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Old Friends, New Enemies #2
Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy: The Pacific War, 1942-1945
This is a scholarly account of the Royal Navy participation in the Pacific War. It concludes the late Arthur Marder's two-volume history of the Royal Navy and the imperial Japanese Navy in the decisive years 1936-1945. Before his death, Arthur Marder completed the first six chapters, and the second volume of this work has been completed by Mark Jacobsen and John Horsfield.
It picks up the story at the nadir of British naval fortunes, and follows the Royal Navy's role from 1942 to the Japanese surrender in August 1945.
It picks up the story at the nadir of British naval fortunes, and follows the Royal Navy's role from 1942 to the Japanese surrender in August 1945.
664 pages, Hardcover
First published September 13, 1990
24 people want to read
About the author
Arthur J. Marder
24 books3 followersThe son of Maxwell J. Marder and Ida Greenstein, Arthur Jacob Marder was raised in Boston, Massachusetts. He attended Harvard University, where he obtained his Bachelor's degree in 1931, his master's degree in 1934, and his Ph.D. in 1936 with a study of British naval policy 1880-1905.
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September 16, 2022
The second volume of Old Friends, New Enemies is less about planning and more about doing. And boy do they do... ...something.
Stiff upper lip?
Volume II picks up the narrative following the destruction of Force Z, where the British, Dutch, Australians and Americans sort of gathered together, sort of tried to defend their holdings, and ended up exactly where "sort of" gets you.
The Admiralty, on the 16th, confessed: 'We know little of United States ships' movements.'
We have coverage of the fall of Malaya and Singapore, the battle of Java Sea and the subsequent rounding up of escaping Allied ships, and the final conquest of the Dutch East Indies. Marder's coverage, which runs up until the Indian Ocean Raid before the other authors take over, is fine, though there are unexpected errors, such as misdescribing the Japanese cruisers Nachi and Haguro as upgunned from 6 inches, or stating that Battle of Java Sea was the only daylight battle fought in the Pacific in the old tradition until 1944, which appears to forget 1943's Battle of Komandorski Islands.
Horsfield and Jacobsen pick up the rest (using Marder’s notes) which covers convoy protection in the Indian Ocean, many abortive counter offensive plans and some late war attacks by the Eastern Fleet, before finishing with the actions of the British Pacific Fleet, perhaps the most famous “forgotten” fleets in history. These parts are competent, as there’s little action to work with, though the protecting Lend Lease’s critical supply path through Iran probably should have been covered.
The descriptions of the Japanese admirals throughout tend to be perfunctory and derogatory, especially in the early chapters. There are repeated descriptions of individual commanders as only of B quality, whereas British commanders get a more heroic tinge. The authors may be misjudging their audience slightly as to what people think would be clever or humorous of some of the British commanders:
Some of his stories were indeed a bit risqué, but the witty way in which he told them, especially in mixed company, immediately had everyone in a fit of laughter.
He enjoyed the company of women and regaled them with witty stories that no one else would have dared tell.
...though they note for one:
Like Beatty, he rated his charm with women highly, and many officers' wives disliked having to sit next to him at dinner.
These, and other stories (such as perhaps why Somerville risked his fleet against vastly superior forces) suggest that the British commanders were actually highly emotive, and that their popular portrayal as cool understated professionals should be revisited:
He had had a favourite parlour trick while serving in submarines of deliberately banging his head very hard against bulkheads.
The inner workings of Japanese strategy making features throughout and is solid. Of particular interest is Japan’s attempts to exit the war. Because Old Friends, New Enemies is a little long in the tooth and it’s a contentious topic, I’m hesitant to review the latter part in detail, other than to say it semi-intentionally provides a defence of sorts to both atomic bombings. I would probably defer to more recent scholarship than rely on the arguments within Old Friends, New Enemies, without saying the book is right or wrong.
Finishing with a bang
War, a master illusionist and a cruel teacher at best, the more so when protracted, taught Britain and Japan the limits to their power. However abundantly displayed, bravery was never enough.
Conclusions can be uninteresting summaries, spiced up by introducing elements that weren’t litigated in the main text.
The conclusion to Old Friends, New Enemies covers both volumes: And. Is. Outstanding.
To be clear. I don’t know if the conclusion is right. But, if you wanted to learn how to:
- cover the events of your narrative;
- provide a summary of the relative importance of those events; and
- explain why you believe parties made the choices leading to those events,
Old Friends, New Enemies is the superlative example.
Thus the Imperial Navy was caught in a hammerlock not of its own devising. If Japan were successfully to fight Britain and the United States, it needed a much, much larger Navy. Yet if the Navy were unable to guarantee the national interest or even its own fuel supplies, it had no claim for additional funding.
The conclusion both good enough to stand on its own, while making the main text (even the endless iterations of “Culverin”, “Buccaneer” and “Dracula”) worth a read. Small elements are covered (such as the operational/tactical decisions of Allied admirals to engage superior enemies with Force Z and at the Battle of Java Sea), along with the main threads:
- why did Japan and Britain go to war in the way they did;
- why did they fight the war the way they did; and
- why did the war end the way it did.
Sadly, the quest of the Imperial Navy in 1941 for quick results led it to make choices that ensured it would fight enemies that would stop at nothing in order to defeat Japan. The British reluctance to contemplate and then to fight a full-scale war in the Pacific stemmed also from weakness, an excess of commitments often mistaken for strength on maps painted red.
I have struggled with more recent books that present Japan’s decision to go to war as a kind of fatalism: They knew they would lose but went to war because there was no other choice. Old Friends, New Enemies advances that yes, the often conflicting and competing choices of Japan’s Navy and Army had constrained its options, but it was not some sense of mysticism that led to war. With France’s and the Netherland’s defeat in Europe in 1940, a window of ‘opportunity’ opened up, paired with a window of vulnerability due to embargoing and the outrageously ambitious naval building programme of the United States. Japan, based on experience in 1894-95 against China and 1904-1905 against Russia, thought it could grab enough quick wins to solidify its position.
As for Britain, the strain of war is made clear. While it did good things, and worked well at the end with its American ally, an important political contribution, it was at the limit of its capacity to fight a global war.
While these points have been made a few times both before and since, Old Friends, New Enemies carefully steps through why Japan and Britain thought what they thought, and what they did about their thoughts. Again, it may not be right, but it’s an interesting contribution, one that elevates this book, despite its age, over the many many many many books on World War Two.
Stiff upper lip?
Volume II picks up the narrative following the destruction of Force Z, where the British, Dutch, Australians and Americans sort of gathered together, sort of tried to defend their holdings, and ended up exactly where "sort of" gets you.
The Admiralty, on the 16th, confessed: 'We know little of United States ships' movements.'
We have coverage of the fall of Malaya and Singapore, the battle of Java Sea and the subsequent rounding up of escaping Allied ships, and the final conquest of the Dutch East Indies. Marder's coverage, which runs up until the Indian Ocean Raid before the other authors take over, is fine, though there are unexpected errors, such as misdescribing the Japanese cruisers Nachi and Haguro as upgunned from 6 inches, or stating that Battle of Java Sea was the only daylight battle fought in the Pacific in the old tradition until 1944, which appears to forget 1943's Battle of Komandorski Islands.
Horsfield and Jacobsen pick up the rest (using Marder’s notes) which covers convoy protection in the Indian Ocean, many abortive counter offensive plans and some late war attacks by the Eastern Fleet, before finishing with the actions of the British Pacific Fleet, perhaps the most famous “forgotten” fleets in history. These parts are competent, as there’s little action to work with, though the protecting Lend Lease’s critical supply path through Iran probably should have been covered.
The descriptions of the Japanese admirals throughout tend to be perfunctory and derogatory, especially in the early chapters. There are repeated descriptions of individual commanders as only of B quality, whereas British commanders get a more heroic tinge. The authors may be misjudging their audience slightly as to what people think would be clever or humorous of some of the British commanders:
Some of his stories were indeed a bit risqué, but the witty way in which he told them, especially in mixed company, immediately had everyone in a fit of laughter.
He enjoyed the company of women and regaled them with witty stories that no one else would have dared tell.
...though they note for one:
Like Beatty, he rated his charm with women highly, and many officers' wives disliked having to sit next to him at dinner.
These, and other stories (such as perhaps why Somerville risked his fleet against vastly superior forces) suggest that the British commanders were actually highly emotive, and that their popular portrayal as cool understated professionals should be revisited:
He had had a favourite parlour trick while serving in submarines of deliberately banging his head very hard against bulkheads.
The inner workings of Japanese strategy making features throughout and is solid. Of particular interest is Japan’s attempts to exit the war. Because Old Friends, New Enemies is a little long in the tooth and it’s a contentious topic, I’m hesitant to review the latter part in detail, other than to say it semi-intentionally provides a defence of sorts to both atomic bombings. I would probably defer to more recent scholarship than rely on the arguments within Old Friends, New Enemies, without saying the book is right or wrong.
Finishing with a bang
War, a master illusionist and a cruel teacher at best, the more so when protracted, taught Britain and Japan the limits to their power. However abundantly displayed, bravery was never enough.
Conclusions can be uninteresting summaries, spiced up by introducing elements that weren’t litigated in the main text.
The conclusion to Old Friends, New Enemies covers both volumes: And. Is. Outstanding.
To be clear. I don’t know if the conclusion is right. But, if you wanted to learn how to:
- cover the events of your narrative;
- provide a summary of the relative importance of those events; and
- explain why you believe parties made the choices leading to those events,
Old Friends, New Enemies is the superlative example.
Thus the Imperial Navy was caught in a hammerlock not of its own devising. If Japan were successfully to fight Britain and the United States, it needed a much, much larger Navy. Yet if the Navy were unable to guarantee the national interest or even its own fuel supplies, it had no claim for additional funding.
The conclusion both good enough to stand on its own, while making the main text (even the endless iterations of “Culverin”, “Buccaneer” and “Dracula”) worth a read. Small elements are covered (such as the operational/tactical decisions of Allied admirals to engage superior enemies with Force Z and at the Battle of Java Sea), along with the main threads:
- why did Japan and Britain go to war in the way they did;
- why did they fight the war the way they did; and
- why did the war end the way it did.
Sadly, the quest of the Imperial Navy in 1941 for quick results led it to make choices that ensured it would fight enemies that would stop at nothing in order to defeat Japan. The British reluctance to contemplate and then to fight a full-scale war in the Pacific stemmed also from weakness, an excess of commitments often mistaken for strength on maps painted red.
I have struggled with more recent books that present Japan’s decision to go to war as a kind of fatalism: They knew they would lose but went to war because there was no other choice. Old Friends, New Enemies advances that yes, the often conflicting and competing choices of Japan’s Navy and Army had constrained its options, but it was not some sense of mysticism that led to war. With France’s and the Netherland’s defeat in Europe in 1940, a window of ‘opportunity’ opened up, paired with a window of vulnerability due to embargoing and the outrageously ambitious naval building programme of the United States. Japan, based on experience in 1894-95 against China and 1904-1905 against Russia, thought it could grab enough quick wins to solidify its position.
As for Britain, the strain of war is made clear. While it did good things, and worked well at the end with its American ally, an important political contribution, it was at the limit of its capacity to fight a global war.
While these points have been made a few times both before and since, Old Friends, New Enemies carefully steps through why Japan and Britain thought what they thought, and what they did about their thoughts. Again, it may not be right, but it’s an interesting contribution, one that elevates this book, despite its age, over the many many many many books on World War Two.
Displaying 1 of 1 review