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Surprise, Security, and the American Experience
September 11, 2001, distinguished Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis argues, was not the first time a surprise attack shattered American assumptions about national security and reshaped American grand strategy. We've been there before, and have responded each time by dramatically expanding our security responsibilities. The pattern began in 1814, when the British attacked Washington, burning the White House and the Capitol. This early violation of homeland security gave rise to a strategy of unilateralism and preemption, best articulated by John Quincy Adams, aimed at maintaining strength beyond challenge throughout the North American continent. It remained in place for over a century. Only when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 did the inadequacies of this strategy become as a consequence, the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt devised a new grand strategy of cooperation with allies on an intercontinental scale to defeat authoritarianism. That strategy defined the American approach throughout World War II and the Cold War. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, Gaddis writes, made it clear that this strategy was now insufficient to ensure American security. The Bush administration has, therefore, devised a new grand strategy whose foundations lie in the nineteenth-century tradition of unilateralism, preemption, and hegemony, projected this time on a global scale. How successful it will be in the face of twenty-first-century challenges is the question that confronts us. This provocative book, informed by the experiences of the past but focused on the present and the future, is one of the first attempts by a major scholar of grand strategy and international relations to provide an answer.
150 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2004
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Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
June 27, 2025
I read Surprise, Security, and the American Experience in the summer of 2001, just before my graduation finals at Asutosh College. The library smelled of old pages and monsoon mildew, and I still remember squeezing in this slim, potent book between rehearsals for our viva and hurried bites of egg rolls from the canteen downstairs. At that time, the world hadn’t yet seen 9/11, but the tremors of American global anxieties had already begun pulsing beneath the surface.
John Lewis Gaddis, with the clarity of a seasoned historian and the insight of a geopolitical oracle, rewinds to the War of 1812, Lincoln’s Civil War strategy, and FDR’s Grand Strategy during World War II—all to show how surprise has historically shocked the U.S. into a paradoxical search for both security and hegemony. It was bracing to see how Gaddis built an argument around unilateralism, preemption, and moral clarity, as both historical themes and policy strategies, long before the Bush Doctrine made them kitchen-table topics.
One line stayed with me, like a whisper echoing through exam stress and tea breaks:
"Surprise produces not just fear, but clarity."
Reading that as a student in a newly liberalized India, I couldn’t help but wonder—what surprises shape our security dreams? Do we even recognize them until they’ve passed us by?
That summer, America’s strategic psyche, as described by Gaddis, made me reflect not just on war and peace, but on history’s strange loops. In a way, this book helped shape my understanding of international relations before I even knew I’d care so much about it later. And in hindsight, reading it in 2001—mere months before the biggest American surprise of all—was itself an eerie, unintentional foreshadowing.
John Lewis Gaddis, with the clarity of a seasoned historian and the insight of a geopolitical oracle, rewinds to the War of 1812, Lincoln’s Civil War strategy, and FDR’s Grand Strategy during World War II—all to show how surprise has historically shocked the U.S. into a paradoxical search for both security and hegemony. It was bracing to see how Gaddis built an argument around unilateralism, preemption, and moral clarity, as both historical themes and policy strategies, long before the Bush Doctrine made them kitchen-table topics.
One line stayed with me, like a whisper echoing through exam stress and tea breaks:
"Surprise produces not just fear, but clarity."
Reading that as a student in a newly liberalized India, I couldn’t help but wonder—what surprises shape our security dreams? Do we even recognize them until they’ve passed us by?
That summer, America’s strategic psyche, as described by Gaddis, made me reflect not just on war and peace, but on history’s strange loops. In a way, this book helped shape my understanding of international relations before I even knew I’d care so much about it later. And in hindsight, reading it in 2001—mere months before the biggest American surprise of all—was itself an eerie, unintentional foreshadowing.
May 3, 2016
This is the kind of book that every scholar should hope to write towards the end of their career. Gaddis puts the Bush Doctrine in the very, very big picture of US history in a provocative, fascinating, and concise set of essays. He starts with simple questions: How are we to understand 9/11 and the Bush Doctrine in a wider historical lens? Is it really that new?
Gaddis argues that the Bush Doctrine harkens back to many aspects of US foreign policy from the early republic, including hegemony (back then on the continent), unilateralism (think avoiding foreign alliances-Washington's farewell address), and pre-emption (treating potential threats as definite threats, striking first to avoid being struck). All of these were essential parts of American national security in the 19th century. We had the challenge of massive, fairly open borders and hostile European powers all around. Our solution was to defend by expanding, which Gaddis says is sort of an instinct of USFP (Wilsonianism is another version of this impulse). We pushed borders outwards, bought new territories, took others, and declared the hemisphere off limits. Gaddis notes that the Monroe Doctrine was originally proposed by the British, who were willing to police the hemisphere jointly. The U.S., fearing entanglements with European powers, said "What a great idea!" and declared the Monroe Doctrine unilaterally, knowing that the coincidence of British interest in policing the hemisphere anyway would serve American interests. This brief history of USFP in the 19th century shows that whatever we say about the Bush Doctrine, we shouldn't necessarily treat it as a radical break with American traditions, for better or worse. I 80 percent agree with this.
The U.S. essentially pursued this approach to national security, with a brief Wilsonian hiatus, until FDR and WWII. During and after WWII, however, FDR transformed US national security by tying it to formal international institutions that would align and shape the interests and norms of as many states as possible. He and subsequent presidents achieved security through expansion and, on the flip side, containing the USSR. The US remained enmeshed in this system of global responsibilities well into the present day. The Bush Doctrine is, in Gaddis' telling, more of a return to those 19th century principles applied globally. It looks radical because it is a departure from the FDR tradition, but this tradition may be better understood as the long exception in American history than the norm. This argument made a lot of sense in 2004, but I think the full on rejection of the Bush Doctrine since the catastrophe of Iraq has made the US under Obama turn back to the FDR tradition.
One thing I like about this book is that it gives the Bush Doctrine a fair evaluation and a fair critique rather than treating it as pure hubris (plenty of hubris was involved nonetheless) or a form of mad imperialism. The excellent critique is that American global power in the Cold War rested largely on consent and the fact that there was always something worse than the US. The something worse is largely gone, and the US under the Bush Doctrine has pursued national security in a way that disconcerts other nations. There appears to be no clear logical limit to US claims to interfere in other states' affairs, or overthrow their governments, in order to maintain their security. Their unilateralism has also been blundering, creating worse problems for opponents and proponents of the war. There has been a drastic failure to align ends and means. Gaddis brings this criticism across very well at the end of the book.
I recommend this book for anyone studying foreign affairs period. Really, given how short it its, it should be read by anyone studying US history at a high level. I'd even consider putting parts of it on a US history intro syllabus.
Gaddis argues that the Bush Doctrine harkens back to many aspects of US foreign policy from the early republic, including hegemony (back then on the continent), unilateralism (think avoiding foreign alliances-Washington's farewell address), and pre-emption (treating potential threats as definite threats, striking first to avoid being struck). All of these were essential parts of American national security in the 19th century. We had the challenge of massive, fairly open borders and hostile European powers all around. Our solution was to defend by expanding, which Gaddis says is sort of an instinct of USFP (Wilsonianism is another version of this impulse). We pushed borders outwards, bought new territories, took others, and declared the hemisphere off limits. Gaddis notes that the Monroe Doctrine was originally proposed by the British, who were willing to police the hemisphere jointly. The U.S., fearing entanglements with European powers, said "What a great idea!" and declared the Monroe Doctrine unilaterally, knowing that the coincidence of British interest in policing the hemisphere anyway would serve American interests. This brief history of USFP in the 19th century shows that whatever we say about the Bush Doctrine, we shouldn't necessarily treat it as a radical break with American traditions, for better or worse. I 80 percent agree with this.
The U.S. essentially pursued this approach to national security, with a brief Wilsonian hiatus, until FDR and WWII. During and after WWII, however, FDR transformed US national security by tying it to formal international institutions that would align and shape the interests and norms of as many states as possible. He and subsequent presidents achieved security through expansion and, on the flip side, containing the USSR. The US remained enmeshed in this system of global responsibilities well into the present day. The Bush Doctrine is, in Gaddis' telling, more of a return to those 19th century principles applied globally. It looks radical because it is a departure from the FDR tradition, but this tradition may be better understood as the long exception in American history than the norm. This argument made a lot of sense in 2004, but I think the full on rejection of the Bush Doctrine since the catastrophe of Iraq has made the US under Obama turn back to the FDR tradition.
One thing I like about this book is that it gives the Bush Doctrine a fair evaluation and a fair critique rather than treating it as pure hubris (plenty of hubris was involved nonetheless) or a form of mad imperialism. The excellent critique is that American global power in the Cold War rested largely on consent and the fact that there was always something worse than the US. The something worse is largely gone, and the US under the Bush Doctrine has pursued national security in a way that disconcerts other nations. There appears to be no clear logical limit to US claims to interfere in other states' affairs, or overthrow their governments, in order to maintain their security. Their unilateralism has also been blundering, creating worse problems for opponents and proponents of the war. There has been a drastic failure to align ends and means. Gaddis brings this criticism across very well at the end of the book.
I recommend this book for anyone studying foreign affairs period. Really, given how short it its, it should be read by anyone studying US history at a high level. I'd even consider putting parts of it on a US history intro syllabus.
July 5, 2016
This discussion about the history of American preemption and unilateralism is short and to the point. I respect Gaddis's ability to discuss these huge topics from their historical roots down to their application by the Bush Administration before the Iraq War.
While the book was written very soon after the War started, it still provides a good perspective, distant enough to look at things somewhat objectively but close enough to see how it continues to play out.
I recommend this book for the historical perspective alone. The United States was built on preemption and unilateralism, a fact we don't like to admit post WWII. However, while Gaddis makes this point, he does not use that as an excuse to continue in that heritage. There are good reasons we haven't lived that way since WWII. And he does not excuse the Bush Administration, even though he does explain some of the reasons why they felt they could do what they did.
While the book was written very soon after the War started, it still provides a good perspective, distant enough to look at things somewhat objectively but close enough to see how it continues to play out.
I recommend this book for the historical perspective alone. The United States was built on preemption and unilateralism, a fact we don't like to admit post WWII. However, while Gaddis makes this point, he does not use that as an excuse to continue in that heritage. There are good reasons we haven't lived that way since WWII. And he does not excuse the Bush Administration, even though he does explain some of the reasons why they felt they could do what they did.
March 2, 2018
Gaddis explains the national security philosophies of either isolation or engagement. He uses as the main examples and basis for his arguments the time periods around the British burning of the Capitol in 1814, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, post-WWII security concerns that led to the Cold War, and terrorist 9/11. The good thing is that the book is very short. The downside is that it's not very developed, interesting, or compelling. Seems like 118 pages is at least long enough to pack a punch... but no.
February 13, 2025
Fantastic discourse on 21st century foreign policy within the wider context of historic American events and prior foreign policy initiatives. Gaddis weaves hope into fact.
August 6, 2012
For a novice in the field of diplomacy, international relations, and grand strategy, this is a fascinating book. It reads like a lecture (a mercifully short 118 pages) but has a great premise. Organized around 3 surprise attacks on the US: the burning of the Capitol in 1814 by the British, Pearl Harbor, and 9/11, the author constructs a history of US diplomatic and military doctrine from the Monroe Doctrine to Wilson, FDR, Truman and the Bush Doctrine, and explains how the Bush Doctrine is quintessentially American harkening back to the Monroe Doctrine. However, the author also points out the weaknesses of the Bush Doctrine and the colossal diplomatic error of the 2nd Iraq War.
August 27, 2013
It's not badly written but the content is painful. Extremely nationalistic and prejudiced. The author tries to portray the white savior complex and the white superiority seen on Americans without becoming a part of it, but it doesn't work. There are lots of logical plot holes but that's history and we can't change it, nonetheless it is enraging.
May 30, 2008
The accuracy of history decreases the closer it is to the present, but the relevance increases. This book is intriguing simply for the historical context it supplies for current foreign policy making, neither justifying nor condemning.
May 28, 2025
This is a great book by a great mind. the book is about 150 pages and is really a series of lectures in book form that cover surprise and security in the American experience in the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries. I read this book when it first came out, I was still in my master's program. it's been on the bookshelf ever since as an indispensable resource.
There was a time in American history, when we relied on our allies to help keep us safe. The British Attack on Washington in 1814 demonstrated otherwise. The wars in Europe had spilled over to the American Continent. Pearl Harbor and 9/11 demonstrated that the American Fortress was not immune from hemispheric hegemony. New methods of projecting military power/strength across great distance meant that a hostile state or entity anywhere can and could endanger American security.
In 1814 and 1941, attacks cam from states in a familiar form of power. In 2001 military force was projected in an unexpected way. In 1814 and 1941 remedies fell within the traditional realm of diplomacy and warfare. In 2001, not so much.
Up until 2001 the United States could defeat, deter and dissuade an “identifiable” regime, led by identifiable leaders from an identifiable geographical space. 2001, changed that dynamic. Yes, there have always been anarchists, terrorists, and assassins operating as lone wolf’s,and in the past, single acts of terrorism rarely shook the stability of a State – until 2001 and after.
Up until 2001, the American record was mostly impressive – the Cold War, the transformation of Europe with the Marshall Plan. China was pulling off a capitalist transformation that Mao or Marx would never have imagined, and so it seemed that America was remaking the world and no one was resisting - we were at the end of history.
So what have we learned? The Global economy is still largely unregulated. Diplomacy is provisional. The prevailing view is still “Do not do anything, it will mean a general war if you do it.” The result [is] that a desire for peace led to war and with the political / military status quo strained everywhere, it [is still] hard to hold the line anywhere.
Germany recently sent 5000 soldiers to Lithuania for permanent station. According to George Friedman of Geopolitical Futures,
Germany’s decision to deploy a permanent force of 5,000 soldiers to Lithuania is extremely significant because it signals the next phase of a new geopolitical era. One of the most fundamental questions of this era is the extent to which the U.S. will limit its military and financial exposure to the global system. Toward that end, Washington has demanded that Europe assume primary responsibility for its own security and has made initial attempts to reshape the international economic order that had been in place since World War II to facilitate the change.
The German deployment is the first response. The size of the deployment is not designed to resist a full Russian attack, of course, but it is meant to trigger a massive response in Europe and instill a sense of caution in Russia. With Germany having thus created a concrete military commitment in Europe, the question now is whether the deployment is the first of many European actions or simply a solitary act
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/germa...
The US Reinforces Europe’s Northern Front
GOTLAND, Sweden—At the crack of dawn, a dozen U.S. Marines recently took position in a field on this sleepy Swedish island about 200 miles from the Russian city of Kaliningrad and fired their mobile rocket system.
The dummy munitions splashed into the Baltic Sea, yet they sent a message to Russia: Even as President Trump has thrown NATO into a historic crisis by questioning its efficacy, in Northern Europe, the U.S. military is doubling down.
https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/the-...
“Talk about the brotherhood of man [is] empty piety; morality [is] tossed when it clash’s with quests for security. In an anarchic world, states only survive by constant devotion to power politics. And what we have is a Failure of Deterrence, not de-escalation. If planners think there are difficulties blunting hegemonic gambits early [will] be severe, the price of rolling them back later could be staggering
There was a time in American history, when we relied on our allies to help keep us safe. The British Attack on Washington in 1814 demonstrated otherwise. The wars in Europe had spilled over to the American Continent. Pearl Harbor and 9/11 demonstrated that the American Fortress was not immune from hemispheric hegemony. New methods of projecting military power/strength across great distance meant that a hostile state or entity anywhere can and could endanger American security.
In 1814 and 1941, attacks cam from states in a familiar form of power. In 2001 military force was projected in an unexpected way. In 1814 and 1941 remedies fell within the traditional realm of diplomacy and warfare. In 2001, not so much.
Up until 2001 the United States could defeat, deter and dissuade an “identifiable” regime, led by identifiable leaders from an identifiable geographical space. 2001, changed that dynamic. Yes, there have always been anarchists, terrorists, and assassins operating as lone wolf’s,and in the past, single acts of terrorism rarely shook the stability of a State – until 2001 and after.
Up until 2001, the American record was mostly impressive – the Cold War, the transformation of Europe with the Marshall Plan. China was pulling off a capitalist transformation that Mao or Marx would never have imagined, and so it seemed that America was remaking the world and no one was resisting - we were at the end of history.
So what have we learned? The Global economy is still largely unregulated. Diplomacy is provisional. The prevailing view is still “Do not do anything, it will mean a general war if you do it.” The result [is] that a desire for peace led to war and with the political / military status quo strained everywhere, it [is still] hard to hold the line anywhere.
Germany recently sent 5000 soldiers to Lithuania for permanent station. According to George Friedman of Geopolitical Futures,
Germany’s decision to deploy a permanent force of 5,000 soldiers to Lithuania is extremely significant because it signals the next phase of a new geopolitical era. One of the most fundamental questions of this era is the extent to which the U.S. will limit its military and financial exposure to the global system. Toward that end, Washington has demanded that Europe assume primary responsibility for its own security and has made initial attempts to reshape the international economic order that had been in place since World War II to facilitate the change.
The German deployment is the first response. The size of the deployment is not designed to resist a full Russian attack, of course, but it is meant to trigger a massive response in Europe and instill a sense of caution in Russia. With Germany having thus created a concrete military commitment in Europe, the question now is whether the deployment is the first of many European actions or simply a solitary act
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/germa...
The US Reinforces Europe’s Northern Front
GOTLAND, Sweden—At the crack of dawn, a dozen U.S. Marines recently took position in a field on this sleepy Swedish island about 200 miles from the Russian city of Kaliningrad and fired their mobile rocket system.
The dummy munitions splashed into the Baltic Sea, yet they sent a message to Russia: Even as President Trump has thrown NATO into a historic crisis by questioning its efficacy, in Northern Europe, the U.S. military is doubling down.
https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/the-...
“Talk about the brotherhood of man [is] empty piety; morality [is] tossed when it clash’s with quests for security. In an anarchic world, states only survive by constant devotion to power politics. And what we have is a Failure of Deterrence, not de-escalation. If planners think there are difficulties blunting hegemonic gambits early [will] be severe, the price of rolling them back later could be staggering
November 23, 2020
This very brief book (118 pages of text with another 20 pages of notes) attempts to analyze the impact of three surprise attacks on broader U.S. foreign policy: (1) the burning of Washington, D.C. in August 1814 during the War of 1812, (2) the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, and (3) the 9/11 attacks. Gaddis repeatedly returns to three methods U.S. leaders have used (to varying degrees) to achieve security: preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony. He also focuses primarily on the policies of three key leaders in shaping U.S. foreign policy since 1814: John Quincy Adams (for the Nineteenth Century), Franklin D. Roosevelt (for the Twentieth Century), and George W. Bush (for the Twenty-First Century).
For me, the most interesting premise deals with FDR. Rather than focusing on the seemingly-improvisational nature of FDR's policies, Gaddis appears to be arguing that when it came to U.S. foreign policy, FDR's approach had an almost laser-like focus. FDR had a clear understanding of the limits of U.S. power, capabilities, and political will, and shaped U.S. foreign policy accordingly. According to Gaddis, FDR knew when and how to use preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony (and to what degree). I would like to see these theories developed in greater detail.
It may seem uncomfortable to declare that George W. Bush is the key figure in developing U.S. foreign policy in the 21st Century. But a friend pointed out to me that, like it or not, the Bush administration created the basic response to the 9/11 attacks and that basic response was followed by the Obama and Trump administrations. Gaddis wrote this book in 2004, when there was more optimism about successfully fighting the global war on terror. It would be interesting to read Gaddis' opinions about how that conflict has played out.
Gaddis has a long history of providing thought-provoking ideas regarding the evaluation of U.S. foreign policy, and this book is no exception. Unfortunately, however, the short length of the book prevents Gaddis from fully developing his ideas. I would love to see a revised edition of this book, with a more detailed analysis of the impact of 9/11. I think that separate books dealing with John Quincy Adams and FDR using the analytical premises Gaddis sets forth here would be interesting. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience is a bit like an appetizer. I'm now waiting for the main course.
For me, the most interesting premise deals with FDR. Rather than focusing on the seemingly-improvisational nature of FDR's policies, Gaddis appears to be arguing that when it came to U.S. foreign policy, FDR's approach had an almost laser-like focus. FDR had a clear understanding of the limits of U.S. power, capabilities, and political will, and shaped U.S. foreign policy accordingly. According to Gaddis, FDR knew when and how to use preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony (and to what degree). I would like to see these theories developed in greater detail.
It may seem uncomfortable to declare that George W. Bush is the key figure in developing U.S. foreign policy in the 21st Century. But a friend pointed out to me that, like it or not, the Bush administration created the basic response to the 9/11 attacks and that basic response was followed by the Obama and Trump administrations. Gaddis wrote this book in 2004, when there was more optimism about successfully fighting the global war on terror. It would be interesting to read Gaddis' opinions about how that conflict has played out.
Gaddis has a long history of providing thought-provoking ideas regarding the evaluation of U.S. foreign policy, and this book is no exception. Unfortunately, however, the short length of the book prevents Gaddis from fully developing his ideas. I would love to see a revised edition of this book, with a more detailed analysis of the impact of 9/11. I think that separate books dealing with John Quincy Adams and FDR using the analytical premises Gaddis sets forth here would be interesting. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience is a bit like an appetizer. I'm now waiting for the main course.
April 13, 2019
I keep trying to put {now} into a historical context. My idea is that things aren't any different {now} than they were in 1950, 1850 or 1750 because humans are humans and their behavior (which derives from their motivations) doesn't change much.
October 8, 2015
An interesting read and an argument I have not heard before. Essentially, Bush's National Security Strategy advancing the ideas of unilateralism and preemption have always been a part of U.S. strategic thought going back to the founding of our nation. Further, since the revolution, U.S. security interests are predicated on space and pushing our boundaries forward. It was not until WWII when the U.S. embraced a broad based coalition. The downside of the book is it was written in 2004, before the longer term consequences of policies in Iraq and Afghanistan have come to the fore.
September 20, 2009
This is a short but fascinating book on the history of US foreign policy. I'd recommend it to anyone interested in understanding the American psyche, FDR's response to WWII, or George W. Bush's response to 9-11. Gaddis is an excellent writer. My only criticism is that he is a historian, so he doesn't carry through all of his thoughts into policy implications. Also, a couple of his arguments are pretty weak.
February 2, 2008
This is an awesome, very easy to read, very well documented analysis of the current state of US foreign policy - and how we got where we are. Must read for anyone interested in politics.
January 5, 2010
start 27 Nov 09; from NSYSU library
complete: 5 Jan 10
complete: 5 Jan 10
December 8, 2011
I wrote a pretty bomb response paper on this baby. Also, an interesting read on attacks on American soil through the years.
February 22, 2016
Fascinating look at how American has increased her protections against foreign attacks not just after Sept. 11, 2001 but throughout her history. Quick read.
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