McClellan and Failure: A Study of Civil War Fear, Incompetence and Worse

by Edward H. Bonekemper III

In the eyes of many historians, Union General George B. McClellan single-handedly did more damage to the Union war effort than any other individual--including Confederate commander Robert E. Lee. McClellan's success in the Mexican War along with his prestigious position as president of the Eastern Division of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad had left him well positioned to enter the Union Army when hostilities began. Originally a major general in command of the Ohio Volunteers, McClellan attained the same rank in the regular Army three weeks after the beginning of the Civil War. Promoting his own ideas and career regardless of the consequences, McClellan spent his Civil War command defying his superiors and attempting to avoid battle, eventually becoming a thorn in the side of President Lincoln and the Union cause. Removed from command on November 5, 1862, McClellan's overly cautious attitude nevertheless permeated the Army of the Potomac for years. From West Point to Antietam, this volume examines his Army career. The main focus of the work is McClellan's Civil War service and the ways in which the man and his decisions affected the course of the war. The Union Army's invasion of northern Virginia, the Peninsula Campaign and the Second Battle of Bull Run are examined in detail with special emphasis on the roles which McClellan played--or did not play. Through a combination of incompetence and paranoia, McClellan managed to throw away numerous chances at a Union victory and, consequently, a quicker end to the war. Excerpts from McClellan's orders and correspondence provide a contemporary picture and firsthand motives for his actions. An appendix examines the treatment given McClellan by various historians. Assorted maps and an index are also included.

Genres: American Civil War

212 pages, Hardcover

First published February 28, 2007

Reviews

[Chris Bennett · Rating 4 out of 5]

A thoroughly damning examination of the Civil War failures of one of the Union's most prominent and promising generals. So much so the author concludes McClellan's actions (or lack of) extended the war by two to three years! And though there are historians on both sides of the McClellan debate, Bonekemper makes some pretty solid arguments backed up by personal and official correspondence by McClellan himself; he was, it turns out, his own most damaging witness.

[Dale · Rating 5 out of 5]

Originally published in 2007.
Published in 2010 by McFarland and Company, Inc.

If you are a student of the Civil War, George B. McClellan is a conundrum at best.

After the Frist Battle of Bull Run (Manassas) in July of 1861, the poorly trained Union Army had fled back to Washington, D.C. They were basically a semi-organized mob awaiting someone to take the lead.

Lincoln looked around and felt that the leadership team that lost at Bull Run was not going to provide a credible lead general so he looked around the Eastern Theater for anyone else with the aura of success.

George B. McClellan had a bit of success in Western Virginia and wrote a lot of reports that made him seem an even better General than he was so Lincoln looked to him to retrain and refit the Army of the Potomac (the main Union Army in the East.)

When I have talked with students about McClellan, I like to compare him to a nervous guy who restores cars. He finds a junker with lots of potential, restores it, and then is afraid to take it out and drive it (the entire purpose of a car) because it might get wrecked again. His men loved him for that - they didn't want to go out and fight and die in a pointless battle. But it was up to McClellan to find a way to take the fight to the enemy and the purpose of an army is to fight, to kill people and blow up things, not to drill and drill and drill while the enemy sits just a few miles away in the middle of the war.

McClellan took over 8 months to rebuild the army before he took it out to fight. It was the largest army of the entire Civil War and was magnificently well-supplied. His predecessor had only been in charge of the same army for about 6 weeks when he took to the field.

Bonekemper documents McClellan's excuses, his time wasted on political lobbying, writing political advice to the President, and his constant inflation of the size of Confederate armies. Bonekemper also makes a strong case that McClellan didn't want to push too hard against the Confederacy because he was pro-slavery and that he let another Union Army be defeated at the Second Battle of Bull Run in August of 1862 out of jealousy.

Once again - the most important general in the U.S. Army refused to engage the enemy because he sympathized with their war aims and he let an entire Union army be defeated when he was ordered to provide assistance because he was angry that the other army had an independent command.

Did McClellan make up for that by being a brilliant field general? No. His own men (generals and even privates) noted that he led from far behind the lines and rarely directed the men once the fighting started.

His last battle of any size was Antietam. Have you ever seen a karate movie where the group of bad guys engage the good guy by taking turns so he can defeat them all one at a time? That's how McClellan engaged with Robert E. Lee's much smaller Army of Norther Virginia - one brigade at a time and Lee basically fought them all to a draw - one brigade at a time.

In a modern army, McClellan may have had found a place dealing with logistics and training - procuring supplies and recruiting soldiers, training them and sending them to the front. But, that was not how things worked in the Civil War.

Of course, Bonekemper lays all of this in detail with the original sources and quotes. A lot of historians give McClellan a pass of sorts. To be honest, I don't know why. This book makes it clear that they shouldn't - he was among the worst of the Union generals.

I rate this book 5 stars out of 5.

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[Bobsie67 · Rating 3 out of 5]

The title says it all. The author really hates McLellan, and if you miss his point, he is glad to add a word or two to emphasize his disdain for the Young Napoleon. The major issue with this "history" is that the author mostly cites other historians who support his premise. We learn a bit about those who supported McLellan, but their arguments are rather quickly dismissed. What primary sources the author does use are specifically chosen to illustrate his thesis. At best this book is a summation of all the best arguments of why McLellan was a terrible general. For a more nuanced approach to McLellan, and terrific insights into the Civil War and its soldiers, please read The Antietam Effect by Bradley Graham