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256 pages, Paperback
Published February 1, 2024
In our days, everything seems pregnant with its contrary: Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving and overworking it; The newfangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want; The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character.--Varoufakis’ father leans more on materialism in conceptualizing how human history sped up through its relations with technology: stone, then bronze, then iron. Varoufakis later pairs this by emphasizing the social (class/political bargaining power) side [emphases added]:
I speculated about what would have happened had James Watt invented the steam engine in ancient Egypt:The most he could have expected is that the ruler of Egypt would have been impressed and placed one or more of his engines in his palace, demonstrating to visitors and underlings how ingenious his Empire was.My point was that the reason the steam engine changed the world, rather than ending up a showpiece in some ruler’s landscaped garden, was the epic raid on the common lands that had preceded its invention: the enclosures [see later].
As consecutive mutations multiply the variants of an organism until, at some point, a brand-new species appears, so technological change proceeds within a social system until, suddenly, the system has been transformed into something quite distinct, though that doesn’t mean that all of the materials out of which the system is built – capital, labour, money – have necessarily changed. […]3) “Capitalism”: volatility and contradictions:
Suppose we were living in the 1770s [First Industrial Revolution], as the first steam engines began driving the water pumps that kept the mines dry and turning the wheels of William Blake’s ‘dark satanic mills’. […] we would not be wrong to speak of an emergent ‘industrial feudalism’ or ‘market feudalism’. Technically, we would be correct.
In the 1770s, and for at least another century, wherever one looked one saw feudalism. Feudal lords dominated rural areas, owned the freehold titles of most city blocks, commanded armies and navies, and presided over parliamentary committees and government bodies. Even in the 1840s, as Marx and Engels were writing their manifesto in response to the worldwide effects of the capitalist class, most production was still taking place under the auspices of the old feudalist class, the landed gentry. Land ownership remained the main source of political authority and rent continued to be more powerful than profit, especially in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars [1803-1815] when landlords regained the upper hand over capitalists by banning grain imports with their Corn Laws [1815-1846].
And yet something critically important would have been lost if those who forged the language of that era had been reluctant to ditch the word feudalism, choosing to call the nascent system not capitalism but industrial or market feudalism. By boldly calling it capitalism, a century before capital had fully dominated our societies, they opened humanity’s eyes to the great transformation unfolding around them as it was happening.
Socialism for the financiers gave rise to another cluster of financial uber-lords to rival the cloudalists - three US companies with powers exceeding those of private equity all terrestrial capitalists put together: BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street. These three firms, the Big Three as they are known in financial circles, effectively own American capitalism. No, I am not exaggerating.
[...] Together, the Big Three are the largest single shareholder in almost 90 percent of firms listed in the New York Stock Exchange, including Apple, Microsoft, ExxonMobil, General Electric, and Coca-Cola. [...] At the time of writing, BlackRock manages nearly $10 trillion in investments, Vanguard $8 trillion, and State Street $4 trillion.
[...] This could not have happened before 2008 because until then the ultra-rich simply did not have access to enough cash with which the Big Three could buy a significant chunk of the New York Stock Exchange. After 2008, however, central bank-sponsored socialism for the ultra-rich created more than enough money.
When you pay for your coffee or train ticket using a smartphone app or microchip-equipped debit card, these conventional digital payments go through the infrastructure of private banks. What China had created with digital money issued directly by a central bank, cutting out those middlemen, the private bankers. [...]
Before 2022, Chinese cloud finance and the digital yuan resembled a brand new road with little traffic. Why would the ultra-wealthy of the world direct money through a yuan-paved road, policed by the People's Bank of China, when they could use the existing, albeit bumpy, dollar-built superhighway? A good reason appeared soon after the first explosions over Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Mariupol: the [...] seizure by America of hundreds of billions of dollars belonging to Russia's central bank.
Blocked from the dollar superhighway, Russian money began to use the under-utilised, glistening Chinese alternative. And it was not just Russian money that chose this new route. Many wealthy non-Russians, too, felt reluctant to continue letting their money race down the dollar freeway. They began to question the wisdom of relying entirely on the kindness of Washington's dollar traffic-rangers, who could pull them over any time. Little by little, they began diversifying.
I fantasised groups of young designers forming co-operatives using industrial-scale 3D printers to create a variety of goods - from personalised cars to made-to-order refrigerators - at a cost that did not require mass production to stay low. Such co-operatives might, I hoped, steal an advantage over the General Motors and the General Electrics of the capitalist world - that, to use the language of economists, the economies of scale that underpin the power of General Motors and General Electric would be eradicated, activating a process that would at least deplete corporate power and might perhaps pave the way towards a decent non-capitalist future.
We should consider the possibility that the true nature of intangible investment has changed. Maybe it conceals rent-seeking activities that superficially look like they increase productivity but actually do nothing of the sort.
From the factory owners in America's Midwest to poets struggling to sell their latest anthology, from London Uber drivers to Indonesian street hawkers, all are now dependent upon some cloud fief for access to customers. [...] Looked at in totality, it becomes apparent that the world economy is lubricated less and less with profit and increasingly with cloud rent. And so a delightful antinomy of our era comes into focus: capitalist activity is growing within the same process of energetic capitalist accumulation that degrades capitalist profit and gradually replaces capital markets with cloud fiefs. In short, capitalism is withering as a result of burgeoning capitalist activity.
Technofeudalism is synonymous with the universalisation of exploitation and with the shrinking of the value base (in proportion to the rise of cloud rent's share of all incomes). This dynamic accentuates the system's propensity to deeper and more frequent crises. As a result, the central banks that funded the initial accumulation of cloud capital will be forced perpetually to print more and more monies to replace the role that profits and wages used to play under capitalism. But this only helps cloud capital accumulate further (since cloudalists will always have a greater capacity than every other class to appropriate the printed central bank money). In short, technofeudalism is condemned to exhibit a dynamic doom-loop more volatile and exploitative than even that of capitalism.
