesen schwierig, ist aber beinahe der größte Gewinn dieses Buches.
Ich habe das Buch sehr gerne gelesen, würde es aber nur Menschen empfehlen, die ein großes Interesse an Wittgenstein haben und dessen Hauptwerke kennen.
April 9, 2026
I co-edited this book, so don't take my word for it, but this is a fascinating book. It has been decades in the making! Wittgenstein's diary was discovered in the 1990s and published in German in 1997 as Denkbewegungen: Tagebücher 1930-1932, 1936-1937. Then Nordmann and I published an English translation as a part of our collection Public and Private Occasions in 2003. We thought R&L would soon produce a paperback edition, but this never happened, and that book always was quite expensive. So over the years we tried again and again to get them to publish an affordable edition of the diary. This has now finally happened! This is the same translation as P&PO, but with some updated footnotes and a new Introduction by Ray Monk.
Gabriel Citron suggested we title it "One of the Damned is Writing This from Hell"--which is what Wittgenstein wrote one might say of an autobiography (p. 53). But it seemed a bit over the top for a book title! Nevertheless there is a lot of intense stuff in this diary--so if you are interested in Wittgenstein or in spiritual journeys you will get a lot out of this diary. As we say on the back cover--it contains "the raw material for what could have been one of the great spiritual autobiographies of the twentieth century." See for yourself!
I'm especially pleased with the cover photo, taken from Wittgenstein's room (Whewell's Court K-10) at Cambridge, and the inserted photo (p. 69) of Wittgenstein's cabin in Skjolden, Norway.
Gabriel Citron suggested we title it "One of the Damned is Writing This from Hell"--which is what Wittgenstein wrote one might say of an autobiography (p. 53). But it seemed a bit over the top for a book title! Nevertheless there is a lot of intense stuff in this diary--so if you are interested in Wittgenstein or in spiritual journeys you will get a lot out of this diary. As we say on the back cover--it contains "the raw material for what could have been one of the great spiritual autobiographies of the twentieth century." See for yourself!
I'm especially pleased with the cover photo, taken from Wittgenstein's room (Whewell's Court K-10) at Cambridge, and the inserted photo (p. 69) of Wittgenstein's cabin in Skjolden, Norway.
December 18, 2025
Me parece precioso cómo Witt, llamemos así al filósofo, va hilvanando los temas que más le interesan junto a su vida cotidiana y personal. Me gusta sobre todo su interés y el despertar teológico que tiene en estos diarios. Hay un lapsus místico aquí y eso es lo que más me chifla.
September 1, 2023
This will give you next to no insight into LW's philosophical positions, but that was okay by me. It is a fascinating document of an individual's spiritual/psychological struggles, and a heartbreaking testament to the burdens we alone place on ourselves. Throughout these diaries and the letters appending them, LW frets about his moral worth, which for him is intimately tied up with the work he produces (as Ray Monk put it, the "duty of genius" that LW derived from Otto Weininger's Character and Culture). He's ruthless in identifying his own cowardice and hypocrisy, but my reaction to many of his confessions was often pity. LW suffered such pangs over violations that, from the outside (or sub specie aeternatis, as LW would have it), seem trivial. For instance, the fount of most anguish in these pages is his confession of an earlier lie about the extent of his Jewish ancestry. One sees the confession as a balm for his soul, not the repair of any real rupture with his interlocutors.
This touches on LW's overall approach: in the olden days, he would be diagnosed with a case of scruples or scrupulosity. LW himself actually heads off a psychologizing gloss on his plight: he at one point says that neither "sickness" nor "madness" accurately describes his condition. While he doesn't expressly say so, Kierkegaard (whom LW was reading and commenting on throughout this period) has his number: this is dread or (religious) anxiety. It's the recognition of the incommensurable gap between what is demanded of you vs. what you can do under your own power. LW feels the obligation of perfection but is all too aware of his faults and foibles, and this is the heartbreaking core of the human condition for a serious person.
To read this diary is to encounter a sensitive man enduring the unhealable wound of life, and that is its value. It's not as full of sharp lines and demos of philosophical arguments as I might have hoped, but it's a vivid portrait of a distinctive individual and a testament to his pain. I loved it even as I wished for more context and detail; the footnotes here are beautifully done but they hint at a much richer extant body of material on this fascinating thinker. You too may find yourself wanting to know LW better after getting this glimpse.
This touches on LW's overall approach: in the olden days, he would be diagnosed with a case of scruples or scrupulosity. LW himself actually heads off a psychologizing gloss on his plight: he at one point says that neither "sickness" nor "madness" accurately describes his condition. While he doesn't expressly say so, Kierkegaard (whom LW was reading and commenting on throughout this period) has his number: this is dread or (religious) anxiety. It's the recognition of the incommensurable gap between what is demanded of you vs. what you can do under your own power. LW feels the obligation of perfection but is all too aware of his faults and foibles, and this is the heartbreaking core of the human condition for a serious person.
To read this diary is to encounter a sensitive man enduring the unhealable wound of life, and that is its value. It's not as full of sharp lines and demos of philosophical arguments as I might have hoped, but it's a vivid portrait of a distinctive individual and a testament to his pain. I loved it even as I wished for more context and detail; the footnotes here are beautifully done but they hint at a much richer extant body of material on this fascinating thinker. You too may find yourself wanting to know LW better after getting this glimpse.
May 26, 2024
«En sjel som vandrer naknere enn de andre fra intet gjennom verden og til helvete, gjør et sterkere inntrykk på verden enn de påkledte borgerlige sjelene. …Jeg har en naknere sjel enn de fleste mennesker, og i dette består så å si mitt genius»
March 24, 2018
i denne dagboken ses Wittgensteins tankevirksomhet i et annet lys. Nemlig det at det er en eksistensiell håpløshet som tilsynelatende driver tankene hans på andre områder innenfor logikk og filosofi. I et utdrag i boken sier han om seg selv at han lider av "åndelig bronkitt", og på mange andre områder antyder han til sin egen håpløshet og "forfengelighet." Når han flere steder i boken snakker om sitt eget arbeide med logikken, klandrer han seg selv gang på gang for de overfladiske motivene som driver hans tankebevegelser. Det ser ut til at han skulle ønske at arbeidet skal settes i proporsjon til et høyere ideal, der han ikke betrakter seg selv som noe annet enn i forhold til dette. Sett at dette stemmer kan hele denne dagboken ses på som en rekke tanker skrevet over en lang periode i frivillig eksil der han forsøker å overkomme sitt eget ego.
Hans tanker på andre områder i verk som tractatus og filosofiske undersøkelser handler om å adskille kjensgjerninger fra det "uutsigelige område". Dvs. at områder som etikk, estetikk og religion ikke er noe som hører den vitenskapelige virksomheten til, men må nås med andre midler.
I denne boken er dette enda tydeligere da han skriver om sine egne åndelige kvaler og sitt eget forhold til Gud.
"Du må elske den fullkomne over alt annet, så vil du bli salig. Det fremstår for meg som summen av den kristne læren".
Det han mener med "den fullkomne" er et menneske som ikke drives av forfengelighet, altså menneskelige lyster og følelser, men bare forholder seg til seg selv som en del av en forhøyd entitet. Det er nettopp det Wittgenstein hevdet selv at han slet med, og som han fikk utløp for i sin filosofiske virksomhet.
Alt i alt er dette en fascinerende og lærerik bok som kan anbefales til alminnelige lesere samt de som ønsker og få mer innsikt i Wittgensteins virke.
Hans tanker på andre områder i verk som tractatus og filosofiske undersøkelser handler om å adskille kjensgjerninger fra det "uutsigelige område". Dvs. at områder som etikk, estetikk og religion ikke er noe som hører den vitenskapelige virksomheten til, men må nås med andre midler.
I denne boken er dette enda tydeligere da han skriver om sine egne åndelige kvaler og sitt eget forhold til Gud.
"Du må elske den fullkomne over alt annet, så vil du bli salig. Det fremstår for meg som summen av den kristne læren".
Det han mener med "den fullkomne" er et menneske som ikke drives av forfengelighet, altså menneskelige lyster og følelser, men bare forholder seg til seg selv som en del av en forhøyd entitet. Det er nettopp det Wittgenstein hevdet selv at han slet med, og som han fikk utløp for i sin filosofiske virksomhet.
Alt i alt er dette en fascinerende og lærerik bok som kan anbefales til alminnelige lesere samt de som ønsker og få mer innsikt i Wittgensteins virke.
April 4, 2023
Sirva esto como la más honesta confesión que puedo escribir ahora mismo:
Soy una persona que no responde emocionalmente de la forma más habitual, y pocas cosas consiguen emocionarme profundamente. Pero pocas cosas han conseguido conmoverme tanto como las entradas de 1937 de los diarios de Wittgenstein, entre registros de la cantidad de luz solar, reflexiones sobre el cristianismo y anotaciones extremadamente sinceras sobre los propios defectos. Honestamente, se me revuelven las entrañas solamente de pensar en esos pasajes.
Sé que Cata, quizás, no llegará a leer estas palabras que escribo sobre uno de los libros que más le han influido. Pero creo firmemente que, por muchas veces que se lo diga, nunca llegará a entender el influjo positivo que su presencia -su compañía, sus conversaciones, sus creencias- ha tenido en mi vida. Ojalá llegue a ser algo bueno y algo honesto. Ojalá pueda ella llegar a verme alcanzar un grado de autoconocimiento como el que muestra Wittgenstein en estos diarios. Tengo mucho miedo de perder, de perder a ella, de perder recuerdos y momentos, de perder cosas valiosas. Hay que intentar vivir.
Soy una persona que no responde emocionalmente de la forma más habitual, y pocas cosas consiguen emocionarme profundamente. Pero pocas cosas han conseguido conmoverme tanto como las entradas de 1937 de los diarios de Wittgenstein, entre registros de la cantidad de luz solar, reflexiones sobre el cristianismo y anotaciones extremadamente sinceras sobre los propios defectos. Honestamente, se me revuelven las entrañas solamente de pensar en esos pasajes.
Sé que Cata, quizás, no llegará a leer estas palabras que escribo sobre uno de los libros que más le han influido. Pero creo firmemente que, por muchas veces que se lo diga, nunca llegará a entender el influjo positivo que su presencia -su compañía, sus conversaciones, sus creencias- ha tenido en mi vida. Ojalá llegue a ser algo bueno y algo honesto. Ojalá pueda ella llegar a verme alcanzar un grado de autoconocimiento como el que muestra Wittgenstein en estos diarios. Tengo mucho miedo de perder, de perder a ella, de perder recuerdos y momentos, de perder cosas valiosas. Hay que intentar vivir.
July 29, 2025
En av mina favoritböcker av Wittgenstein, han överger nästan sitt högmod och blir lite romantisk. Pratar mycket om fåfängan, den han försöker undvika till varje pris men misslyckas.
Såhär löd mina anteckningar om boken Tankerörelser — fåfänga, Kierkegaard, drömmar (Freud), kärlek (för å va W), genius pga naken själ men för svag för att bryta samman, rädd för att bli vansinnig och även rädd för att bryta samman (pga fåfänga?) - Kierkegaard och fåfänga återkommer ofta. I Tractatus säger han att man ej upplever döden, de e ingen livshändelse. Drabbas ändå som många i takt med ålder av dödsångest och religiositet. ”Det är lättare att acceptera förmaningar från en Dostojevskij än en Kierkegaard”
Älskar alltid dagböcker, jag är billig i drift då
Såhär löd mina anteckningar om boken Tankerörelser — fåfänga, Kierkegaard, drömmar (Freud), kärlek (för å va W), genius pga naken själ men för svag för att bryta samman, rädd för att bli vansinnig och även rädd för att bryta samman (pga fåfänga?) - Kierkegaard och fåfänga återkommer ofta. I Tractatus säger han att man ej upplever döden, de e ingen livshändelse. Drabbas ändå som många i takt med ålder av dödsångest och religiositet. ”Det är lättare att acceptera förmaningar från en Dostojevskij än en Kierkegaard”
Älskar alltid dagböcker, jag är billig i drift då
March 25, 2024
The most extensive of Wittgenstein’s discussion of religion. Raised Catholic, one of his home schooling tutors a Catholic priest. In the gymnasium he also had Catholic religion courses. A regular reader of the New Testament, but misguided in his reading of Dostoevsky.
May 23, 2023
Some very touching and moving entries, but made tedious (especially towards the end) by the omnipresent religious, introspective torture
July 25, 2023
Interessant mand
Read
December 19, 2023 You shall live so that you can hold your own in the face of madness when it comes. And you shall not flee madness.
December 24, 2024
Deepest love to you…
December 25, 2024
Strøtanker med små stykker guld. Læseværdigt efterord som bonus. I den danske oversættelse.
August 30, 2023
This review is not for the main content of the book, but is for the introduction by Ray the Pastor. The worst thing about Monk’s writing is that it is so obvious that he is in love with his subject ‘and his own line of thought’. Everything unfolds in his head like a beautiful drama, and to most others, it is the cheapest sort of drama imaginable. Another thing about Ray Ray is that he writes exactly the same things in each book in which he writes about his idol, St Ludwig. Why this is annoying is that, so used to telling this story from his dreams and daydreams, he can replicate the placement of every single comma in each instance. It is like hearing same jokes for ever.
September 12, 2018
Rommelig om te lezen, hier en daar wel prachtige zin
Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews