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Soviet Marxism
-- Douglas Kellner, University of Texas, Austin
271 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 1958
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About the author
Herbert Marcuse
233 books635 followersGerman-Jewish philosopher, political theorist and sociologist, and a member of the Frankfurt School. Celebrated as the "Father of the New Left", his best known works are Eros and Civilization, One-Dimensional Man and The Aesthetic Dimension. Marcuse was a major intellectual influence on the New Left and student movements of the 1960s.
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
October 20, 2014
Cursory summation of classical Marxism and the revisions of the Second International, then detailed examinations of doctrine in Leninist, Stalinist, and Khrushchev periods.
Opens with “the formation of Soviet Marxist theory proceeds on the basis of Lenin’s interpretation of Marxism, without going back to original Marxian theory” (25). The characteristic feature of this revision is “the shift in the revolutionary agent from the class-conscious proletariat to the centralized party as the avant garde of the proletariat and the emphasis on the role of the peasantry as ally of the proletariat, developed under the impact of the sustained strength of capitalism at the ‘imperialist stage’” (id.). In the initial period of 1917, the Bolsheviks had an “almost desperate orientation toward Germany” (30). When the German left was destroyed and its revolution a failure, the Leninists were forced to re-evaluate doctrine to co-exist with the stronger capitalist world, which appeared to be stabilizing, as well as fostering “the developing revolutionary movement in the colonial and semi colonial countries as more than a mere ‘reserve’ for the revolutionary army” (id.).
The Leninist geopolitical dialectic apprehended two contradictions: intracapitalist and capitalist v. socialist; the former is what would grant the soviets some reprieve in the latter, which was made manifest in the cappy intervention into the civil war, an event that soured the soviets basically forever on western liberalism (irrespective of whether MacMillan is correct in Paris 1919 that the cappies just kind of blundered into intervention).
Basic principles of soviet Marxism that remained constant: total industrialization, progressive collectivization, general mechanization, gradual rise in standard of living, construction of work morale, preservation of the state, and transition to the meeting of individual needs after the first five principles are satisfied (63-64).
After reaching advanced industrialism, the “transition to communism” might begin, involving some nifty dialectical reasoning (64-65).
Marcuse describes SM’s “pragmatic directives for action”: SM “is built around a small number of constantly recurring and rigidly canonized statements to the effect that Soviet society is a socialist society without exploitation, a full democracy in which the constitutional rights of all citizens are guaranteed and enforced; or, on the other side, that present-day capitalism exists in a state of sharpening class struggle, depressed living standards, unemployment, and so forth. Thus formulated and taken by themselves, these statements are obviously false--according to Marxian and as well as non-Marxian criteria. But within the context in which they appear, their falsity does not invalidate them, for, to Soviet Marxism, their verification is not in the given facts, but in ‘tendencies,’ in a historical process in which the commanded political practice will bring about the desired facts” (71).
Will not belabor the transformations in the later periods any further, except to point out that the internal is typically in dialectical relation with the external, which, after WWII, means vis-à-vis the actions of the United States. Plenty of aesthetic and ethics commentary, as well as author’s well known interest in Freud. This review is pathetic; the book kicks ass.
Recommended for those with an almost desperate orientation toward Germany, persons with an interest in the ideology that becomes the last refuge for opposition, and readers who understand that Antigone is right against Creon as Creon is right against Antigone.
Opens with “the formation of Soviet Marxist theory proceeds on the basis of Lenin’s interpretation of Marxism, without going back to original Marxian theory” (25). The characteristic feature of this revision is “the shift in the revolutionary agent from the class-conscious proletariat to the centralized party as the avant garde of the proletariat and the emphasis on the role of the peasantry as ally of the proletariat, developed under the impact of the sustained strength of capitalism at the ‘imperialist stage’” (id.). In the initial period of 1917, the Bolsheviks had an “almost desperate orientation toward Germany” (30). When the German left was destroyed and its revolution a failure, the Leninists were forced to re-evaluate doctrine to co-exist with the stronger capitalist world, which appeared to be stabilizing, as well as fostering “the developing revolutionary movement in the colonial and semi colonial countries as more than a mere ‘reserve’ for the revolutionary army” (id.).
The Leninist geopolitical dialectic apprehended two contradictions: intracapitalist and capitalist v. socialist; the former is what would grant the soviets some reprieve in the latter, which was made manifest in the cappy intervention into the civil war, an event that soured the soviets basically forever on western liberalism (irrespective of whether MacMillan is correct in Paris 1919 that the cappies just kind of blundered into intervention).
Basic principles of soviet Marxism that remained constant: total industrialization, progressive collectivization, general mechanization, gradual rise in standard of living, construction of work morale, preservation of the state, and transition to the meeting of individual needs after the first five principles are satisfied (63-64).
After reaching advanced industrialism, the “transition to communism” might begin, involving some nifty dialectical reasoning (64-65).
Marcuse describes SM’s “pragmatic directives for action”: SM “is built around a small number of constantly recurring and rigidly canonized statements to the effect that Soviet society is a socialist society without exploitation, a full democracy in which the constitutional rights of all citizens are guaranteed and enforced; or, on the other side, that present-day capitalism exists in a state of sharpening class struggle, depressed living standards, unemployment, and so forth. Thus formulated and taken by themselves, these statements are obviously false--according to Marxian and as well as non-Marxian criteria. But within the context in which they appear, their falsity does not invalidate them, for, to Soviet Marxism, their verification is not in the given facts, but in ‘tendencies,’ in a historical process in which the commanded political practice will bring about the desired facts” (71).
Will not belabor the transformations in the later periods any further, except to point out that the internal is typically in dialectical relation with the external, which, after WWII, means vis-à-vis the actions of the United States. Plenty of aesthetic and ethics commentary, as well as author’s well known interest in Freud. This review is pathetic; the book kicks ass.
Recommended for those with an almost desperate orientation toward Germany, persons with an interest in the ideology that becomes the last refuge for opposition, and readers who understand that Antigone is right against Creon as Creon is right against Antigone.
September 9, 2020
Marxism as practiced (or, more properly, distorted) by leaders in the former Soviet Union resulted from their superficial understanding of it. That led to a rigidity with tragic results, including the choice to invade Czechoslovakia to suppress the Prague Spring. But even allowing for the inability of Soviet leaders to grasp the complexity and originality of Marxist theory, there must be deeper reasons for the appalling narrowness of what they allowed to be expressed or considered "proper" interpretations.
Herbert Marcuse presented a strong case that the narrowness and rigidity of Soviet interpretations of Marxism were rooted in the practical needs of those leaders, although those needs themselves are rooted in ideological constructs, some of which did not necessarily comport with material reality. The most important of these were the insistence on the part of Soviet leaders that judgments should be made on an idealized future rather than present-day conditions; the propaganda necessary to uphold the doctrine of "socialism in one country" and the contradictions inherent in that; and the need to out-complete the capitalist West in a prolonged period where the two systems, Soviet and capitalist, would exist side by side for a long period of time.
The first of three reasons rested on a belief that the Soviet Union had found the one true path to socialism, a path that would eventually lead to the projected communist future of abundant free time and full fulfillment of material and personal-development needs as briefly sketched by Karl Marx. At the time of Marcuse's writing, the late 1950s, Soviet ideology insisted that socialism had been achieved. Stalin had declared that toward the end of the 1930s, and throughout the Khrushchev era, that declaration remained sacrosanct. Marcuse wrote:
"Soviet Marxism is built around a small number of constantly recurring and rigidly canonized statements to the effect that Soviet society is a socialist society without exploitation, a full democracy in which the constitutional rights of all citizens are guaranteed and enforced. … [T]hese statements are obviously false—according to Marxian as well as non-Marxian criteria. But within the context in which they appear, their falsity does not invalidate them, for, to Soviet Marxism, their verification is not in the given facts, but in 'tendencies,' in a historical process in which the commanded political practice will bring about the desired facts."
"Socialism in one country" was something of a "consolation" ideology that began developing in the 1920s when it became obvious that the European revolutions the Bolsheviks had counted on would not be happening anytime soon. But it is nonetheless a contradiction because socialism has always been seen as an international system. Marcuse argued that the doctrine has its practical usages:
"The doctrine of 'socialism in one country,' which provided the general framework for Soviet Marxism during the Stalinist period [the era of Stalin as uncontested party leader], also serves to provide a world-historical justification for the repressive functions of the Soviet state. The doctrine has retained throughout its dependence on the international development: the initial isolation of the Bolshevik Revolution, the confinement of socialism to backward areas, and the reconsolidation of capitalism on an intercontinental scale are held responsible for the internal as well as external contradictions which plague Soviet society."
Marcuse argued that despite Soviet Marxism insisting that the "capitalist environment" enforces a continued strengthening of the repressive security organs and the accompanying need to divert resources to the military instead of consumer goods, it is that military strengthening that perpetuates the "capitalist environment." Marcuse's opinion was that the deadlock between the two systems could have been resolved in the Soviet Union's favor only if "the productive power of the Soviet state is redirected to serve the needs and faculties of its citizens." In this conception, "the rise of the level of material and intellectual culture is not the mere by-product but the goal of the social effort." The deadlock could have only been broken by transforming Soviet society so that it would demonstrate cultural and material superiority over capitalism, Marcuse argues.
Marcuse could not have known that within a few years, Leonid Brezhnev would be raised to power and usher in the "era of stagnation" that badly delayed necessary movements away from the over-centralization and political repression that blocked the country from making the advances it needed to make or even freely discussing its deepening problems and contradictions.
Finally, Marcuse argued that the needs of Soviet society to "catch up" with the industrialized West required a discipling of workers, increasing productivity and enforcing a long working day along with educating a cadre of engineers and managers. The need for an authoritarian discipline in the workplace conflicted with "Stakhanovist competition" (individual workers or work groups challenging one another to greater feats of production), among other contradictions. The need for rapid industrialization became an end into itself and thus the system of rigid commands from above became an uncontestable canon.
Marcuse developed complex arguments to buttress his main points, amply supplemented by writings in Soviet literature. It may seem today that, three decades after the implosion of the Soviet Union, that a study of this sort is no longer relevant. But I would argue the opposite. An understanding of how the Soviet Union went wrong and why it ultimately collapsed is a part of our human heritage that needs to be understood. Achieving that understanding can't avoid a study of how Soviet ideologues distorted Marxism and the philosophies used to justify their rule.
We need to study history to understand our present world, and to understand what happened and why. Most readers will likely disagree with some aspects of Marcuse's study, as I did, but this book is the most useful study of Soviet ideology I have come across.
Herbert Marcuse presented a strong case that the narrowness and rigidity of Soviet interpretations of Marxism were rooted in the practical needs of those leaders, although those needs themselves are rooted in ideological constructs, some of which did not necessarily comport with material reality. The most important of these were the insistence on the part of Soviet leaders that judgments should be made on an idealized future rather than present-day conditions; the propaganda necessary to uphold the doctrine of "socialism in one country" and the contradictions inherent in that; and the need to out-complete the capitalist West in a prolonged period where the two systems, Soviet and capitalist, would exist side by side for a long period of time.
The first of three reasons rested on a belief that the Soviet Union had found the one true path to socialism, a path that would eventually lead to the projected communist future of abundant free time and full fulfillment of material and personal-development needs as briefly sketched by Karl Marx. At the time of Marcuse's writing, the late 1950s, Soviet ideology insisted that socialism had been achieved. Stalin had declared that toward the end of the 1930s, and throughout the Khrushchev era, that declaration remained sacrosanct. Marcuse wrote:
"Soviet Marxism is built around a small number of constantly recurring and rigidly canonized statements to the effect that Soviet society is a socialist society without exploitation, a full democracy in which the constitutional rights of all citizens are guaranteed and enforced. … [T]hese statements are obviously false—according to Marxian as well as non-Marxian criteria. But within the context in which they appear, their falsity does not invalidate them, for, to Soviet Marxism, their verification is not in the given facts, but in 'tendencies,' in a historical process in which the commanded political practice will bring about the desired facts."
"Socialism in one country" was something of a "consolation" ideology that began developing in the 1920s when it became obvious that the European revolutions the Bolsheviks had counted on would not be happening anytime soon. But it is nonetheless a contradiction because socialism has always been seen as an international system. Marcuse argued that the doctrine has its practical usages:
"The doctrine of 'socialism in one country,' which provided the general framework for Soviet Marxism during the Stalinist period [the era of Stalin as uncontested party leader], also serves to provide a world-historical justification for the repressive functions of the Soviet state. The doctrine has retained throughout its dependence on the international development: the initial isolation of the Bolshevik Revolution, the confinement of socialism to backward areas, and the reconsolidation of capitalism on an intercontinental scale are held responsible for the internal as well as external contradictions which plague Soviet society."
Marcuse argued that despite Soviet Marxism insisting that the "capitalist environment" enforces a continued strengthening of the repressive security organs and the accompanying need to divert resources to the military instead of consumer goods, it is that military strengthening that perpetuates the "capitalist environment." Marcuse's opinion was that the deadlock between the two systems could have been resolved in the Soviet Union's favor only if "the productive power of the Soviet state is redirected to serve the needs and faculties of its citizens." In this conception, "the rise of the level of material and intellectual culture is not the mere by-product but the goal of the social effort." The deadlock could have only been broken by transforming Soviet society so that it would demonstrate cultural and material superiority over capitalism, Marcuse argues.
Marcuse could not have known that within a few years, Leonid Brezhnev would be raised to power and usher in the "era of stagnation" that badly delayed necessary movements away from the over-centralization and political repression that blocked the country from making the advances it needed to make or even freely discussing its deepening problems and contradictions.
Finally, Marcuse argued that the needs of Soviet society to "catch up" with the industrialized West required a discipling of workers, increasing productivity and enforcing a long working day along with educating a cadre of engineers and managers. The need for an authoritarian discipline in the workplace conflicted with "Stakhanovist competition" (individual workers or work groups challenging one another to greater feats of production), among other contradictions. The need for rapid industrialization became an end into itself and thus the system of rigid commands from above became an uncontestable canon.
Marcuse developed complex arguments to buttress his main points, amply supplemented by writings in Soviet literature. It may seem today that, three decades after the implosion of the Soviet Union, that a study of this sort is no longer relevant. But I would argue the opposite. An understanding of how the Soviet Union went wrong and why it ultimately collapsed is a part of our human heritage that needs to be understood. Achieving that understanding can't avoid a study of how Soviet ideologues distorted Marxism and the philosophies used to justify their rule.
We need to study history to understand our present world, and to understand what happened and why. Most readers will likely disagree with some aspects of Marcuse's study, as I did, but this book is the most useful study of Soviet ideology I have come across.
March 30, 2022
I agree with his criticising the USSR. Do I agree with his criticism? Not really, to be honest. He is consistent, though.
January 2, 2015
Most of the radical left had a hard time working out what to think about Soviet Marxism after 1956. And this book seemed muddled to me. Like Marcuse wanted to say something but wasn't sure what. The clearest parts are where he is criticising the cold war on the American side. There's some interesting stuff about Soviet crisis theory. And an essentially Orwellian picture of the overall Soviet worldview. But as far as an analysis of what the Soviet Union actually was, this book is lacking. He seems to very cautiously entertain the hope that a genuine socialism may be forthcoming. But he doesn't want to fully commit himself either way.
Most of his other books were much better.
Most of his other books were much better.
May 24, 2013
Marcuse's precise and systematic analysis of Soviet Marxist society teases out the ways in which Stalinist methodologies have become adopted by late capitalism in the neoliberal state. He successfully defends his thesis that the total mobilization of society has occurred in both situations, and elaborates on the consequences for the individual subject in the late 20th (and indeed early 21st) society. Despite the seemingly dated material, it is deeply relevant to any observer of the contemporary neoliberal nation-state.
October 2, 2025
A SYMPATHETIC (YET REALISTIC) PERSPECTIVE ON SOVIET MARXISM
Philosopher Herbert Marcuse wrote in the Preface to the 1961 edition, “The reception of this book was a strange one… In the United States, I am said to … be more unambiguous in my ‘critical analysis of Western life and society’ than in my analysis of the Soviet Union… I should like to … [note] some of the major events which occurred after the date of publication. The trend toward reform and liberalization within the Soviet Union has continued. Administrative decentralization … greater range of freedom for writers, artists, and critics, and, most important, gradual introduction of a reduced working day and increasing availability of consumer goods testify to this trend… [But] recent Soviet foreign policy appears to refute the hypothesis of tendential liberalization… the intransigent attitude of the Soviet delegation in the United Nations seem to mark clearly enough the return to a ‘hard’ policy…” (Pg. v-vi)
He continues, “A considerable part of this book is devoted to showing the fundamental ambivalence in Soviet developments: the means for liberation and humanization operate for preserving domination and submission, and the theory that destroyed all ideology is used for the establishment of a new ideology… It is perfectly true that a free society presupposes the existence of the material base of all freedom; it is also perfectly true that the creation of this base, in a still backward society in fateful competition with advanced capitalism, presupposes … the diversion of a large part of the national product to military purposes. But it is no less true that the means prejudice the end and that the dialectical circle must be broken if the new society is to emerge.” (Pg. xiv)
He goes on, “on the basis of the achievements of industrialization… pretechnological rationality would itself become … technical progress toward the inner end of all technology, namely the elimination of scarcity and toil. The wholly unrealistic character of these prospects derives from one single fact: they are contingent on the … attainment of a peaceful contest between communism and capitalism… Thus it is more than one contingency… but the very structure of our world.” (Pg. xvi)
He observes in the first chapter, “the actual development of capitalism suggested … another way of surpassing the historical coincidence, namely, through a fundamental change in the relations between the two conflicting classes whereby the proletariat fails to act as the revolutionary class. The emergence of this alternative is perhaps the most decisive factor in the development of Soviet Marxism.” (Pg. 43)
He admits, “If, as Marxism has never ceased to claim, the effectiveness of the revolution depends on winning over the majority, not only of the proletariat but of the people, then Communist strategy has to be adjusted to the conditions under which the majority is not revolutionary.” (Pg. 56)
He notes, “The Soviet system seems to be another example of a late-comer ‘skipping’ several developmental stages after a long period of protracted backwardness, joining and running ruthlessly ahead of a general trend in late industrial society. The skipped stages are those of enlightened absolutism and liberalism, of free competitive enterprise, of matured middle-class culture with its individualistic and humanitarian ideologies.” (Pg. 67)
He acknowledges, “Soviet Marxism is built around a small number of constantly recurring and rigidly canonized statements to the effect that Soviet society is a socialist society without exploitation, a full democracy in which the constitutional rights of all citizens are guaranteed and enforced; or, on the other side, that present-day capitalism exists in a state of sharpening class struggle, depressed living standards, unemployment, and so forth. Thus formulated and taken by themselves, these statements are obviously false… But within the context in which they appear, their falsity does not invalidate them, for, in Soviet Marxism, their verification is not in the given facts, but in ‘tendencies,’ in a historical process in which the commanded political practice will BRING ABOUT the desired facts.” (Pg. 71)
He states, “They [Soviet Marxists] are frozen in the Western defense economy; the dissolution of this integrated political economy is… the indispensable first objective. But the Soviet leadership can hope to attain this objective only if the USSR is no longer a military and political threat to the West… To Soviet Marxism, such a transformation of Soviet society appears as a … requirement of international politics in the era of coexistence.” (Pg. 83)
He summarizes, “the Soviet construction of socialism, while progressing, develops a dialectic of its own. On the one hand, the totalitarian administration strengthens itself AND the very forces against which it acts… in doing so, it perpetuates the repressive economic and political features of the Soviet system.” (Pg. 154-155)
He asserts, “Socialist morality thus succumbs to industrial morality… combining elements from … enlightened absolutism and liberalism, nationalism, chauvinism, and internationalism, capitalist and socialist values. This is the strange syndrome presented by Soviet ethics. Within this syndrome, the repressive elements are predominant…” (Pg. 226)
He summarizes, “The technological rationality… is constrained and distorted by the repressive usage of technology… If no longer under the pressure of necessity, this activity would have no other aim than growth in the consciousness and enjoyment of freedom. Indeed, technical productivity might then be the very opposite of specialization and pertain to the emergence of that ‘all-round individual’ who looms so large in Marxian theory… Needless to say, the present reality is so far removed from this possibility that the latter appears as idle speculation. However, the forces inherent in a systematically progressing industrialization are such that they deserve consideration even if the strongest political forces seem to arrest or suppress them.” (Pg. 242)
He concludes, “To be sure, ideological pressure and even the weakening of the established morality are not per se a serious threat in a regime which has at its disposal all the instruments for enforcing its objectives. However, substantially linked with the economic and political dynamic on an international scale, these forces, though unformed and unorganized, may well determine, to a considerable extent, the course of Soviet developments.” (Pg. 251-252)
This book will interest those studying the Soviet Union, and its concept of Marxism.
Philosopher Herbert Marcuse wrote in the Preface to the 1961 edition, “The reception of this book was a strange one… In the United States, I am said to … be more unambiguous in my ‘critical analysis of Western life and society’ than in my analysis of the Soviet Union… I should like to … [note] some of the major events which occurred after the date of publication. The trend toward reform and liberalization within the Soviet Union has continued. Administrative decentralization … greater range of freedom for writers, artists, and critics, and, most important, gradual introduction of a reduced working day and increasing availability of consumer goods testify to this trend… [But] recent Soviet foreign policy appears to refute the hypothesis of tendential liberalization… the intransigent attitude of the Soviet delegation in the United Nations seem to mark clearly enough the return to a ‘hard’ policy…” (Pg. v-vi)
He continues, “A considerable part of this book is devoted to showing the fundamental ambivalence in Soviet developments: the means for liberation and humanization operate for preserving domination and submission, and the theory that destroyed all ideology is used for the establishment of a new ideology… It is perfectly true that a free society presupposes the existence of the material base of all freedom; it is also perfectly true that the creation of this base, in a still backward society in fateful competition with advanced capitalism, presupposes … the diversion of a large part of the national product to military purposes. But it is no less true that the means prejudice the end and that the dialectical circle must be broken if the new society is to emerge.” (Pg. xiv)
He goes on, “on the basis of the achievements of industrialization… pretechnological rationality would itself become … technical progress toward the inner end of all technology, namely the elimination of scarcity and toil. The wholly unrealistic character of these prospects derives from one single fact: they are contingent on the … attainment of a peaceful contest between communism and capitalism… Thus it is more than one contingency… but the very structure of our world.” (Pg. xvi)
He observes in the first chapter, “the actual development of capitalism suggested … another way of surpassing the historical coincidence, namely, through a fundamental change in the relations between the two conflicting classes whereby the proletariat fails to act as the revolutionary class. The emergence of this alternative is perhaps the most decisive factor in the development of Soviet Marxism.” (Pg. 43)
He admits, “If, as Marxism has never ceased to claim, the effectiveness of the revolution depends on winning over the majority, not only of the proletariat but of the people, then Communist strategy has to be adjusted to the conditions under which the majority is not revolutionary.” (Pg. 56)
He notes, “The Soviet system seems to be another example of a late-comer ‘skipping’ several developmental stages after a long period of protracted backwardness, joining and running ruthlessly ahead of a general trend in late industrial society. The skipped stages are those of enlightened absolutism and liberalism, of free competitive enterprise, of matured middle-class culture with its individualistic and humanitarian ideologies.” (Pg. 67)
He acknowledges, “Soviet Marxism is built around a small number of constantly recurring and rigidly canonized statements to the effect that Soviet society is a socialist society without exploitation, a full democracy in which the constitutional rights of all citizens are guaranteed and enforced; or, on the other side, that present-day capitalism exists in a state of sharpening class struggle, depressed living standards, unemployment, and so forth. Thus formulated and taken by themselves, these statements are obviously false… But within the context in which they appear, their falsity does not invalidate them, for, in Soviet Marxism, their verification is not in the given facts, but in ‘tendencies,’ in a historical process in which the commanded political practice will BRING ABOUT the desired facts.” (Pg. 71)
He states, “They [Soviet Marxists] are frozen in the Western defense economy; the dissolution of this integrated political economy is… the indispensable first objective. But the Soviet leadership can hope to attain this objective only if the USSR is no longer a military and political threat to the West… To Soviet Marxism, such a transformation of Soviet society appears as a … requirement of international politics in the era of coexistence.” (Pg. 83)
He summarizes, “the Soviet construction of socialism, while progressing, develops a dialectic of its own. On the one hand, the totalitarian administration strengthens itself AND the very forces against which it acts… in doing so, it perpetuates the repressive economic and political features of the Soviet system.” (Pg. 154-155)
He asserts, “Socialist morality thus succumbs to industrial morality… combining elements from … enlightened absolutism and liberalism, nationalism, chauvinism, and internationalism, capitalist and socialist values. This is the strange syndrome presented by Soviet ethics. Within this syndrome, the repressive elements are predominant…” (Pg. 226)
He summarizes, “The technological rationality… is constrained and distorted by the repressive usage of technology… If no longer under the pressure of necessity, this activity would have no other aim than growth in the consciousness and enjoyment of freedom. Indeed, technical productivity might then be the very opposite of specialization and pertain to the emergence of that ‘all-round individual’ who looms so large in Marxian theory… Needless to say, the present reality is so far removed from this possibility that the latter appears as idle speculation. However, the forces inherent in a systematically progressing industrialization are such that they deserve consideration even if the strongest political forces seem to arrest or suppress them.” (Pg. 242)
He concludes, “To be sure, ideological pressure and even the weakening of the established morality are not per se a serious threat in a regime which has at its disposal all the instruments for enforcing its objectives. However, substantially linked with the economic and political dynamic on an international scale, these forces, though unformed and unorganized, may well determine, to a considerable extent, the course of Soviet developments.” (Pg. 251-252)
This book will interest those studying the Soviet Union, and its concept of Marxism.
May 15, 2023
El peor libro de Marcuse, sin dudas. Su «crítica inmanente» del marxismo soviético es un bodrio que caricaturiza el pensamiento y la práctica de Lenin para irse contra su degeneración: el estalinismo. Quizás dos o tres ideas sean valiosas, pese a que ni siquiera se hallan desarrolladas de una forma rigurosa (la de la hipóstasis del Estado en detrimento de la comunidad de individuos que supone el régimen soviético, la de los influjos políticos y subjetivos de la economía y del trabajo enajenado y, por último, la de la sociedad industrial como instancia productora de semejanzas entre Occidente capitalista y el Oriente soviético); todo lo demás, es una sobre-simplificación de la situación rusa (pre-revolucionaria, revolucionaria y pos-revolucionaria) que se atiene a los programas y los pronunciamientos y a una que otra referencia menor. Pienso que, en ese sentido, Trotsky se lo lleva de calle. Francamente no recomiendo este libro. Mejor lean a Trotsky.
May 1, 2022
A generally good analysis of the successes and shortcomings of the Soviet Union with some reference to their use of dialectics in justification of the Soviet state. Marcuse's criticism of Soviet "authoritarianism" appears to be largely predicated on the bureaucracy that sprung from their economic-technical base and how this formed an ideological attachment to socialist realism and the growth of the productive base which perhaps hindered the transition to the lower phase of communism. Is quite critical of what he perceives as Stalin's subtle manipulation of dialectics which facilitated antagonistic state machinery.
February 27, 2021
An uneven, shoddily structured exposition on some aspects of official Soviet-Marxist ideology and theory. Fascinating at times, e.g. the comparison of Western individualism and Soviet collectivism; the magical thinking in Soviet ideology; how moral absolutism (regarding ends) can lead to relativism (regarding means). As a whole the treatment felt shallow and the choice of topics arbitrary. The language was unnecessarily blocky.
December 10, 2021
Revealing as much about Marcuse as the Soviet regime, I found this quite a stimulating read. Nothing fundamentally cause me to change my views of Communism but thought provoking all the same.
April 4, 2023
Mostly felt like a highly elaborated shitpost. Impressive for 1958.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews