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Democracy Erodes from the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe
Why leaders, not citizens, are the driving force in Europe's crisis of democracy
A seeming explosion of support for right-wing populist parties has triggered widespread fears that liberal democracy is facing its worst crisis since the 1930s. Democracy Erodes from the Top reveals that the real crisis stems not from an increasingly populist public but from political leaders who exploit or mismanage the chronic vulnerabilities of democracy.
In this provocative book, Larry Bartels dismantles the pervasive myth of a populist wave in contemporary European public opinion. While there has always been a substantial reservoir of populist sentiment, Europeans are no less trusting of their politicians and parliaments than they were two decades ago, no less enthusiastic about European integration, and no less satisfied with the workings of democracy. Anti-immigrant sentiment has waned. Electoral support for right-wing populist parties has increased only modestly, reflecting the idiosyncratic successes of populist entrepreneurs, the failures of mainstream parties, and media hype. Europe's most sobering examples of democratic backsliding--in Hungary and Poland--occurred not because voters wanted authoritarianism but because conventional conservative parties, once elected, seized opportunities to entrench themselves in power.
By demonstrating the inadequacy of conventional bottom-up interpretations of Europe's political crisis, Democracy Erodes from the Top turns our understanding of democratic politics upside down.
A seeming explosion of support for right-wing populist parties has triggered widespread fears that liberal democracy is facing its worst crisis since the 1930s. Democracy Erodes from the Top reveals that the real crisis stems not from an increasingly populist public but from political leaders who exploit or mismanage the chronic vulnerabilities of democracy.
In this provocative book, Larry Bartels dismantles the pervasive myth of a populist wave in contemporary European public opinion. While there has always been a substantial reservoir of populist sentiment, Europeans are no less trusting of their politicians and parliaments than they were two decades ago, no less enthusiastic about European integration, and no less satisfied with the workings of democracy. Anti-immigrant sentiment has waned. Electoral support for right-wing populist parties has increased only modestly, reflecting the idiosyncratic successes of populist entrepreneurs, the failures of mainstream parties, and media hype. Europe's most sobering examples of democratic backsliding--in Hungary and Poland--occurred not because voters wanted authoritarianism but because conventional conservative parties, once elected, seized opportunities to entrench themselves in power.
By demonstrating the inadequacy of conventional bottom-up interpretations of Europe's political crisis, Democracy Erodes from the Top turns our understanding of democratic politics upside down.
280 pages, Paperback
Published August 6, 2024
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About the author
Larry M. Bartels
7 books29 followersLarry Bartels is an American political scientist.
He holds the May Werthan Shayne Chair of Public Policy and Social Science at Vanderbilt University.
His scholarship focuses on public opinion, campaigns and elections, representation, and public policy.
In addition to his books, he is also the author of numerous scholarly articles and of occasional pieces in the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and other outlets.
He holds the May Werthan Shayne Chair of Public Policy and Social Science at Vanderbilt University.
His scholarship focuses on public opinion, campaigns and elections, representation, and public policy.
In addition to his books, he is also the author of numerous scholarly articles and of occasional pieces in the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and other outlets.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
June 28, 2024
The title of the book summarises accurately its content - it is the political elites that lead and contribute to the downfall of democratic institutions, not the people. After all, as Nancy Bermeo demonstrated, ordinary citizens do not tend to choose authoritarians or dictators at the ballot box. Bartels admits that citizens do not punish those incumbent statesmen who lead illiberal policies either, but he focuses on the corrosive government policies instead.
His logic is simple but comprehensive. To understand whether citizens are choosing illiberal statesmen or not, Bartels bases his argument on public opinion and whether there is a shift toward any particular ideology. His draws his data from the European Social Survey (ESS) data of 2002-2019 and attempts to capture public attitudes toward issues such as the Euro-crisis, the welfare state, immigration, democratic support, and populism. The conclusion contradicts the alarmist camp of media and policy makers who content that the economic crisis of 2008, the influx of immigrants from war torn Syria and Iraq, the rise of anti-democratic governments in Hungary and Poland, and the popularity of extreme right parties have contributed to an erosion of democratic credentials in the European Union.
Bartels found that subjective satisfaction with the economy varies among countries and personal characteristics such as age, sex, income, and education level. The fluctuations over the period of 17 years show that overall people are more satisfied with their lives and the general economy. Bartels also subscribes to the opinion that the most indicative measure of quality of life is the degree to which the welfare state has a large presence in a society, as it is more conducive to human well-being. Support for more spending for the welfare state has increased during the first quarter of the 21st century in Europe, and so has the support for immigrants, especially among younger people.
What about the immigration pushback that featured prominently all over media in the past decade? Bartels explains that the backlash has less to do with the influx of immigrants in certain countries than with the ways in which political elites have responded to that influx. How about the so-called "populist wave" that dominated many domestic politics of European countries? Bartels downgrades their appeal and contents that their rise is the result of "the increased ability and willingness of populist entrepreneurs to mobilise and cater" to an ever present but insignificant demand for right wing sentiment among the voters. It is the political elites, that saw an opportunity to capitalise on limited right wing activism, that drove the shift to the narrative and not the public opinion. But even the support for right-wing populist parties is driven not by issues of immigration, economic dissatisfaction, or the way democracy is working, but by wider conservative worldview and conservative ideology. Certain political parties (UKIP in the UK) and incumbent governments (Hungary and Poland) found an opportunity to capitalise on those sentiments and shifted the conversation, making it anti-EU and anti-immigrant.
The case of Hungary and Poland is especially illustrative, showing how newly elected conservative governments that built their appeal on corrupt predecessors, secured overwhelming mandate. This allowed them to amend the constitution and invade in the sphere of independent courts and media. The mandate these centre rights parties acquired in the ballot box did not equate with a mandate to invade into democratic institutions. These mainstream parties became mildly authoritarian after taking over power, therefore a shift toward right-wing populism was not predicated on the basis of their pleadges. The vast majority of the population that saw a right-wing shift did not protest due to an increase in their living standards.
Bartels Central argument is compelling and well structured, although the vast and detailed statistical tables do not offer a pleasant bed time reading. An even more interesting reading could be a comparative analysis against the thesis that democracy erodes from the bottom.
His logic is simple but comprehensive. To understand whether citizens are choosing illiberal statesmen or not, Bartels bases his argument on public opinion and whether there is a shift toward any particular ideology. His draws his data from the European Social Survey (ESS) data of 2002-2019 and attempts to capture public attitudes toward issues such as the Euro-crisis, the welfare state, immigration, democratic support, and populism. The conclusion contradicts the alarmist camp of media and policy makers who content that the economic crisis of 2008, the influx of immigrants from war torn Syria and Iraq, the rise of anti-democratic governments in Hungary and Poland, and the popularity of extreme right parties have contributed to an erosion of democratic credentials in the European Union.
Bartels found that subjective satisfaction with the economy varies among countries and personal characteristics such as age, sex, income, and education level. The fluctuations over the period of 17 years show that overall people are more satisfied with their lives and the general economy. Bartels also subscribes to the opinion that the most indicative measure of quality of life is the degree to which the welfare state has a large presence in a society, as it is more conducive to human well-being. Support for more spending for the welfare state has increased during the first quarter of the 21st century in Europe, and so has the support for immigrants, especially among younger people.
What about the immigration pushback that featured prominently all over media in the past decade? Bartels explains that the backlash has less to do with the influx of immigrants in certain countries than with the ways in which political elites have responded to that influx. How about the so-called "populist wave" that dominated many domestic politics of European countries? Bartels downgrades their appeal and contents that their rise is the result of "the increased ability and willingness of populist entrepreneurs to mobilise and cater" to an ever present but insignificant demand for right wing sentiment among the voters. It is the political elites, that saw an opportunity to capitalise on limited right wing activism, that drove the shift to the narrative and not the public opinion. But even the support for right-wing populist parties is driven not by issues of immigration, economic dissatisfaction, or the way democracy is working, but by wider conservative worldview and conservative ideology. Certain political parties (UKIP in the UK) and incumbent governments (Hungary and Poland) found an opportunity to capitalise on those sentiments and shifted the conversation, making it anti-EU and anti-immigrant.
The case of Hungary and Poland is especially illustrative, showing how newly elected conservative governments that built their appeal on corrupt predecessors, secured overwhelming mandate. This allowed them to amend the constitution and invade in the sphere of independent courts and media. The mandate these centre rights parties acquired in the ballot box did not equate with a mandate to invade into democratic institutions. These mainstream parties became mildly authoritarian after taking over power, therefore a shift toward right-wing populism was not predicated on the basis of their pleadges. The vast majority of the population that saw a right-wing shift did not protest due to an increase in their living standards.
Bartels Central argument is compelling and well structured, although the vast and detailed statistical tables do not offer a pleasant bed time reading. An even more interesting reading could be a comparative analysis against the thesis that democracy erodes from the bottom.
September 8, 2024
This book is an interesting, but perhaps underwhelming follow-up to Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government.
It makes an important argument that by some important measures, European governments succeeded in much of the 2010s, so you can't attribute the rise of the far-right and the weakening of democracy to that.
It goes on to argue, much like Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government that what happens is much more leadership driven than public policy driven. And it provides a useful framework, a reservoir of populist sentiment that can be tapped by politicians, to generate anti-system support.
But it drags. It gets boring. It could be 1/2 the length and make the point in a more compelling way.
Theoretically and professionally important. I need to have read it. It's useful. But I didn't love it.
It makes an important argument that by some important measures, European governments succeeded in much of the 2010s, so you can't attribute the rise of the far-right and the weakening of democracy to that.
It goes on to argue, much like Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government that what happens is much more leadership driven than public policy driven. And it provides a useful framework, a reservoir of populist sentiment that can be tapped by politicians, to generate anti-system support.
But it drags. It gets boring. It could be 1/2 the length and make the point in a more compelling way.
Theoretically and professionally important. I need to have read it. It's useful. But I didn't love it.
April 11, 2025
El argumento, si bien es muy interesante, busca ser realista y termina siendo deprimente. Nosotros, los ciudadanos, no escogemos líderes autoritarios, y pocos estamos dispuestos a salvar la democracia si una amenaza se presenta. Más bien, la supervivencia de nuestra democracia se encuentra en la calidad de nuestras instituciones políticas (su capacidad de limitar la concentración de poder), la cultura política y la educación cívica de los líderes.
Esta perspectiva busca alejarse de la democracia romántica, que exalta la "voluntad" popular, y busca abrazar una perspectiva Schumpeteriana. El "pueblo", siguiendo una función de utilidad económica, escoge a sus líderes, los cuales deben competir por el voto. Esta perspectiva, que de verdad algo tiene, lleva a concluir lo siguiente:
"When the corruption and incompetence of political leaders seems to impinge in their well-being, they will register their disapproval through whatever channels are most readily available to them. When they experience peace and prosperity, they will mostly be happy to let the people in charge carry on. If the results in either case amount to a crisis of democracy, that is first and foremost a crisis of political leadership, not a crisis of public opinion"
Esta perspectiva busca alejarse de la democracia romántica, que exalta la "voluntad" popular, y busca abrazar una perspectiva Schumpeteriana. El "pueblo", siguiendo una función de utilidad económica, escoge a sus líderes, los cuales deben competir por el voto. Esta perspectiva, que de verdad algo tiene, lleva a concluir lo siguiente:
"When the corruption and incompetence of political leaders seems to impinge in their well-being, they will register their disapproval through whatever channels are most readily available to them. When they experience peace and prosperity, they will mostly be happy to let the people in charge carry on. If the results in either case amount to a crisis of democracy, that is first and foremost a crisis of political leadership, not a crisis of public opinion"
April 10, 2024
The general hypothesis of the book - that is not a shift in popular attitudes which caused the surge in European right-wing populism over the last 20 years - is soundly rooted in empirical data. The book could certainly be shorter, though, and sometimes operate with sounder terminology (the "conservative worldviews"/"liberal worldviews" it references seem more like "traditional/conformist/collectivist" and "individualist/personality-expressive", in which the latter is closer to current-day right-wing discourse glorifying the individual (and their right to do what they want regardless of the consequences).
June 24, 2025
Interesting research, but very academic and a little bit boring.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews