Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting

by Daniel C. Dennett

Anyone who has wondered if free will is just an illusion or has asked 'could I have chosen otherwise?' after performing some rash deed will find this book an absorbing discussion of an endlessly fascinating subject. Daniel Dennett, whose previous books include "Brainstorms "and (with Douglas Hofstadter) "The Mind's I, " tackles the free will problem in a highly original and witty manner, drawing on the theories and concepts of several fields usually ignored by philosophers; not just physics and evolutionary biology, but engineering, automata theory, and artificial intelligence.

In "Elbow Room," Dennett shows how the classical formulations of the problem in philosophy depend on misuses of imagination, and he disentangles the philosophical problems of real interest from the "family of anxieties' they get enmeshed in - imaginary agents, bogeymen, and dire prospects that seem to threaten our freedom. Putting sociobiology in its rightful place, he concludes that we can have free will and science too. "Elbow Room" begins by showing how we can be "moved by reasons" without being exempt from physical causation. It goes on to analyze concepts of control and self-control-concepts often skimped by philosophers but which are central to the questions of free will and determinism. A chapter on "self-made selves" discusses the idea of self or agent to see how it can be kept from disappearing under the onslaught of science. Dennett then sees what can be made of the notion of acting under the idea of freedomdoes the elbow room we think we have really exist? What is an opportunity, and how can anything in our futures be "up to us"? He investigates the meaning of "can" and "could have done otherwise," and asks why we want free will in the first place.We are wise, Dennett notes, to want free will, but that in itself raises a host of questions about responsibility. In a final chapter, he takes up the problem of how anyone can ever be guilty, and what the rationale is for holding people responsible and even, on occasion, punishing them.

"Elbow Room "is an expanded version of the John Locke Lectures which Dennett gave at Oxford University in 1983.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Psychology, Science, Metaphysics, Neuroscience, Academic

248 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1984

About the author

Daniel Clement Dennett III was a prominent philosopher whose research centered on philosophy of mind, science, and biology, particularly as they relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. He was the co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies and the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. Dennett was a noted atheist, avid sailor, and advocate of the Brights movement.

Dennett received his B.A. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963, where he was a student of W.V.O. Quine. In 1965, he received his D.Phil. from Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied under the ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle.

Dennett gave the John Locke lectures at the University of Oxford in 1983, the Gavin David Young Lectures at Adelaide, Australia, in 1985, and the Tanner Lecture at Michigan in 1986, among many others. In 2001 he was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize, giving the Jean Nicod Lectures in Paris. He has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987. He was the co-founder (1985) and co-director of the Curricular Software Studio at Tufts University, and has helped to design museum exhibits on computers for the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Science in Boston, and the Computer Museum in Boston. He was a Humanist Laureate of the International Academy of Humanism and a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.

Reviews

[Kevin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Brain Yoga

Keeping up with Daniel Dennett's train of thought is a bit like herding cats. Just when you think you've got a handle on one postulate he launches another, often in a totally opposite direction. Even with his weirdly exquisite analogies (e.g. frog in a beer mug) I couldn't always wrap my brain around his concepts on the first pass. There were many paragraphs, and at least one entire chapter, that I had to read twice.

That's not to say this book isn't fantastic—it is!. Dennett tackles the question of free will with surgical precision. He examines arguments, both pro and con, with such absence of malice that I really wasn't sure until the last few pages exactly what side of the debate he was on.

Not to be overtly deterministic, but I knew I was going to enjoy this book before I read it. After all, it's Daniel f-ing Dennett! My only criticism, and it's a small one, is the title. 'Elbow Room' doesn't exactly jump out at you and scream "buy me!" or "read me!" ...and yet I did and I did.

[Jimmy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Determinism does not mean that our fate was determined before we were born. But much of what happens to us in a lifetime is certainly influenced by that. Determinism is not fatalism. For someone to say, "It does not matter what I do, whatever is meant to happen will happen," is quite absurd. And yet to say we have free will and that I can do whatever I want to do, is also absurd.

For me understanding determinism, I think of this instant of my life on a straight line. The straight line is my past. It cannot be changed, as much as I would give anything to change some things. I ache to change them. But they are frozen in time. It is the next instant in my life line that is determined by all that went before. Those instants pile up.

Soren Kierkegaard said, "Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards." I learn from my past and behave based on that learning. I am affected by environment, heredity, and chance.

I "feel" like I have free will, just like everyone else. In fact, I understand that I am wrong, that in reality I have no free will. But I cannot shake that "feeling" that I am a free person.

[Keith Swenson · Rating 3 out of 5]

I am a big fan of Dan Dennett. Free will is a very difficult topic to explain and this is a very careful, thoughtful treatment of the subject. I started to write a detailed summary of the book, but decided cut to the basics: This was an early book of his on the topic of consciousness and free will, and his later books are much better. You can see in this book the seeds of ideas that he will later present in "Consciousness Explained." Most everything in this book is explained better in that one.

The age old question of free will. Dennett approach the problem as a sculptor would a piece of granite. He wants to work all our the edges, get a very rough idea, before adding detail and ultimately polishing the theory.

He start with an entire chapter on why we don't want to think about free will. It seems clear that the idea of free will is a very dear to us. We simply can't be disinterested, there is some nagging feeling that makes us want to avoid the subject like a really bad smell. He outlines a set of bugbears:

(1) Invisible Jailer: If we have not free will, then we might be in jail
(2) Nefarious Neurosurgeon: or someone might be able to control us
(3) Cosmic Child Toys: or we might be toys to gods
(4) Malevolent Mindreader: or we might be predicable and therefor unable to win
(5) Sphexishness: we might be just acting according to program
(6) Disappear self: if we look to hard we might find there is no one home
(7) Dread Secret: finding out the truth might ruin your life

The "problem" with free will, is all of the fears embodied above.

There is an interesting part about body english -- those movements that you do that can't possibly have effect, but you do them anyway, as if superstitiously. Launching the bowling ball and then dancing or wheeling as if to control the ball down the alley. However there is an alternative: don't loop up too soon after hitting a golf ball. The practive of keeping your head down AFTER hitting the ball still can have an effect how you behave before hitting it. Which is it: pointless or important?

He lists a number of intuition pumps:

(1) Plato's cave
(2) Quine's Gavagai
(3) Goodman's grue-bleen puzzle
(4) Rawl's original position
(5) Farrell's bat
(6) Putnam's twin earth
(7) Searle's chinese room

What we are left with is the "Compatiblist" view of free will, which always feels like merely shifting the definition of the terms. The compatiblist believe that we make all the choices that we want to make, and that those choices are determined by our history. You might say: your actions are determined by your needs and desires, but your needs and desires are determined by your experience, and therefor your actions are determined. But STILL you exercise free will because that IS your free will to follow your needs and desires.

This argument leaves most traditionalists unsatisfied. "I don't FEEL like my actions are determined. I can decide what I want to do any moment." Of course you can, but you always decide what you think is the best or most appropriate thing to do, which at the end of the day is determined for you.

The most important part of this discussion is really exposing the "libertarian free will" as unrealistic illusive fantasy. You would never want to live a life where you could arbitrarily make any choice at any moment without regard to your needs and desires. You really don't want to ride in a taxi where the driver had the free will to just drive off a cliff or into a wall at any moment. We would never want the kind of free will that allow you to suddenly decide to put arsenic into the dinner you are making, or to arbitrarily decide to throw your child from a building. we most certainly do not want to make completely arbitrary and capricious actions.

It turns out that free will means simply that your actions are guided by YOUR needs and desires, and they are NOT guided by someone else's desired. Free will is denied when you are locked up and prevented from some external reason to do what you desire. What we really mean by free will is not that we can take any ARBITRARY action at any moment, but that we are not FORCED to take an action different than what we want. It really has nothing to do with determinism.

Thus, having your own actions determined by your own needs and desires is actually the kind of free will that you want. That is the point of this book. I assure you, if you are not already acquainted with these ideas, you will on first reading reject them. As most people will reject the superficial description of the book. But further study is warranted, and Dennett has adequately organized this concept. However, as I said earlier, I would recommend his later, larger book: Consciousness Explained as it covers many of these same topics.

[Mattia · Rating 4 out of 5]

"There's no sense wringing our hands because we can't undo the past, and can't prevent an event that actually happens, and can't create ourselves ex nihilo, and can't choose both alternatives at a decision point, and can't be perfect."

[Chris]

Read it in college. Reading it again. He has a terrific beard.

[Rob, the Monk · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting read, but difficult: Dennett writes for the student of Philosophy. Eminently accessible to a person willing to commit, but, as all philosophical writing, commitment it requires. He explores Free Will in terms of Determinism, that is, the proposal that Free Will as we think of it, is an illusion and that human beings as rational agents are as subject to causation as dominoes. It's an extremely uncomfortable idea for many people, and Dennett doesn't spend a great deal of time acclimating one. Best to get comfortable with the idea before Dennett sweeps you up in all the subsequent implications.

[Masha · Rating 4 out of 5]

I had to go and google "compatibilism" after finishing it lmao. sometimes an argument is too nuanced that you don't see the forest for the trees. It was an interesting dissection of the different false metaphors, "bug-bears", that philosophers use to make the notion of free will more scary/dramatic, but I feel like it could have had a bit more synthesis/construction rather than deconstruction. in general his view can be summarized by saying that free will is an emergent phenomenological aspect of how we experience the human condition and not an essential/structural property of our biology/metaphysics.

[Mike · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent little series of essays on free will which only occasionally gets bogged down in "philosophese". Dennett very deftly takes on the fears based on the sneaking suspicion that we don't actually have "free will" by first asserting that we should buck up and not scare ourselves too much with deterministic bugbears. Then he makes the case that determinism could very much feel similar to free will. Then he points out that when many people talk about having even "free-er" will than we already seemingly have, they are talking about the ability to make contradictory choices or disobey other physical laws. He also considers the asymptotic case of using free will to make the best possible choices based on the most (and most relevant) information, and points out that we - tragically - don't have time for all of that nonsense in making our day to day choices.

In the end, his conclusion seems to be that of course we have free will, in that we seem to have free will in all of the ways that matter, and even if we don't we wouldn't know it, so quit worrying about it. A thoroughly humanistic and useful conclusion, and an enjoyable read.

[Gendou · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is Dennett's earlier attempt to clarify philosophical thinking on the topic of free will. His thinking has evolved since it was written, and the newest edition has some qualifiers in the preface. But it remains a masterpiece complete with many important thought experiments which help demystify this question that has plagued philosophers of the past for a long time.

He takes a so-called "compatibilist" approach in this books, that free will and determinism are compatible ideas. He defines free will by showing what it would mean for free will, as we know it, to be taken away. In the end free will isn't some fundamental magical stuff that we have happen to uniquely posses, but a sort of meta-phenomenon that, like the intentional stance, is a useful description of part of the human experience.

This book is written in a fairly airy style, a little less down to Earth than his later writing.

[Dave Peticolas · Rating 5 out of 5]

What does it mean to have free will? Is free will incompatible with determinism? With indeterminism? What does it mean to control oneself? What does it mean to make a choice? Why do we want free will at all and what do we want when we want it?

Dennett examines these perennial philosophical problems and disposes of many of the "bugbears" which plague the often fear-riddled investigations into these topics. Dennett also develops answers, or at least the start of some answers, that embrace the possibility of determinism and evolution. Good as usual.

[Asher]

There is a whole bunch of genuinely useful stuff in this book that will, I think, change the way that I think about my self. There are also a bunch of places where I think that Dennett is hindered by a particular "rational" viewpoint that prevents him from offering the sort of argument that will be meaningful to a non-academic audience. It's certainly not the responsibility of academia to make itself accessible, but I think that in a book where so much of the discussion rests on an assumption of how people as a group think and feel about a topic, there is a clear and present benefit to having a very good understanding of how those people think, and I'm not always convinced that Dennett does.

But let's talk about the good stuff. Dennett develops an argument about humans as biological robots made out of overlapping cognitive systems, and talks about how we have evolved to be good approximations of "semantic engines," or systems that can engage with pure, Platonic ideas. As such, there is no singular atomic seat of our consciousness, no indivisible unit that is our self. Dennett discusses the weirdness of particle physics: it doesn't matter if atomic interactions are purely deterministic or are probabilistic because in either case our minds are much too large of structures to affect the outcome. I came away from this with an appreciation for the fact that "free will" as conceived of in the popular sentiment is probably the wrong thing to even be thinking about, and that the determinism of the atoms in our universe is entirely irrelevant.

Clearly, this is not a book that I'm going to recommend to other people unless they're looking for something very specific, but even still, I think this is going to fundamentally improve the way I think about my mind. Not read for enjoyment, so no star rating.

(As an aside, if you have ever read Anathem, you will find so much in this book that Stevenson has incorporated.)

[Keenan · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting and thought-provoking look into the question of free will and its associated philosophical concepts of consciousness, luck, responsibility, control, fairness, and morality. Dennett walks a tightrope of considerations with a good mix of explanations, sarcasm, and nuance, starting chapters with outlandish scenarios that most readers can see the truth/falsity in and whittling them down to hypothetical scenarios that guide you into the crux of his argument is. I found sections that dealt with determinism/indeterminism vis-à-vis quantum mechanics to be weak but perhaps necessary given their philosophical popularity, while chapters that delved into the continuous spectrum of consciousness and the biological basis for self-control to be extremely convincing.

[Nick Klagge]

I always enjoy Dennett's writing style, but I also think this is the most convincing of his work that I've read. It's similar to Consciousness Explained in focusing in on one particular topic, but Dennett is still grasping toward a theory of consciousness in that book, while I think his theory of compatibilism as laid out here is much more complete. I came into this book believing in determinism and felt Dennett did a good job arguing that it does not constrain our free will in ways that matter. The most challenging mental hurdle for me, and the cornerstone of the argument, is breaking the natural conceptual separation of "ourselves" from "the physical world."

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

A nice presentation of the contemporary compatibilist position on free will (ie even though determinism may be how our physical world works, that's no reason to think we don't have free will)

[Nick de Vera · Rating 4 out of 5]

clarifying, much food for thought, and oddly motivating, like self-help from an unusual angle

[Kate · Rating 5 out of 5]

On the pitfalls of premature verdicts of stupidity in the wasp, see Dawkins 1982, pp. 48-50.

True, much of these causes occur 'inside' us--is it better to be a hand puppet than a marionette?

Note that this "can" is Austin's frog at the bottom of the beer mug.

Now it is open for some genius of pessimism to discover for us some sort of contra-Darwinian patterns of motiveless malignancy which would permit us to reconceptualize our view of nature as a sort of Manichaean struggle between Mother Nature and the Evil One, but so far as I know, no such patterns have been seriously entertained.

"Les choses sont contre nous"--that is the aphoristic heart of Resistentialism.

An act in equilibrium withstands knowledge of its own causes.

See Dawkins 1976, pp. 82-83, on the conditions under which a poker face is an evolutionarily stable strategy.

They give you an answer every time you ask, and who cares if it's "right"?

Designing a wise and workable method of ignoring things has proven to be one of the deepest and most intractable problems in Artificial Intelligence.

Nobody can do. Things only happen.

"How can I tell what I think until I see what I say?"

The unexamined life may not be worth living, but the overexamined life is nothing to write home about either.

"After the temptation has been yielded to, the desiring 'I' will come to an end, but the conscience-stricken 'I' may endure to the end of life."

"Some souls one will never discover, unless one invents them first."

What it means to say a dog can bark is that one may not rely on its silence. These same deliberators, to whom barks are so important, may not care much just how a dog barks when it does. So such deliberators will for these purposes partition dogs as systems with a two-state degree of freedom: the barker is either ON or OFF.

Which direction gravity works in is never up to me.

Sartre sees the importance of this, and with his customary cool understatement defines a free agent as "a being who can realize a nihilating rupture with the world and with himself."

There is a difference between being optimally designed and being infallible.

[Jeff · Rating 5 out of 5]

I take the debate about free will very seriously. It's one of the few areas where I think a common-sense understanding (that we all have it) is wrong, and a philosophical dissection of the concept will do a lot of good. Many books on the subject, though, are unbearably dry and bog down in technical discussions that eventually bore even tech-y philosophers like myself. This one doesn't. It reaches a conclusion that I am in total agreement with, and it does so without "cheating" by avoiding any of the complex issues along the way. At the same time, the book remains readable throughout, Dennett consistently favoring the use of examples and analogies that are as catchy and memorable as they are illuminating. I think it is no accident that Dennett is one of the most celebrated philosophers of our time, and this book makes clear why. An oldie (from the mid 80's), but a goodie.

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book should be called Varieties of Determinism Worth Wanting, or Varieties of Determinism Worth Having the Illusion that We Want, But are Incapable of Because Everything is Pre-ordained, Anyway.

Whatever the title, this book doesn't describe any credable model of freedom.

[Mari Stroud · Rating 5 out of 5]

Dennett spends half his time making the case for determinism, and the other half laying out the argument for why it's really not that scary. He uses very clear language to keep the book accessible even to people without backgrounds in philosophy, which is good. Philosophers are weird, y'all.

[Sarah · Rating 4 out of 5]

"The unexamined life may not be worth living, but the overexamined life is nothing to write home about either." pg. 87

[Adam Jackson · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of my favorite books of all time.

[Daniel Hageman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Much more clear and focused than his later 'Freedom Evolves'. Probably recommend this to those new to the free will discussion who haven't yet familiarized themselves with compatibilism.

[Feng Ouyang · Rating 4 out of 5]

In "Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting", philosopher Daniel Dennett delves into an intricate exploration of the concept of free will. The book dissects a multitude of interconnected notions, including freedom, determinism, agency, consciousness, and more, providing a dialectic discourse that stimulates the mind.

Dennett's central thesis proposes that free will is a subjective entity. Regardless of whether human thoughts are deterministic or fueled by random processes, the belief in free will is pivotal in maintaining our happiness, personal accountability, and societal harmony.

To substantiate his viewpoint, Dennett presents a series of nuanced thought experiments illustrating how perceptions can drastically vary even when the underlying reality remains unchanged.

Consider the concept of agent control. We acknowledge that an airplane is controlled by a pilot using levers and pedals. Yet, the sense of control is reduced with remote-controlled airplanes. What happens when another agent intercepts and mimics our airplane control? Or, if someone else is controlling the plane while we pretend to, based on our perfect prediction of their actions? Despite these scenarios being indistinguishable to an observer tracking our thoughts, actions, and the airplane's response, our perceived agency varies dramatically depending on the perceived directness of control.

Another contemplative scenario delves into the complexities of freedom. Confinement in a jail cell limits our freedom. However, would this feeling persist if the cell were so vast that we would never venture beyond its limits, or if we were unaware of the cell walls due to our limited exploration? The revelation of this unknown confinement doesn't objectively influence our behavior or circumstances, but does it alter our perception of freedom?

A third scenario ponders over randomness. In a lottery, the winning numbers are presumed to be randomly drawn. But what if the outcome is determined by a pseudo-random sequence or if the winning numbers have been pre-drawn and kept secret? Despite our winning chances remaining identical, our perception of randomness could significantly differ in each case.

Through these thought experiments and more, Dennett contends that free will, while subjective, should not be dismissed as an illusion. Because it's subjective, it coexists with deterministic biological and neurological processes suggested by science, quantum uncertainty or not. Dennett argues that if the notion of free will serves individual and societal interests, it should be upheld, regardless of scientific evidence.

Dennett also probes into the multifaceted meanings and implications of free will, viewing it as a gradated concept. We may feel the liberty to consciously make decisions and choices, yet we're unconsciously confined by our predispositions and biases. These constraints, shaped by our biological traits, upbringing, and life experiences, limit our freedom to what Dennett refers to as "elbow room." As such, clarifying the meaning of free will becomes essential in any discussion about it.

"Elbow Room" is a noteworthy contribution to the enduring debate on free will. However, its writing style could have been more reader-friendly. The lack of introductions and conclusions in each chapter leaves readers in ambiguity regarding the direction of the discussion. Despite the author's attempts to provide occasional "where are we" metadiscourses to summarize and direct the conversation, subsequent discussions continue in a similarly unclear arc. References to other thinkers appear excessively and disjointedly. It is unclear to a reader what are the cited people, why they are brought into the conversation, and whether the author agrees with them. Furthermore, the audiobook's citation readings, including author names, publication years, and sometimes page numbers, prove distracting without immediate access to a bibliography. These factors hinder the overall reading experience.

Despite its limitations, "Elbow Room" presents an enticing philosophical exploration of free will and consciousness within the framework of subjective reflections. The scope of the book is limited. It does not discuss the logic behind these discussions (can we think about free will, or anything, if there is no free will?), the objective experiences (if the assumption of free will works well in society organization, should we continue to believe in free will?), and scientific methodology (is there an experiment that can determine the existence of free will? Or is such an experiment impossible in principle?). Nonetheless, I recommend that readers start with the final two chapters to grasp Dennett's fundamental stance before delving into the preceding chapters' arguments.

[Deep Sarkar · Rating 5 out of 5]

Do we have Free Will? The question is as old as philosophy itself. Western philosophers throughout history have had some conception of Free Will and 'Freedom.' However, this seemingly innocuous question becomes notoriously difficult to answer when one ponders the notions of Free Will and Freedom, not least because our physical universe appears to be governed by deterministic laws that, apparently, leave no room for free action. But is this really the case? Must we necessarily sacrifice our freedom in a causally determined universe? or insist that the universe is, in fact, not deterministic to salvage free will?

Perhaps neither of these drastic moves is necessary. Perhaps the choice between determinism and free will is simply a false dichotomy because determinism need not undermine free will and free will need not defy determinism after all. Counterintuitive though this idea may be, it has found acceptance among most modern-day philosophers, with Daniel Dennett being one of its major proponents.

Dennett, in his book "Elbow Room", anticipates all the difficulties that may arise in making sense of the 'compatibilist' view of free will and sets out to establish the validity of this position by ruling out these difficulties one by one. Drawing on his unique insights on a vast array of disciplines ranging from neuroscience to cybernetics and automata theory, Dennett goes on to show how, even in a determined universe, one can imagine a rational (free) agent who can view its future as open to possibilities even as it accepts that it could not have done otherwise. That rationality and causality need not be at odds with one another, that determinism need not erode an agent's self-control, and that ignoring minute details and forgoing deliberation can sometimes be the most rational approach to take.

Unlike what some may fear, "Elbow Room" is not an exercise in abstruse philosophical reasoning as a desperate attempt to salvage free will, as some skeptics and hard determinists are likely to feel. It is, in fact, one of the most lucid books in philosophy I have read so far, and one which I would recommend to anyone who's become convinced of the illusory nature of Free Will after reading Sam Harris. In fact, it's best if one reads Harris before Dennett because it's very likely that Harris' "Free Will" will appear far less impressive once one has had the taste of the careful considerations Dennett makes in establishing his case.

Will reading "Elbow Room" make one an ardent believer of Free Will? Dennett does not rule out the possibility that Free Will may be an illusion after all (a message that appears subliminally in the phrase "Free Will Worth Wanting") but insists that it might still be worth wanting if it were the best we could hope for.

[Jill · Rating 3 out of 5]

It was really hard to rate this book. I have no use for most philosophy. I appreciate the premise but cannot abide so many self-important godless people hypothesizing themselves into oblivion. If that isn't enough, the rest of us are invited along with them. The book is really well written (other than some incorrectly conjugated verbs, but I'll blame the editor), and it is comprehensive in that it considers - or at least mentions - opposing points of view. The arguments are very thorough, if equally useless. The really compelling part to me was the clergy experiment mentioned in the epilogue. Wow! THAT was fascinating! The group is a bunch of anonymous clergy who struggle with their conscience about the vast dichotomy between their actual beliefs and what their liturgy says. This was really gripping information (though hardly astonishing), and I took time to reflect once again on the incredible conflict of interest that exists any time someone is "paid to preach the gospel". If that is your career, then it obviously behooves you to tell people what they want to hear, lest they quit your church and take financial support elsewhere. It is really sad to me that these people are living such a self-troubling double-standard, and see no way out. They report to a body who prescribes what is to be preached, and perhaps they believe the congregations are not ready for the truth or perhaps not be so amenable to a call to repentance. The only other interesting thing to me in the book was the debate of free will - whether or not it exists. Mostly this is a book full of philosophies of men. So interesting that people make a career out of studying such mind-numbing and useless conundrums. They're useful as an intellectual exercise, but I can't imagine spending a lifetime investing in or actually subscribing to such godless drivel.

[Asad Zaman · Rating 1 out of 5]

The book came highly recommended, so I was deeply disappointed. The non-problem that Dennett wants to solve comes from 19th Century physics, which led to the belief that the world is deterministic. How can we reconcile this with our experienced perception of free will? While the whole book is meant to provide an answer to this question, I could not find them. To the best of my knowledge, after reading this book, I believe that Dennett has no answers.
First, note that 20th Century physics, based on quantum theory, is not deterministic. Even Newtonian mechanics leads to chaos theory, which allows the minutest perturbations to lead to greatest of changes - this creates elbow room for free will if you look at the equations carefully. But never mind. Let us give it all up: assume, contrary to fact, that the best theories of physics show us a deterministic world today. What makes you think that the laws of physics are etched in stone until eternity? Just a little while ago, there was excitement over a fundamental discovery of new particles, new principles of physics. The search for a unified theory is still on. As Karl Popper noted, and no one has refuted, law of science can never be proven, they can only be disproven. Why should we believe in a deterministic universe?
NEXT, consider what this determinism has to trump. Every moment of my life, I am making decisions, big and small. Whether I should go out for dinner, or just order in? We all feel, intuitively, that the decisions we make matter, and determine our future. Dennet wants us to believe that ALL of mankind is deluded, and only he, and a handful of philosophers, have exclusive grasp of a terrible truth - we are, none of us, free to choose. He is free to believe that, but you and I are also free not to.

[Nicolas · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a journey :) I read this to get a better understanding of what compatibilism is all about and this book more than delivered. While I can't say that I was able to fully follow all of his arguments or that I am now fully convinced, I have to say that Dennett brings some very interesting perspectives to the table as to why we actually have free will in a deterministic universe (at least the kind of free will that one might want). It must also be said that he can be quite funny at times, "dropping some lines" that I would not have expected in a philosophy book on such a difficult subject.

Dennett starts by looking at typical ways in which a lack of free will is often introduced, and shows that these thought experiments (whether on purpose or without thinking about it) play on some innate fears that one might have about such a scenario. He shows that these fears are unfounded, which sets the scene for a more neutral discussion of what we might mean when we say "I have free will", focusing on different areas such as "What would be control over my decisions", "Who is this me that wants free will", etc.?

I can't really give a good overview of all the points made as I still need to read more to get the full picture, but just for the idea of "transivity of control" and the basic idea of "when you wake up in the morning you either get up or you don't - you have to choose" this was a wonderful read.

When I have seen more perspectives I will definitely revisit this for further understanding. I honestly regret buying this for the Kindle... This deserves a place on my physical bookshelf. But perhaps I was doomed to make that mistake < /pun>

[Richard Thompson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Danel Dennett is so smart. I love reading his books. 90% of the time I find him persuasive, even when is going out on a limb, and the other 10% of the time when I don't buy his arguments, he gets me thinking even more than when I agree with him. I want to read more of his books, but even though he writes very clearly, his ideas are challenging enough that I couldn't read him all the time. I have to put him aside for a rest before coming back to him for another helping.

In this book about free will, the basic bottom line conclusion is compatibilism - it isn't one or the other, the answer is both that we have free will and that we don't. The world is probably deterministic, but we still have a sort of free will. He exposes the flaws in many of the arguments pro and con on the free will issue. He examines what it means to have free will and concludes that many of the attempts to define free will have been misconceived. And then the real kicker, which I think is his most telling point, is that even if we don't have free will, it serves our purposes both as individuals and on the societal level to act as if we do. Furthermore, it seems best to continue to think that we have free will under a sort of Pascal’s Wager argument - if we believe that we have free will but are wrong we lose nothing, whereas if we reject free will and are wrong, we lose the ability to affect our own destinies.

[Caroline · Rating 3 out of 5]

Reading this, I was struck by how similar Dennett’s so-called compatiblist position is to the so-called incompatibilist positions of Sam Harris and Galen Strawson (the other authors I’ve read on free will recently). The best I can tell, though they put it differently, they all agree that it doesn’t make sense to punish people who have done wrong merely for the sake of punishing them, but it does often make sense to punish people for the sake of deterring them or similar people from continuing to do wrong. The main disagreement seems to be whether the decision making capability humans inarguably do have should be called free will or not!

I found the style of the book somewhat annoying. Dennett spends a lot of time attacking what he calls “bugbears” - analogies for lack of free will that are designed to present it as concerning. These analogies include things like being a puppet controlled by a puppeteer, or being locked in a room while incorrectly thinking you are free to leave at any time. In each case, he points out dissimilarities between the analogy and our actual situation and argues that the dissimilarities, and not the similarities, are what cause us concerns in the case of the bugbears. I did find it helpful to think through these analogies and how they are similar to and different from reality. The overall tone, though, seemed condescending and a bit strawman-ish.

[Luke · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dennett like Hofstadter, is a popular thinker but not appreciated enough as an actual philosopher. If you compare him with Dawkins and Hitchens he comes off as this fringe scientist or something. Dennet is just as knowledgeable as Dawkins and Hitchens scientifically, if not more so. And on the same level if not above Harris philosophically. Just because Dennett doesn’t attack Christianity in the face all the time doesn’t mean he doesn’t understand religion in context. His discretion comes from his open mindedness. He’s past the whole rebellious phase of hating on the exploitation of religion. And thank goodness for that. We need better emotional leadership than that. Which is why this book is not a five for me. It’s philosophically really well done but it lacks any kind of superfluous or artistic connection with the information. I’m interested in the way he experiences free will day to day. I need to know more how he might feel about the information age of social media algorithms and data points. What kind of free will is meaningfully left. The question is practical and philosophical. Like a modern form of Kant. Even Deleuze struggles to answer this directly enough. We need an American philosopher to really take a stand on this stuff.