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Modern War Studies
The GI Offensive In Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945
Presents a study of America's infantry combat performance in Europe during World War II, showing that the Army succeeded by developing combat effective divisions that could not only fight and win battles but also sustain that effort over years of combat. Mansoor (lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army and military historian) analyzes the impact of personnel and logistical systems on the Army's strength, and he argues that the American army won because unit for unit at the division level, it was more effective than its adversaries. Contains many b&w photos of Army personnel and battle scenes. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
344 pages, Hardcover
First published June 1, 1999
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
June 24, 2017
This book makes a nice companion to Rick Atkinson's Liberation Trilogy. Atkinson explains how the US Army evolved from a green force to a seasoned, veteran juggernaut capable of facing any army in the world on even terms. Mansoor shows us why the Army was able to learn from its mistakes (in most cases) and overcome its initial ineptitude.
The simple answers are training and leadership. Given the same human material, a US Army division would almost always fail or take heavy casualties if it were poorly led by officers at the divisional and regimental level; likewise, replacing those officers with men of proven talent (combat experience not necessarily needed, but it never hurt) could turn that same division around.
The other factor, training, was something not all divisions got to experience equally. The Army's training plan was sound, and when allowed to complete it uninterrupted, those divisions so trained tended to perform very well, even their first time in combat. But unfortunately, the Army—desperate for reinforcements for divisions already overseas—repeatedly plundered units still in training for replacements, meaning the divisions back home had to start the training process all over again...or more likely, get deployed with less training time and unit cohesion than the plan called for.
A better way to keep divisions in the field than this practice of combing out replacements, deleterious as it was, was never devised during the war, so the triumph of the American Army has to be considered in that light. Yes we tended to have material superiority when the logistics chain permitted it; but material alone can't explain the almost uniformly (no pun intended) splendid performance of US divisions in the ETO by 1945.
Don't read this book as a battle history. The maps are barely sufficient to support the narrative, and the battles and campaigns are described in the barest outline necessary to make the author's points. This was a wise choice. Histories of the US Army's battles, down to the smallest level of action, are available in abundance. Read those first, if you wish; then pick up Mansoor's excellent book to learn the back story about the leaders, the training history, and the development of fighting skill and spirit in the divisions involved. This book is a must for the shelves of any serious reader about World War II in the ETO.
The simple answers are training and leadership. Given the same human material, a US Army division would almost always fail or take heavy casualties if it were poorly led by officers at the divisional and regimental level; likewise, replacing those officers with men of proven talent (combat experience not necessarily needed, but it never hurt) could turn that same division around.
The other factor, training, was something not all divisions got to experience equally. The Army's training plan was sound, and when allowed to complete it uninterrupted, those divisions so trained tended to perform very well, even their first time in combat. But unfortunately, the Army—desperate for reinforcements for divisions already overseas—repeatedly plundered units still in training for replacements, meaning the divisions back home had to start the training process all over again...or more likely, get deployed with less training time and unit cohesion than the plan called for.
A better way to keep divisions in the field than this practice of combing out replacements, deleterious as it was, was never devised during the war, so the triumph of the American Army has to be considered in that light. Yes we tended to have material superiority when the logistics chain permitted it; but material alone can't explain the almost uniformly (no pun intended) splendid performance of US divisions in the ETO by 1945.
Don't read this book as a battle history. The maps are barely sufficient to support the narrative, and the battles and campaigns are described in the barest outline necessary to make the author's points. This was a wise choice. Histories of the US Army's battles, down to the smallest level of action, are available in abundance. Read those first, if you wish; then pick up Mansoor's excellent book to learn the back story about the leaders, the training history, and the development of fighting skill and spirit in the divisions involved. This book is a must for the shelves of any serious reader about World War II in the ETO.
August 28, 2013
A tremendous history that combines operational narrative with analysis of force-generation policies and the strategic direction of the war. Mansoor does an outstanding job of combining the dry facts of standard operational histories (unit designations, commanders' names, casualty figures, and so on) with biographical details, contextual information from memoirs and other non-official sources, and poignant, challenging historiographic assessment. His brief summary of the related literature is worth the price of the book on its own. Mansoor definitely has a take, and he never fails to remind you of it, but I consider that a strength of the book. A must-read for students of ground combat in the European theater and of force generation/personnel management in the Second World War.
January 4, 2014
Excellent historical study. Dr. Mansoor refutes the contention of authors like T. N. Dupuy and S.L.A.Marshall that the Allies won World War II in Europe because of our overwhelming materiel advantage. He contends that these other authors arrived at their conclusions by comparing "vanilla" US infantry divisions with the Wehrmacht elite, a comparison much akin to comparing apples and oranges. A valuable contribution to the literature on World War II.
May 28, 2012
Very informative, fact filled. Somewhat dry.
November 14, 2016
A decent book that focuses primarily on the standard infantry divisions that fought in the ETO.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews