Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army

by Donald W. Engels

"The most important work on Alexander the Great to appear in a long time. Neither scholarship nor semi-fictional biography will ever be the same again. . . .Engels at last uses all the archaeological work done in Asia in the past generation and makes it accessible. . . . Careful analyses of terrain, climate, and supply requirements are throughout combined in a masterly fashion to help account for Alexander's strategic decision in the light of the options open to him...The chief merit of this splendid book is perhaps the way in which it brings an ancient army to life, as it really was and the hours it took for simple operations of washing and cooking and feeding animals; the train of noncombatants moving with the army. . . . this is a book that will set the reader thinking. There are not many books on Alexander the Great that do."― New York Review of Books

Genres: History, Ancient History, Nonfiction, War, Military History, Military Fiction, Greece

208 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1978

Reviews

[Gmc · Rating 4 out of 5]

Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army by Donald W. Engels

This is a great book, full of facts, dates, maps, tables and a extensive bibliography. Engels does a wonderful job explaining what it took to move the Macedonian army from point "A" to point "B". I found one of Alexanders rules interesting NO carts, No Oxen. Oxen move slower than Horses mules and camels so they had no place in his army except maybe on the menu. Baggage also slow down the army, so no carts, if you couldn't carry it you didn't need it.

There is one point I will disagree with him on, one of the campaigns was recorded as having cover a great deal of ground in a very short time he said that it was impossible. I know that it is possible. Today endurance riders do 100 miles in 24 hours, and some of them finish the ride in 10 hours. These rides are done in mountains and very rough terrain. Wild horses have been documented to travel 30-40 miles in a day.

[R. · Rating 2 out of 5]

I should preface this by saying that I am a logistics officer in the United States Army. This is . . . not entertaining. This is a good study on the art of ancient logistics and supplying an army in the field and on the march but a absolutely terrible book. This should probably be categorized as a reference book, not a normal one. This is the kind of book that you'd be required to buy at a military logistics course or in a college course and then the professor would only require you to read a ten page chapter. Why can't we do half stars again in ratings? This is really a 1.5 star book.

[Hugo Ahlberg · Rating 4 out of 5]

Super nerdy but oh so fascinating. Kinda bland, and not much storytelling as seen in contemporary nonfiction books, but rather just facts and analysis. Moving a massive army of 120 000 through entire countries, through dessert, winterland, on foot.. having to plan for climate, water, animals and of course food! It's insane.
https://readwise.io/bookreview/3158938

[Eloy van Loon · Rating 5 out of 5]

Een ontzettend leuk nicheboekje dat een diepgaande analyse biedt van hoe de slimme, gedisciplineerde Macedoniërs onder leiding van Alexander de Grote het Achaemenidische Rijk veroverden door zorgvuldige logistieke voorbereiding.

zou eerst meer lezen over Alexander de grote en zijn verovering in het algemeen voordat je hier aan begint

[Christan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not nearly as dry as you might assume from the title. Quite informative.

[Kobi Lee · Rating 4 out of 5]

As someone with a background as an outdoor guide and thus familiarity with planning the logisitics for expeditions, I found this really interesting. I am fascinated by ambitious expeditions like this or Ernest Shackelton's antarctic expedition and the massive logistical effort required to pull off extraordinary feats.

[Kayla]

Read for my Military History of the Western World class!

[Maria · Rating 5 out of 5]

Recommended by a friend on Twitter as a highly detailed study of history, military strategy, and logistics. It became one of my all-time favorite esoteric history books.

It’s also lyrical and dramatic. Fascinating quote from the first page of Chapter 1:

“Traveling with the Macedonians were bodyguards, older Macedonians exempt from combat duty, hostages, servants, seers, physicians, sophists, poets, a historian, a tutor, secretaries, surveyors, the transport guard, and Babylonian soothsayers, Phoenician traders, courtesans, a harpist, a siege train, engineers, and as the expedition advanced further into Asia, women and children.”

We learn the names of some of the seers (Aristander, Demophon, Cleomantis), physicians (Philip, Critobulus), sophists (Anaxarchis), poets (Agis, Choerilus, Cleo), the tutor (Lysimachus), and the harpist (Aristonicus) thanks to detailed sources. (So many footnotes! Everything is carefully documented.)

From there the author provides pages and pages of data: numbers of pack animals, descriptions of tortuous mountain passes, estimate weights of water rations, inventory lists of Macedonian soldier standard equipment, weather patterns, and so much more.

One of the most insightful observations is the burn rate of pack animal food, such that an animal carrying food to distant armies would eat all the food it is carrying after a certain distance. Thereby negating its role as an ancient Uber vehicle delivering food to far-off horses needing fodder.

The burn rate is high! The daily army grain requirement (men, cavalry, pack animals) was 269,000 lbs! Carry capacity was 250 lb. per pack animals.

So pack animals needed to carry:

2-day supply → 2,340 lbs
15-day → 40,350 lbs
20-day → 107,600 lbs

“A day's supply of grain for 40,350 horses would weigh over 200 tons…there would be little possibility of it reaching the animals overland since it would have to be carried by other pack animals who would be consuming the supplies they were carrying.”

What a wonderful book. We learn: not all scaling is useful.

Fantastic statistics abound! One of the best images conjured up by the well-numerate author. For Alexander’s army to have a 20-day supply train:

“…if there were 107,600 animals and they traveled in single file, their line would extend for 306 miles. Even if the animals traveled 10 abreast, the line would extend 31 miles…”

In desert conditions, even with half-rations, the upper boundary is 4.5 days—with decreasing returns after day one due to pack animals consuming the very supplies they carry.

This book was splendid. If you are the type of person that enjoys puzzles, Excel spreadsheets, cocktail napkin math, clay tablets, military strategy, business strategy and logistics. moments of tense drama where the fate of an empire hangs on one decision, and long lists of tactile objects used to conquer 2 million square miles of the world in less than 13 years—I highly recommend this as a worthwhile intellectual dessert. There is no reason to read about camels, astrologers, generals, deserts, and stories from 2300 years ago. It’s purely delight and satisfaction. (I did learn quite a few lessons applicable to business, planning, and modern life though.)

“Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army” is a stellar work of science and reason. How did an army of over 65,000 people and 10,000 animals cross mountains, rivers, and deserts and defeat great ancient empires including the Achaemenid (Persian) Empire, the Greek city-states, Anatolia, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Bactria and beyond? The author makes it clear. This 20-year old young man (who lost his father to assassination) was a supply-chain genius. He was not a god, as some soldiers and conquered peoples believed. He was tutored by Aristotle. Alexander is now seen as one of the greatest military commanders of all time. Underneath the real military prowess was good logistics planning. Strategic resource planning allowed Alexander to move quickly and take things.

This book clearly shows how great leaders operate with forethought and courage. This is one of the most narrow and nerdy books I’ve read recently.

“The line between disorder and order lies in logistics…” – Sun Tzu, The Art of War

[Lloyd Downey · Rating 5 out of 5]

I was going to write this review and send a copy to my good friend Dick who seems to have similar interests in books to me. Then I thought that I might as well address it to him. So Dick this is for you almost as much is it is for me. You will remember that I recommended a couple of books by Peter Green about the Battle of Salamis and Alexander of Macedon. You will note that he doesn't call him Alexander the "Great".......because he certainly had some flaws as a human being. Anyway, you said the you had enjoyed both books and recently I came across the current book which covers much the same ground as Alexander of Macedon....well at least his invasion of the Persian and Egyptian empires. So I was intrigued to find that Engles had been encouraged/inspired to write the current book by Peter Green. Maybe it's a small world out there in Hellenic Studies.
But I have not been disappointed. In fact, I've been fascinated by the way the Engles has been able to go back to basic logistics: how much food and water does a marching soldier need? how much grain and fodder can a horse carry...including the food that it needs to sustain itself? how far could Alexander's army march in a day? How long would it take for the army to march through some of the narrow passes? and so on. Clearly these kind of calculations put boundaries around what was possible for Alexander and his army and, in some cases, it redefines the route or the timeline of his conquests.
One thing that I had not adequately appreciated was that if they were marching through desert conditions where they had to depend entirely on food and water that could be carried with them then they could sustain a three day expedition. But for a four day expedition they would need 11,400 pack animals ....and this still might be possible but a fifth day would be impossible ...even at half rations. This is a fundamental part of Engels reasoning about various routes taken by Alexander's army and the timing of marches etc. All sounds pretty reasonable to me......except for one thing.
Engles assumes that the pack horses and cavalry would have to carry their own grain rations and fodder in these desert conditions but I wonder if he has underestimated the ability of horses, mules, camels etc., to feed themselves off the land. I'm familiar with parts of the dry Australian interior which qualifies as desert on most criteria. Yet in most of these desert areas there is still patchy vegetation which can sustain livestock....albeit at a very low stocking rate. But if the cavalry and pack animals spread themselves over a broad front of, say, 500 metres (which would be probable for most of the army's advances as they were not fighting most of the time) then a typical day's march of, say 15 miles (24 km) per day would mean that the livestock would have access to whatever vegetation was in a swarth of 24,000 x 500 square m or 1200 ha.
And 1200 ha of arid land might easily have 80kg of dry matter per ha or around 96,000 kg of dry matter vegetation which horses etc., could graze on as they ambled along (because 15 km per day for a horse is not a fast pace......they can eat as they go). Engle's figures in his Appendix 5 indicate that the army's forage requirements for a day would be about 74,000kg but if much of this could be supplied by grazing on the march then this would significantly alter Engle's figures and extend the capacity of the Army. Now, in certain areas .....for example desert sand dunes there may be no vegetation (though that is not always true) and not all the dry vegetation may be edible but it is a great error to assume that simply because the vegetation is dry and brown that it does not supply nutrition. And in most of the situations that the army was marching they were not waterless deserts and the grazing might be significantly better.....replacing much of the grain requirements that Engle's estimates. So I think that this is a serious under-estimate by Engle's of the army's capacity to advance. But generally, it will not make a huge difference to capabilities or to the routes selected etc.
Something else which Engles draws attention to is the fact that Alexander's army was not accompanied by a huge baggage train with carts and camp followers (at least in the early stages to Persepolis).. They had nil or very few wheeled vehicles; the soldiers themselves had to carry large loads, and pack horses etc., made up the baggage train. But this gave them tremendous mobility and was the secret behind Alexander's ability to move so fast and out manoeuvre his opponents.
Quite a bit of Engle's time is devoted to analysing Alexander's rapid advances ....places such as Sogdiana from Oxus to Nautaka where they appeared to have covered 34.5 miles (55.5km) per day. He, quite reasonably, points out that such rapid advances were not made by the whole army but by smaller units and often by cavalry. And sometimes, the ancient authors had simply made errors about departure times or the route taken.
I found myself quite fascinated by his analysis of the length of time it would take the army to march through a mountain pass such as the Khawak pass in the Hindu Kush. He points out that, like water in a funnel, it is the narrowest part that determines the rate of passage and shows the narrowest part here would allow no more than two soldiers and a pack animal to walk abreast at the same time. As it took 16 days for the army to traverse the pass, Engle's estimates that they had to be walking at least two abreast to permit about 100,000 troops and followers plus cavalry to make the crossing in 16 days. (And no-one would leave the base after the 13th day...because of the length of the column). He also notes (p154 that for an army of 65,000 personnel and 6,000 cavalry, marching ten abreast, their column would extend for some 16.65 miles ....so when the soldiers at the head of the column were filing into camp at the end of a day's march, those at the rear would not arrive for over 5 hours. The army must also make one day's halt every 7 days to give the pack animals respite.
Engles is clearly an admirer of Alexander's mastery of logistics. He, or his logistic experts, clearly calculated what was necessary for the army to be able to advance and set up advance stores in some places and were replenished by ship in many circumstances....especially in Palestine. Engle's take on the logistical disaster of the Gedrosian desert is interesting. It appears that Alexander lost about 75% of the army and followers (though it is suggested that the losses we're probably mainly with the camp followers). The big issue was an intelligence failure and a misunderstanding about when the fleet would be able to stock those marching inland. But it certainly takes some of the shine off Alexander as a logistical genius.
I must confess, that I loved this book. the combination of rigorous analytical work with marginally reliable ancient texts and modern maps brought to life the previous works that I've read...including that by Peter Green. Why do I keep reading this ancient history? Well it seems to me that Alexander's rapid advance, his Macedonian Phalanx and his exceptional skills as a general, and his political skills in establishing cities and satrapies enabled him to "Hellenise" a huge slice of the world that lasted, at least for 300 years and arguably more. In other words, it was a significant event in world history and worth studying for that reason alone.
But in the process, I've learned a lot of new things about logistics and the movement of armies across terrain. Happy to give this book five stars.

[Owen · Rating 4 out of 5]

A bit dry and academic, but really interesting, if only for the very specific population that I work in. Unless you have a fondness for calculating the feed and lift ratio of mule trains, then it's scintillating. Semper Logistics.

[Elin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Incredibly useful information on speeds of march and how long it takes to move various types of pack animal, also how much forage they would need. Plus a good overview of the Afghanistan campaign.

[elche_dimmi · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book took me way too long to finish.
Not because it was hard to read. It was simply just because I was lazy.
Anyway, this book fascinated me. It took some serious thinking on the part of the author and other scholars to come up with the information this book provided. There was a common theme throughout that I noticed. Alexander constantly had people keeping their eyes and ears open for his next venture. He would send out scouts ahead of the army to determine what the topography of the land looked like. This also included the weather that may come during a certain season and what sort of villages (big or small) would be living in those regions. This (and more information, obviously) helped determine whether Alexander and his army could move and where.
Though the book is small (total of 194 pages), it is PACKED with detail and information. I will say, there were points that the information seemed a bit repetitive, but, I think it may have been necessary. Every time Alexander moved, he had to improvise. Not one region he passed through would repeat similar circumstances.
One of the lines that stood out to me the most in the book can be found in the conclusion chapter:
"Yet Alexander was able to overcome these obstacles where other armies had failed because of his superior abilities in gathering intelligence, planning, preparation, and organization."
I think Alexander was an obsessive type. He obsessed over the heroes in the Iliad (Achilles being his favorite) and wanted to be the best soldier. He pushed himself and his army hard and achieved a great prestige.
If you want to know more detail about Alexander's exploits, this book can provide you with a little insight into what may have happened during this era.
Great book.

[Steven Keays · Rating 4 out of 5]

A wonderful discovery. I have long wondered why Alexander and his Macedonian army spent ten years conquering Egypt, Lebannon, and Persia. The explanation lies in this book. The genius of Alexander as military commander lies in his mastery of logistics, more than warfare. How? The seven-month siege of Tyre in 332 BC exemplifies it. Over those seven months, the author estimates that the army would have needed 28 000 tons of grain to feed men and animals, amidst a region that could annually produce at most 2000. That grain had to be imported from Anti-Lebanon (sic), Syria, Palestine and beyond by both sea and land. Land implies significant additional quantities to sustain the horses and men transporting this grain. And transporters were maxed out at around 14 days of grain provisions and 3 days for water. In other words, even scavenging from cities and villages could not be improvised. Imagine now crossing deserts and highland plateaus where grazing isn't possible. That's where the genius of Alexander comes into play: he was a monster of planning, a machine in intelligence gathering, and a mound of patience. Alexander took ten years because, when you have to walk an army across hundreds upon hundreds of kilometer every week, you can only do so when the region you are crossing has completed its annual grain harvest.
The book was a revelation in its analysis, quantification, and induction reasoning behind the author's explanations of when Alexander moved, when he stayed put, which paths he chose and which he did not, and how everything was made possible because the entire odyssey was planned, year after year, with year-long planning to overcome the logistics of the journey

[Christine · Rating 4 out of 5]

Megan Whalen Turner mentioned that it wasn't too hard a read on her Tumbler feed. I was curious, and it was in the library.

I noticed that it was written before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and (I think?) the Iranian Revolution, so some sources and sites may have been more accessible then than they are now to American Scholars.

It felt more like reading science fiction than another genre - because I know nothing of horses, and the only logistics I've practiced are getting 5 people out the door on time for church with breakfast in their bellies.

But yes, it was interesting, and not too hard to read, though it was the first time I've come across the word "panoply" besides in the hymn Soldiers of Christ Arise.

[Jonathan F · Rating 5 out of 5]

The breadth of the research is overwhelming and fascinating.

As an amateur in the subject matter, I'm not equipped to speak of the merits to the arguments of the book. I will say that the amount of evidence and support that the author brings to build his case is colossal.

Although the subject is logistics, an amateur like me would find this a highly enjoyable read.

[David Wogahn · Rating 5 out of 5]

If Putin or one of his generals had read this book I think they would have learned about the importance of the boring topic of logistics. Alexander invaded other countries without all the benefit of things like computers and modern transportation.

I read this book about three years ago and it's still on my mind. Highly recommended.

[Luke Gong · Rating 5 out of 5]

Incredible work. The logistic problems in antiquity period are often neglected. But, this book provides the extremely thorough analysis of the campaign of Alexander the Great. It is actually pretty fun to read, provides a totally unique perspective on history.

[Ivan Savić · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great insight of the problematics of the logistics of Alexander's army. But it is more focused on reconstructing where the army traveled then on the small logistic details. But as the author said there are not much historical data about it.

[Steven Leonard · Rating 5 out of 5]

There is no better study of detailed logistics planning and execution in ancient warfare. Logistics is often lost in the sauce of the exploits of the great battle captains, but Engels teases out a level of detail you won't find in any other historic study of the period.

[Sarah · Rating 3 out of 5]

Incredibly interesting and detailed, if you need to have info about moving a large army on foot through areas where supplies are going to be scarce.

[Scott Mccoy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Absolutely essential, a must-read.

[Sierra Allred · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is very thorough!

[Graham Hill · Rating 2 out of 5]

Very dull.

[nikki · Rating 3 out of 5]

So much learning from this book that can be applied to daily life—when carrying out a 30 day campaign ensure that the route is around captured coastal areas that can be reached by naval fleets, to carry grain and water that cannot be brought by pack animals and foot soldiers

[Nathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Because information on the routes of Alexander and his Army are limited, the maps are small in size and include illustrations based on the information from primary sources. The maps also have the directions of Alexander’s army along with a scale to better illustrate the challenges of the conquests. Engles details the movement, strategy and tactics that Alexander employed throughout his expedition. The appendices include data tables estimating the amount of soldiers and animals in the army, and the amount of food needed for each march. In another data table, Engels estimates the amount of miles traveled per day during each expedition.
Engels details the logistics of Alexander's army as they traversed areas in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and Africa. Engels goes in depth about the tactics that Alexander used in order to provide his army enough food and water throughout their voyages, and attempts to figure out how Alexander acquired his provisions throughout the lengthy distances he lead his army. Because Engles does not have enough definite details to help answer these questions, he uses mathematical formulas based on common knowledge regarding the necessary amount of food and water for traveling soldiers and livestock going a particular distance. While keeping this in mind, Engles determines that it is impossible for a size of Alexander’s army to use more than four days worth of food and water. Engels describes how Alexander overcame the challenges of acquiring goods for his army in order to survive and conquer with the help of sources left by ancient travelers, historians, and common knowledge.
The book is written with an analytical approach based on limited amount of information available.

The book has a historical basis about the many frontiers of Alexander and documents his clashes with Darius and the Persian army. Engels does not attempt to make a strong argument for his case, instead, he mentions early on in the introduction that his work was written hypothetically without much first hand knowledge of the topic.

Primarily, this book was written for anyone who studies Alexander the Great and the Macedonian conquests or for anyone who is curious about the topic of logistics. Engels has clearly stated his point and made a strong case for his argument within the early pages of the book, and it tends to get a bit repetitive in the following chapters. Regardless, it is a fascinating study about the brilliant organizational skills of Alexander.

For anyone interested in war strategy and ancient Macedonian history this book is a must read.

[Nic · Rating 4 out of 5]

(The maps are actually in the back, but I'm still giving it my map-in-the-front tag. It has maps, is what I'm saying.)

I found this book fascinating. I had never thought much about how much a military campaign - especially an ancient military campaign - would depend on its ability to supply its troops with food and water while passing through often-hostile territory. I enjoyed reading about Alexander's strategies for ensuring that his army had food and water.

I also liked getting a sense of how much space a large army actually takes up. For instance, the author at one point determines that, with about 65,000 combatants (a number that varied widely through his campaign), if Alexander had the infantry march in rows that were 10 men wide and the cavalry in rows that were 5 horses wide, the line would be about 16.5 miles long. When the leaders reached camp, the people in back would still be walking for another 5 hours before they reached it. (The author provides the rest of the details of the math, e.g. how many infantry vs. cavalry Alexander had, in the book.)

Anyway, I just thought it was all pretty neat. :)

[Ethelinda Webb · Rating 4 out of 5]

I got this book because I saw it recommended somewhere as a potential good resource for writers, and I think the recommendation was a good one! I don't know a whole lot about Alexander's campaigns, but I still found the book interesting, and it definitely had a lot of very useful information about the type and amount of supplies one needs to move men and pack animals over large distances.

The author makes the point that Alexander and his generals were very conscious of these issues, and that all of their movements to build his empire were driven by the need to make sure they had adequate supplies of food and water available at all times; this thesis seems well supported by the historical evidence available. Engels also, very usefully, abstracts away from the specifics of Alexander's situation to provide some general numbers and calculations about the amount of supplies needed to move given numbers of men and animals over what time frames and distances, which is very helpful for a writer. It is information that could easily be applied to any large group on the move, not just a military force.

[Nils · Rating 5 out of 5]

Amazing reconstruction of how logistics drove the military strategy of Alexander the Great. The central challenge was how to provision the “city on the March” which was the Macedonian army of 60k men. Critical to the endeavor was to raise the tooth-to-tail ration by getting rid of as many animals and servants as possible, thus not only increasing the steppes at which the army moved by even more crucially reducing supply needs of both grain and water. Continuous logistical support by sea emerges as critical to the Macedonian army’s advances. So too was negotiating surrender of opponents before even arising. One also realizes that Alexander must have produced famines wherever his ravenous army arrived, though Engels does not dwell on this point.

[George Kasnic · Rating 5 out of 5]

Should be mandatory reading for all logistics officers. As a former US Army logistics officer, this book helped me immensely in doing my job and analyzing and choosing courses of action.

Read this in college and used the data therein the attempt to calculate which pass Hannibal used to enter Italy in the 2nd Punic War. Three credit college independent study project as a senior, finishing out my minor in History. Really solid information on what it took to supply ancient armies and what logistical constraints they labored under. By the way, I think it was Mont Cenis pass.

[Thomas Harlan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good detail of the logistical issues faced by Alexander; reasonable explanations of what must have been done at each stage of the campaigns to overcome them; useful information on rates of march, and ability of the Macedonian army to carry/transport supplies. Interestingly, the rates of march of the phalanges equal or exceed those of WW1 and WW2 armies also relying on foot/horse/wagon technologies to move them in battle.